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Saturday, October 19, 2013
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA Date: 20131017 Docket: 34816
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v. Ontario (Environment), 2013 SCC 52.
Date: 20131017
Docket: 34816
Between:
Castonguay Blasting Ltd.
Appellant
and
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario as represented
by the Minister of the Environment
Respondent
- and -
Canadian Environmental Law Association and Lake Ontario Waterkeeper
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 41)
Abella J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring)
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
castonguay blasting ltd. v. ontario (environment)
Castonguay Blasting Ltd. Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario
as represented by the Minister of the Environment Respondent
and
Canadian Environmental Law Association and
Lake Ontario Waterkeeper Interveners
Indexed as: Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v. Ontario (Environment)
2013 SCC 52
File No.: 34816.
2013: May 17; 2013: October 17.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Environmental law — Offences — Obligation to report to Ministry of Environment discharge of contaminant into natural environment — Subcontractor’s blasting operations propelling rock debris into air, damaging home and car — Subcontractor failing to report to Ministry of Environment discharge of contaminant — Whether reporting requirement triggered in this case — Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 15(1).
The appellant C was conducting blasting operations for a highway‑widening project when the operation went awry and rock debris known as “fly‑rock” was propelled into the air by an explosion. The fly‑rock shot approximately 90 metres in the air and damaged a home and a car. A significant amount of rock also landed in the yard. C did not report the incident to the Ministry of the Environment (“Ministry”) and was subsequently charged with failing to report to the Ministry the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment contrary to s. 15(1) of the Environmental Protection Act (“EPA”). C was acquitted by the Ontario Court of Justice. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction. A majority in the Court of Appeal dismissed C’s appeal.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act requires that the Ministry of the Environment be immediately notified when a contaminant is discharged into the environment. There are two pre‑conditions to this reporting requirement — the discharge must have been out of the normal course of events and it must have had — or was likely to have — an adverse environmental impact. The purpose of the requirement is to let the Ministry know about potential environmental damage so that any consequential remedial steps can be taken in a timely way.
The EPA is Ontario’s principal environmental protection statute. Its status as remedial legislation entitles it to a generous interpretation. Environmental protection is a complex subject matter — the environment itself and the wide range of activities which might harm it are not easily conducive to precise codification. As a result, environmental legislation embraces an expansive approach to ensure that it can adequately respond to a variety of environmentally harmful scenarios, including ones which might not have been foreseen by the drafters of the legislation. Because the legislature is pursuing the objective of environmental protection, its intended reach is wide and deep.
The overall purpose of the EPA is set out in s. 3: “The purpose of this Act is to provide for the protection and conservation of the natural environment”. The EPA also protects those who use the natural environment by protecting human health, plant and animal life, and property. The EPA seeks to achieve its goal of protecting the natural environment and those who use it through a series of regulations, prohibitions and reporting requirements. It also provides for a wide range of inspection, enforcement, preventative and remedial powers.
One of the means by which the EPA promotes its protective and preventative purposes is through the prohibition in s. 14(1) against discharging a contaminant into the natural environment where it is likely to have an “adverse effect”. This purpose is reinforced by the related requirement in s. 15(1) that any such discharge which is out of the normal course of events be reported to the Ministry of the Environment.
When a contaminant is discharged, the discharger may not know the full extent of the damage caused or likely to be caused. The purpose of the reporting requirement in s. 15(1) is to ensure that it is the Ministry, and not the discharger, who decides what, if any, further steps are required. Moreover, many potential harms may be difficult to detect without the expertise and resources of the Ministry. As a result, the statute places both the obligation to investigate and the decision about what further steps are necessary with the Ministry and not the discharger. Notification provides the Ministry with the opportunity to conduct an inspection as quickly as possible and to obtain information in order to take any necessary remedial action and to fulfill its statutory mandate. This enables the Ministry to respond in a timely way to the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment and to be involved in determining what, if any, preventative or remedial measures are appropriate.
“Adverse effect” is defined in s. 1(1) of the EPA. It has eight definitional components. These eight branches of the definition reflect a statutory recognition that protecting the natural environment requires, among other strategies, maximizing the circumstances in which the Ministry of the Environment may investigate and remedy environmental harms. Each of the eight branches provides an independent trigger for the duty to report.
Section 15(1) of the EPA was clearly engaged in the circumstances of this case and C was required to report the discharge of fly‑rock forthwith to the Ministry of the Environment. C “discharged” fly‑rock into the “natural environment”, and there is no doubt that fly‑rock meets the definition of “contaminant”. The discharge was “out of the normal course of events”, and it caused an “adverse effect” under the definition of that term in s. 1(1), namely, it caused injury or damage to property and loss of enjoyment of the normal use of property. The adverse effects were not trivial. The force of the blast, and the rocks it produced, were so powerful they caused extensive and significant property damage, penetrating the roof of a residence and landing in the kitchen. A vehicle was also seriously damaged. The fly‑rock could easily have seriously injured or killed someone. Accordingly, C was required to report the discharge of fly‑rock forthwith to the Ministry of Environment under s. 15(1) of the EPA.
Cases Cited
Referred to: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031; R. v. Dow Chemical Canada Inc. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 577; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, s. 13(1).
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E‑19, ss. 1(1) “adverse effect”, “contaminant”, “discharge”, “natural environment”, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15(1), 17, 18, 91.1, 92, 93, 94, 97, 132, 156, 157, 157.1.
Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, s. 64.
Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, s. 53.
Authors Cited
McIntyre, Owen, and Thomas Mosedale. “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law” (1997), 9 J. Envtl. L. 221.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (MacPherson, Simmons and Blair JJ.A.), 2012 ONCA 165, 109 O.R. (3d) 401, 289 O.A.C. 146, 65 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 10 C.L.R. (4th) 165, [2012] O.J. No. 1161 (QL), 2012 CarswellOnt 2199, affirming a decision of Ray J., 2011 ONSC 767, 57 C.E.L.R. (3d) 142, 226 C.R.R. (2d) 180, [2011] O.J. No. 364 (QL), 2011 CarswellOnt 467, which set aside a decision of Hunter J., 53 C.E.L.R. (3d) 140, [2010] O.J. No. 5713 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt 6245. Appeal dismissed.
J. Bruce McMeekin, Andrea Farkouh and Marie‑France Major, for the appellant.
Sara Blake, Paul McCulloch and Danielle Meuleman, for the respondent.
Joseph F. Castrilli and Ramani Nadarajah, for the interveners.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Abella J. —
[1] Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 19 (“EPA”), requires that the Ministry of the Environment be immediately notified when a contaminant is discharged into the environment. There are two pre-conditions to this reporting requirement — the discharge must have been out of the normal course of events and it must have had — or was likely to have — an adverse environmental impact. The purpose of the requirement is to let the Ministry know about potential environmental damage so that any consequential remedial steps can be taken in a timely way.
[2] The interpretive exercise engaged in this appeal is to determine when the reporting requirement is triggered. In my view, there is clarity both of legislative purpose and language: the Ministry of the Environment must be notified when there has been a discharge of a contaminant out of the normal course of events without waiting for proof that the natural environment has, in fact, been impaired. In other words: when in doubt, report.
Background
[3] In 2007, Castonguay Blasting Ltd. was hired as a subcontractor to conduct blasting operations for a highway-widening project commissioned by the Ontario Ministry of Transportation.
[4] On November 26, 2007, Castonguay was blasting rock when the operation went awry and rock debris known as “fly-rock” was propelled into the air by an explosion. Had the blast been carried out according to plan, the force of the blast would have been contained and concentrated inwards, reducing the risk of shattered rock becoming airborne. In this case, however, the fly-rock shot approximately 90 metres in the air and crashed through the roof of a home, damaging the kitchen ceiling, the siding and the eavestroughs. Some of the fly-rock hit a car, breaking the windshield and damaging the hood. There was also a significant amount of rock in the yard.
