The French BEA's latest interim report on its investigation into the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447 indicated that the pilots were inadequately trained and failed to properly identify a stall situation or react promptly to it.
BEA said in May that the Airbus A330-200 took fewer than four minutes to fall from approximately 38,000 ft. into the waters of the Atlantic Ocean following the disengagement of the autopilot (ATW Daily News, May 30). It released a detailed report Friday on the cockpit crew's actions in the moments leading up the crash, based on an analysis of the cockpit voice and flight data recorders recovered in the spring. The report is carefully worded, and BEA emphasized that it does not assess blame, but the portrait painted of the pilots is not positive—and was rejected by AF.
The A330 crashed while en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris Charles de Gaulle on June 1, 2009, killing all 228 passengers and crew. BEA reiterated that a key factor in the crash was the inconsistent speed measurements from the aircraft's pitot probes.
It revealed the flight captain was "resting" when the emergency situation arose; operating the flight were two copilots who engaged in "no explicit task-sharing," BEA said. According to the accidents investigation bureau, even though the pilots "identified and announced the loss of the speed indications, neither of the two copilots called the procedure 'unreliable IAS' [indicated airspeed]. The copilots had received no high altitude training for the 'unreliable IAS' procedure and manual aircraft handling. No standard callouts regarding the differences in pitch attitude and vertical speed were made. There is no CRM [crew resource management] training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief captain."
Even though a stall warning alarm was triggered, "neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning" and "neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation," BEA stated. At one point, it noted, the stall warning "was triggered continuously for 54 seconds."
BEA recommended that "regulatory authorities re-examine the content of [air transport pilot] training and check programs, and in particular make mandatory the creation of regular specific exercises aimed at manual airplane handling [including] approach to and recovery from stall, including at high altitude."
In its response to BEA's findings, AF said that a "combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster" and insisted the flight crew "comprising both first officers and the captain showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end … At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew's technical skills … It is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew's understanding of the situation."
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