Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Report of Findings Use of sensitive health information for targeting of Google ads raises privacy concerns January 14, 2014 The Privacy Commissioner of Canada


Report of FindingsUse of sensitive health information for targeting of Google ads raises privacy concerns

January 14, 2014

See also: News Release – Google ads sparked by web surfing on health sites violate privacy rights, investigation finds
Complaint under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (the Act)
On January 24, 2013, our Office accepted a complaint concerning the delivery of tailored advertisements, through Google Inc.’s (Google) AdSense service, relating to medical devices based on sites visited online.

More specifically, the complainant alleges that, since he had searched online for medical devices for sleep apnea [specifically, a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) device that is used during sleep], various websites that display advertisements from Google’s AdSense service often served him advertisements for CPAP devices. The complainant views his online activities relating to sleep apnea as sensitive information that should not be used for the delivery of targeted advertisements and should require his express consent.

Google was notified of the complaint on May 2, 2013. Representations were received from Google from June 20, 2013 through to December 6, 2013. On August 20, 2013, based on the results of our investigation, our Office issued a Preliminary Report of Investigation to Google (Preliminary Report). In our Preliminary Report, we made recommendations to Google with the aim of ensuring that it was meeting its obligations under the Act with respect to the issues our Office investigated. This Report of Findings reflects those recommendations and Google’s response.
Introduction
The complainant alleges to have been “followed” by advertisements for CPAP devices for up to a month following his online search using the Google search engine. The advertisements were displayed on websites that were unrelated to the search topic. The complainant was signed in to his Google account while performing the online search for sleep apnea devices.
In his initial representations, the complainant provided our Office with a screen capture of a CPAP advertisement displayed on a comic strip website.
The complainant indicated that he leaves his browser open continuously. He also indicated that he shuts down his computer every few days and then opens a new browser once he restarts his computer.
The complainant is of the view that he did not provide Google with consent to display his personal medical information in browsers. He feels that regardless of the fact that he was signed into his Google account, Google should never track users while they perform searches for medical conditions or other sensitive personal interests.
The complainant maintains that he was unable to locate contact information in order to attempt to resolve his concerns with Google directly. As such, he submitted the current complaint to our Office.
Summary of Investigation
A technical analysis was conducted by our Office to test and verify the complainant’s allegation.

For the testing, an interest in CPAP was induced by performing a Google search on the topic and then visiting the top 20-40 sites listed in the search results. To assess whether online behavioural advertising (OBA) was taking place, our Office then visited 9 different sites (test sites) that were unrelated to CPAP or sleep apnea (e.g., sites about news, weather, or reference information). These sites displayed Google advertisements.

The assessment of OBA was carried out by visiting the home page and a few subordinate pages for each test site. If an advertisement related to CPAP was displayed, a screen shot was taken and the presence of OBA was noted. The testing confirmed that CPAP ads were being delivered using OBA. That the content of the advertisements was generated using OBA became clear to our Office, given that CPAP related advertisements were seen immediately after CPAP-related sites were visited, and ads related to CPAP were prevalent on many of the test sites. In our Office’s view this eliminated the possibility of CPAP advertisements being delivered as a coincidence.

To test the persistence of the ads, the computers used for the testing were restarted repeatedly over a period of days, and the testing resumed where our Office had left off. Ads continued to be displayed after the computers were restarted.

The test sites were chosen arbitrarily and there is no reason to believe that the advertisements for CPAP devices would be limited to these sites hosting unrelated content.

The testing also confirmed that Google was the responsible party that placed the ads. We confirmed this using a free web browser plugin popular for web development and debugging. This tool allowed us to examine the instructions and code involved with placing the CPAP advertisements on test sites.

Our Office has issued two documents on OBA since 2011: Privacy and Online Behavioural Advertising (the OBA Guidelines), and Policy Position on Online Behavioural Advertising (the OBA Policy Position).