[5] Castonguay immediately reported the incident to the contract administrator, who in turn reported it to the Ministry of Transportation (which had commissioned the project) and the provincial Ministry of Labour in accordance with the requirements in s. 53 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1. Further blasting on the project stopped until the site was inspected and remedial steps were agreed to with the Ministry of Labour.
[6] Castonguay did not report the incident to the Ministry of the Environment. That Ministry was not notified until May 2008, when it was told about the incident by the Ministry of Transportation.
[7] In September 2009, Castonguay was charged with failing to report the “discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment” to the Ministry of the Environment contrary to s. 15(1) of the EPA. Castonguay was acquitted by the Ontario Court of Justice. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction (2011 ONSC 767, 57 C.E.L.R. (3d) 142). Castonguay appealed on the basis that s. 15(1) was not triggered in these circumstances.
[8] In the Court of Appeal (2012 ONCA 165, 109 O.R. (3d) 401), MacPherson J.A., writing for the majority, concluded that the plain meaning of the relevant provisions of the EPA, the relevant case law, and a proper understanding of the broad purposes of the EPA confirmed that the discharge of the fly-rock in this case was covered by s. 15(1) of the EPA and that Castonguay was therefore required to report the incident to the Ministry of the Environment. In dissent, Blair J.A. found no breach of s. 15(1) in these circumstances. I agree with the majority that Castonguay was required to report the incident.
Analysis
[9] The EPA is Ontario’s principal environmental protection statute. Its status as remedial legislation entitles it to a generous interpretation (Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, s. 64; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, at para. 84). Moreover, as this Court recognized in Canadian Pacific, environmental protection is a complex subject matter — the environment itself and the wide range of activities which might harm it are not easily conducive to precise codification ( para. 43). As a result, environmental legislation embraces an expansive approach to ensure that it can adequately respond “to a wide variety of environmentally harmful scenarios, including ones which might not have been foreseen by the drafters of the legislation” (para. 43). Because the legislature is pursuing the objective of environmental protection, its intended reach is wide and deep (para. 84).
[10] The overall purpose of the EPA is set out in s. 3: “The purpose of this Act is to provide for the protection and conservation of the natural environment”. “[N]atural environment” is defined in s. 1(1) as the “air, land and water, or any combination or part thereof, of the Province of Ontario”. The EPA also protects those whouse the natural environment by protecting human health, plant and animal life, and property. This purpose was aptly summarized by MacPherson J.A. in R. v. Dow Chemical Canada Inc. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), as being “to protect the natural environment and the people who live, work and play in it” (para. 49).
[11] The EPA seeks to achieve its goal of protecting the natural environment and those who use it through a series of regulations, prohibitions and reporting requirements. It also provides for a wide range of inspection, enforcement, preventative and remedial powers, such as the authority to issue control orders (s. 7), stop orders (s. 8), orders requiring the repair of damage (s. 17), preventative measure orders requiring steps to ensure that a discharge does not occur or recur (s. 18), or contravention orders requiring a discharger to take compliance steps (s. 157).
[12] One of the means by which the EPA promotes its protective and preventative purposes is through the prohibition in s. 14(1) against discharging a contaminant into the natural environment where it is likely to have an adverse effect, and the related requirement in s. 15(1) that any such discharge which is out of the normal course of events be reported to the Ministry of the Environment.
[13] The issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of the reporting requirement in s. 15(1). This provision states:
15. — (1) Every person who discharges a contaminant or causes or permits the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment shall forthwith notify the Ministry if the discharge is out of the normal course of events, the discharge causes or is likely to cause an adverse effect and the person is not otherwise required to notify the Ministry under section 92.
[14] The terms “discharge”, “contaminant”, “natural environment” and “adverse effect” are defined in s. 1(1) of the EPA, as follows:
“natural environment” means the air, land and water, or any combination or part thereof, of the Province of Ontario;
“discharge”, when used as a verb, includes add, deposit, leak or emit and, when used as a noun, includes addition, deposit, emission or leak;
“contaminant” means any solid, liquid, gas, odour, heat, sound, vibration, radiation or combination of any of them resulting directly or indirectly from human activities that causes or may cause an adverse effect;
“adverse effect” means one or more of,
(a) impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it,
(b) injury or damage to property or to plant or animal life,
(c) harm or material discomfort to any person,
(d) an adverse effect on the health of any person,
(e) impairment of the safety of any person,
(f) rendering any property or plant or animal life unfit for human use,
(g) loss of enjoyment of normal use of property, and
(h) interference with the normal conduct of business;
[15] Castonguay conceded that the discharge of fly-rock caused property damage, but argued that injury or damage to private property alone is insufficient to engage the reporting requirement. Since the discharge did not impair the natural environment — the air, land or water — Castonguay was not required to report the incident to the Ministry.
[16] Castonguay’s argument is, in essence, an argument that while the definition of “adverse effect” has eight components — (a) to (h) — paragraph (a) is an umbrella clause. In other words, there must be, in the language of (a), “impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it” before any of the other seven elements come into play. They are not stand-alone elements and only constitute an “adverse effect” if they are accompanied by the impairment to the quality of the natural environment set out in paragraph (a). An adverse effect as defined in paragraph (b) through (h) without any accompanying impairment to the quality of the natural environment under paragraph (a) will not be sufficient to trigger s. 15(1).
[17] The Minister of the Environment, on the other hand, argued that if the discharge caused or was likely to cause one or more of the adverse effects listed in paragraphs (a) to (h) of the statutory definition, the obligation to report the discharge of a contaminant under s. 15(1) materializes. Each of the eight listed components is a separate impact that can trigger the requirement to report.
[18] The Minister’s position is demonstrably supported by the language of s. 15(1) and the relevant definitions in the EPA. The purpose of the reporting requirement in s. 15(1) is to ensure that it is the Ministry of the Environment, and not the discharger, who decides what, if any, further steps are required. When a contaminant is discharged, the discharger may not know the full extent of the damage caused or, in the words of s. 15(1), likely to be caused. Moreover, many potential harms such as harm to human health, or injury to plants and animals, and even impairment of the natural environment, may be difficult to detect without the expertise and resources of the Ministry. As a result, the statute places both the obligation to investigate and the decision about what further steps are necessary with the Ministry and not the discharger.
[19] Notification provides the Ministry with the opportunity to conduct an inspection as quickly as possible and to obtain information in order to take any necessary remedial action and to fulfil its statutory mandate. This enables the Ministry to respond in a timely way to the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment and to be involved in determining what, if any, preventative or remedial measures are appropriate.
[20] As the interveners Canadian Environmental Law Association and Lake Ontario Waterkeeper pointed out in their joint factum, s. 15(1) is also consistent with the precautionary principle. This emerging international law principle recognizes that since there are inherent limits in being able to determine and predict environmental impacts with scientific certainty, environmental policies must anticipate and prevent environmental degradation (O. McIntyre and T. Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law” (1997), 9 J. Envtl. L.221, at pp. 221-22; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, at paras. 30-32). Section 15(1) gives effect to the concerns underlying the precautionary principle by ensuring that the Ministry of the Environment is notified and has the ability to respond once there has been a discharge of a contaminant out of the normal course of events, without waiting for proof that the natural environment has, in fact, been impaired.
[21] Parsing the language of s. 15(1) illuminates its clear preventative and protective purposes. First, a person must discharge a contaminant. Second, the contaminant must be discharged into the natural environment. Third, the discharge must be out of the normal course of events. Fourth, the discharge must be one that causes or is likely to cause an adverse effect. Finally, the person must not be otherwise required to notify the Ministry under s. 92, which refers to the spill of pollutants from a structure, vehicle or container and is therefore not applicable to the circumstances of this case.
[22] Taking each phrase in turn, the full scope of the reporting requirement is revealed. Section 15(1) applies to the discharge of “contaminant[s]” as defined by the EPA. The definition of contaminant in s. 1(1) of theEPA includes “any solid liquid, gas, odour, heat, sound, vibration, radiation or combination of any of them resulting directly or indirectly from human activities that causes or may cause an adverse effect”. The reference to human activities in the definition of contaminant, when read in the context of s. 15 and the EPA as a whole, recognizes that the EPA applies only to those activities which engage the natural environment – the air, land or water in the province. This ensures that the definition of contaminant and s. 15 of the EPA maintain a nexus to the statutory objective of environmental protection.
