The geek with a cynical view

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370/MAS370 2014-05-29.

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370/MAS370)[a] was a scheduled international passenger flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing that lost contact with air traffic control [2] on 8 March 2014 at 01:20 MYT,[b] less than an hour after takeoff. At 07:24, Malaysia Airlines (MAS) reported the flight missing.[4] The aircraft, a Boeing 777-200ER, was carrying 12 Malaysian crew members and 227 passengers from 14 nations.[5] There has been no confirmation of any flight debris[6][7][8][9][10] and no crash site has been found.[11]

A multinational search and rescue effort, later reported as the largest in history,[12] began in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea.[13][14] Within a few days, the search was extended to the Strait of Malacca andAndaman Sea.[15][16][17] On 15 March, based on military radar data and radio "pings" between the aircraft and an Inmarsat satellite, investigators concluded that the aircraft had diverted from its intended course and headed west across the Malay Peninsula, then continued on a northern or southern track for around seven hours.[18][19][20] The search in the South China Sea was abandoned.[21] Three days later, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority began searching the southern part of the Indian Ocean.

On 24 March, the Malaysian government confirmed independent analyses by the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and Inmarsat, and announced that search efforts would be concentrated on the Australian-led area. In the first two weeks of April, aircraft and ships deployed equipment to listen for signals from the underwater locator beacons attached to the aircraft's "black box" flight recorders. Four unconfirmed signals were detected between 6 and 8 April but after that time the batteries of the beacons were believed to have become exhausted. The search continued in the area of the signals, using a robotic submarine.

Contents [hide]
1 Disappearance
1.1 Timeline of disappearance
1.2 Satellite pings
2 Assumed loss
3 Search
3.1 Hypothesised routes
3.2 Hypothesised locations
3.2.1 First phase
3.2.2 Second phase
3.2.3 Third phase
3.2.4 Fourth phase
3.3 International involvement
3.4 Information sharing
3.5 Analysis of satellite communication
4 Aircraft
5 Passengers and crew
5.1 Passengers
5.2 Crew
6 Investigation
6.1 International participation
6.2 Possible passenger involvement
6.3 Crew and cargo
6.4 Claims of responsibility
7 Criticism and response
8 Timeline of events
9 See also
10 Notes
11 References
12 External links

Disappearance[edit]

Route: Kuala Lumpur – Beijing. Insert: initial search areas and known path through waypointsIGARI, VAMPI, and IGREX. Small red squares: radar contacts. Small circles: claimed spotting of debris.

The flight departed from Kuala Lumpur International Airport on 8 March 2014 at 00:41 local time (16:41 UTC, 7 March) and was scheduled to land at Beijing Capital International Airport at 06:30 local time (22:30 UTC, 7 March). It climbed to its assigned cruise altitude of 35,000 feet (11,000 m) and was travelling at 471 knots (872 km/h; 542 mph)[22] true airspeed when it ceased all communications and the transponder signal was lost. The aircraft's last known position on 8 March at 01:21 local time (17:21 UTC, 7 March) was at the navigational waypoint IGARI in the Gulf of Thailand, at which the aircraft turned westwards, heading towards a waypoint called VAMPI in the Strait of Malacca,[23] primary radar tracking suggests that the aircraft descended as low as 12,000 feet (3,700 m). From there, the aircraft flew towards a waypoint called GIVAL, arriving at 2:15 local time (18:15 UTC, 7 March), thereafter to the Southern Thailand Islands (Andaman Coast) of Phuket, and was last plotted heading northwest towards another waypoint called IGREX.[24][25][26]

The crew was expected to contact air traffic control in Ho Chi Minh City as the aircraft passed into Vietnamese airspace, just north of the point where contact was lost.[27][28] The captain of another aircraft attempted to reach the crew of Flight 370 "just after 1:30 am" using the International distress frequency to relay Vietnamese air traffic control's request for the crew to contact it; the captain said he was able to establish contact, and just heard "mumbling" and static.[29]

Malaysia Airlines (MAS) issued a media statement at 07:24, one hour after the scheduled arrival of the flight at Beijing, stating that contact with the flight had been lost by Malaysian ATC at 02:40.[4] MAS stated that the government had initiated search and rescue operations.[3] It later emerged that Subang Air Traffic Control had lost contact with the aircraft at 01:22 and notified Malaysia Airlines at 02:40. Neither the crew nor the aircraft's onboard communication systems relayed a distress signal, indications of bad weather, or technical problems before the aircraft vanished from radar screens.[30][31]
Timeline of disappearance[edit]
Elapsed (HH:MM)TimeEvent
MYT UTC
00:00 8 March 7 March Take-off from KUL (Kuala Lumpur)
00:41 16:41
00:20 01:01 17:01 Crew confirms altitude of 35,000 feet (11,000 m)[32]
00:26 01:07 17:07 Last ACARS data transmission received;[33] crew confirms altitude of 35,000 feet, a second time[32]
00:38 01:19 17:19 Last Malaysian ATC voice contact[34]
00:40 01:21 17:21 Last secondary radar (transponder) contact at

6°55′15″N 103°34′43″E [35][36]
00:41 01:22 17:22 Transponder and ADS-B no longer operating.
00:49 01:30 17:30 Voice contact attempt by another aircraft, at request of Vietnam ATC; mumbling and radio static heard in reply[29]
00:56 01:37 17:37 Missed expected half-hourly ACARS data transmission[33]
01:34 02:15 18:15 Last primary radar contact by Malaysian military, 200 miles (320 km) NW of Penang,

6°49′38″N 97°43′15″E
01:41 02:22 18:22 1st of 6 roughly hourly Classic Aero[37] pings (handshakes) since last ACARS transmission, via the Inmarsat-3 F1 satellite[38][39]
05:49 06:30 22:30 Missed scheduled arrival at PEK (Beijing)
06:43 07:24 23:24 Malaysia Airlines pronounces flight missing in statement released to media[4]
07:30 08:11 8 March 6th and last successful automated hourly handshake with Inmarsat-3 F1[38][40]
00:11
07:38 08:19 00:19 Unscheduled, unexplained partial handshake transmitted by aircraft[41][42]
08:34 09:15 01:15 Scheduled hourly ping attempt by Inmarsat goes unanswered by aircraft[38]

Satellite pings[edit]

On 11 March, New Scientist reported that, prior to the aircraft's disappearance, two Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) reports had been automatically issued to engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce's monitoring centre in the United Kingdom;[43] and The Wall Street Journal, citing sources in the US government, asserted that Rolls-Royce had received an aircraft health report every thirty minutes for five hours, implying that the aircraft had remained aloft for four hours after its transponder went offline.[44][45][46]

The following day, Hishammuddin Hussein, the acting Malaysian Minister of Transport, refuted the details of The Wall Street Journal report stating that the final engine transmission was received at 01:07 MYT, prior to the flight's disappearance from secondary radar.[46] The WSJ later amended its report and stated simply that the belief of continued flight was "based on analysis of signals sent by the Boeing 777's satellite-communication link... the link operated in a kind of standby mode and sought to establish contact with a satellite or satellites. These transmissions did not include data..."[47][48]

Inmarsat said that "routine, automated signals were registered" on its network,[49] and that analysis of "keep-alive message[s]" that continued to be sent after air traffic control first lost contact could help pinpoint the aircraft's location,[50] which led The Independent to comment on 14 March that the aircraft could not have met with a sudden catastrophic event, or all signals would have stopped simultaneously.[23] There was a call for automated transponders after the attacks of 11 September 2001; however, no changes were made as aviation experts preferred flexible control, in case of malfunctions or electrical emergencies.[51]

On 25 March, Hishammuddin revealed that Inmarsat had found evidence that the aircraft had attempted a final seventh handshake with the satellite at 00:19 UTC, eight minutes after the last hourly report. This "partial ping" initiated by the aircraft was unscheduled, not the result of any human interaction,[52][53] and is consistent with the satellite equipment aboard the aircraft requesting a logon during power-up after an electrical outage, perhaps caused by fuel exhaustion.[54]
Assumed loss[edit]

Messages of hope and prayer for MH370 at a bookstore in Malaysia

On 24 March, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said,

Using a type of analysis never before used in an investigation of this sort... Inmarsat and the AAIB have concluded that MH370 flew along the southern corridor, and that its last position was in the middle of the Indian Ocean, west of Perth. This is a remote location, far from any possible landing sites. It is therefore with deep sadness and regret that I must inform you that, according to this new data, flight MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean.[55][c]

Just before Najib spoke at 22:00 MYT, Malaysia Airlines announced that Flight 370 was assumed lost with no survivors. It notified most of the families in person or via telephone, and some received the following SMS:

Malaysia Airlines deeply regrets that we have to assume beyond any reasonable doubt that MH370 has been lost and that none of those on board survived. As you will hear in the next hour from Malaysia's Prime Minister, we must now accept all evidence suggests the plane went down in the Southern Indian Ocean.[58][59][60]

On 29 March, the Government of Malaysia and the AAIB stated that, in accordance with the protocols detailed in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 concerning aircraft accident investigation, they would set up an international team to investigate the loss of the flight.[61][62] On 30 March, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the appointment of retired Australian Air Chief Marshal Angus Houstonto head the Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC) to co-ordinate the search effort and closely co-operate with Malaysia, the responsible state under international law.[63][64]

If the official assumption of no survivors holds, Flight 370 would be the deadliest aviation incident in the history of Malaysia Airlines (surpassing the 1977 hijacking and crash of Malaysian Airline System Flight 653 that killed all 100 passengers and crew on board); and the deadliest to date involving a Boeing 777, surpassing Asiana Airlines Flight 214. It would also be the second-deadliest incident in the Indian Ocean, behind Iran Air Flight 655;[65] the 17th-deadliest incident of all time; and the deadliest incident since the February 2003 crash of an Iranian military aircraft.
Search[edit]
Hypothesised routes[edit]

Search for aircraft. Pink circle: Range of aircraft based on fuel (5,300 kilometres (3,300 mi)). Ping corridors: possible locations (in red) of aircraft at last ping to Inmarsat and possible last location (lighter red) based on residual fuel. Search areas: 1) 8–20 March, 2) 20–27 March, 3) 28 March.