Our Office differentiates between certain types of advertising on the Internet. In our view, OBA involves an advertising service placing an advertisement on a webpage based on tracking data collected across multiple unrelated websites. This practice refers to using information about where a user has been. For example if a user has visited websites about pets in the past, then ads related to pets might be shown on various web sites, even sites that are not related to pets (e.g., an online newspaper). In contrast, we view contextual advertising as advertising using information about a user’s current visit to a website in order to serve a targeted advertisement to the user on that site. For example, if a user is visiting a website about pets, then ads related to pets might be shown to the user while visiting that website.
The Original Information provided by Google
Google’s advertising system is made up of two principle means of targeting ads online: interest based advertising and contextual advertising.
Interest based advertising (or OBA) involves the use of browser cookies and is based on the behaviour of the user. There are two types of interest based ads:
Ads based on categories of interests: There are several hundred customized categories of interest. Google’s automated system can add interest categories based on the user’s browsing of websites that are in Google’s publisher network. Users can view and edit the interest categories associated with their advertising cookie in the Ads Settings page and also have the ability to opt-out of interest based ads on that page. There are no interest categories related to ‘health’.
Ads based on remarketing: Remarketing allows an advertiser to build a custom list of users to which to target ads, based on user visits to that advertiser’s website, its customer lists, or other advertiser determined criteria.
Contextual advertising is advertising that is targeted based upon the page content, sometimes also called keyword advertising.
In its original representations to our Office, Google maintained that none of the ads delivered to the complainant involved OBA. Google further stated that, while the appearance of such ads may have led to the mistaken impression that they were placed as a result of interest-based or user profile targeting, that was not the case. Instead, such ads were based on recent or related page content that appeared out of context to the user.
Google explained that a technical issue with its keyword advertising system caused the complainant’s experience and took steps to remedy it.
Application of the Act
In making our determinations on this issue, we applied Principles 4.3 and 4.3.6 of Schedule 1 of the Act.
Principle 4.3 states that the knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate.
Principle 4.3.6 states that the way in which an organization seeks consent may vary, depending on the circumstances and the type of information collected. An organization should generally seek express consent when the information is likely to be considered sensitive. Implied consent would generally be appropriate when the information is less sensitive.
Analysis
With regard to the facts of this complaint, advertisements were delivered by Google to the complainant based on the context of the sites visited by the complainant, which appeared when the complainant visited unrelated websites. In our view, the delivery of such advertisements were consistent with the description of remarketing as highlighted above, as advertisements were ultimately placed on a webpage based on the complainant’s visits to other websites. This fits within our Office’s definition of OBA. As such, we consider Google’s delivery of ads that follow an individual user through his or her online activities to be OBA.
Even if our Office did accept Google’s position that the delivery of ads was not based on OBA, and instead based on recent or related page content, this does not concord with the complainant’s experience. The complainant indicated that he was followed over a period of a month, which is inconsistent with Google’s claim that advertisements are delivered based on pages recently visited during the same browsing session. Our technical analysis confirmed this, also showing that advertisements related to CPAP devices appeared for a week, representing the longest test period.
Google’s privacy policy states “[w]e use information collected from cookies and other technologies, like pixel tags, to improve your user experience and the overall quality of our services […] When showing you tailored ads, we will not associate a cookie or anonymous identifier with sensitive categories, such as those based on race, religion, sexual orientation or health”1.
Since we are of the view that the advertisements served by Google in this case were tailored based on a personal health interest, Google is delivering tailored ads in respect of a sensitive category, in this case, health. In our view, this practice does not correspond to the actual wording of the privacy policy as outlined above.
Our Office is of the view that meaningful consent is required for the delivery of OBA. As stated in our Office’s OBA guidelines, implied or opt-out consent for OBA purposes may be acceptable provided that the information collected and used is limited, to the extent practicable, tonon-sensitive information (avoiding sensitive information such as medical or health information).
The complainant was searching information related to a medical device used to treat sleep apnea. Given that this complaint relates to personal health information (i.e. online activities and viewing history of health related websites), our Office is of the view that such information is sensitive. Therefore, implied consent for the collection or use of the complainant’s sensitive personal health information for the purpose of delivering ads based on the complainant’s online behaviour is not appropriate, and express consent is required.
Since Google did not seek express consent in the circumstances, we are of the view that in this context, Google has contravened Principles 4.3 and 4.3.6 of the Act.
Our Office completed an additional round of testing prior to issuing the Preliminary Report and found that CPAP advertisements were still being delivered in a manner consistent with the results of the testing outlined above and the complainant’s allegations.
Recommendations
In our Preliminary Report, we recommended that Google confirm that it will bring itself into compliance with the Act and align its advertising with our Office’s OBA Guidelines. More specifically, we recommended that Google ensure that no sensitive interests will be used to deliver advertisements without express consent.
Revised Response from Google
In response Google provided additional written representations and also met with our Office. These discussions are summarized below.
Remarketing
Google indicated that it also observed that the ads in question continued to appear and concluded that the technical issue with its keyword advertising system did not account for the complainant’s experience with CPAP related advertising. It was caused instead by “remarketed ads”, a form of interest-based advertising.
Google provided our Office with the following technical account of its involvement in the execution of a remarketing ad campaign placed through Google AdWords. In order for remarketing to take place, an advertiser copies code from Google’s advertiser-facing interface and inputs that code on a webpage or pages related to the remarketing campaign. When a user visits that page, the code will run, making a request to Google’s system to add the user’s advertising cookie ID to the advertiser’s designated remarketing list. The user list is stored by Google. If there is no existing advertising cookie, Google will attempt to set one. If the user has opted out of interest-based advertising, there is no cookie ID to collect.
Advertisers also use Google’s services to develop the advertisement. An advertiser uses Google’s online tools to create a remarketing campaign. The information about the campaign (name, scope, advertising creatives, etc.) are input into this interface and stored by Google. When that user visits another webpage that uses Google’s advertising products, he or she will see an ad served by Google. If the remarketing campaign wins the automated auction2 process amongst the available advertising inventory, the user will be shown an ad from that remarketing campaign.
Google stated that remarketing criteria and user lists are determined by the advertiser directly. Google requires all advertisers using this platform to agree to specific policies, which prohibit all forms of interest based advertising involving sensitive categories, including the use of user lists based on “health or medical information”. According to Google, it is up to each remarketer to determine the application of Google’s policies to any proposed remarketing. Google indicated that, despite its policies and guidance, certain advertisers or third party buyers can use remarketing products in error.
When an advertiser uses Google’s system to set up remarketing, there is a reminder to advertisers: “review the remarketing program policy to find out what you need to include in your site’s privacy policy, and which sensitive categories of sites can’t use this feature” (with a link to the policy provided).
Google does allow remarketing for sites that are medical in nature so long as they do not imply that the users have a particular medical condition or disease.
Complaints
Interest based ads delivered via AdSense often include an AdChoices icon
(). Once a user clicks on the icon, they are linked to a page that explains Google’s delivery of ads. At the bottom of the page there is a section for users to submit feedback to Google (see below).