[23] The discharge must be into the natural environment, defined as the air, land and water of Ontario. Section 15(1) does not impose any restrictions on the length of time the contaminant remains in the natural environment, nor does it require that the contaminant become part of the natural environment.
[24] Only discharges that are out of the normal course of events are required to be reported to the Ministry. This restricts the application of s. 15(1) by excluding many everyday, routine activities. Although driving a car, for example, discharges fumes into the natural environment, the discharge is not out of the normal course of events and no report to the Ministry is required.
[25] The key, in my view, to understanding s. 15(1) is that the discharge of the contaminant caused or was likely to cause an “adverse effect”. As previously noted, adverse effect is defined as:
“adverse effect” means one or more of,
(a) impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it,
(b) injury or damage to property or to plant or animal life,
(c) harm or material discomfort to any person,
(d) an adverse effect on the health of any person,
(e) impairment of the safety of any person,
(f) rendering any property or plant or animal life unfit for human use,
(g) loss of enjoyment of normal use of property, and
(h) interference with the normal conduct of business;
[26] There is already a jurisprudential trail from this Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal to guide our interpretation. In Canadian Pacific, this Court considered an earlier version of the EPA, which did not specifically mention the term “adverse effect”. The appeal focused on what was then s. 13(1) of the EPA, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, which stated:
13. — (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the regulations no person shall deposit, add, emit or discharge a contaminant or cause or permit, the deposit, addition, emission or discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment that,
(a) causes or is likely to cause impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it;
(b)causes or is likely to cause injury or damage to property or to plant or animal life;
(c)causes or is likely to cause harm or material discomfort to any person;
(d)adversely affects or is likely to adversely affect the health of any person;
(e)impairs or is likely to impair the safety of any person;
(f)renders or is likely to render any property or plant or animal life unfit for use by man;
(g)causes or is likely to cause loss of enjoyment of normal use of property; or
(h)interferes or is likely to interfere with the normal conduct of business.
[27] The first part of s. 13(1) is now s. 14(1).[1] Paragraphs (a) to (h) now form part of the definition of “adverse effect” found in s. 1(1) of the EPA.
[28] The issue in Canadian Pacific was whether the words “for any use that can be made of it” in para. (a) of s. 13(1) were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Although the Court’s reasoning was focused on the constitutional issues raised in that case, the Court made several statements about the interpretation of s. 13(1)(a) of the EPA which are helpful in resolving the interpretive issue in this appeal. Notably, in finding that the provision was neither vague nor overbroad, Gonthier J., writing for the majority, held that the application of s. 13(1)(a) was confined to the discharge of contaminants that cause, or are likely to cause, non-trivial impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that could be made of it.
[29] Lamer C.J., in concurring reasons which were not endorsed by the majority, was of the view that para. (a) should be interpreted as an umbrella clause so that harm to the quality of the natural environment was independently required before the rest of the provisions in (b) to (h) of s. 13(1) were engaged.
[30] Castonguay advocates that we adopt the minority approach of Lamer C.J. in Canadian Pacific. This, with respect, is an argument that cannot survive the amended language in the EPA after Canadian Pacific was decided. The most significant change to the EPA was the creation of a separate statutory definition of “adverse effect”. The definition included the words “means one or more of” the eight components set out in (a) through (h). None of these components is said to be an overriding requirement, and each is stated to be an adverse effect. As a result, all eight branches of “adverse effect” provide independent triggers for liability. Castonguay’s interpretation reads out these crucial legislative directives that each effect is deemed to be adverse.
[31] To interpret “adverse effect” restrictively not only reads out the plain and obvious meaning of the definition, it narrows the scope of the reporting requirement, thereby restricting its remedial capacity and the Ministry’s ability to fulfill its statutory mandate.
[32] Canadian Pacific was interpreted and applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Dow Chemical. In that case, Dow Chemical, like Castonguay, argued that, in order to establish an adverse effect under the EPA, “impairment of the quality of the natural environment” under para. (a) must be made out in addition to any of the other effects set out in (b) through (h). MacPherson J.A. rejected this approach, concluding instead that:
[Paragraph] (a) is just one of eight defined adverse effects. It relates to the natural environment, which is defined in the Act as “the air, land and water” (s. 1(1)). The other seven [paragraphs] set out other forms of adverse effect. Some relate to plants and animals [para.] (b) and (f)); some relate to people [para.] (c), (d) and (f)) and their property [para.] (g)) and business [para.] (h)) [para. 29]
[33] Applying Gonthier J.’s language in Canadian Pacific, MacPherson J.A. accepted that each of the eight enumerated adverse effects must be more than trivial but that any of them was sufficient to satisfy the definition (para. 30).
[34] The effects set out in paragraphs (a) to (h) are designed to capture a broad range of impacts. Some are limited to impacts on animals, people or property and do not require any impairment of the air, land or water in Ontario. Since the EPA protects the natural environment and those who use it, this is consistent with the broader protections the EPA was intended to provide. Paragraphs (a) through (h) also reflect a statutory recognition that protecting the natural environment requires, among other strategies, maximizing the circumstances in which the Ministry of the Environment may investigate and remedy environmental harms, including those identified in paragraphs (a) to (h).
[35] Moreover, it is important to note that the words “adverse effect” appear in many provisions of theEPA. Sections 6, 14, 18, 91.1, 93, 94, 97, 132, 156, 157.1, and 188.1 deal with a range of environmental concerns such as when an order to take preventative measures may be issued or the development of spill prevention and contingency plans. Restricting the definitional scope of “adverse effect” would therefore also limit the scope of the EPA’s protective and preventative capacities and, consequently, the Ministry’s ability to respond to the broad purposes of the statute.
[36] In summary, the requirement to report “forthwith” in s. 15(1) of the EPA is engaged where the following elements are established:
i. a “contaminant” is discharged;
ii. the contaminant is discharged into the natural environment (the air, land and water or any combination or part thereof, of the Province of Ontario);
iii. the discharge is out of the normal course of events;
iv. the discharge causes, or is likely to cause, an adverse effect, namely one or more of the effects listed in paragraphs (a) to (h) of the definition;
v. the adverse effect or effects are not trivial or minimal; and
vi. the person is not otherwise required to notify the Ministry under s. 92, which addresses the spill of pollutants.
[37] Applying these elements to this case, s. 15(1) was clearly engaged. Castonguay “discharged” fly-rock, large pieces of rock created by the force of a blast, into the “natural environment”. There is also no doubt that fly-rock meets the definition of “contaminant”. The discharge in this case was “out of the normal course of events” — it was an accidental consequence of Castonguay’s blasting operation. Had the blast been conducted routinely, the fly-rock would not have been thrust into the air.
[38] Finally, the discharge of fly-rock caused an “adverse effect” under paras. (b) and (g) of the definition, namely, it caused injury or damage to property and loss of enjoyment of the normal use of the property. Because the reporting requirement is also engaged when the discharge is “likely to cause an adverse effect”, para. (e) is also applicable since the potential existed for “impairment of the safety of any person”.
[39] The adverse effects were not trivial. The force of the blast, and the rocks it produced, were so powerful they caused extensive and significant property damage, penetrating the roof of a residence and landing in the kitchen. A vehicle was also seriously damaged. The fly-rock could easily have seriously injured or killed someone.
[40] Accordingly, s. 15(1) of the EPA applied and Castonguay was required to report the discharge of fly-rock forthwith to the Ministry of the Environment.
[41] I would therefore dismiss the appeal. In accordance with the Minister of the Environment’s request, there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors for the appellant: Miller Thomson, Markham; Supreme Advocacy, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor for the interveners: Canadian Environmental Law Association, Toronto.
[1] Section 14(1) of the EPA states:
14. (1) Subject to subsection (2) but despite any other provision of this Act or the regulations, a person shall not discharge a contaminant or cause or permit the discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment, if the discharge causes or may cause an adverse effect.