On 11 March, it was reported that military radar indicated the aircraft turned west away from the intended flight path and continued flying for 70 minutes before disappearing from Malaysian radar near Pulau Perak.[66][67] It was also reported that it had been tracked flying at a lower altitude across Malaysia to the Malacca Strait, approximately 500 kilometres (310 mi) from its last contact with civilian radar.[68] The next day, the Royal Malaysian Air Force chief denied the report.[69][70] A few hours later however, the Vietnamese transport minister claimed that Malaysia had been informed on 8 March by Vietnamese air traffic control personnel, that they had "noticed the flight turned back west".[71][d]

Although Bloomberg News said that analysis of the last satellite "ping" received suggested a last known location approximately 1,000 miles (1,600 km) west of Perth, Western Australia,[74] the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said on 15 March that the last signal, received at 08:11 Malaysian time, might have originated from as far north as Kazakhstan.[75] Najib explained that the signals could not be more precisely located than to one of two possible loci: a northern locus stretching approximately from the border of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to northern Thailand, or a southern locus stretching fromIndonesia to the southern Indian Ocean.[76] Many of the countries on a possible northerly flight route – China, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and India – denied the aircraft could have entered their country's airspace, because military radar would have detected it.[77]

It was later confirmed that the last ACARS transmission showed nothing unusual and a normal routing all the way to Beijing,[78] The New York Times reported "senior American officials" saying on 17 March that the scheduled flight path was pre-programmed to unspecified western coordinates through the flight management system before the ACARS stopped functioning,[79] and a new waypoint "far off the path to Beijing" was added.[79] Such a reprogramming would have resulted in a banked turn at a comfortable angle of around 20 degrees that would not have caused undue concern for passengers. The sudden cessation of all on-board communication led to speculation that the aircraft's disappearance may have been due to foul play.[79]
Hypothesised locations[edit]
[show]Map of all coordinates from Google
Map of up to 200 coordinates from Bing

As the available data analyses of the flight were refined, the foci of search operations changed to different areas in several distinct phases.
First phase[edit]

A MH-60R Sea Hawk lands aboardUSS Pinckney during a crew swap before returning to the search and rescue on 10 March 2014

An admiral of the Vietnamese navy reported that radar contact with the aircraft was last made over the Gulf of Thailand.[30][80] Oil slicks detected off the coast of Vietnam on 8 and 9 March later tested negative foraviation fuel.[81][82] Alleged discovery of debris about 140 km (87 mi) south-west of Phú Quốc Island near 80 km (50 mi) south of Thổ Chu Island on 9 March was also found to be not from an aircraft.[83] Searches following a Chinese website's satellite images, taken on 9 March, showing three floating objects measuring up to 24 × 22 metres (79 × 72 ft) at 6.7°N 105.63°E also turned up blank;[84][85] Vietnamese officials said the area had been "searched thoroughly".[86][87]

The Royal Thai Navy shifted its focus in the search away from the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea at the request of its Malaysian counterpart, which was investigating the possibility that the aircraft had turned around and could have gone down in the Andaman Sea, near Thailand's border.[88] The chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force, Rodzali Daud, claimed that military recordings of radar signals did not exclude the possibility of the aircraft turning back on its flight path.[89][90] The search radius was increased from the original 20 nautical miles (37 km; 23 mi) from its last known position,[91] south of Thổ Chu Island, to 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi), and the area being examined then extended to the Strait of Malacca along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, with waters both to the east of Malaysia in the Gulf of Thailand, and in the Strait of Malacca along Malaysia's west coast, being searched.[14][41][90]

On 12 March, authorities also began to search the Andaman Sea, northwest of the Strait of Malacca, and the Malaysian government requested help from India to search in the area.[92]
Second phase[edit]

Chinese PLAAF Ilyushin Il-76arriving at RAAF Base Pearce in Perth, Australia on 21 March 2014

On 13 March, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said "an additional search area may be opened in the Indian Ocean based on some new information"[44][93] and a senior official at The Pentagon told ABC News: "We have an indication the plane went down in the Indian Ocean."[94] On 17 March, Australia agreed to lead the search in the southern locus from Sumatra to the southern Indian Ocean.[95][96] The search would be coordinated by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), with an area of 600,000 km2 (230,000 sq mi) between Australia and the Kerguelen Islands lying more than 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) Southwest of Perth, to be searched by ships and aircraft of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.[97] This area, which Australian PM Tony Abbott described as "as close to nowhere as it's possible to be", is renowned for its strong winds, inhospitable climate, hostile seas, and deep ocean floors.[98][99] On 18 March, the search of the area began with a single Royal Australian Air Force P-3 Orion aircraft.[100] On 19 March, the search capacity was ramped up to three aircraft and three merchant ships;[101] the revised search area of 305,000 square kilometres (118,000 sq mi) was about 2,600 kilometres (1,600 mi) south-west of Perth.[102]

Search efforts intensified on 20 March, after large pieces of possible debris had been photographed in this area four days earlier by a satellite.[103][104][105][106][107] Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea assigned military and civilian ships and aircraft to the search.[108][109] China published images from satellite Gaofen 1 on 22 March that showed large debris about 120 km (75 mi) south west of the previous sighting.[6][7][8] On 26 March, images from French satellites indicated 122 floating objects in the southern Indian Ocean.[9][110] Thai satellite images published on 27 March showed about 300 floating objects about 200 km (120 mi) from the French satellites' target area.[111] The abundant finds, none yet confirmed to be from the flight, brought the realisation of the prior lack of surveillance over the area, and the vast amounts ofmarine debris littering the oceans.[112][113]
Third phase[edit]

Deployment of a towed pinger locator for detecting an aircraft's ULB

Revised estimates of the radar track and the aircraft's remaining fuel led to a move of the search 1,100 kilometres (680 mi) north-east of the previous area on 28 March,[10][114] to a new search area of 319,000 square kilometres (123,000 sq mi), roughly 1,850 kilometres (1,150 mi) west of Perth.[115][116][117][118] This search area had more hospitable weather conditions.[7]

On 30 March, four large orange-coloured objects found by search aircraft, described by media as "the so far most promising lead", turned out to be fishing equipment.[119] On 2 April, the centre of the search area was shifted again 456 kilometres (283 mi) east, to a position 1,504 kilometres (935 mi) west of Perth.[120] The same day, Royal Navy survey vessel HMS Echo and submarine HMS Tireless arrived in the area,[121] with HMS Echo starting immediately to search for the aircraft's underwater locator beacons (ULBs) fitted to the "black box" flight recorders,[122] whose batteries are expected to have expired around 7 April.[123][124]
Fourth phase[edit]

Ocean Shield deploys Bluefin-21, 14 April 2014

On 4 April, the search was refocused to three more northerly areas from 1,060 to 2,100 kilometres (660 to 1,300 mi) west of Learmonth, spanning over 217,000 square kilometres (84,000 sq mi).[125][126] ADV Ocean Shield, fitted with a TPL-25 towed pinger locator, together with HMS Echo – which carried a "similar device", began searching for pings along a 240 kilometres (150 mi) seabed line believed to be the Flight 370 impact area.[123][127][128]Operators considered it a shot in the dark,[129] when comparing the vast search area with the fact that TPL-25 could only search up to 50 square miles (130 km2) per day.[129]

On China's announcement of two unconfirmed acoustic events picked up by Haixun 01 through a handheld hydrophone on 4 and 5 April,[130][131][132][133][134] the Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC) ordered HMS Echo to the area, to attempt verification with more advanced equipment.[135]

On 6 April, JACC announced that Ocean Shield had also picked up a signal, about 300 nautical miles (560 km; 350 mi) from Haixun 01.[135][136] It was announced the next day that the TPL-25 pinger locator towed by Ocean Shield had picked up a signal twice on 6 April.[137][138] The first, in the morning of 6 April at approximately 3,000 metres (9,800 ft) depth, lasted 2 hours and 20 minutes; the second episode took place at approximately 300 metres (980 ft) depth with the TPL only in the process of being deployed, and lasted 13 minutes. During the second episode, two distinct pinger returns were audible. Both episodes of recorded signals, which took place at roughly the same position though several kilometres apart, were considered to be consistent with signals expected from an aircraft's flight recorder ULB.[139] The Ocean Shield events were recorded at the north of a newly calculated impact area, which was announced on 7 April, while the Haixun 01 events had been recorded at its southern edge.[139][140][141] Ocean Shield detected two more signals on 8 April – the first signal acquired at 16:27AWST held for 5 minutes, 32 seconds; the second signal was acquired at 22:17 AWST and held for around 7 minutes.[11][142][143] Experts had determined that the earlier signals captured by Ocean Shield were "very stable, distinct, and clear ... at 33.331 kHz and ... consistently pulsed at a 1.106-second interval". These were claimed to be consistent with the flight recorder ULB.[11] but the frequency of the detections was well outside the manufacturer's specification of 37.5 +/- 1.[144] The later signals detected, at a frequency of 27 kHz, cast further doubt that they were from a black box.[145] On 10 April, a signal recorded by one of the sonobuoys deployed with a hydrophone at 300 metres depth[146][147] was found unlikely to have originated from Flight 370.[148]

On 14 April, due to the likelihood of the ULBs' acoustic pulses ceasing after their batteries had run down, the Towed Pinger Locator search gave way to a sea-bed search using side-scan sonar installed in the Bluefin-21 Autonomous Underwater Vehicle.[149] The first day's search was aborted because the sea bed was considerably deeper than the maximum operating depth of Bluefin. Scanning resumed after the abortive initial mission.[150]

After covering 42 square miles in its first four dives, the submersible was reprogrammed to allow it to dive 604 feet lower than its limit of 14,800 feet, when the risk of damage was assessed as "acceptable". Ravikumar Madavaram, an aviation expert at Frost & SullivanAsia Pacific described the search as "definitely the biggest operation ever." The search was then believed to have cost $100 million (£72m) and had been labelled "the costliest in aviation history".[151]

Bluefin-21 required 16 missions to complete its search of the 314 square kilometre area around the detections made by the Towed Pinger Locator.[152][153] At a news conference in Canberra on 28 April, Tony Abbott said "It is now 52 days since Malaysia Airlines Fight MH370 disappeared and I'm here to inform you that the search will be entering a new phase". Abbott also explained that "a much larger" area of the ocean floor would now be searched; it was "highly unlikely" that any surface wreckage would be found; and that the aerial searches had been suspended.[154][155][156] Mission 17 of Bluefin-21, covering the new, wider search area, was on 30 April.[153]

On 12 May, it was reported that the captain of Ocean Shield said there was increasing doubt that pings #3 and #4 detected on 8 April originated with MH370's black boxes because their frequency of about 27 kHz was too far below the pinger's design frequency of 37.5 kHz. Pings #1 and #2, detected on 5 April at 33 kHz, were still being considered by the search authorities.[157] On 13 May the search was interrupted due to problems with both the transponder mounted on Ocean Shield and that mounted on Bluefin-21.[158] By 22 May those problems had been resolved and the search was resumed, with Ocean Shield being joined by the Chinese survey ship Zhu Kezhen, which was to conduct a bathymetric survey of the area.[159]

On 26 May CNN reported that after Bluefin-21 had completed searching the area centered on the four pings, search efforts would be put on hold to allow for a new operator for the search effort to be selected. Equipment envisaged to be used would include towed side-scan sonar.[160] On 29 May the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Warren Truss, announced that no aircraft debris had been found in that part of the ocean where searchers previously had reported 'pings' from the black boxes. The announcement followed a statement, by a US Navy officer, which cast doubt on whether the signals were from an aircraft flight recorder. Truss informed parliament that, beginning in August, the search would move into a new phase "that could take twelve months".[161]
International involvement[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Search of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.