Leave feedback on the website or ad you just saw

The issues(s) were with: the ads

To send us feedback about an AdWords ad, please viste the AdWords ad feedback form.
Google revealed that it had received certain user complaints relating to the advertiser (the Advertiser) delivering the CPAP ads in the context of this complaint. Google further indicated that these complaints would have been reviewed and determined to be compliant with its policies, and therefore permitted to continue. However, after the involvement of our Office, Google took action to reject the Advertiser’s use of remarketing by applying its remarketing and interest based advertising policy.
Our Office repeated testing on a number of occasions since Google rejected the Advertiser’s use of remarketing and we continue to see the ongoing delivery of CPAP and sleep apnea ads from other advertisers. Our Office has raised this with Google and has been reassured that corrective action is ongoing to control the delivery of such ads.
Google indicated that when there is an issue regarding compliance with its policies, it endeavours to review the products and website(s) in question and determine the appropriate treatment for that advertiser. For cases involving a compliance issue, advertisers will typically receive a warning to fix the problem without getting their account suspended. However, in other cases when policies are broken repeatedly, or if the issue is considered very serious, Google can suspend an advertiser's account.
From our perspective, this online advertising ecosystem is complex and appears challenging to control given the existence of bad actors and the sheer volume of monitoring given the “billions of ads submitted to Google every year”3. Google has indicated that while it endeavors to obtain 100% compliance with its policies, some malicious advertisers continuously work to subvert or avoid its compliance mechanisms.
Monitoring
Google provided our Office with information on how it monitors and prevents abuses to its advertising system. Our Office recognizes that this information is sensitive and confidential, and if released, could enable malicious advertisers to attempt to subvert Google’s policy enforcement efforts or could be competitively harmful. For these reasons, we have not disclosed the specifics of Google’s compliance monitoring in this Report of Findings.
It is our view that the tools that Google had in place at the time of the complaint for monitoring were not scalable and had demonstrable shortcomings.
Based on the above-noted discussions we had with Google during the course of our investigation, our Office made further recommendations to Google that it should develop a more formalized and rigorous system for reviewing advertisements and addressing instances of non-compliance.
Google’s Proposed Remedial Measures
Google accepted our recommendations and undertook the following initiatives:
Google rejected all active remarketing campaigns involving CPAP devices. Specifically, Google periodically searched for remarketing campaigns that contained terms such as “CPAP” or “sleep apnea” within Google advertising products and rejected any new campaigns that violated its policies. Google continues to conduct these searches.

Google recognized that clarity in communicating its policies to advertisers was key given that advertisers create remarketing campaigns based on their own content. Google therefore committed to revising its public interest-based advertising policies to add additional information about medical devices — including CPAP devices in particular. Google agreed to revise its policies by the end of December 2013.
Google will develop new training for internal teams (including ads policy specialists and sales staff) to keep up to date with sensitive category ads policy, improve recognition of potential policy violations, and better understand how and when to escalate complaints and issues. According to Google the training will be rolled out in stages, with full coverage for its new training implemented by the end of March 2014.
Google has increased monitoring of existing remarketing campaigns, to better identify advertisers that have created campaigns that violate its policies. In particular, Google has increased searches of active remarketing campaigns for keywords relating to CPAP devices or other topics identified as potentially related to sensitive categories.
Google has committed to reviewing and upgrading its automated review systems. According to Google this system will be developed by the end of June 2014.
Conclusion
Our Office expects that, once implemented, Google’ proposed remedial measures as set out above will meet our recommendations and bring it in compliance with the Act. Accordingly, we conclude that the allegation iswell-founded and conditionally resolved.
Other
In the course of our investigation, we also raised with Google the complainant’s claim that he was unable to locate contact information in order to submit his complaint to Google. Although Google does have contact information available we encouraged them to take steps to increase transparency in this regard. Google confirmed that they share our interest in improving transparency and indicated that they were reviewing possible improvements.


[1] Google Privacy Policy. June 24, 2013.


[2] Google uses an automated auction process that determines the ads that appear to users, based on bids submitted by advertisers.


[3] Official Blog: Making our ads better for everyone. March 14, 2012.