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Friday, October 18, 2013
Court of Appeal Denies Canadians Right to Choose Assisted Death
Court of Appeal Denies Canadians Right to Choose Assisted Death
Court says that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Rodriguez is binding – BCCLA seek leave to appeal decision to Supreme Court of Canada
Today the BC Court of Appeal released its decision in Carter v. Canada, with a divided two-to-one decision overturning last year’s historic BC Supreme Court ruling. The majority of the court did not base its decision on the merits of the case. Instead, it decided that it could not reverse the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1993 decision in Rodriguez v. B.C., effectively leaving the case up the Supreme Court to sort out. The result is that, for now, seriously ill people do not have the freedom to choose a physician-assisted death. As a result, the BCCLA will seek leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Grace Pastine, Litigation Director for the BCCLA said, “We are disappointed, but the Court of Appeal has effectively thrown the ball to the Supreme Court of Canada. We will ask the Supreme Court hear this case and to recognize the right to die with dignity. We will continue to argue that the government has no place at the bedside of seriously ill Canadians, denying the right to decide to those who have made firm decisions about the amount of suffering they will endure at the end of life.”
The BCCLA had argued – and the Chief Justice of B.C. agreed in his dissent – that the Supreme Court of Canada had not fully considered the issues raised in this case in Rodriguez, and that the evidence since Rodriguez shows that appropriate and carefully-tailored safeguards can be created to protect vulnerable individuals.
Pastine added, “We will stand for what we know is right – compassion and choice at the end of life. We look forward to asking the Supreme Court of Canada to hear our case. We are confident that ultimately, there will be legal change, and that Canadians who are suffering unbearably at the end of life will have the right to choose a dignified and peaceful death.”
The lawsuit filed by the BCCLA in April 2011 challenged the laws that make it a criminal offense to assist seriously and incurably ill individuals to die with dignity.
In June 2012, the B.C. Supreme Court struck down the laws that makes physician-assisted dying illegal in Canada, ruling that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the right to die with dignity. B.C. Supreme Court Justice Lynn Smith ruled that the laws violated the rights of Gloria Taylor, who suffered from ALS, and the rights of two other plaintiffs in the lawsuit, Lee Carter and Hollis Johnson. Gloria Taylor became the first person in Canadian history to have the legal right to seek an order allowing her to have the assistance of a physician to hasten her death. The federal government appealed the decision. The B.C. Court of Appeal heard arguments in the case March 18 – 22, 2013.
Joseph Arvay, Q.C., co-lead lawyer for the plaintiffs said, “The Court of Appeal decided that their hands were tied by the 20-year-old Rodriguez decision. We are prepared to go to the highest court in land to resolve this issue because it is so critically important. The choice to live or die, and to control when and how to die, are choices of profound and personal importance, and should not be unnecessarily interfered with by the state. Criminalizing assisted dying ensures that there will continue to be a maze of back-alleys that put people at greater risk than a regulated scheme. People will find ways to end lives that have lost all meaning, no matter what the law says, even if that means choosing a violent death.”
Alison Latimer, lawyer for the plaintiffs said, “The choice to die with dignity should be available to all Canadians. All Canadians deserve compassionate care at the end of life, including the option of a physician-assisted death. Choice is a fundamental cornerstone of our medical system. Patients have a right to accept or refuse medical treatment, even if it hastens death. For example, a patient can request to be taken off a ventilator. It is not the role of government to say that one of these types of choices results in a “natural” death, while the other choice does not.”
Sheila Tucker, co-lead lawyer for the plaintiffs said, “We disappointed that people suffering unbearably will have to continue to wait for this question to be resolved. We are convinced that inflicting such suffering on dying patients who wish to end their lives with dignity is unjust and unconstitutional. We hope that the Supreme Court of Canada will agree, and restore the decision of the BC Supreme Court recognizing the right to a medically-assisted death.”
The plaintiffs are represented by Joseph Arvay, Q.C. and Alison Latimer of Arvay Finlay and Sheila Tucker of Davis LLP.
Labels:
Canada,
Conservative Party of Canada,
news,
people
Thursday, October 17, 2013
Baby blues strikes dads as often as moms
Baby blues strikes dads as often as mums
A new study at the Karolinska Institute in Solna in collaboration with the Stockholm County Council showed that men are just as likely as women to experience depressive symptoms after becoming parents.
"We didn't think we'd find so many," Magdalena Carlberg, who lead the study, told The Local. "We expected fewer fathers than mothers to express depressive symptoms, considering the general prevalence of depression in men and women."
The study included more than 3,600 new dads in Stockholm. Some 15 percent of them reported they experienced symptoms of depression after child birth. The number matches post-partum depression rates of mothers, that is estimated at 10 to 15 percent in Stockholm County.
If the statistics for the rest of Sweden match those of Stockholm, over 15,000 new fathers in Sweden may face depression to various degrees after they become a parent, whether for the first time or not.
The participants in the study filled out two questionnaires about how they had been feeling, answering the same questions given to new mums. The questionnaires use a point system to calculate a total score. At a certain number of points, the parent was considered to be showing possible symptoms of depression.
"International studies show that fathers underestimate and thus under-report their symptoms by about two points,” Carlberg told The Local. "So we set the limit for the fathers two points lower than on the scale for women. But even if we raise the limit, the numbers will still probably be quite similar to those of new mothers with symptoms, who have been estimated to 10-15 percent in Stockholm County."
It took Jonas Rasmussen, a father from southern Sweden, several years to seek help for his depression. Rasmussen was rarely happy, but thought that was just how it felt to be a dad.
"At one point I sat down at the kitchen table and said to myself that I love my wife, I love my son, but I hate being a parent," Rasmussen told Sveriges Radio (SR).
"Now I can really enjoy sitting down and building lego with him," Rasmussen said. "Or drawing or reading him a book. It's truly remarkable."
The term baby blues usually refers to post-partum depression in women, most likely caused by fluctuating hormone levels and is also common among mothers a couple of days after giving birth. Carlberg said, however, that a different kind of depression can set in any time during the first year after delivery - which is the depression stalking new fathers. For dads the symptoms appear to be delayed, with an increasing number of new fathers beginning to display signs of depression, reaching a peak when the child is about six months old.
"Both for mums and dads with depressive symptoms," Carlberg said, "this can lead to relationship problems with the child, the partner and within the family."
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
United States debt ceiling.
F
or the history of the United States debt ceiling, see History of United States debt ceiling.
Part of a series on Government
United States
budget and debt topics
Major dimensions[hide]
Economy · Expenditures
Federal budget · Financial position
Military budget · Public debt
Taxation · Unemployment
Programs[hide]
Medicare · Social programs
Social Security
Contemporary issues[hide]
Fiscal cliff · Budget sequestration in 2013
Bowles-Simpson Commission · Bush tax cuts
Debt-ceiling crisis (2011 · 2013) ·Deficit reduction
Health care reform · Political debates
Social Security debate · "Starve the beast"
Subprime mortgage crisis
Financial crisis of 2007–08
Government shutdowns of 1995–96
Government shutdown of 2013
Terminology[hide]
Cumulative deficit · Interest · Debt ·Balance of payments · Inflation
v
t
e
The United States debt ceiling or debt limit is a legislative mechanism to limit the amount of national debt that can be issued by theTreasury. The debt ceiling is an aggregate figure which applies to the gross debt, which includes debt in the hands of the public and in Intragovernment accounts. Because expenditures are authorized by separate legislation, the debt ceiling does not directly limit budget deficits. In effect, it can only restrain Treasury from paying for expenditures after the limit has been reached, but which have already been approved (in the budget) and appropriated.
When the debt ceiling is actually reached without an increase in the limit having been passed, Treasury may resort to "extraordinary measures" to temporarily finance the government's expenditures and obligations until a resolution can be reached. The Treasury has never reached the point of exhausting extraordinary measures. If this situation were to occur, it is unclear whether Treasury would be able to prioritize payments on debt to avoid a default on its debt obligations, but it would at least have to default on some of its non-debt obligations. A default could trigger a variety of economic problems including a financial crisis and a decline in output that would put the country into a recession.