In response to the incident, the Malaysian government mobilised its civil aviation department, air force, navy, and Maritime Enforcement Agency; and requested international assistance under Five Power Defence Arrangementsprovisions and from neighbouring states. Various nations mounted a search and rescue mission in the region's waters.[162][163] Within two days, the countries had already dispatched more than 34 aircraft and 40 ships to the area.[14][15][90] The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission analysed information from its network of infrasound detection stations, but failed to find any sounds made by Flight 370.[164]

On 11 March, the China Meteorological Administration [165] activated the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, a 15 member organisation whose purpose is to "provide a unified system of space data acquisition and delivery to those affected by natural or man-made disasters,"[166] the first time the charitable and humanitarian redeployment of the assorted corporate, national space agency, and international satellite assets under its aegis had been used to search for an airliner.[167]

Another 11 countries joined the search efforts by 17 March, after more assistance was requested by Malaysia.[18] At the peak, before the search was moved to the south Indian Ocean, 26 countries were involved in the search, contributing a total of nearly 60 ships and 50 aircraft. In addition to the above, these parties included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam.[168][169] While not participating in the search itself, Sri Lanka gave permission for search aircraft to use its airspace.[170] Malaysia deployed military fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters,[171] and ships.[171][172][173] A co-ordination centre at the National Disaster Control Centre (NDCC) in Pulau Meranti, Cyberjaya was established.[174]

On 16 March, three staff members of the French government agency BEA flew to Kuala Lumpur to share with Malaysian authorities their experience in the organisation of undersea searches, acquired during the search for the wreckage of Air France Flight 447.[175]

The United Kingdom provided technical assistance from the Ministry of Defence, the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Department for Transport and the Met Office; and personnel from the Royal Air Force.[176]

Ships and aircraft from Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States were involved in the search of the southern Indian Ocean.[124][177] On 27 March, the Canadian Press reported that a Royal Canadian Air Force pilot on exchange with the Royal Australian Air Force was flying with a crew of 12 to assist in the search.
Information sharing[edit]

Although Malaysia's acting Transport Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, who is also the country's Defence Minister, denied the existence of problems between the participating countries, academics said that because of regional conflicts, there were genuine trust issues involved in co-operation and sharing intelligence, and that these were hampering the search.[178][179] International relations experts said entrenched rivalries over sovereignty, security, intelligence, and national interests made meaningful multilateral co-operation very difficult.[178][179] A Chinese academic made the observation that the parties were searching independently, thus it was not a multilateral search effort.[179] However, The Guardian noted the Vietnamese permission given for Chinese aircraft to overfly its airspace as a positive sign of co-operation.[179]

Malaysia had initially declined to release raw data from its military radar, deeming the information "too sensitive", but later acceded.[178][179] Defence experts suggested that giving others access to radar information could be sensitive on a military level. As an example: "The rate at which they can take the picture can also reveal how good the radar system is."[178] One suggested that some countries could already have had radar data on the aircraft but were reluctant to share any information that could potentially reveal their defence capabilities and compromise their own security.[178] Similarly, submarines patrolling the South China Sea might have information in the event of a water impact, and sharing such information could reveal their locations and listening capabilities.[180] This is quite plausible, given how quickly the US redirected USS Kidd to begin searching the Indian Ocean, even as other search assets were then still focused on searching previous search areas.[94]

Satellite imagery was also made available by Tomnod for the public to help with the search through crowdsourcing.[181]
Analysis of satellite communication[edit]

The datalink for Malaysia Airline's avionics communications is supplied by SITA, which contracted with Inmarsat to provide a satellite communication link using Inmarsat's Classic Aero service.[39][182] An aircraft's satellite communication (SATCOM) system is used to transmit messages from the cockpit as well as automated messages from on-board systems using the ACARS communications protocol, but may also be used to transmit FANS & ATN messages and provide voice, fax and data links[37] using other protocols.[39][182][183] The SATCOM signals from the aircraft are picked up by Inmarsat's constellation of satellites and relayed to ground stations.[38] In the absence of a signal from a terminal, the ground station transmits hourly 'log on/log off' messages – informally referred to as a 'ping' – to the terminal; an active terminal automatically responds. The entire process is referred to as a 'handshake'.[38][184] After ACARS equipment on the aircraft was disabled, the SATCOM transceiver aboard Flight 370 completed six further handshakes; the final complete handshake occurring at 00:11 UTC on 8 March (08:11 MYT).[38][184]

Although the ACARS system on Flight 370 was disabled at 01:21 MYT (17:21 UTC, 7 March), the SATCOM terminal remained operable.[39] On 8 March, Inmarsat provided basic flight data relating to Flight 370 to SITA, which relayed information to Malaysia Airlines and investigators.[185] On 9–10 March, Inmarsat engineers noted that the ground station log recorded pings from the aircraft for several hours after contact was lost with air traffic control.[185] An analysis of the time difference between the transmission of the ping and the aircraft's response allowed Inmarsat to determine the aircraft's distance from the satellite resulted in the plotting of two arcs—referred to as the "northern corridor" and "southern corridor" where the aircraft may have been located at the time of its last complete handshake at 00:11 UTC.

Inmarsat conducted further analysis on the signals received during the handshakes, focusing on the frequency shift of the signal emitted from the aircraft compared with the actual frequency received, known as the burst frequency offset,[38][184] using a baseline of earlier system data for the aircraft, satellite, and ground station.[184] The burst frequency offset, caused by the Doppler effect, varies based on the aircraft's speed and whether it is moving towards or away from the satellite. Using an "innovative technique"[184] that has "never before [been] used in an investigation of this sort",[55] the team determined it could also use the burst frequency offset to determine the aircraft's speed and position along the identified arcs. Inmarsat cross-checked its methodology to known flight data from six Boeing 777 aircraft flying in various directions on the same day, and found a good match.[38] Applying the technique to the handshake signals from Flight 370 gave results that correlated strongly with the expected and actual measurements of a southern trajectory over the Indian Ocean, but poorly with a northern trajectory.[38][184][186] Further revised calculations to account for movements of the satellite relative to the earth allowed the northern corridor to be ruled out completely. This analysis was passed on to Malaysian authorities on 23 March.[39] At 22:00 local time the next day, Prime Minister Najib cited this development to conclude that "Flight MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean."[39][187]

In addition to the six completed handshakes between Flight 370 and the ground station after ACARS stopped sending messages, there is "evidence of a partial handshake" at 00:19 UTC which was not immediately well understood and is subject to further investigation.[38][184] Since the aircraft did not respond to a ping at 01:15 UTC, it was concluded that at some point between 00:11 UTC and 01:15 UTC, the aircraft lost the ability to communicate with the ground station,[38][184][185] which Malaysia's Department of Civil Aviation noted was "consistent with the maximum endurance of the aircraft".[184] Of note, the SATCOM terminal on an aircraft requires power from the aircraft to operate.[185]

Malaysian investigators set up an international working group, consisting of various agencies with experience in aircraft performance and satellite communications, to further analyse the signals between Flight 370 and the ground station, especially the signal at 00:19 UTC.[184] These included representatives from the UK's Inmarsat, AAIB and Rolls-Royce; China's Civil Aviation Administration and Aircraft Accident Investigation Department; the US NTSB and FAA, and Malaysian authorities.[188] Also on 7 April, JACC announced that the Malaysian technical investigation team indicated that the partial ping from Flight 370 at 08:19 MYT was most likely when it impacted with the water. Together with further refinement of the satellite data calculation, the investigation team hypothesised a reduced search area.[139][140][141]

In an article published on 8 May several satellite experts questioned the analysis of satellite pings made by Inmarsat staff because the Doppler frequency shifts measured were apparently not properly corrected against the satellite's own drift (a periodic North-South oscillation of 3º every 24 hours). Without any additional data being released, the implication of this new analysis was that the northern portion of the Inmarsat satellite pings arc could not be ruled out.[189]

On 27 May 2014, the Malaysian government released a listing of the raw satellite data obtained from Inmarsat to the public.[190][191]
Aircraft[edit]

Flightdeck of 9M-MRO in 2004.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to aircraft 9M-MRO.

Flight 370 was operated with a Boeing 777-2H6ER,[e] serial number 28420, registration 9M-MRO. The 404th Boeing 777 produced,[193] it first flew on 14 May 2002, and was delivered new to Malaysia Airlines on 31 May 2002. The aircraft was powered by two Rolls-Royce Trent 892 engines,[193] and configured to carry 282 passengers.[194] 9M-MRO had accumulated 53,460 hours and 7,525 cycles in service,[195] and had not previously been involved in any major incidents,[196] though a minor incident while taxiing at Shanghai Pudong International Airport in August 2012 resulted in a broken wingtip.[197][198] Its last maintenance 'A' check was carried out on 23 February 2014.[195]

The Boeing 777, introduced in 1994, is generally regarded by aviation experts as having a safety record that is one of the best of any commercial aircraft.[199][200] Since its first commercial flight in June 1995, there have been only three other serious accidents involving hull-loss: British Airways Flight 38 in 2008; a cockpit fire in a parked Egyptair 777-200 at Cairo International Airport in 2011;[201][202] and Asiana Airlines Flight 214 in 2013, in which three people died.
Passengers and crew[edit]
People on board by countryCountryNo.