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

National Council of Canadian Muslims files a notice of libel over comments by Jason MacDonald & PMO



A major Canadian Muslim group is demanding an apology from Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his chief spokesman for a comment it says linked the organization to the militant group Hamas.

The National Council of Canadian Muslims has filed a notice of libel in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that accuses Jason MacDonald of acting maliciously when he made the comment earlier this month.

The council had criticized the inclusion of a controversial rabbi in Harper's delegation that went to the Middle East last week.

"Rather than responding to our legitimate concerns, the PMO's director of communications attacked us and attempted to smear our name by claiming NCCM had 'documented ties to a terrorist organization such as Hamas,"' Ihsaan Gardee, the council's executive director, told a news conference Tuesday.

"Nothing could be further from the truth. NCCM will not let the PMO's false statement stand."

The council says MacDonald's comment was a deliberate attempt to discredit the group and Harper is responsible for the words uttered by his spokesman.

The libel notice is the first step in what could become a formal lawsuit.

The Prime Minister's Office responded tersely: "As this matter may be the subject of litigation, we have no further comment."
Further legal action possible

Further legal action is possible, said Nader Hassan, lawyer for the council.

"Whether we go through with the lawsuit is going to depend on a number of factors, namely the quality, timing and content of the public apology and retraction," he said.

Gardee said MacDonald's comment was "categorically false, offensive and defamatory."

The libel notice said MacDonald's statement was unwarranted.

"The defamatory words were stated maliciously in order to discredit and insult an organization that did nothing other than exercise its constitutional right to freedom of expression to criticize a decision made by the prime minister," it said.

"Mr. MacDonald simply made up that statement in an effort to discredit NCCM and deflect its criticism of Mr. Harper."

The council describes itself as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit group which has worked for 14 years on human rights and civil liberties issues on behalf of Canadian Muslims.

A half-dozen other rights groups, including the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian Association of University Teachers, have offered support to the Muslim group.

Farhat Rehman of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women said more than just the council was impacted by the remark.

"This defamation endangers the very valuable work of NCCM and goes against every Canadian democratic principle," she said.

"Further, it exposes the members of NCCM and the whole Muslim community to suspicion, hatred and bigotry."

Monday, January 27, 2014

problems with Boeing 737 next generation with structural dangers report...















SBS news reporting of hazards with the 737 boeing air crafts when made in 2002 reporting dangerous workmanship and not building to government standards and people who whisle blew got saked. boeing aircrafts have safely issues not dealt with and over looked.

Friday, January 24, 2014

Boeing battery compartment vent incident 787



Nearly nine months after it returned to the sky and its battery system was declared safe, new reports surfaced Tuesday of smoke aboard a Boeing 787 Dreamliner at Tokyo's Narita International Airport.


The incident "appears to have involved the venting of a single battery cell," aboard a Japan Airlines 787, Boeing told CNN in a statement. A year ago, overheated batteries aboard two Dreamliners prompted aviation officials to ground all 50 of the planes worldwide.


Tuesday's incident "occurred during scheduled maintenance activities with no passengers on board," the Boeing statement said. "The improvements made to the 787 battery system last year appear to have worked as designed." Boeing said it was working with Japan Airlines to return the plane to service.


Japan Airlines and the government's Japanese Aviation Bureau told CNN Tuesday night that the battery unit was removed from the aircraft to be handed over to manufacturers Boeing/Yuasa for further investigation. The airline told Flightglobal that the plane sustained no damage. JAL is monitoring their other 787s as a precautionary measure, Flightglobal reported.


Boeing's stake in the Dreamliner is huge. Hundreds of millions of dollars are riding on the success of the 787, which represents a new generation of lighter, more efficient money making planes.


Boeing issues warning


When it began service in 2011, the Dreamliner boasted a new battery system that used new, lighter lithium-ion batteries. After the planes were grounded, Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration collaborated on a new battery compartment. The compartment was designed to insulate the batteries in a ventilated armor-plated box to protect the rest of the plane in case of a fire caused by overheating batteries. The NTSB announced this month it plans to issue a final investigation report later this fall.


Interactive diagram of the 787


The National Transportation Safety Board said it was aware of Tuesday's battery incident in Japan.


"By international treaty, aviation accidents and incidents are investigated by the investigative authority in the country in which the accident or incident occurred.


"If the Japan Transport Safety Board opens an investigation into the battery smoke event, the NTSB stands ready to assist," the U.S. agency said in a statement.


In July 2013, investigators blamed a fire aboard an empty Ethiopian Airlines 787 parked at London's Heathrow airport on a malfunctioning emergency beacon.


Tuesday's incident comes nearly two months after Boeing warned airlines about another 787 concern: possible icing problems in its GE engines.


The aircraft manufacturer alerted 787 operators after instances of "ice crystal icing that resulted in temporary diminished engine performance," Boeing said in a statement.


Although it said only a small number of the engines have experienced the ice problems, Boeing advised pilots to keep planes at least 50 nautical miles from storms that may contain ice crystals until General Electric can make improvements to the "GEnx" engines.