Contents
[hide]
1 Background
2 Relationship to federal budget
3 Legislative history
3.1 1995 debt ceiling crisis
3.2 2011 debt ceiling crisis
3.3 2013 debt ceiling crisis
4 Reaching the debt limit
4.1 Extraordinary measures
4.2 Default on financial obligations
5 Controversy
6 References
7 Sources
8 Further reading
Background
The United States has had some sort of legislative limit on debt since 1917. From time to time, political disputes arise when the Treasury advises Congress that the debt ceiling is about to be reached and indicating that a default is imminent. When the debt ceiling is reached, and pending an increase in the limit, Treasury may resort to "extraordinary measures" to buy more time before the ceiling can be raised by Congress. The United States has never reached the point of default where Treasury is incapable of paying its debt obligations, except in the War of 1812 when the Burning of Washington happened and parts of Washington D.C. including the Treasury were burned.[1]
In 2011, the United States reached a point of near default. The delay in raising the debt ceiling resulted in the first downgrade in the United States credit rating, a sharp drop in the stock market, and an increase in borrowing costs. Congress raised the debt limit with the Budget Control Act of 2011, which created the fiscal cliff and set a new debt ceiling that was reached on December 31, 2012. Treasury has adopted extraordinary measures to avoid a default on its obligations. On February 4, 2013, President Barack Obama signed a suspension of the debt ceiling that ran until May 19, 2013. After May 19, the debt ceiling was raised to $16.699 trillion, the level of debt incurred during the suspension, and Treasury resumed extraordinary measures.[2] Treasury Secretary Jack Lew notified Congress that these measures would be exhausted by October 17, 2013.[3] On October 7, 2013 Treasury indicated that the debt ceiling and extraordinary measures will be exhausted and that a default will occur on October 17 when interest payments are due.[citation needed]
The United States and Denmark are the only constitutional countries to have legislative restrictions on the incurring of public debt. The Danish debt ceiling is, however, mainly a formality and follows the budgeting and expenditure process and provides ample latitude for unforeseen deficits. It has never created the periodic crises as has the American.[4]
Relationship to federal budget
The process of setting the debt ceiling is separate and distinct from the United States budget process, and raising the debt ceiling neither directly increases nor decreases the budget deficit, and vice versa. The Government Accountability Office explains, "the debt limit does not control or limit the ability of the federal government to run deficits or incur obligations. Rather, it is a limit on the ability to pay obligations already incurred."[5]
The President formulates a federal budget every year, which Congress must pass, sometimes with amendments, in a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President's signature and is not binding. The budget details projected tax collections and expenditures and, therefore, specifies the amount of borrowing the government would have to do in thatfiscal year.
Legislative history
Further information: History of United States debt ceiling
Prior to 1917, the United States had no debt ceiling. Congress either authorized specific loans or allowed Treasury to issue certain debt instruments and individual debt issues for specific purposes. Sometimes Congress gave Treasury discretion over what type of debt instrument would be issued.[6] The United States first instituted a statutory debt limit with the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917. This legislation set limits on the aggregate amount of debt that could be accumulated through individual categories of debt (such as bonds and bills). In 1939, Congress instituted the first limit on total accumulated debt over all kinds of instruments.[7]
Prior to the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the debt ceiling played an important role since Congress had few opportunities to hold hearings and debates on the budget.[8] James Surowiecki argued that the debt ceiling lost its usefulness after these reforms to the budget process.[9]
In 1979, noting the potential problems of hitting a default, Dick Gephardt imposed the "Gephardt Rule," a parliamentary rule that deemed the debt ceiling raised when a budget was passed. This resolved the contradiction in voting for appropriations but not voting to fund them. The rule stood until it was repealed by Congress in 1995.[10]
1995 debt ceiling crisis
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 1995
The debt-ceiling debate of 1995 led to a showdown on the federal budget, which did not pass, and resulted in the United States federal government shutdown of 1995 and 1996.[11][12]
2011 debt ceiling crisis]
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 2011
In 2011, Republicans in Congress attempted to use the debt ceiling as leverage for deficit reduction. The delay in raising the debt ceiling led to the first ever downgrade in the federal government's credit rating. The credit downgrade and debt ceiling debacle contributed to the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling 2,000 points in late July and August. Following the downgrade itself, the DJIA had one of its worst days in history and fell 635 points on August 8.[13] The GAO estimated that the delay in raising the debt ceiling raised borrowing costs for the government by $1.3 billion in 2011 and noted that the delay would also raise costs in later years. The Bipartisan Policy Center extended the GAO's estimates and found that the delay raised borrowing costs by $18.9 billion over ten years.[14]
2013 debt ceiling crisis
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 2013
The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (October 2013)
Following the increase in the debt ceiling to $16.394 trillion in 2011,[15] the United States again reached the debt ceiling on December 31, 2012 and the Treasury began taking extraordinary measures. The fiscal cliff was resolved with the passage of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA), but no action was taken on the debt ceiling. Following the tax cuts from ATRA, the government needed to raise the debt ceiling by $700 billion to finance operations for the rest of the 2013 fiscal year.[16] Extraordinary measures were expected to be exhausted by February 15.[17] The Treasury has said it is not set up to prioritize payments, and it's not clear that it would be legal to do so. Given this situation, the Treasury would simply delay payments if funds could not be raised through extraordinary measures and the debt ceiling had not been raised. This would put a freeze on 7% of the nation's GDP, a contraction greater than the Great Recession. The economic damage would worsen as recipients of social security benefits, government contracts, and other government payments cut back on spending in response to having the freeze in their revenue.[18]
Under the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013, both houses of Congress voted to suspend the debt ceiling from February 4, 2013 until May 19, 2013. On May 19, the debt ceiling was raised to approximately $16.699 trillion to accommodate the borrowing done during the suspension period. The Treasury is now using extraordinary measures to avoid a default. Due to the impacts of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, the Sequester, and a $60 billion payment from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that will reach the Treasury on June 28, 2013, extraordinary measures are currently predicted to last until October 17 by the Treasury,[19] but financial firms suggest funds may last a little longer. Jefferies Group says extraordinary measures may last until the end of October while Credit Suisse estimates mid-November.[20]
Reaching the debt limit
Extraordinary measures
The Treasury Department is authorized to issue debt needed to fund government operations (as authorized by each federal budget) up to the debt ceiling, with some small exceptions. When the debt ceiling is reached, Treasury can declare a debt issuance suspension period and utilize "extraordinary measures" to acquire funds to meet federal obligations but which do not require the issue of new debt.
These measures may include suspending investments in the "G-fund" of the individual retirement funds of federal employees, the Thrift Savings Plan. In 2011 these measures were extended to suspending investments in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (Postal Benefits Fund), and the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). In addition to suspending investments, certain CSRDF investments were also redeemed early.[21] In 1985, the Treasury had also exchanged Treasury securities for non-Treasury securities held by the Federal Financing Bank.[22]
However, these amounts are not sufficient to cover government operations.[23] Treasury first used these measures on December 16, 2009, to remain within the debt ceiling, and avoid a government shutdown,[24] and also used it during the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011. However, there are limits to how much can be raised by these measures.