Australia 6

Canada 2

China 152

France 4

Hong Kong [f] 1

India 5

Indonesia 7

Iran[g] 2

Malaysia[h] 50

Netherlands 1

New Zealand 2

Russia 1

Taiwan 1

Ukraine 2

United States 3
Total 239

Malaysia Airlines released the names and nationalities of the 227 passengers and 12 crew members, based on the flight manifest, later modified to include two Iranian passengers travelling on stolen passports.[205]
Passengers[edit]

152 of the 227 passengers were Chinese citizens, including a group of 19 artists with six family members and four staff returning from a calligraphy exhibition of their work in Kuala Lumpur; 38 passengers were Malaysian. The remaining passengers were from 13 different countries.[206] Of the total, 20 were employees of Freescale Semiconductor, a company based in Austin, Texas – 12 of whom were from Malaysia and 8 from China.[207][208] One passenger who worked as a flight engineer for a Swiss jet charter company was briefly suspected as potential hijacker because he was thought to have the relevant skill set.[209]

Under a 2007 agreement with Malaysia Airlines, Tzu Chi – an international Buddhist organisation – immediately sent specially trained teams to Beijing and Malaysia to give emotional support to passengers' families.[210][211] The airline also sent its own team of caregivers and volunteers[174] and agreed to bear the expenses of bringing family members of the passengers to Kuala Lumpur and providing them with accommodation, medical care, and counselling.[91]Altogether, 115 family members of the Chinese passengers flew to Kuala Lumpur.[212] Some other family members chose to remain in China, fearing they would feel too isolated in Malaysia.[213] The airline's offer of an ex gratiacondolence payment of US$5,000 to the family of each passenger was initially rejected;[214][215] the amounts were handed out to relatives on 12 March. It was also reported that Malaysian relatives only received $2,000.[216]
Crew[edit]

All 12 crew members were Malaysian citizens. The flight's captain was 53-year-old Zaharie Ahmad Shah from Penang; he joined MAS in 1981 and had 18,365 hours of flying experience.[217] Zaharie was also an examiner qualified to conduct simulator tests for pilots.[218]

The first officer was 27-year-old Fariq Abdul Hamid, an employee of MAS since 2007, with 2,763 flying hours.[219][220] This was Fariq's first flight as a fully qualified Boeing 777 first officer, following the completion of his supervised transition to that type of aircraft.[220]
Investigation[edit]
International participation[edit]

On 8 March, although a formal (ICAO-sanctioned) investigation had not yet started, Boeing announced that it was assembling a team of experts to provide technical assistance to investigators,[221] in accordance with ICAO protocols. The United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) soon thereafter announced it was sending its own team of investigators with technical advisers from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).[222][223]

The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had already deployed technical experts and agents to investigate the disappearance.[224] A senior US law enforcement official clarified that FBI agents had not been sent to Malaysia.[225] By 17 March the investigation was also being assisted by Interpol and other relevant international law enforcement authorities according to the Malaysian government.[226][227]

On 6 April Malaysia announced it had set up three ministerial committees to help co-ordinate the search, and a new investigation team including members from Australia, China, the US, the UK, and France had been established,[228] being led according to the ICAO standards by "an independent investigator in charge".[229] The investigation into the aircraft's disappearance was Malaysia's responsibility and Australia was co-ordinating the ocean search. Australia, the US, UK, and China had agreed to be "accredited representatives" of the investigation.[230]
Possible passenger involvement[edit]

Two men identified on the manifest, an Austrian and an Italian, had reported their passports stolen in 2012 and 2013, respectively.[30][231] Interpol stated that both passports were listed on its database of lost and stolen passports, and that no check had been made against its database.[232][233] Malaysia's Home Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, criticised his country's immigration officials for failing to stop the passengers travelling on the stolen European passports.[233] The two one-way tickets purchased for the holders of the stolen passports were booked through China Southern Airlines.[234] It was reported that an Iranian had ordered the cheapest tickets to Europe via telephone in Bangkok, Thailand. The tickets were paid for in cash.[235][236] The two passengers were later identified as Iranian men, one aged 19 and the other 29, who had entered Malaysia on 28 February using valid Iranian passports. The head of Interpol said the organisation was "inclined to conclude that it was not a terrorist incident".[204] The two men were believed to be asylum seekers.[237][238] United States and Malaysian officials were reviewing the backgrounds of every passenger named on the manifest.[206] On 18 March the Chinese government announced that it had checked all of the Chinese citizens on the aircraft and ruled out the possibility that any were potential hijackers.[239]
Crew and cargo[edit]

Police searched the homes of the pilot and co-pilot,[240] on suspicion that those in the cockpit had been responsible for the aircraft's disappearance.[241] However, no evidence had emerged to support this theory. After the FBI reconstructed the deleted data from the pilot's home flight simulator, the Malaysian government spokesman indicated that "nothing sinister" had been found on it.[242][243]

Malaysia Airlines disclosed its cargo manifest on 1 May.[244] On 17 March, MAS chief executive, Ahmad Jauhari Yahya, indicated only that the aircraft was carrying 3 to 4 tonnes/tons of mangosteens and said that nothing it transported was dangerous.[245][246][247]Three days later, he also confirmed that potentially flammable batteries, identified as lithium-ion,[248] were on board, adding that all cargo was "packed as recommended by the ICAO", checked several times, and deemed to meet regulations.[249][250][251] The cargo manifest released on 1 May had revealed two air waybills (AWBs) for lithium-ion batteries with a total consignment weight of 221 kg. Three other AWBs weighing 2,232 kg, were declared as radio accessories and chargers, but an MAS representative said he was not permitted to provide additional information.[252]

On 2 April Khalid Abu Bakar, Malaysia's Police Inspector-General, said that as part of its ongoing criminal investigation, more than 170 interviews had been conducted, including with family members of the pilots and crew.[253][254] Khalid said that the provenance and destination of all cargo, including the mangosteens and in-flight meals, were being investigated to rule out sabotage as a cause.[255]
Claims of responsibility[edit]

On 9 March 2014, members of the Chinese news media received an open letter that claimed to be from the leader of the Chinese Martyrs Brigade, a previously unknown group. The letter claimed that the loss of flight MH370 was in retaliation for the Chinese government's response to the knife attacks at Kunming railway station on 1 March 2014 and part of the wider separatist campaign against Chinese control over Xinjiang province's Uyghur regions. The letter also listed unspecified grievances against the Malaysian government. The letter's claim was dismissed as fraudulent based on its lack of detail regarding the fate of MH370 and the fact that the name "Chinese Martyrs Brigade" appeared inconsistent with Uyghur separatist groups which describe themselves as "East Turkestan" and "Islamic" rather than "Chinese".[256][257]
Criticism and response[edit]

Public communication from Malaysian officials regarding the loss of the flight was initially beset with confusion.[i] The New York Times wrote that the Malaysian government and the airline released imprecise, incomplete, and sometimes inaccurate information, with civilian officials sometimes contradicting military leaders.[269] Malaysian officials were also criticised after the persistent release of contradictory information, most notably regarding the last point and time of contact with the aircraft.[270]

Vietnam temporarily scaled back its search operations after the country's Deputy Transport Minister cited a lack of communication from Malaysian officials despite requests for more information.[271] China, through the official Xinhua News Agency, said that the Malaysian government ought to take charge and conduct the operation with greater transparency, a point echoed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry days later.[178][272]

On 11 March, three days after the aircraft disappeared, British satellite company Inmarsat had provided officials (or its partner, SITA) with data suggesting the aircraft was nowhere near the areas in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea being searched at that time; and may have diverted its course through a southern or northern corridor. This information was only publicly acknowledged and released by Najib on 15 March in a press conference.[39][273]

Questions and criticisms were raised by air force experts and the Malaysian opposition about the current state of Malaysia's air force and radar capabilities.[274][275][276] Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim said it was impossible and unacceptable that the country's advanced British radar system and military readiness had not been triggered by such a diverted flight.[277]

On 14 March, Malaysia Airlines retired the MH370/MH371 flight number pair for the Kuala Lumpur–Beijing–Kuala Lumpur route, replacing them with MH318 and MH319 respectively.[278]

On 24 March, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Xie Hangsheng reacted sceptically to the conclusion by the Malaysian government that the aircraft had gone down with no survivors. Xie Hangsheng demanded "all the relevant information and evidence about the satellite data analysis", and said that the Malaysian government must "finish all the work including search and rescue."[42][279]

Criticism was also levelled at the delay of the search efforts. Explaining why information about satellite signals had not been made available earlier, Malaysia Airlines said that the raw satellite signals needed to be verified and analysed "so that their significance could be properly understood" before it could publicly confirm their existence.[280] Hishammuddin said Malaysian and US investigators had immediately discussed the Inmarsat data upon receiving them on 12 March, and on two occasions, both groups agreed that it needed further processing and sent the data to the US twice for this purpose. Data analysis was completed on 14 March: by then, the AAIB had independently arrived at the same conclusion.[281]

On 25 March, Chinese president Xi Jinping said he was sending a special envoy to Kuala Lumpur to consult with the Malaysian government over the missing aircraft.[282] The same day, around two hundred family members of the Chinese passengers protested outside the Malaysian embassy in Beijing.[283][284] Relatives who had arrived in Kuala Lumpur after the announcement continued with their protest, accusing Malaysia of hiding the truth and harbouring the murderer. They also wanted an apology for the Malaysian government's poor initial handling of the disaster and its "premature" conclusion of loss, drawn without physical evidence.[285] An op-ed for China Daily said that Malaysia was not wholly to be blamed for its poor handling of such a "bizarre and unprecedented crisis", and appealed to Chinese people not to allow emotions to prevail over evidence and rationality.[286] The Chinese ambassador to Malaysia rebuked the "radical and irresponsible opinions" of the Chinese relatives, and said that they "[did] not represent the views of Chinese people and the Chinese government".[287] The ambassador also strongly criticised Western media for having "published false news, stoked conflict and even spread rumours" to the detriment of relatives and of Sino–Malaysian relations.[255] On the other hand, an article in the The New York Times criticized China for providing apparently false leads that detracted from the search effort and wasted time and resources.[288][289]
Timeline of events[edit]

Date (UTC)CategoryEvent7 March Media Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) Malaysia and Malaysia Airlines confirm Subang Air Traffic Control outside Kuala Lumpur lost contact with Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 on 8 March 2014 at 02:40 local time (on 7 March 2014 at 18:40UTC), later corrected to 01:30 local time (17:30 UTC) located at

6°33′05″N 103°20′39″E [290]
Search Malaysian and Vietnamese authorities jointly searching in the Gulf of Thailand area; China dispatches two maritime rescue ships to the South China Sea.[291]
8 March Search An international search and rescue mission mobilised, focusing on Gulf of Thailand. Natuna Islands archipelago and South China Sea. Malaysia, Vietnam, China, Singapore and Indonesia.
Media Malaysia Airlines releases passenger manifest of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.[292]
Two men from Austria and Italy, listed among the passengers on Flight 370, are not in fact on board. Officials in both countries say that each had his passport stolen.[293]
9 March Search The search zone expanded, to include areas in the Strait of Malacca as military radar tracking indicates aircraft might have turned west from its flight plan and flight path.[294]
Investigation INTERPOL confirms that at least two passengers are found to have been travelling on stolen passports registered in its databases.[295]
10 March Search Ten Chinese satellites deployed in the search. Oil slicks on the surface of the South China Sea test negative for jet fuel.
Media Malaysia Airlines announces it will give US$5,000 to the relatives of each passenger.
11 March Investigation INTERPOL says that two false identities are not linked to the disappearance.[204]
Media China activates the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters.
12 March Search Chinese satellite images of possible debris from Flight 370 in the South China Sea at