The Dreamliner's development was marked by production delays and other problems. Then, a year ago this month, batteries were blamed for two overheating instances on a Japan Airlines 787 in Boston and on an All Nippon Airways 787 in Japan. No one was hurt in either case, but concerns about the incidents spurred the FAA to ground all U.S. Dreamliners. Officials around the world followed suit.


Experts say every airliner experiences "teething pains" during its first few years of service, as minor problems are shaken out. But the FAA's decision to ground the Dreamliner put it under intense scrutiny.


United Airlines is the lone U.S. operator of Boeing 787s.





In an apparent show of confidence in July, United announced it was ordering 20 new 787-10 models, which are a longer version of the plane.

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

Saturday, January 18, 2014

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2013 ONCA 750 DATE: 20131212 DOCKET: C5548

CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2013 ONCA 750
DATE: 20131212
DOCKET: C55486
Doherty, Blair and Watt JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Neil Singh
Appellant
Anil Kapoor and Lindsay Daviau, for the appellant
Amy Alyea, for the respondent
Heard: October 18, 2013
On appeal from the conviction entered on December 9, 2011 and the sentence imposed on July 27, 2012 by Justice Julie A. Thorburn of the Superior Court of Justice, with reasons for sentence reported at 2012 ONSC 4429, sitting with a jury.
R.A. Blair J.A.:
Introduction
[1]          Canadian society cannot tolerate – and the courts cannot permit – police officers to beat suspects in order to obtain confessions.  Yet, sadly, that is precisely what happened in this case.  One of the two police officers who participated in the beatings apparently thought, as he said, that “it’s part of [his] job” to do so.
[2]          It is not.
[3]          Respectfully, the trial judge erred in failing to grant a stay, and I would allow the appeal on that basis for the following reasons. 
Background
[4]          On February 9, 2009, two or more assailants robbed Crane Supply of approximately $350,000 worth of copper piping.  During the heist a Crane employee was confronted by one of the robbers (not the appellant) in the warehouse office.  He was bound up with zip ties and duct tape, and threatened with what he believed to be a handgun.  A second robber (alleged to have been the appellant) loaded the copper piping into a vehicle, operating the forklift used for that purpose in a way that made the bound employee think the operator was familiar with the warehouse.  The appellant was also a Crane employee and had left work only a short time before the robbery occurred. 
[5]          After the robbers left, the bound employee managed to free himself and called 911. The appellant and a co-accused, Randy Maharaj, were arrested some months later.  Both were charged with robbery and unlawful confinement.  Both alleged police brutality in relation to the statements obtained from them.  Maharaj suffered serious injuries, including a fractured rib.  The appellant was less seriously injured.
[6]          The Crown stayed the charges against Maharaj.  The appellant’s trial proceeded, however, and he was convicted on both counts.  The statement he ultimately gave to police was exculpatory, but there was circumstantial evidence upon which it was open to the jury to convict. 
[7]          After conviction, and before sentencing, the appellant applied for a stay of the convictions pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that his rights under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter had been violated.  Section 7 protects life, liberty and security of the person.  Section 12 protects against cruel and unusual punishment.
[8]          The trial judge dismissed the application: R. v. Singh, 2012 ONSC 2028.   Although she recognized that the conduct of the police was egregious – and the Crown conceded that the appellant’s Charter rights had been violated – the trial judge concluded that the violation could be remedied by a reduction in the sentence imposed.  At sentencing, she reduced what would otherwise have been a sentence of 6 ½ years’ incarceration to one of 5 ½ years “in consideration of the police misconduct”: R. v. Singh, at para. 78.
[9]          The appellant seeks to set aside his conviction on a number of grounds.  He also seeks to appeal the sentence imposed.  In my view, the appeal can be determined on the basis of the trial judge’s failure to grant a stay.  It is therefore unnecessary to address the other grounds, including the appeal from sentence.
The Beatings
[10]       The appellant testified that he was beaten on three separate occasions over an extended period of time, prior to giving what turned out to be a generally exculpatory statement.  Three police officers were involved: Detective Constable Jamie Clark, Detective Steve Watts, and Detective Donald Belanger.  D.C. Clark was the principal administrator of the actual beatings, while Detective Watts appears to have been the police presence in the room; he did nothing to intervene and did his best otherwise to persuade the appellant to confess.  Detective Belanger’s role was that of “good cop” in relation to the interrogation of the appellant, although he appears to have been active as an aggressor in the case of Maharaj, who also testified on the stay hearing.
[11]       The evidence of the appellant and Maharaj with respect to the assaults was not contested.  None of the police officers testified and the Crown called no other evidence to counter that tendered on behalf of the appellant.  Nor does the Crown contest that evidence on appeal.  It therefore provides the factual framework for what actually happened.
The First Assault
[12]       The appellant was arrested at his workplace on June 11, 2009, several months after the robbery occurred.
[13]       After his arrest, D.C. Clark and Detective Watts brought the appellant to the police station and placed the appellant in an interrogation room.  They strip searched him, and then left him alone.  About 15 minutes later they returned and began questioning the appellant about the robbery.  The appellant denied any involvement.  He also denied knowing Maharaj (a statement that was not true).