Default on financial obligations
If the debt ceiling is not raised by the time extraordinary measures are exhausted, the government will be unable to pay its financial obligations. The United States has never reached this point. If extraordinary measures are exhausted, the executive branch has the authority to determine which obligations are paid and which are not.[25]
Failure to pay obligations has been characterized as a default; however, some have argued that the executive branch can choose to prioritize interest payments on bonds, which would avoid an immediate, direct default on sovereign debt. During the debt ceiling crisis in 2011, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geitner argued that prioritization of interest payments would not help since government expenditures would have needed to be cut by an unrealistic 40% if the debt ceiling is not raised. Also, a default on non-debt obligations would still undermine American creditworthiness according to at least one rating agency.[26] In 2011, the Treasury suggested that it could not prioritize certain types of expenditures because all expenditures are on equal footing under the law. In this view, when extraordinary measures are exhausted, no payments could be made at all and the United States would be in default on all of its obligations.[27] The CBO notes that prioritization would not avoid the technical definition found in Black's Law Dictionary where default is defined as “the failure to make a payment when due.”[28]
Controversy
A vote to increase the debt ceiling is usually seen as a formality[by whom?], needed to continue spending that has already been approved previously by Congress and the President. Earlier reports to Congress from experts have repeatedly said that the debt limit is an ineffective means to restrain the growth of debt.[8] James Surowiecki argues that the debt ceiling originally served a useful purpose. When introduced, the President had stronger authority to borrow and spend as he pleased; however, after 1974, Congress began passing comprehensive budget resolutions that specify exactly how much money the government can spend.[9] The apparent redundancy of the debt ceiling has led to suggestions that it should be abolished altogether.[29][30]
A January 2013 poll of a panel of highly regarded economists found that 84% agreed or strongly agreed that, since Congress already approves spending and taxation, "a separate debt ceiling that has to be increased periodically creates unneeded uncertainty and can potentially lead to worse fiscal outcomes." Only one member of the panel, Luigi Zingales, disagreed with the statement.[31]
References
Jump up^ [1]
Jump up^ Sahadi & May 17, 2013 2013.
Jump up^ [2]
Jump up^ DR Nyheder.
Jump up^ Government Accountability Office (February 22, 2011). "Debt Limit: Delays Create Debt Management Challenges and Increase Uncertainty in the Treasury Market".
Jump up^ Austin 2008, p. 2.
Jump up^ Austin 2008, p. 2-3.
^ Jump up to:a b Kowalcky & LeLoup 1993, p. 14.
^ Jump up to:a b Surowiecki 2011.
Jump up^ Green 2011.
Jump up^ U.S. GAO, "Debt Ceiling: Analysis of Actions During the 1995-1996 Crisis", AIMD-96-130, 1996 August 30
Jump up^ New Republic, "How Clinton Handled His Debt Ceiling Crisis Better Than Obama", Kara Brandeisky, 2 August 2011
Jump up^ Sweet 8 August 2011.
Jump up^ Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 1.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 1.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013.
Jump up^ Sahadi 2013.
Jump up^ Yglesias 2013.
Jump up^ [3]
Jump up^ [4]
Jump up^ GAO 2012, p. 10.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 3-4.
Jump up^ Timothy Geithner (April 4, 2011). "Geithner Letter to Congress". Treasury Department.
Jump up^ "U.S. National Debt Tops Debt Limit". CBS News. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ Austin & Levit 2012.
Jump up^ Lawder 2012.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 8.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 15.
Jump up^ Lowrey, Annie (May 16, 2011). "Debt ceiling crisis: The debt ceiling is a pointless, dangerous relic, and it should be abolished". Slate. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ Epstein, Jennifer (July 18, 2011). "Moody's: Abolish the debt limit". Politico. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ IGM Forum.
Sources
"Amerikanere kan lære af dansk gældsloft" (in Danish). DR Nyheder. 3 August 2011. Retrieved 6 May 2013.
"Analysis of 2011-2012 Actions Taken and Effect of Delayed Increase on Borrowing Costs". GAO. July 2012. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Austin, D. Andrew (29 April 2008). "The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases". Congressional Research Service.
Austin, D. Andrew; Levit, Mindy R. (27 December 2012). "The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases". Congressional Research Service.
"Debt ceiling". IGM Forum. Chicago Booth. 15 January 2013. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
"Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit, November 2012". Congressional Budget Office. November 2012.
"Debt Limit Analysis". Bipartisan Policy Center. 27 November 2012. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
"Delays Create Debt Management Challenges and Increase Uncertainty in the Treasury Market". GAO-11-203. GAO. February 2011. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Green, Joshua (9 May 2011). "How Dick Gephardt Fixed the Debt-Ceiling Problem". The Atlantic.
Kowalcky, Linda W.; LeLoup, Lance T. (1993). "Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation". Public Administration Review 53 (1). JSTOR 977272.
Lawder, David (29 June 2011). "Prioritizing debt payments won't work: Geithner". Reuters.
Levit, Mandy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Timothy J.; Nuschler, Dawn. "Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations".
Masters, Jonathan. "U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences". Renewing America. Council on Foreign Relations.
Sahadi, Jeanne (7 January 2013). "Debt Ceiling: 'Chaotic' choices on 100 million payments". CNNMoney. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Surowiecki, James (1 August 2011). "Smash the Ceiling". The New Yorker.
Sweet, Ken (8 August 2011). "Dow plunges after S&P downgrade". CNNMoney.
Yglesias, Matthew (16 January 2013). "What if Congress Doesn’t Raise the Debt Ceiling?". Slate.
Further reading
Eisner, Robert (1993). "Federal Debt". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (1st ed.). Library of Economics and Liberty. OCLC 317650570,50016270 and 163149563
Categories:
Government finances in the United States
United States public debt
or the history of the United States debt ceiling, see History of United States debt ceiling.
Part of a series on Government
United States
budget and debt topics
Major dimensions[hide]
Economy · Expenditures
Federal budget · Financial position
Military budget · Public debt
Taxation · Unemployment
Programs[hide]
Medicare · Social programs
Social Security
Contemporary issues[hide]
Fiscal cliff · Budget sequestration in 2013
Bowles-Simpson Commission · Bush tax cuts
Debt-ceiling crisis (2011 · 2013) ·Deficit reduction
Health care reform · Political debates
Social Security debate · "Starve the beast"
Subprime mortgage crisis
Financial crisis of 2007–08
Government shutdowns of 1995–96
Government shutdown of 2013
Terminology[hide]
Cumulative deficit · Interest · Debt ·Balance of payments · Inflation
v
t
e
The United States debt ceiling or debt limit is a legislative mechanism to limit the amount of national debt that can be issued by theTreasury. The debt ceiling is an aggregate figure which applies to the gross debt, which includes debt in the hands of the public and in Intragovernment accounts. Because expenditures are authorized by separate legislation, the debt ceiling does not directly limit budget deficits. In effect, it can only restrain Treasury from paying for expenditures after the limit has been reached, but which have already been approved (in the budget) and appropriated.
When the debt ceiling is actually reached without an increase in the limit having been passed, Treasury may resort to "extraordinary measures" to temporarily finance the government's expenditures and obligations until a resolution can be reached. The Treasury has never reached the point of exhausting extraordinary measures. If this situation were to occur, it is unclear whether Treasury would be able to prioritize payments on debt to avoid a default on its debt obligations, but it would at least have to default on some of its non-debt obligations. A default could trigger a variety of economic problems including a financial crisis and a decline in output that would put the country into a recession.