6.7°N 105.63°E released, but surface search finds no wreckage.[85] Malaysian government receives Inmarsat info that Flight 370 pinged for hours after ACARS went off-line.
Media Chinese government criticises Malaysia for inadequate answers regarding Flight 370.
Investigation Royal Malaysian Air Force chief says that an aircraft plotted on military radar crossed the Malay Peninsula after changing course, towards a waypoint called GIVAL at 2:15 local time (18:15 UTC, 7 March), 200 miles (320 km) northwest of Penang Island off Malaysia's west coast. It followed standard aviation corridors. Search and rescue efforts being stepped up in Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal.[296][297]
14 March Investigation Investigation concludes that Flight 370 was still under human control after it lost ground control contact.
Media MAS retires the MH370/MH371 flight number pair.[278]
15 March Search New phase of multi-national search and rescue operations within two areas in the northern and southern "corridors". Twenty-six countries involved, among the northern corridor countries are Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, China,Thailand, including South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand. The southern corridor covers Indonesia, Australia, and the Indian Ocean.[298][299]
India continues search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370; Malaysia ends hunt in South China Sea.[21]
Investigation Malaysian police search the homes of both of the aircraft's pilots.
16 March Search Twenty-five countries are involved in the search. India ends its search in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal.[300]
17 March Search Search area reported by Malaysian authorities to be 2,000,000 square miles (5,200,000 km2), as a belt beneath the last possible arc position stretching from Kazakhstan over Indonesia to the southern part of the Indian Ocean.[298]Australia pledges to lead a search from Sumatra to the southern Indian Ocean.[301]
18 March Search China starts a search operation in its own territory. Australia conducts an aerial search through waters West and North of Cocos Islands and Christmas Island (close to Indonesia). Australia also conducts its first aerial search of the southern Indian Ocean,[100] roughly 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) southwest of Perth.[99]
19 March Search Australia searches the southern Indian Ocean with three aircraft and three merchant ships,[101] transiting through a slightly revised search area of 305,000 square kilometres (118,000 sq mi) about 2,600 kilometres (1,600 mi) southwest of Perth.[102]
20 March Media Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, told parliament that the "new and credible information" had emerged from expert analysis of satellite imagery.[302]
Search Five aircraft and a fourth (merchant) ship are dispatched to

44°03′02″S 91°13′27″E.[103]
22 March Search Chinese satellite image taken on 18 March shows a possible object measuring 22.5 by 13 metres (74 by 43 ft) at

44°57′30″S 90°13′40″E, approximately 3,170 kilometres (1,970 mi) west of Perth and 120 kilometres (75 mi) from the earlier sighting, but did not confirm the object's nature.
24 March Media Prime Minister of Malaysia announces that Flight 370 is assumed to have gone down in the southern Indian Ocean; Malaysia Airlines states to families that it assumes "beyond reasonable doubt" there are no survivors.[303]
Search Search area narrowed to the southern part of the Indian Ocean west and southwest of Australia. The northern search corridor (northwest of Malaysia) and the northern half of the southern search corridor (the waters betweenIndonesia and Australia) are definitively ruled out. An Australian search aircraft spots two objects at sea, 1,550 miles (2,490 km) southwest of Perth.[304]
26 March Search French satellite images captured on 23 March show 122 possible pieces of debris[9] at

44°41′24″S 90°25′19.20″E,

44°41′38.45″S 90°29′31.20″E and

44°40′10.20″S 90°36′25.20″E.[305]
Media UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) heads a team of investigators from other states as part of an international effort supporting the Malaysian authorities in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) code.[306][307]
27 March Search The search area narrows to roughly 76,000 square kilometres (29,000 sq mi). Thai and Japanese[citation needed] satellite images, captured 24–26 March show floating objects 200 kilometres (120 mi) south of the French observations.[111] Five ships from Australia and China are engaged.
28 March Search Search shifts to a new 319,000-square-kilometre (123,000 sq mi) area 1,100 kilometres (680 mi) northeast of the previous search area.[115][116]
29 March Media Malaysia announces that an international panel will be formed under United Nations protocols to investigate the Flight 370 incident.[308]
30 March Media Prime Minister of Australia announces newly formed Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC) headed by Angus Houston.[309] Military air crew from Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States are actively engaged.[310]
5 April Search Chinese patrol ship Haixun 01 detects a pulse signal at

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.

Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network
Preliminary Report - Preliminary report issued by the Malaysia Ministry of Transport. Dated 9 April 2014 and released publicly on 1 May 2014.
Prime Minister of Malaysia Press Releases.
Malaysian Ministry of Transport: Press Statements and Briefings from the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and acting Minister of Transport, Director General of the Department of Civil Aviation and Director General of Immigration. Includes transcripts of questions and answers not available on other external links.
Updates regarding MH370 from Malaysia Airlines
Australian Maritime Safety Authority MH370 Search Media Kit Original Briefings and charts etc. for the MH370 search in the Australian area. Includes MP3 and MP4 videos of Media Briefings. From 1 April 2014, communication regarding the MH370 search were issued by the Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC). The AMSA site does however include all charts, including those after 1 April.
JACC: Media releases, press conference transcripts.
US Department of Defense – MH370: news & photos regarding MH370 from the US Department of Defense (content is in the public domain)

Monday, May 26, 2014

National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation certification testing of lithium-ion batteries to be used on commercial airplanes and the certification of new technology.

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: May 22, 2014
In reply refer to: A-14-032 through -036

The Honorable Michael P. Huerta
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, DC 20591

We are providing the following information to urge the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to take action on the safety recommendations issued in this letter. These recommendations
address certification testing of lithium-ion batteries to be used on commercial airplanes and the
certification of new technology. The recommendations are derived from the
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) ongoing investigation of the January 7, 2013,
battery event aboard a Boeing 787 in Boston, Massachusetts. As a result of this investigation, the
NTSB has issued five recommendations, all of which are addressed to the FAA. Information
supporting these recommendations is discussed below.
Background
On January 7, 2013, smoke was discovered by cleaning personnel in the aft cabin of a
Japan Airlines Boeing 787-8, JA829J, which was parked at a gate at General Edward Lawrence
Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. About the same time, a maintenance
manager in the cockpit observed that the auxiliary power unit (APU)—the sole source of airplane
power at the time—had automatically shut down. Shortly afterward, a mechanic opened the aft
electronic equipment (E/E) bay and found “heavy smoke” and a “small flame” coming from the
APU battery case.1
No passengers or crewmembers were aboard the airplane at the time, and
none of the maintenance or cleaning personnel aboard the airplane was injured.
Although this incident is still under investigation, the NTSB’s preliminary findings
indicated that one of the eight APU lithium-ion battery cells had experienced an uncontrollable
increase in temperature and pressure (known as a thermal runaway) as a result of an internal

1
The mechanic reported that he saw “heavy smoke in the [E/E] compartment” and a “small flame around APU
batt[ery].” He estimated the flame size to be “about 3 inch[es].” 2
short circuit.2
The single-cell failure propagated to adjacent cells, resulting in the cascading
thermal runaway of several cells and the release of additional smoke and flammable electrolyte
from the battery case.
3
This type of failure was not expected based on the testing and analysis of
the APU battery system that Boeing performed as part of the 787 certification program.
The APU battery model is also used for the 787 main battery. On January 16, 2013, an
incident involving the main battery occurred aboard a 787 airplane operated by
All Nippon Airways during a flight from Yamaguchi to Tokyo, Japan. The airplane made an
emergency landing in Takamatsu, Japan, shortly after takeoff. No injuries were reported. The
Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) is investigating this incident with support from the NTSB. 4

Certification Requirements
In September 2004, Boeing met with representatives of the FAA’s aircraft certification
office in Seattle, Washington, to indicate the company’s intent to install lithium-ion technology
for the main and APU batteries on the 787 airplane. In response, the FAA reviewed the adequacy
of the existing regulations governing the installation of batteries in large transport-category
airplanes and determined that the regulations did not sufficiently address several failure,
operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium-ion batteries that could affect the safety
of the battery installations.
5
As a result, the FAA issued Special Conditions 25-359-SC, “Boeing
Model 787-8 Airplane; Lithium-Ion Battery Installation,” which detailed nine specific
requirements regarding the use of these batteries on the 787.6
The intent of these special
conditions was to establish additional safety standards that the FAA considered necessary to
provide a level of safety that was equivalent to the existing standards for aircraft batteries.
Special condition 2 of 25-359-SC stated, “design of the lithium-ion batteries must
preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.”
During the NTSB’s April 2013 investigative hearing on the Boston battery incident, Boeing and
FAA representatives testified that only those failure conditions resulting in cell venting with
smoke and fire were considered relevant to special condition 2. The Boeing and FAA
representatives also testified that, at the time of the 787 certification, they believed that an
uncontrolled increase in temperature or pressure could only occur if a cell or a battery were

2
The APU battery consists of eight individual lithium-ion cells that are connected in series and assembled in
two rows of four cells. The cells are based on a lithium cobalt-oxide compound technology and contain electrolyte
liquid. The cause of the internal short circuit is currently under investigation.
3
Evidence of the electrolyte fluid (in the form of residue and thermal damage) was seen within areas located
about 20 inches from the APU battery installation. No primary structures (that is, those associated with airplane
flight loads) were found damaged; secondary structures—specifically, the avionics rack and the floor
panel―exhibited thermal damage near the location where the APU battery had been installed.
4
The JTSB described this battery event as a “serious incident.” For information about this investigation, see the
JTSB’s website, which can be accessed at http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/english.html. The JTSB is also assisting the
NTSB with its investigation of the Boston battery incident.
5
The battery regulations that existed at the time were found in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.1353,
“Electrical Equipment and Installations,” paragraphs (c)(1) through (4).
6
The final special conditions for the 787 lithium-ion battery installation (72 Federal Register 57842,
October 11, 2007) became effective on November 13, 2007. 3
overcharged. The NTSB’s investigation has not found any evidence to date to indicate that the
Boston incident battery was overcharged.
Development Testing Results
Boeing determined that an internal short circuit in a single cell that resulted in thermal
runaway would not propagate to other cells within the battery. This determination was based in
part on the results of development (noncertification) testing performed in November 2006 by
GS Yuasa Corporation of Kyoto, Japan, which developed, designed, and manufactured the
battery.
7
This testing involved driving a steel nail through a cell case to penetrate the electrodes
of a fully charged single cell within a fully charged, nongrounded, preproduction battery to
induce an internal short circuit within the cell.8
The purpose of the test, which was conducted at a
temperature representative of the E/E bay operating temperature during a typical flight, was to
observe the behavior of the cells near the nail-penetrated cell, observe any release of smoke or
initiation of fire, and document any damage to the battery case.
9

The nail penetration test results showed that the surface temperature of the
nail-penetrated cell increased, smoke vented from the cell and the battery case, and the surface
temperature of the adjacent cells increased with no venting. On the basis of this development test
and field reliability data of a similar cell designed and manufactured by GS Yuasa,
Boeing determined that the effects of cell internal short circuiting would be limited to (1) the
release of smoke from the battery, which could be effectively handled by the airplane’s
ventilation system, and (2) an increase in surface temperature of the short-circuited cell with no
propagation of thermal runaway to adjacent cells, damage to the battery case, fire, or explosion.
As a result, the 787 electrical power system (EPS) certification plan proposed by Boeing and
approved by the FAA did not include a cell internal short circuit abuse test because it was not
required for demonstrating compliance with special condition 2.
10