[14]       D.C Clark responded violently to these denials.  He struck the appellant on the back of the head five or six times and kneed him in the ribs once or twice, all the while telling the appellant he was lying about not knowing Maharaj. The attack lasted for up to two minutes, during which the appellant was pinned against the wall of the interrogation room.  D.C. Clark and Detective Watts then left the room.
[15]       About five minutes later, Detective Belanger came into the room.  The appellant described him as nice and seemingly genuinely concerned.  Detective Belanger told the appellant that “[he should] make sure [he had] something to say or else they’re coming back”.  The appellant denied knowing anything about the robbery.  Detective Belanger left the room simply shaking his head.
The Second Assault
[16]       Sometime later, D.C. Clark and Detective Watts re-appeared.  They asked if the appellant was ready to talk.  He told them that he ready to talk, but not about the robbery since he knew nothing about it.
[17]       D.C. Clark again responded with force.
[18]       He grabbed the appellant’s neck, squeezing his throat and slamming his head against the wall.  He said to the appellant: “This is what it feels like when you wave guns in people’s faces.”  The squeezing was forceful enough that the appellant was unable to breathe and felt that he was about to black out, but D.C. Clark let go before he did.  The punching continued, however.  D.C. Clark hit the appellant forcefully on the back with his fist several times, and demanded that the appellant tell them what happened in the robbery.  Finally the officers left.  As they did they stated “I bet you would talk if Randy [Maharaj] was here”, and said they would be back.
[19]       Detective Belanger later returned.  The appellant was crying.  Detective Belanger advised him to “tell them something, tell them anything or else they’re going to come back.”  Receiving no response, he left.
The Third Assault
[20]       Ten or fifteen minutes later Detective Watts and D.C. Clark opened the door and said “Look.”  Maharaj was between them.  The door then closed and the appellant was left alone again.  Maharaj corroborated this in his testimony, observing that the appellant looked as though he had been in a fight.
[21]       Sometime later, Detective Watts and D.C. Clark returned to the interrogation room.  D.C. Clark told the appellant he was lying, and claimed Maharaj had given a statement implicating the appellant in the robbery.  The appellant denied he was lying.  D.C. Clark then asked: “What does zip ties mean?”[1]  The appellant said he didn’t know.  D.C. Clark then began to administer another prolonged beating, hitting the appellant forcefully on the back of the head and on his back many times – sometimes with an open fist, sometimes with a closed fist.  He testified he was in such pain at the time that he felt he could not go on and began to beg the officers just to kill him.
[22]       The officers then left the room.
The Apology
[23]       An hour later, D.C. Clark returned alone.  He apologized to the appellant, saying: “I am sorry for what I did to you.  It’s part of my job.”  At this point D.C. Clark gave the appellant a bottle of water, a chicken sandwich and a towel.  He told the appellant he believed him but wanted the appellant to make a statement on video.
The Video Statement
[24]       After being given the opportunity to go to the washroom and clean himself up – the trial judge remarked that it was not possible to determine from the video what injuries he had received – the appellant prepared to give a statement.  Before doing so, he was told by D.C. Clark that if he said “Yes” when asked on the video if he wanted to speak to a lawyer, they would make sure that he was charged.  During the video statement the appellant said he did not want a lawyer and denied having anything to do with the robbery.  The video statement was exculpatory.
[25]       In spite of the foregoing, the appellant did not seek medical attention until July 10, 2009, ten days after he was released from custody, when he visited his family doctor and complained of neck pain.  As noted, however, the Crown does not dispute the foregoing narrative.
The Maharaj Assaults
[26]       Randy Maharaj was also beaten.  While the stay here is not sought in relation to the charges against him – as noted, the Crown voluntarily sought a stay of those proceedings – the Maharaj assaults are relevant for the light they shed upon the pattern of conduct of the police officers involved.
[27]       D.C. Clark was once again the principal actor in the assaults, but Detective Belanger participated as well.  This time it was Detective Watts who played the “good cop” role.
[28]       After being given the opportunity to speak with duty counsel, Maharaj was taken from the interrogation room, where he saw the appellant, who, according to Maharaj, appeared as if he had been in a fight.  He was then returned to the interrogation room, where he was initially reluctant to make a video statement based on his advice from duty counsel, but changed his mind and agreed to make a statement on videotape.  However, after being moved to the video room, he changed his mind and advised D.C. Clark and Detective Belanger that he did not wish to make a video statement.  In his words, “that didn’t go over too well.”
[29]       D.C. Clark reacted violently again.  He grabbed Maharaj, pulled him out of his chair, and dragged him into an adjoining room – undoubtedly one without a video camera – where he pushed Maharaj to the ground, fell on top of him, and began punching him in the ribs for an extended period of time.  At the same time, Detective Belanger attempted to grab hold of Maharaj’s leg and step on his testicles.  D.C. Clark added an oral element to the intimidation and assault: he said, “[O]h, you don’t want to make a statement? You don’t want to make a statement? You’re going to make a statement.  We’ll make sure you make a statement … I hope you’re tougher than your buddy.”  As the trial judge noted, Maharaj screamed loudly enough that someone opened the door, and the beating stopped.