Contents
[hide]
1 Background
2 Relationship to federal budget
3 Legislative history
3.1 1995 debt ceiling crisis
3.2 2011 debt ceiling crisis
3.3 2013 debt ceiling crisis
4 Reaching the debt limit
4.1 Extraordinary measures
4.2 Default on financial obligations
5 Controversy
6 References
7 Sources
8 Further reading
Background
The United States has had some sort of legislative limit on debt since 1917. From time to time, political disputes arise when the Treasury advises Congress that the debt ceiling is about to be reached and indicating that a default is imminent. When the debt ceiling is reached, and pending an increase in the limit, Treasury may resort to "extraordinary measures" to buy more time before the ceiling can be raised by Congress. The United States has never reached the point of default where Treasury is incapable of paying its debt obligations, except in the War of 1812 when the Burning of Washington happened and parts of Washington D.C. including the Treasury were burned.[1]
In 2011, the United States reached a point of near default. The delay in raising the debt ceiling resulted in the first downgrade in the United States credit rating, a sharp drop in the stock market, and an increase in borrowing costs. Congress raised the debt limit with the Budget Control Act of 2011, which created the fiscal cliff and set a new debt ceiling that was reached on December 31, 2012. Treasury has adopted extraordinary measures to avoid a default on its obligations. On February 4, 2013, President Barack Obama signed a suspension of the debt ceiling that ran until May 19, 2013. After May 19, the debt ceiling was raised to $16.699 trillion, the level of debt incurred during the suspension, and Treasury resumed extraordinary measures.[2] Treasury Secretary Jack Lew notified Congress that these measures would be exhausted by October 17, 2013.[3] On October 7, 2013 Treasury indicated that the debt ceiling and extraordinary measures will be exhausted and that a default will occur on October 17 when interest payments are due.[citation needed]
The United States and Denmark are the only constitutional countries to have legislative restrictions on the incurring of public debt. The Danish debt ceiling is, however, mainly a formality and follows the budgeting and expenditure process and provides ample latitude for unforeseen deficits. It has never created the periodic crises as has the American.[4]
Relationship to federal budget
The process of setting the debt ceiling is separate and distinct from the United States budget process, and raising the debt ceiling neither directly increases nor decreases the budget deficit, and vice versa. The Government Accountability Office explains, "the debt limit does not control or limit the ability of the federal government to run deficits or incur obligations. Rather, it is a limit on the ability to pay obligations already incurred."[5]
The President formulates a federal budget every year, which Congress must pass, sometimes with amendments, in a concurrent resolution, which does not require the President's signature and is not binding. The budget details projected tax collections and expenditures and, therefore, specifies the amount of borrowing the government would have to do in thatfiscal year.
Legislative history
Further information: History of United States debt ceiling
Prior to 1917, the United States had no debt ceiling. Congress either authorized specific loans or allowed Treasury to issue certain debt instruments and individual debt issues for specific purposes. Sometimes Congress gave Treasury discretion over what type of debt instrument would be issued.[6] The United States first instituted a statutory debt limit with the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917. This legislation set limits on the aggregate amount of debt that could be accumulated through individual categories of debt (such as bonds and bills). In 1939, Congress instituted the first limit on total accumulated debt over all kinds of instruments.[7]
Prior to the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the debt ceiling played an important role since Congress had few opportunities to hold hearings and debates on the budget.[8] James Surowiecki argued that the debt ceiling lost its usefulness after these reforms to the budget process.[9]
In 1979, noting the potential problems of hitting a default, Dick Gephardt imposed the "Gephardt Rule," a parliamentary rule that deemed the debt ceiling raised when a budget was passed. This resolved the contradiction in voting for appropriations but not voting to fund them. The rule stood until it was repealed by Congress in 1995.[10]
1995 debt ceiling crisis
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 1995
The debt-ceiling debate of 1995 led to a showdown on the federal budget, which did not pass, and resulted in the United States federal government shutdown of 1995 and 1996.[11][12]
2011 debt ceiling crisis]
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 2011
In 2011, Republicans in Congress attempted to use the debt ceiling as leverage for deficit reduction. The delay in raising the debt ceiling led to the first ever downgrade in the federal government's credit rating. The credit downgrade and debt ceiling debacle contributed to the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling 2,000 points in late July and August. Following the downgrade itself, the DJIA had one of its worst days in history and fell 635 points on August 8.[13] The GAO estimated that the delay in raising the debt ceiling raised borrowing costs for the government by $1.3 billion in 2011 and noted that the delay would also raise costs in later years. The Bipartisan Policy Center extended the GAO's estimates and found that the delay raised borrowing costs by $18.9 billion over ten years.[14]
2013 debt ceiling crisis
Main article: United States debt-ceiling crisis of 2013
The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (October 2013)
Following the increase in the debt ceiling to $16.394 trillion in 2011,[15] the United States again reached the debt ceiling on December 31, 2012 and the Treasury began taking extraordinary measures. The fiscal cliff was resolved with the passage of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA), but no action was taken on the debt ceiling. Following the tax cuts from ATRA, the government needed to raise the debt ceiling by $700 billion to finance operations for the rest of the 2013 fiscal year.[16] Extraordinary measures were expected to be exhausted by February 15.[17] The Treasury has said it is not set up to prioritize payments, and it's not clear that it would be legal to do so. Given this situation, the Treasury would simply delay payments if funds could not be raised through extraordinary measures and the debt ceiling had not been raised. This would put a freeze on 7% of the nation's GDP, a contraction greater than the Great Recession. The economic damage would worsen as recipients of social security benefits, government contracts, and other government payments cut back on spending in response to having the freeze in their revenue.[18]
Under the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013, both houses of Congress voted to suspend the debt ceiling from February 4, 2013 until May 19, 2013. On May 19, the debt ceiling was raised to approximately $16.699 trillion to accommodate the borrowing done during the suspension period. The Treasury is now using extraordinary measures to avoid a default. Due to the impacts of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, the Sequester, and a $60 billion payment from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that will reach the Treasury on June 28, 2013, extraordinary measures are currently predicted to last until October 17 by the Treasury,[19] but financial firms suggest funds may last a little longer. Jefferies Group says extraordinary measures may last until the end of October while Credit Suisse estimates mid-November.[20]
Reaching the debt limit
Extraordinary measures
The Treasury Department is authorized to issue debt needed to fund government operations (as authorized by each federal budget) up to the debt ceiling, with some small exceptions. When the debt ceiling is reached, Treasury can declare a debt issuance suspension period and utilize "extraordinary measures" to acquire funds to meet federal obligations but which do not require the issue of new debt.
These measures may include suspending investments in the "G-fund" of the individual retirement funds of federal employees, the Thrift Savings Plan. In 2011 these measures were extended to suspending investments in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (Postal Benefits Fund), and the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). In addition to suspending investments, certain CSRDF investments were also redeemed early.[21] In 1985, the Treasury had also exchanged Treasury securities for non-Treasury securities held by the Federal Financing Bank.[22]
However, these amounts are not sufficient to cover government operations.[23] Treasury first used these measures on December 16, 2009, to remain within the debt ceiling, and avoid a government shutdown,[24] and also used it during the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011. However, there are limits to how much can be raised by these measures.
Default on financial obligations
If the debt ceiling is not raised by the time extraordinary measures are exhausted, the government will be unable to pay its financial obligations. The United States has never reached this point. If extraordinary measures are exhausted, the executive branch has the authority to determine which obligations are paid and which are not.[25]
Failure to pay obligations has been characterized as a default; however, some have argued that the executive branch can choose to prioritize interest payments on bonds, which would avoid an immediate, direct default on sovereign debt. During the debt ceiling crisis in 2011, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geitner argued that prioritization of interest payments would not help since government expenditures would have needed to be cut by an unrealistic 40% if the debt ceiling is not raised. Also, a default on non-debt obligations would still undermine American creditworthiness according to at least one rating agency.[26] In 2011, the Treasury suggested that it could not prioritize certain types of expenditures because all expenditures are on equal footing under the law. In this view, when extraordinary measures are exhausted, no payments could be made at all and the United States would be in default on all of its obligations.[27] The CBO notes that prioritization would not avoid the technical definition found in Black's Law Dictionary where default is defined as “the failure to make a payment when due.”[28]
Controversy
A vote to increase the debt ceiling is usually seen as a formality[by whom?], needed to continue spending that has already been approved previously by Congress and the President. Earlier reports to Congress from experts have repeatedly said that the debt limit is an ineffective means to restrain the growth of debt.[8] James Surowiecki argues that the debt ceiling originally served a useful purpose. When introduced, the President had stronger authority to borrow and spend as he pleased; however, after 1974, Congress began passing comprehensive budget resolutions that specify exactly how much money the government can spend.[9] The apparent redundancy of the debt ceiling has led to suggestions that it should be abolished altogether.[29][30]
A January 2013 poll of a panel of highly regarded economists found that 84% agreed or strongly agreed that, since Congress already approves spending and taxation, "a separate debt ceiling that has to be increased periodically creates unneeded uncertainty and can potentially lead to worse fiscal outcomes." Only one member of the panel, Luigi Zingales, disagreed with the statement.[31]
References
Jump up^ [1]
Jump up^ Sahadi & May 17, 2013 2013.
Jump up^ [2]
Jump up^ DR Nyheder.