Accounting for Internal Short Circuits and Thermal Runaway in Certification Tests
An FAA issue paper, dated March 2006, included Boeing’s statement that the
certification tests planned for the 787 main and APU batteries would substantiate that the battery

7
Boeing had collaborated with GS Yuasa and Thales Avionics Electrical Systems of France about the
development tests to be performed on cells and batteries. (Thales designed the equipment for the 787 electrical
power conversion subsystem, which includes the main and APU battery systems and is part of the 787 electrical
power system.) Results from this testing helped Boeing determine what types of abuse (thermal, physical, and/or
electrical) certification testing and/or safety analyses needed to be performed to show compliance with the
applicable battery regulations, including the special conditions. The development tests were not required by the
FAA.
8
The test battery was considered to be in a “floating” ground state because its case was not electrically
grounded. The battery case, when installed in the airplane, is grounded via the 787 common return network.
9
APU battery temperature was not recorded on the incident flight recorder. However, after the incident, Boeing
monitored E/E bay temperatures during several flights and reported average values of 10ºC to 15ºC (50ºF to 59ºF)
during a typical flight.
10
A cell internal short circuit abuse test simulates the most severe effects of internal short circuiting by
triggering thermal runaway of a cell (or cells) within the battery to evaluate the potential for propagation to other
cells and resulting hazardous effects, such as smoke, excessive heat, release of flammable electrolyte, fire, and/or
explosion. 4
design would remove the possibility of internal short circuit failures.11
In its design safety
assessment for certification, Boeing considered the potential for smoke generation as a result of
the internal short circuit failure mode. However, Boeing underestimated the more serious effects
of an internal short circuit, that is, thermal runaway of other cells within the battery, excessive
heat, flammable electrolyte release, and fire.12
The 787 EPS certification plan proposed by
Boeing, which, as previously stated, did not include a cell internal short circuit abuse test, was
approved by the FAA in January 2007.
Lithium-ion batteries in service at that time in other applications (including cellular
telephones and personal computers) were exhibiting susceptibility to internal short circuiting
with effects such as excessive heating or an explosion.13
Such failures were generally attributed
to manufacturing or design deficiencies or exposure of the cell or battery to abuse conditions.14

In addition, in December 2007, the NTSB issued safety recommendations addressing the hazards
of transporting lithium batteries as a result of its investigation of an in-flight cargo fire aboard a
United Parcel Service DC-8 airplane.15

Experts in lithium-ion technology have indicated that the conditions within a cell that
lead to an internal short circuit can progress over time while the battery is in use and that these
conditions are not readily detectable until an internal short circuit occurs.
16
Depending on its
effects, an internal short circuit might not be detected and managed by a battery monitoring
system in sufficient time to stop the thermal runaway of a cell and subsequent adjacent cells. For
example, between the date that the Boston incident airplane was delivered new to the operator
(December 20, 2012) and the date of the incident (January 7, 2013), there were no abnormal
indications or maintenance messages related to issues with the incident battery.17
As a result, it is
important for manufacturers to demonstrate, as part of certification testing, that a battery’s design
can effectively mitigate the most severe effects of an internal short circuit because the failure
conditions that lead to an internal short circuit may not be apparent.

11
Federal Aviation Administration Issue Paper SE-9, “Special Condition: Lithium-Ion Battery Installations,”
March 31, 2006.
12
In April 2013, the NTSB held a forum on lithium-ion batteries in transportation. The forum included panelists
from the US military, civilian government agencies, academia, and the transportation industry who discussed the
safety risks of internal short circuits in lithium-ion batteries. The presentations from this forum can be found on the
NTSB’s website, which can be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. Information from two of the presenters is discussed
in this section of the letter.
13
S. Tobishima, “Secondary Batteries – Lithium Rechargeable Systems – Lithium-Ion: Thermal Runaway,”
Encyclopedia of Electrochemical Power Sources, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009, pages 409-417.
14
For more information, see J. Lamb and C.J. Orendorff, “Evaluation of Mechanical Abuse Techniques in
Lithium Ion Batteries,” Journal of Power Sources, vol. 247, 2014, pages 189-196.
15
For more information, see Inflight Cargo Fire, United Parcel Service Company Flight 1307,
McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 7, 2006, Aircraft Accident Report
NTSB/AAR-07/07 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2007), which can be accessed at the NTSB’s website.
16
J. Lamb and C.J. Orendorff, “Evaluation of Mechanical Abuse Techniques in Lithium Ion Batteries.”
M. Keyser, D. Long, Y.S. Jung, A. Pesaran, E. Darcy, B. McCarthy, L. Patrick, and C. Kruger, “Development of a
Novel Test Method for On-Demand Internal Short Circuit in a Li-Ion Cell,” Presented at the Large Lithium Ion
Battery Technology and Application Symposium, Advanced Automotive Battery Conference, Pasadena, California,
January 2011. B. Barnett, D. Ofer, S. Sriramulu, and R. Stringfellow, “Lithium-Ion Batteries, Safety,” Encyclopedia
of Sustainability Science and Technology, New York: Springer, 2012, pages 6097-6122.
17
During this time period, the airplane had logged 169 flight hours and 22 flight cycles. 5
It appears that the most severe effects of a cell internal short circuit were not
demonstrated during GS Yuasa’s 2006 lithium-ion battery development testing for a number of
possible reasons, one of which is that the test setup did not include mechanical and electrical
interfaces between the battery and the airplane system.18
Thus, the test setup did not fully
represent the battery installation on the airplane.
A postincident inspection of the Boston battery found evidence that electrical arcing
between a cell case and the battery case had occurred at some point during the failure sequence.19

There was also evidence of excessive current flow in the ground wire connecting the battery case
to the airplane grounding point and in the shielded signal wires in the connector between the
battery and the battery charger unit. This damage showed that a number of unintended electrical
interactions occurred among the cells, the battery case, and the electrical interfaces between the
battery and the airplane, likely after the initiation of thermal runaway in the first cell, which
might have contributed to the propagation of thermal runaway to the other cells.
The NTSB conducted testing in March 2014 to understand the effects of temperature and
installation configuration on the 787 battery’s response to a simulated short circuit (via
nail penetration) within a single cell.20
In one test, the battery was electrically grounded using a
single ground wire that was representative of the ground wire installed on the 787 airplane.21
The
battery temperature at the beginning of this test was between 11ºC and 14ºC (about 52ºF
to 57ºF), which was consistent with measured temperatures in the E/E bay during a typical flight.
In another test, the battery was not electrically grounded (similar to the test setup used by
GS Yuasa in its 2006 battery development test), but the test was conducted at the battery’s
maximum operating temperature of 70ºC/158ºF.
22

The test with the electrically grounded battery showed that when a short circuit was
induced into a single cell inside the battery, thermal runaway occurred, resulting in cell swelling
and venting of the nail-penetrated cell. None of the other cells in the battery underwent thermal
runaway or vented. This test also showed that the initiating cell and other cells within the battery
case began to electrically discharge at an uncontrolled rate, causing a high electrical current to

18
Integration of the battery into the 787 EPS involved connection of the battery to other system elements and
airplane interfaces, including the battery charger unit, the electrical power bus, the electrical grounding point, and
the physical mounting structure in the E/E bay. Design requirements were established for this integrated system and
each system component, including the battery. Various development and certification tests were conducted by
GS Yuasa, Thales, and Boeing to verify that the requirements could meet design, performance, and safety objectives.
GS Yuasa’s testing was conducted only at the battery level.
19
The battery case exhibited a 0.25-inch-wide nodular protrusion that extended about 0.12 inch from the case.
The protrusion was inspected using a scanning electron microscope and energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. The
inspections determined that arc damage occurred from contact between the battery case and a cell case that was
adjacent to the protrusion. For more information, see the March 2013 interim factual report for this incident on the
NTSB’s website.
20
This testing was conducted at Underwriters Laboratories’ facility in Northbrook, Illinois.
21
The battery test setup did not include all electrical ground paths to the battery case as installed on the airplane
(that is, the ground wire, shielded signal wires, and a physical connection between the battery case mounting rails
and ground).
22
A joint Thales and GS Yuasa document describing the thermal environment for the battery indicated that its
operating temperature range was -18ºC to 70ºC (-0.4ºF to 158ºF). 6
discharge through the ground wire circuit.23
Within 30 seconds of the initiation of cell venting of
the nail-penetrated cell, the ground wire fused open, and the current flow through the grounding
path ceased. The post-test inspection of the battery found signs of arcing between the
nail-penetrated cell and the battery case, including welding of the cell case to the battery case.
The test with the ungrounded battery showed that thermal runaway of a single cell
propagated to all other cells inside the battery case. This result (propagation to and venting of all
cells) differed from the result of GS Yuasa’s battery development test (venting of the
nail-penetrated cell and no propagation to and venting of other cells), but the NTSB notes that
GS Yuasa’s battery test was performed at a temperature that did not reflect the battery’s
maximum operating temperature under normal conditions. The post-test inspection of the battery
used for this NTSB test found no signs of arcing between the nail-penetrated cell (or other vented
cells) and the battery case.
A presenter at the NTSB’s forum on lithium-ion batteries in transportation stated that a
cell internal short circuit is a critical safety concern and that the risk of propagation from a
single-cell failure increases at higher temperatures.24
Another presenter at the NTSB’s forum
stated that internal short circuits are one of the causes of catastrophic failures in lithium-ion
batteries. She also stated that cell-level safety controls to mitigate the effects of lithium-ion
battery failure modes do not necessarily translate to battery-level safety controls for this purpose.
As a result, lithium-ion battery safety controls need to be verified by testing at the appropriate
level and in the relevant environment.25

The Boston 787 battery incident demonstrated that thermal runaway of a single cell could
propagate to other cells at a temperature consistent with that in the E/E bay during a typical
flight, which is below the battery’s maximum operating temperature. The incident battery also
exhibited damage consistent with electrical arcing between a cell case and the battery case.
Neither of the NTSB’s tests nor GS Yuasa’s battery development test had completely repeated
the damage found in the Boston incident battery, but each NTSB test replicated one aspect of the
documented battery damage. Specifically, the 70ºC/158ºF test repeated the propagation of
thermal runaway to all cells within the battery, and the grounded battery test repeated electrical
arcing damage sufficient to melt the battery case material. Thus, the NTSB’s tests indicated that
the damage to the battery that resulted when a single cell underwent thermal runaway varied and
that design and environmental factors, such as installation interfaces and/or ambient temperature
conditions to which the battery was exposed, could affect test results.