[30]       Maharaj was then returned to the original interrogation room, and then escorted to the room where the beatings occurred.  There, Maharaj was shown a portion of the appellant’s videotaped statement.  D.C. Clark and Detective Belanger assured Maharaj that “[his] buddy [had] talked.  He told us everything.  Now you’re [screwed].”  While being escorted back to the original holding room, Maharaj was intercepted by Detective Watts who requested to speak to Maharaj alone.  He was advised by Detective Watts that he should make a statement because, if he did not, Detective Watts would not be able to protect him from Detective Belanger and D.C. Clark. Maharaj testified that, fearing another beating, he agreed to give a statement.  He was told that if he did so, he should say that he did not wish to have counsel. 
[31]       Maharaj gave an inculpatory statement, admitting his involvement in the robbery (which he later said was not true).  He required medical attention for various bumps, scratches and bruises and sore ribs.  X-rays subsequently revealed that he had suffered an acute fracture to the seventh rib on his left side.
The Crown Evidence with respect to the Beatings
[32]       It bears repeating that none of the foregoing evidence was contradicted or contested by the Crown.  The primary argument appears to have been that the appellant was not permanently injured (and may have been exaggerating his injuries) and therefore was not the victim of police misconduct sufficiently serious to warrant a stay of proceedings.
Decision below - The Trial Judge’s Decision on the Application for Stay
[33]       The trial judge recognized the egregious nature of the police misconduct.  Indeed, she accurately characterized it as “thoroughly reprehensible behavior on the part of those acting on behalf of the state”. She concluded, nonetheless, that the beatings did not warrant a stay of the convictions in the circumstances.  Her reasons were essentially three-fold: first, the police brutality had not affected the fairness of the trial (the defence conceded this); secondly, the appellant’s injuries “were not permanent or lasting nor did they result in serious harm”; and, thirdly, the appellant had been convicted of two very serious charges. She also concluded that there were very few cases in Canadian jurisprudence where a stay has been imposed solely as a remedy for police brutality.
Analysis
[34]       On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Kapoor accepts that the trial judge’s decision not to impose a stay of the conviction was discretionary and that the decision should be disturbed on appeal “only if the trial judge misdirects [herself] or if [her] decision is so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice”: R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 117; R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509, at paras. 17-19.  He submits, however, that the state misconduct here was so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in light of it would be so offensive to society that a stay of the conviction is warranted in the circumstances.
[35]       I agree.
[36]       In substance, the trial judge concluded that because trial fairness issues were admittedly not in play, and because the appellant’s injuries did not result in serious harm, a stay was not warranted.  However, the analysis is incomplete at that point.  In my view, the trial judge was required as well to direct her mind to the nature of the police misconduct in the context of its potential systemic ramifications and the need to consider its impact upon the integrity of the administration of justice.  Respectfully, she failed to do so.  In my opinion, this constituted an error in principle overriding the deference to which her decision would otherwise be entitled.
[37]       To be sure, the granting of a stay of proceedings as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter often turns on trial fairness issues.  But the remedy is not limited to cases where those kinds of issues are implicated.  In the seminal case of R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that there is a residual category of cases that do not impinge on trial fairness – albeit relatively narrow in application –  where a stay may be appropriate. This was confirmed in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 89, where the Court said:
Most often a stay of proceedings is sought to remedy some unfairness to the individual that has resulted from state misconduct. However, there is a "residual category" of cases in which a stay may be warranted. L'Heureux-Dubé J. described it this way, in R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 73:
This residual category does not relate to conduct affecting the fairness of the trial or impairing other procedural rights enumerated in the Charter, but instead addresses the panoply of diverse and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances in which a prosecution is conducted in such a manner as to connote unfairness or vexatiousness of such a degree that it contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
[38]       That is not to detract from the general principle – confirmed in O’Connor, at para. 75, and Tobiass, at para. 90, and accepted by the trial judge – that two criteria must be satisfied for a stay to be granted:
(i) The prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome; and
(ii) No other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that prejudice.
[39]       Tobiass also clarified that the first of these criteria must be satisfied even in cases where – as here – the improper conduct falls into the residual category.  That is because a stay of proceedings is not designed to redress a wrong already committed; rather, it is a prospective remedy designed “to prevent the perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble the parties and the community as a whole in the future.”  As the Court explained in the same passage, at para. 91:
For a stay of proceedings to be appropriate in a case falling into the residual category, it must appear that the state misconduct is likely to continue in the future or that the carrying forward of the prosecution will offend society’s sense of justice…. There may be exceptional cases in which the past misconduct is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the light of it will be offensive.  But such cases should be relatively very rare.
And further, at para. 96:
Admittedly, if the past abuse were serious enough, then public confidence in the administration of justice could be so undermined that the mere fact of carrying forward in the light of it would constitute a new and ongoing abuse sufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings.  However, only an exceedingly serious abuse could ever bring such continuing disrepute upon the administration of justice. It is conceivable, we suppose, that something so traumatic could be done to an individual in the course of a proceeding that to continue the prosecution of him, even in an otherwise unexceptional manner, would be unfair.  Similarly, if the authorities were to fabricate and plant evidence at the scene of a crime, continued pursuit of a criminal prosecution might well be damaging to the integrity of the judicial system.
                                                          [Emphasis added.]
[40]       In my opinion, this is one of those rare cases.
[41]       The trial judge was partially influenced by a dearth of authorities in analogous situations.  At paragraph 49 of her reasons on the stay application she said:
There are few cases in Canadian jurisprudence where a stay has been imposed solely as a remedy for police brutality.  The parties were unable to provide me with a case where in circumstances involving equally serious charges in the absence of trial fairness issues and very serious injuries, a stay of proceedings was ordered.
[42]       The serious nature of the charges in question, the absence of trial fairness issues, and the nature of the injuries inflicted are all important factors in the balancing exercise that leads to the grant or refusal of a stay of proceedings.  None is controlling, however, where – as here – the conduct involved goes to the heart of the integrity of the justice system.  I do not think it is necessary, therefore, to canvass the jurisprudence in search of the perfectly analogous precedent in order to compare factual situations in other circumstances and the outcomes of those situations. Each case must be determined in the context of its own factual matrix.  This case calls for the imposition of a stay.
[43]       What occurred here was not a momentary overreaction by a police officer caught up in the moment of a difficult interrogation.  What occurred here was the administration of a calculated, prolonged and skillfully choreographed investigative technique developed by these officers to secure evidence.  This technique involved the deliberate and repeated use of intimidation, threats and violence, coupled with what can only be described as a systematic breach of the constitutional rights of detained persons – including the denial of their rights to counsel.[2]   It would be naïve to suppose that this type of egregious conduct, on the part of these officers, would be confined to an isolated incident.
[44]       The courts must not condone such an approach to interrogation.  Real life in the police services is not a television drama.  What took place here sullies the reputations of the many good officers in our country, whose work is integral to the safety and security of our society. 
[45]       Nor does it appear that these officers have been called to account in any meaningful way, although the trial judge made it plain that, in her view, they should be.  We were told that an internal investigation was undertaken by the police but that it ceased when the victims, not surprisingly, were unwilling to cooperate.  Crown counsel was not able to advise of any charges, disciplinary measures, or other consequences flowing from the investigation. 
[46]       Yet the police had provided no response to the testimony of the appellant and Maharaj on the stay hearing.  Indeed, they have not done so to this day. The absence of any meaningful disciplinary measures is telling, in my view, because the inability or refusal of the police to muster a pointed response in the face of such unchallenged allegations of serious criminal conduct by state actors during a criminal investigation makes the case for a stay under the residual category all the more compelling. Just as the fabrication of evidence by the police violates the integrity of the administration of justice, so too does the police misconduct in question here.  Notwithstanding the absence of prejudice to trial fairness, this is, in my view, the very type of conduct “that the mere act of carrying forward in the light of it would constitute a new and ongoing abuse sufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings.” 
[47]       This view is reinforced by the more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Bellusci.  There, a prison guard assaulted and injured the accused when the accused was, at the time, chained, handcuffed, defenceless and shackled in a secure cell in a prison van while being transported with other prisoners to a penitentiary.  The prison guard had disclosed to the other prisoners that the accused was charged with rape.  In return, the accused threatened to rape the prison guard’s wife and children.  In spite of the provocation, the Court held that the prison guard’s “egregious breach” of the accused’s constitutional rights warranted a stay of a conviction of a charge of intimidating the prison guard.
[48]       I come to the same conclusion in these circumstances.  Balancing all of the competing interests at play in contemplating a stay of proceedings – the seriousness of the offence and society’s interest in upholding a conviction, the integrity of the justice system, and the nature and gravity of the violation of the appellant’s rights – I am satisfied that a stay is warranted and should have been imposed.  The state misconduct was a flagrant breach of the appellant’s Charter-protected rights.  The prolonged and grave nature of the beatings, and the careful choreography underlying them, suggest a pattern of misconduct on the part of D.C. Clark and Detectives Watts and Belanger that has systemic implications.  That similar assaults were committed against the appellant’s co-accused reinforces this concern.   
[49]       To adopt the language of Tobiass, cited above, a stay of the convictions is necessary “to prevent the perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble the parties and the community as a whole in the future.”
Disposition
[50]       For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal and grant a stay of the convictions entered against Mr. Singh.
“R.A. Blair J.A.”
“I agree D. Doherty J.A.”
“I agree David Watt J.A.”
Released: December 12, 2013


[1] Recall that zip ties had been used to tie up the employee in Crane’s office.
[2] Indeed, the conduct in this case might well be characterized as “torture” as that term is defined in s. 269.1(2) of the Criminal Code.