Jump up^ Government Accountability Office (February 22, 2011). "Debt Limit: Delays Create Debt Management Challenges and Increase Uncertainty in the Treasury Market".
Jump up^ Austin 2008, p. 2.
Jump up^ Austin 2008, p. 2-3.
^ Jump up to:a b Kowalcky & LeLoup 1993, p. 14.
^ Jump up to:a b Surowiecki 2011.
Jump up^ Green 2011.
Jump up^ U.S. GAO, "Debt Ceiling: Analysis of Actions During the 1995-1996 Crisis", AIMD-96-130, 1996 August 30
Jump up^ New Republic, "How Clinton Handled His Debt Ceiling Crisis Better Than Obama", Kara Brandeisky, 2 August 2011
Jump up^ Sweet 8 August 2011.
Jump up^ Bipartisan Policy Center, p. 1.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 1.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013.
Jump up^ Sahadi 2013.
Jump up^ Yglesias 2013.
Jump up^ [3]
Jump up^ [4]
Jump up^ GAO 2012, p. 10.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 3-4.
Jump up^ Timothy Geithner (April 4, 2011). "Geithner Letter to Congress". Treasury Department.
Jump up^ "U.S. National Debt Tops Debt Limit". CBS News. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ Austin & Levit 2012.
Jump up^ Lawder 2012.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 8.
Jump up^ Levit et al. 2013, p. 15.
Jump up^ Lowrey, Annie (May 16, 2011). "Debt ceiling crisis: The debt ceiling is a pointless, dangerous relic, and it should be abolished". Slate. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ Epstein, Jennifer (July 18, 2011). "Moody's: Abolish the debt limit". Politico. Retrieved August 1, 2011.
Jump up^ IGM Forum.
Sources
"Amerikanere kan lære af dansk gældsloft" (in Danish). DR Nyheder. 3 August 2011. Retrieved 6 May 2013.
"Analysis of 2011-2012 Actions Taken and Effect of Delayed Increase on Borrowing Costs". GAO. July 2012. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Austin, D. Andrew (29 April 2008). "The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases". Congressional Research Service.
Austin, D. Andrew; Levit, Mindy R. (27 December 2012). "The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases". Congressional Research Service.
"Debt ceiling". IGM Forum. Chicago Booth. 15 January 2013. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
"Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit, November 2012". Congressional Budget Office. November 2012.
"Debt Limit Analysis". Bipartisan Policy Center. 27 November 2012. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
"Delays Create Debt Management Challenges and Increase Uncertainty in the Treasury Market". GAO-11-203. GAO. February 2011. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Green, Joshua (9 May 2011). "How Dick Gephardt Fixed the Debt-Ceiling Problem". The Atlantic.
Kowalcky, Linda W.; LeLoup, Lance T. (1993). "Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation". Public Administration Review 53 (1). JSTOR 977272.
Lawder, David (29 June 2011). "Prioritizing debt payments won't work: Geithner". Reuters.
Levit, Mandy R.; Brass, Clinton T.; Nicola, Timothy J.; Nuschler, Dawn. "Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations".
Masters, Jonathan. "U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences". Renewing America. Council on Foreign Relations.
Sahadi, Jeanne (7 January 2013). "Debt Ceiling: 'Chaotic' choices on 100 million payments". CNNMoney. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
Surowiecki, James (1 August 2011). "Smash the Ceiling". The New Yorker.
Sweet, Ken (8 August 2011). "Dow plunges after S&P downgrade". CNNMoney.
Yglesias, Matthew (16 January 2013). "What if Congress Doesn’t Raise the Debt Ceiling?". Slate.
Further reading
Eisner, Robert (1993). "Federal Debt". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (1st ed.). Library of Economics and Liberty. OCLC 317650570,50016270 and 163149563
Categories:
Government finances in the United States
United States public debt
Saturday, October 12, 2013
In its first day, an online crowdfunding campaign for an innovative cancer technology has raised $20,000 in donations.
In its first day, an online crowdfunding campaign for an innovative cancer technology has raised $20,000 in donations.
WaveCheck — a painless, non-surgical clinical technique — is poised to transform chemotherapy response monitoring for women with breast cancer.
Invented by Sunnybrook's Dr. Gregory Czarnota and Ryerson University's Michael C. Kolios, WaveCheck combines traditional ultrasound with new software to detect responses in chemotherapy in breast cancer tissues, making it possible for a woman to know what's happening inside her own body weeks, not months, into her chemotherapy treatment.
WaveCheck has been used in clinical studies at Sunnybrook with nearly 100 women receiving upfront, neoadjuvant chemotherapy to treat locally-advanced breast cancer. These results are published in two leading journals, Clinical Cancer Research and Translational Oncology.
To make WaveCheck available to women everywhere as fast as possible, MaRS Innovation seeks to raise $96,987 on Indiegogo from October 9 to November 27, 2013 and get the first of three North American clinical study locations running in parallel with Sunnybrook's existing data. The campaign's overall goal is to raise $687,950 to fund all three sites with WaveCheck's partners.
Watch the video below to learn more and visit the Indiegogo page to contribute to the crowdfunding campaign:
Friday, October 11, 2013
CFIA suspends licence of Beira Mar Importers Co. Ltd.
CFIA suspends licence of Beira Mar Importers Co. Ltd.
October 11, 2013 (Ottawa): The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) suspended the licence of Beira Mar Importers Co. Ltd., effective October 8, 2013. The cheese importing company is located in Burnaby, BC.
There are no food safety issues with distributed product, and no product is being recalled. Furthermore, all imported cheese products at the facility remain under detention.
The licence was suspended because the operator failed several times to implement corrective actions for non-compliances such as failing to provide information as required under the Dairy Products Regulations paragraph 26.3 (d) and paragraph 26.4 (a) and (b).
Beira Mar Importers Co. Ltd. will not have their licence reinstated until they have fully demonstrated the capacity to implement the necessary corrective actions as approved by the CFIA.
The CFIA safeguards food, animals and plants which enhances the health and well-being of Canada's people, environment and economy, and access to international markets. Licences and registrations of federally registered establishments or companies can be suspended or cancelled for failing to comply with relevant CFIA Acts and Regulations.
Thursday, October 10, 2013
Allergy Alert - Undeclared milk in certain Norma's Wholesome Bakery Goods brand banana bread and certain The Goodyman brand cookies
Allergy Alert - Undeclared milk in certain Norma's Wholesome Bakery Goods brand banana bread and certain The Goodyman brand cookies
Recall / advisory date:
October 8, 2013
Reason for recall / advisory:
Allergen - Milk
Hazard classification:
Class 1
Company / Firm:
Norma's Bakery Ltd.
Distribution:
Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, May be National, Ontario, Saskatchewan
Extent of the distribution:
Retail
Reference number:
8382
Contents
Advisory details
Affected products
More information
Media Enquiries
Photos
Advisory details
Ottawa, October 8, 2013 - The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Norma's Bakery Ltd. are warning people with allergies to milk not to consume the banana bread and cookies described below. The affected products contain milk which is not declared on the label.
There have been no reported illnesses associated with the consumption of these products.
Consumption of these products may cause a serious or life-threatening reaction in persons with allergies to milk.
The manufacturer, Norma's Bakery Ltd., Chilliwack, BC, is voluntarily recalling the affected products from the marketplace. The CFIAis monitoring the effectiveness of the recall.
Affected products
Brand NameCommon NameSizeUPC
Norma's Wholesome Bakery Goods Banana Bread 100 g 7 73510 00231 3
Norma's Wholesome Bakery Goods Chocolate Chip Banana Bread 100 g 7 73510 00232 0
The Goodyman Chunky chocolate (cookies) 100 g 6 83978 00003 8
More information
For more information, consumers and industry can contact:
Norma's Bakery Ltd. at 604-792-4023; or,
CFIA by filling out the online feedback form.
For information on common food allergens, visit the Food Allergens web page.
Product photos
Printer ready version of photos
Labels:
Canada,
Conservative Party of Canada,
food,
Law,
news
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