23
The incident battery ground wire was found intact with the wire insulation exhibiting an undamaged exterior
surface but a slightly blackened interior surface, which was consistent with resistance heating associated with the
flow of high levels of electrical current. The shielded signal wires also exhibited signs of internal heating that were
consistent with resistance heating by high levels of electrical current. For more information, see the NTSB’s interim
factual report for this incident.
24
Daniel H. Doughty, Failure Mechanisms of Lithium-Ion Batteries. Presented at the Lithium Ion Batteries in
Transportation Forum, National Transportation Safety Board, April 2013. The presenter is the president of a battery
safety consulting firm in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
25
Judith Jeevarajan, End-User Acceptance: Requirements or Specifications, Certification, & Testing. Presented
at the Lithium Ion Batteries in Transportation Forum, National Transportation Safety Board, April 2013. The
presenter is the group lead for battery safety and advanced technology at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas. 7
Although the NTSB’s tests were not exhaustive regarding all aspects of the battery
design, use, and approved operating conditions, the test results indicated that, to fully understand
the most severe effects that could occur when a single cell within a lithium-ion battery undergoes
thermal runaway, various factors expected during normal operations need to be included in
aircraft certification tests. In particular, it is important to ensure that installation, environmental,
and usage factors are fully accounted for in abuse tests intended to demonstrate the most severe
effects of an internal short circuit-induced thermal runaway. The current standard for lithium-ion
battery design and safety certification in aviation applications, RTCA document DO-311,
“Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Battery Systems,”
includes abuse testing, but the document does not address all of the unique aspects of a battery’s
installation on an aircraft.26
Thus, aircraft manufacturers need to evaluate whether additional
requirements and testing are necessary to ensure aircraft-level safety.
The NTSB concludes that aircraft certification tests that induce thermal runaway of a cell
in a lithium-ion battery configured as installed on the aircraft would better demonstrate to the
FAA that the battery installation could effectively mitigate the potential safety effects of an
internal short circuit. As a result, the NTSB recommends that the FAA develop abuse tests that
subject a single cell within a permanently installed, rechargeable lithium-ion battery to thermal
runaway and demonstrate that the battery installation mitigates all hazardous effects of
propagation to other cells and the release of electrolyte, fire, or explosive debris outside the
battery case. The tests should replicate the battery installation on the aircraft and be conducted
under conditions that produce the most severe outcome. The NTSB also recommends that, after
Safety Recommendation A-14-032 has been completed, the FAA require aircraft manufacturers
to perform the tests and demonstrate acceptable performance as part of the certification of any
new aircraft design that incorporates a permanently installed, rechargeable lithium-ion battery.
Although the NTSB believes that tests to induce thermal runaway of a cell are necessary
to verify that a battery’s design adequately mitigates the potential threats (to the aircraft and its
occupants) of internal short circuiting, the NTSB is concerned about the reliability and
repeatability of such tests. According to government and industry experts in lithium-ion battery
technology, the test method used to induce thermal runaway (such as nail penetration or hot pad),
the type of short induced, and the cell and battery design could all significantly impact test
results such that the most severe effects of internal short circuiting would not be fully evaluated
during certification.27
According to a National Renewable Energy Laboratory report, “an internal
short hazard is one of the most difficult to reproduce, yet it is the most important to solve to

26
In 2006 the FAA chartered a federal advisory committee, known as RTCA Special Committee SC-211, to
develop a standard for the design, certification, production, and use of permanently installed, rechargeable
lithium-ion battery systems. The committee included representatives from the FAA, US Air Force, US Navy,
US Army, commercial air carriers, and battery and aircraft manufacturers. Boeing, Thales, and GS Yuasa were also
members of the RTCA special committee. The resulting standard, DO-311, which was issued in 2008, is currently
considered by the FAA to be an acceptable means of compliance to the special conditions for rechargeable
lithium-ion batteries and battery systems.
27
For more information, see David Howell, U.S. DOE Perspective on Lithium-Ion Battery Safety. Presented at
Technical Symposium: Safety Considerations for EVs Powered by Li-Ion Batteries, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, May 2011. Also see Premanand Ramadass, Weifeng Fang, and Zhengming (John) Zhang,
“Study of Internal Short in a Li-ion Cell I. Test Method Development Using Infra-red Imaging Technique,”
Journal of Power Sources, vol. 248, 2014, pages 769-776. 8
improve safety.”28
Researchers have found that current test methods might not reliably produce
failure effects as severe as those observed in actual field failures involving internal short
circuiting and that, as a result, a consensus for how best to simulate this critical failure mode is
needed.
29

The NTSB conducted additional testing in March 2014 to understand and compare the
energy level of a thermal runaway in response to three different methods of simulating an
internal short circuit within a single cell from a 787 battery assembly. During the testing, thermal
runaway of each cell was initiated using the indentation, nail penetration, or hot pad methods to
simulate a short circuit, and temperatures were measured at various locations on the cell cases.30

Preliminary test results indicated that, immediately after inducing the short circuit, (1) the
maximum temperature at a common location on the cell cases ranged from about 240ºC to 375ºC
(about 464ºF to 707ºF), (2) depending on the method used, the cell case temperature at various
locations differed by as much as about 270ºC/518ºF, and (3) the hot pad method resulted in the
highest temperatures measured.
Although various other factors, such as cell age, were not evaluated during this testing,
the preliminary test results were consistent with the observations of industry experts who
indicated that the method used to simulate a cell internal short circuit in a thermal runaway abuse
test could have a significant impact on the resulting thermal energy released.31
Thus, the method
used to initiate thermal runaway as part of an internal short circuit abuse test could also influence
how the thermal runaway condition could affect other cells within a battery.
Significant ongoing research about the causes and types of internal short circuiting in
lithium-ion batteries and potential test evaluation methods to simulate worst-case effects is
currently being conducted by experts within the US military, civilian federal agencies,
US national laboratories, and test standards development organizations.
32
Maintaining awareness
of this evolving body of knowledge could help the FAA determine the most reliable ways to
simulate an internal short circuit in a lithium-ion battery and ensure that manufacturers have the
guidance needed to address related aircraft-level safety hazards during certification.

28
Daniel H. Doughty, Vehicle Battery Safety Roadmap Guidance, Department of Energy, National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, NREL Report No. SR-5400-54404 (Golden, Colorado: NREL, 2012). This report, which
addressed lithium-ion battery safety in electric vehicles, noted that development of an internal short circuit test is an
important objective that is being explored by several laboratories but that “no one test has gained acceptance by
industry or test organizations.”
29
J. Lamb and C.J. Orendorff, “Evaluation of Mechanical Abuse Techniques in Lithium Ion Batteries.”
Daniel H. Doughty, Vehicle Battery Safety Roadmap Guidance. L. Florence, H.P. Jones, and A. Liang, Safety Issues
for Lithium-Ion Batteries, Underwriters Laboratories, 2010.
30
This testing was performed at Underwriters Laboratories’ facility in Taipei, Taiwan.
31
David Howell, U.S. DOE Perspective on Lithium-Ion Battery Safety. Premanand Ramadass, Weifeng Fang,
and Zhengming (John) Zhang, “Study of Internal Short in a Li-ion Cell I. Test Method Development Using Infra-red
Imaging Technique.”
32
J. Lamb and C.J. Orendorff, “Evaluation of Mechanical Abuse Techniques in Lithium Ion Batteries.”
M. Keyser et al., “Development of a Novel Test Method for On-Demand Internal Short Circuit in a Li-Ion Cell.”
Daniel H. Doughty, Vehicle Battery Safety Roadmap Guidance. Alvin Wu, Mahmood Tabaddor, and Carl Wang, Test
Methods for Simulating Internal Short Circuits in Lithium Ion Cells, Presented at the Seventh Triennial International
Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference, December 2013. 9
The NTSB concludes that an evaluation of various methods to replicate internal short
circuiting within a lithium-ion cell could help manufacturers determine whether they are using
appropriate test methods to demonstrate the most severe effects that could result at the cell,
battery, and aircraft levels given the battery’s unique design and installation. Guidance on test
protocols and methods that reliably simulate the most severe effects of internal short circuiting in
lithium-ion batteries could help ensure that this failure mode is properly assessed as part of
aircraft certification. As a result, the NTSB recommends that the FAA work with lithium-ion
battery technology experts from government and test standards organizations, including
US national laboratories, to develop guidance on acceptable methods to induce thermal runaway
that most reliably simulate cell internal short-circuiting hazards at the cell, battery, and aircraft
levels.
In-Service Lithium-Ion Batteries
According to the FAA’s March 2006 issue paper, the Boeing 787-8 airplane was the first
large transport-category airplane to use permanently installed lithium-ion main and APU
batteries.33
The 787 also incorporated lithium-ion batteries in the airplane’s flight control
electronics, the emergency lighting system, and the recorder-independent power supply. Other
airplane designs, including the Boeing 777-200/300/300ER and 737NG and the Airbus A380,
have incorporated permanently installed lithium-ion batteries. Each of these airplane designs was
required to comply with the same special conditions applied to the 787 certification. However,
the methods used to show compliance with the special conditions in each of those programs were
uniquely established with agreement between the applicant and the FAA to address the features,
installation, and operating environment of each specific battery application.
Given the absence of a standardized certification test to evaluate a battery’s response to a
cell thermal runaway as installed on an aircraft, the NTSB concludes that the methods of
compliance used to certify in-service lithium-ion batteries might not have adequately accounted
for the hazards that could result from internal short circuiting. As a result, the NTSB
recommends that the FAA review the methods of compliance used to certify permanently
installed, rechargeable lithium-ion batteries on in-service aircraft and require additional testing, if
needed, to ensure that the battery design and installation adequately protects against all adverse
effects of a cell thermal runaway.
Introduction of New Technology Into Aircraft
Although lithium-ion batteries have been used in non-aviation applications for more than
a decade, the high-power nature of the 787 main and APU lithium-ion batteries represented new
technology for use in commercial airplanes. New, first-of-a-kind technology can offer substantial
improvements in operational efficiency, capabilities, and/or safety, and its safe introduction into
the aviation system is a key objective of the aircraft certification process.

33
An article in an SAE International journal stated that the Cessna Citation J4, which was certified on
March 10, 2010, was believed to be the first civil airplane certificated with a lithium-ion main battery. The 787-8
received transport-category approval on August 26, 2011. For more information about the SAE article, see
Vernon W. Chang, Steven B. Waggoner, and John W. Gallman, “System Integration of a Safe, High Power,
Lithium Ion Main Battery into a Civil Aviation Aircraft,” SAE International Journal of Aerospace, vol. 3, no. 1,
2010, pages 149-158. 10
Although the 787 battery special conditions were developed with input from various FAA
technical staff members and in consultation with members of the RTCA SC-211 committee, FAA
certification staff members relied primarily on Boeing’s expertise and knowledge to define the
necessary tests and analyses for certification of the main and APU battery design. The NTSB
recognizes that reliance on a manufacturer’s expertise is a necessary part of the FAA’s aircraft
certification process and that this process has historically been an effective component for
ensuring safety.34
However, expertise outside the aviation industry during a certification program
involving new technology could further strengthen the aircraft certification process by ensuring
that both the FAA and the manufacturer are kept up to date about the most current research and
information related to the technology, which could be rapidly expanding in other industries
during the course of an aircraft certification program (which can typically last 5 or more years).35

As early as 2000, researchers supporting Department of Energy programs dedicated to the
development of large-scale lithium-ion batteries for automotive applications had determined
through testing that internal short circuiting could result in thermal runaway of a cell and the
potential for propagation to other cells within the battery. The researchers had also determined
that thermal runaway from internal short circuiting could result in venting with smoke and fire
for a number of different cell and battery designs.36
If the FAA had reached out to these or other
experts working on large-scale lithium-ion batteries to tap into their knowledge, it is possible that
the FAA could have recognized that the 787 methods of compliance were insufficient to
appropriately evaluate the risks associated with cell internal short circuiting and that an internal
short circuit test was needed as part of certification.
The nature of the aircraft certification process requires manufacturers to “lock down”
designs early in the program because of the multiyear timeframe needed to complete the testing
and evaluation required to demonstrate regulatory compliance. As a result, it is difficult for
manufacturers to incorporate new information into the aircraft design as the certification program
progresses. Incorporating new information becomes even more difficult once the aircraft design
goes into service because design changes can require extensive recertification activity. As a
result, the involvement of outside experts as early as possible in a certification program could be
the most efficient way to help ensure the operational safety of a new technology.

34
In 2006, the NTSB found that the FAA’s type certification process was sound and produced a high level of
safety but that improvements were warranted because “existing policy, practices, and procedures for the ongoing
assessment of risks…do not ensure that the underlying assumptions made during design and certification are
adequately and continuously assessed in light of operational experience, lessons learned, and new knowledge.”
For more information, see Safety Report on the Treatment of Safety-Critical Systems in Transport Airplanes,
Safety Report NTSB/SR-06/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2006), which can be found on the NTSB’s website.
35
Title 14 CFR 21.17, “Designation of Applicable Regulations,” states, “an application for type certification of
a transport category aircraft is effective for 5 years…unless an applicant shows at the time of application that
product requires a longer period of time for design, development, and testing, and the FAA approves a longer
period.”
36
This work was performed as part of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), a research
collaboration involving the federal government and the US automotive industry. The PNGV partners, which
included seven federal agencies, 19 federal laboratories, and a consortium representing three car manufacturers,
researched different subject areas for building a hybrid electric car. For example, Sandia National Laboratories
focused on energy storage (batteries and their safety). 11
The NTSB concludes that technical knowledge imparted by independent and neutral
experts outside of the FAA and an aircraft manufacturer could provide the agency with valuable
insights about best practices and test protocols for validating system and equipment safety
performance during certification when new technology is incorporated. As a result, the NTSB
recommends that the FAA develop a policy to establish, when practicable, a panel of independent
technical experts to advise on methods of compliance and best practices for certifying the safety
of new technology to be used on new or existing aircraft. The panel should be established as
early as possible in the certification program to ensure that the most current research and
information related to the technology could be incorporated during the program.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:
Develop abuse tests that subject a single cell within a permanently installed,
rechargeable lithium-ion battery to thermal runaway and demonstrate that the
battery installation mitigates all hazardous effects of propagation to other cells
and the release of electrolyte, fire, or explosive debris outside the battery case.
The tests should replicate the battery installation on the aircraft and be conducted
under conditions that produce the most severe outcome. (A-14-032)
After Safety Recommendation A-14-032 has been completed, require aircraft
manufacturers to perform the tests and demonstrate acceptable performance as
part of the certification of any new aircraft design that incorporates a permanently
installed, rechargeable lithium-ion battery. (A-14-033)
Work with lithium-ion battery technology experts from government and test
standards organizations, including US national laboratories, to develop guidance
on acceptable methods to induce thermal runaway that most reliably simulate cell
internal short-circuiting hazards at the cell, battery, and aircraft levels. (A-14-034)
Review the methods of compliance used to certify permanently installed,
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries on in-service aircraft and require additional
testing, if needed, to ensure that the battery design and installation adequately
protects against all adverse effects of a cell thermal runaway. (A-14-035)
Develop a policy to establish, when practicable, a panel of independent technical
experts to advise on methods of compliance and best practices for certifying the
safety of new technology to be used on new or existing aircraft. The panel should
be established as early as possible in the certification program to ensure that the
most current research and information related to the technology could be
incorporated during the program. (A-14-036)
Acting Chairman HART and Members SUMWALT, ROSEKIND, and WEENER
concurred in these recommendations.
The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to
prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within
90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement the 12
recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We
encourage you to submit your response electronically

Saturday, May 24, 2014

eBay To Ask Users to Change Their Passwords, No Evidence PayPal Customer Information Accessed or Compromised

eBay To Ask Users to Change Their Passwords, No Evidence PayPal Customer Information Accessed or Compromised
May
21

Later today, eBay Inc. will be asking all eBay users to change their passwords due to a cyber attack that compromised an eBay database containing encrypted eBay passwords and other non-financial information. eBay will notify its user base directly within the next 24 hours with more details.

Extensive forensic research has shown no evidence of unauthorized access or compromise to personal or financial information for PayPal customers. PayPal customer and financial data is encrypted and stored separately, and PayPal never shares financial information with merchants, including eBay.

In addition to asking users to reset passwords, eBay Inc. said it will also encourage any eBay user who used the same password on other sites to change those, too.

We will update the PayPal Forward blog and eBay Inc blog with more details later today.

Friday, May 23, 2014

EBAY INC. TO ASK EBAY USERS TO CHANGE PASSWORDS

eBay Inc. (Nasdaq: EBAY) said beginning later today it will be asking eBay users to change their passwords because of a cyberattack that compromised a database containing encrypted passwords and other non-financial data. After conducting extensive tests on its networks, the company said it has no evidence of the compromise resulting in unauthorized activity for eBay users, and no evidence of any unauthorized access to financial or credit card information, which is stored separately in encrypted formats. However, changing passwords is a best practice and will help enhance security for eBay users.

Information security and customer data protection are of paramount importance to eBay Inc., and eBay regrets any inconvenience or concern that this password reset may cause our customers. We know our customers trust us with their information, and we take seriously our commitment to maintaining a safe, secure and trusted global marketplace.

Cyberattackers compromised a small number of employee log-in credentials, allowing unauthorized access to eBay’s corporate network, the company said. Working with law enforcement and leading security experts, the company is aggressively investigating the matter and applying the best forensics tools and practices to protect customers.

The database, which was compromised between late February and early March, included eBay customers’ name, encrypted password, email address, physical address, phone number and date of birth. However, the database did not contain financial information or other confidential personal information. The company said that the compromised employee log-in credentials were first detected about two weeks ago. Extensive forensics subsequently identified the compromised eBay database, resulting in the company’s announcement today.

The company said it has seen no indication of increased fraudulent account activity on eBay. The company also said it has no evidence of unauthorized access or compromises to personal or financial information for PayPal users. PayPal data is stored separately on a secure network, and all PayPal financial information is encrypted.

Beginning later today, eBay users will be notified via email, site communications and other marketing channels to change their password. In addition to asking users to change their eBay password, the company said it also is encouraging any eBay user who utilized the same password on other sites to change those passwords, too. The same password should never be used across multiple sites or accounts.

About eBay Inc.

eBay Inc. (NASDAQ: EBAY) is a global commerce and payments leader, providing a robust platform where merchants of all sizes can compete and win. Founded in 1995 in San Jose, Calif., eBay Inc. connects millions of buyers and sellers and enabled $205 billion* of commerce volume in 2013. We do so through eBay, one of the world’s largest online marketplaces, which allows users to buy and sell in nearly every country on earth; through PayPal, which enables individuals and businesses to securely, easily and quickly send and receive digital payments; and through eBay Enterprise, which enables omnichannel commerce, multichannel retailing and digital marketing for global enterprises in the U.S. and internationally. We also reach millions through specialized marketplaces such as StubHub, the world’s largest ticket marketplace, and eBay classifieds sites, which together have a presence in more than 1,000 cities around the world. For more information about the company and its global portfolio of online brands, visit www.ebayinc.com.

* This adjusted number reflects decision to remove vehicles and real estate GMV from ongoing total GMV and ECV metrics (previously stated ECV for 2013 was $212 billion, incorporating vehicles and real estate GMV).

Thursday, May 22, 2014

NTSB ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTIFICATION OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

NTSB ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTIFICATION OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
May 22

WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board issued a series of recommendations today related to the evaluation and certification of lithium-ion batteries for use in aircraft systems, as well as the certification of new technology.

The five safety recommendations, all addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, are derived from the NTSB's ongoing investigation of the January 7, 2013, fire event that occurred in a lithium-ion battery on a Boeing 787 that was parked at Boston Logan Airport.

Investigators found that the battery involved in the Boston 787 fire event showed evidence not just of an internal thermal runaway but that "unintended electrical interactions occurred among the cells, the battery case, and the electrical interfaces between the battery and the airplane."

The 12-page safety recommendation letter said that the processes used in 2006 to support the certification of the lithium-ion battery designed for the 787 were inadequate, in part, because there is no standardized thermal runaway test that's conducted in the environment and conditions that would most accurately reflect how the battery would perform when installed and operated on an in-service airplane.

Further, the NTSB said that because there is no such standardized thermal runaway test, lithium-ion battery designs on airplanes currently in service might not have adequately accounted for the hazards associated with internal short circuiting.

In its examination of the challenges associated with introducing newer technologies into already complex aircraft systems, the NTSB said that including subject matter experts outside of the aviation industry "could further strengthen the aircraft certification process" by ensuring that both the FAA and the aircraft manufacturer have access to the most current research and information related to the developing technology.

To address all of these issues, the NTSB asked the FAA to do the following:
Develop an aircraft-level thermal runaway test to demonstrate safety performance in the presence of an internal short circuit failure
Require the above test as part of certification of future aircraft designs
Re-evaluate internal short circuit risk for lithium-ion batteries now in-service
Develop guidance for thermal runaway test methods
Include a panel of independent expert consultants early in the certification process for new technologies installed on aircraft

"The history of commercial aviation is one in which emerging technologies have played a key role in enhancing flight safety," said NTSB Acting Chairman Christopher A. Hart. "This is why it's crucial that the process by which these technologies are evaluated and certified is as robust and thorough as possible. These recommendations will take us further in that direction."

The final report on the January 2013 Boston 787 battery fire investigation is estimated to be completed in the fall.

The full text of the safety recommendation letter to the FAA is available at http://go.usa.gov/8XaV.

All of the information and resources the NTSB has released for this investigation can be accessed from the following page: http://go.usa.gov/4K4J.