Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 117/15 Luxembourg, 6 October 2015 Judgment in Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner The Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is invalid COPY.

 Court of Justice of the European Union
PRESS RELEASE No 117/15
Luxembourg, 6 October 2015
Judgment in Case C-362/14
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner
The Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is
invalid
Whilst the Court of Justice alone has jurisdiction to declare an EU act invalid, where a claim is
lodged with the national supervisory authorities they may, even where the Commission has
adopted a decision finding that a third country affords an adequate level of protection of personal
data, examine whether the transfer of a person’s data to the third country complies with the
requirements of the EU legislation on the protection of that data and, in the same way as the
person concerned, bring the matter before the national courts, in order that the national courts
make a reference for a preliminary ruling for the purpose of examination of that decision’s validity
The Data Protection Directive1
provides that the transfer of personal data to a third country may, in
principle, take place only if that third country ensures an adequate level of protection of the data.
The directive also provides that the Commission may find that a third country ensures an adequate
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments. Finally, the
directive provides that each Member State is to designate one or more public authorities
responsible for monitoring the application within its territory of the national provisions adopted on
the basis of the directive (‘national supervisory authorities’).
Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian citizen, has been a Facebook user since 2008. As is the case
with other subscribers residing in the EU, some or all of the data provided by Mr Schrems to
Facebook is transferred from Facebook’s Irish subsidiary to servers located in the United States,
where it is processed. Mr Schrems lodged a complaint with the Irish supervisory authority (the Data
Protection Commissioner), taking the view that, in the light of the revelations made in 2013 by
Edward Snowden concerning the activities of the United States intelligence services (in particular
the National Security Agency (‘the NSA’)), the law and practice of the United States do not offer
sufficient protection against surveillance by the public authorities of the data transferred to that
country. The Irish authority rejected the complaint, on the ground, in particular, that in a decision of
26 July 20002
the Commission considered that, under the ‘safe harbour’ scheme,3
the United
States ensures an adequate level of protection of the personal data transferred (the Safe Harbour
Decision).
The High Court of Ireland, before which the case has been brought, wishes to ascertain whether
that Commission decision has the effect of preventing a national supervisory authority from
investigating a complaint alleging that the third country does not ensure an adequate level of
protection and, where appropriate, from suspending the contested transfer of data.
In today’s judgment, the Court of Justice holds that the existence of a Commission decision
finding that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection of the personal data transferred
cannot eliminate or even reduce the powers available to the national supervisory authorities

1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).
2 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (OJ 2000 L 215, p. 7).
3
The safe harbour scheme includes a series of principles concerning the protection of personal data to which United
States undertakings may subscribe voluntarily.
www.curia.europa.eu
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the directive. The Court
stresses in this regard the right, guaranteed by the Charter, to the protection of personal data and
the task with which the national supervisory authorities are entrusted under the Charter.
The Court states, first of all, that no provision of the directive prevents oversight by the national
supervisory authorities of transfers of personal data to third countries which have been the subject
of a Commission decision. Thus, even if the Commission has adopted a decision, the national
supervisory authorities, when dealing with a claim, must be able to examine, with complete
independence, whether the transfer of a person’s data to a third country complies with the
requirements laid down by the directive. Nevertheless, the Court points out that it alone has
jurisdiction to declare that an EU act, such as a Commission decision, is invalid. Consequently,
where a national authority or the person who has brought the matter before the national authority
considers that a Commission decision is invalid, that authority or person must be able to bring
proceedings before the national courts so that they may refer the case to the Court of Justice if
they too have doubts as to the validity of the Commission decision. It is thus ultimately the Court
of Justice which has the task of deciding whether or not a Commission decision is valid.
The Court then investigates whether the Safe Harbour Decision is invalid. In this connection, the
Court states that the Commission was required to find that the United States in fact ensures, by
reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental
rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU under the directive read in the light of
the Charter. The Court observes that the Commission did not make such a finding, but merely
examined the safe harbour scheme.
Without needing to establish whether that scheme ensures a level of protection essentially
equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU, the Court observes that the scheme is applicable
solely to the United States undertakings which adhere to it, and United States public authorities are
not themselves subject to it. Furthermore, national security, public interest and law enforcement
requirements of the United States prevail over the safe harbour scheme, so that United States
undertakings are bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective rules laid down by that
scheme where they conflict with such requirements. The United States safe harbour scheme
thus enables interference, by United States public authorities, with the fundamental rights of
persons, and the Commission decision does not refer either to the existence, in the United States,
of rules intended to limit any such interference or to the existence of effective legal protection
against the interference.
The Court considers that that analysis of the scheme is borne out by two Commission
communications,4
according to which the United States authorities were able to access the
personal data transferred from the Member States to the United States and process it in a way
incompatible, in particular, with the purposes for which it was transferred, beyond what was strictly
necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security. Also, the Commission noted that
the persons concerned had no administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in particular,
the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the case may be, rectified or erased.
As regards a level of protection essentially equivalent to the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed within the EU, the Court finds that, under EU law, legislation is not limited to what
is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, storage of all the personal
data of all the persons whose data is transferred from the EU to the United States without any
differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued and
without an objective criterion being laid down for determining the limits of the access of the public
authorities to the data and of its subsequent use. The Court adds that legislation permitting the
public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic

4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US
Data Flows’ (COM(2013) 846 final, 27 November 2013) and Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies
Established in the EU (COM(2013) 847 final, 27 November 2013).
www.curia.europa.eu
communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to
respect for private life.
Likewise, the Court observes that legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual to
pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the
rectification or erasure of such data, compromises the essence of the fundamental right to
effective judicial protection, the existence of such a possibility being inherent in the existence of
the rule of law.
Finally, the Court finds that the Safe Harbour Decision denies the national supervisory authorities
their powers where a person calls into question whether the decision is compatible with the
protection of the privacy and of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The Court
holds that the Commission did not have competence to restrict the national supervisory
authorities’ powers in that way.
For all those reasons, the Court declares the Safe Harbour Decision invalid. This judgment has
the consequence that the Irish supervisory authority is required to examine Mr Schrems’
complaint with all due diligence and, at the conclusion of its investigation, is to decide
whether, pursuant to the directive, transfer of the data of Facebook’s European subscribers
to the United States should be suspended on the ground that that country does not afford
an adequate level of protection of personal data.
NOTE: A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in disputes
which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the Court of Justice about the interpretation of
European Union law or the validity of a European Union act. The Court of Justice does not decide the
dispute itself. It is for the national court or tribunal to dispose of the case in accordance with the Court’s
decision, which is similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised.

Date: 20151005 Docket: A-124-15 Citation: 2015 FCA 212 Present: TRUDEL J.A. BETWEEN: THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Appellant and ZUNERA ISHAQ Respondent and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO Intervener Dealt with in writing without appearance of parties. Order delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on October 5, 2015. copy

http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/120099/index.do?r=AAAAAQANWnVuZXJhIElzaGFxIAE









. copy



Date: 20151005





Docket: A-124-15

Citation: 2015 FCA 212

Present: TRUDEL J.A.


BETWEEN:


THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION


Appellant


and


ZUNERA ISHAQ


Respondent


and


ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO


Intervener


Dealt with in writing without appearance of parties.

Order delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on October 5, 2015.


REASONS FOR ORDER BY:

TRUDEL J.A.








Date: 20151005





Docket: A-124-15

Citation: 2015 FCA 212

Present: TRUDEL J.A.


BETWEEN:


THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION


Appellant


and


ZUNERA ISHAQ


Respondent


and


ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO


Intervener


REASONS FOR ORDER

TRUDEL J.A.

[1] This is a Motion by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) for a stay of a September 15, 2015 judgment of this Court (2015 FCA 194) and of the related February 6, 2015 judgment of the Federal Court (2015 FC 156).

[2] Both judgments relate to operational bulletin 359, dated December 12, 2011, later incorporated into Policy Manual C-15 (the Policy). The Policy requires citizenship candidates who wear full or partial face coverings to remove those face coverings during the recitation of the oath of citizenship at a citizenship ceremony, in order to receive their Canadian citizenship.

[3] The respondent challenged the Policy under section 2(a) and subsection 15(1) of theCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of The Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11 (Charter), and on the administrative law grounds that the Policy was inconsistent with its governing legislation and that it unduly fettered the discretion of citizenship judges who administer the oath.

[4] On a preliminary matter, the Federal Court found that the application was not premature, as policies alleged to be unlawful or unconstitutional may be challenged at any time (May v. CBC/Radio Canada, 2011 FCA 130, 231 C.R.R. (2d) 369). This argument was not strongly advocated by the appellant before our Court with respect to the administrative question.

[5] The Federal Court declared the Policy to be unlawful, finding it to be mandatory in nature and inconsistent with the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-29 and its regulations. The Federal Court judge exercised his discretion not to decide the Charter issues, as it was unnecessary to do so.

[6] Although this Court did not endorse all of the Federal Court’s findings, it dismissed the Minister’s appeal stating that there was no basis to interfere with the Federal Court’s finding as to the mandatory nature of the impugned change in policy. This Court decided not to consider the Charter issues, because it was unnecessary for the disposition of the case and because the record was relatively scant with respect to those issues.

[7] This Court and the Federal Court did not decide whether the Minister could or could not impose rules regarding taking the oath, but only that he could not achieve the result that he seeks through a change in policy. It remains open to the Minister to proceed by way of properly enacted regulations, subject of course to Charter limits.

[8] The Minister has filed a Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and seeks a stay of the Federal Court of Appeal and Federal Court’s judgments until the later of either: (a) final determination of the appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada or; (b) if leave is granted, a final determination of the appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada.

[9] Having considered the appellant’s record, the respondent’s record and the appellant’s reply, I conclude that the Motion for stay is to be denied with costs to the respondent.

[10] I also took notice of the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Intervenor, the Attorney General of Ontario. In view of my conclusion, I need not address the appellant’s reply submissions that the Attorney General of Ontario does not have the standing to intervene in this stay. She intervened as of right in the Federal Court of Appeal pursuant to a notice of Constitutional Question, but no Constitutional Question was addressed by our Court in its decision that is the subject of the appellant’s Motion for stay.

[11] The grounds for the Motion raised by the appellant are as follows:


a) The Minister has filed a Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from this Court’s September 15, 2015 dismissal of the Minister’s appeal from the decision of Boswell J. dated February 6, 2015 (the Judgments);


b) The Judgments raise an issue of public importance that has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: what is the proper interpretive approach to construing an administrative policy in order to determine whether it has an impermissible mandatory effect fettering administrative decision making in a manner not authorized by statute?;


c) By providing guidance to citizenship judges who must ensure that the oath, the last statutory requirement to become a citizen, is taken, the policy at issue enhances the integrity of obtaining citizenship and promotes the broader objective of having the oath recited publicly, openly and in community with others. These are important Canadian values and an integral part of becoming a Canadian citizen. Irreparable harm to the public interest in these values would result from the policy being subject to a declaration of invalidity pending the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada;


d) Regarding the balance of inconvenience, the irreparable harm to the public interest represented by the Minister if the stay is not granted exceeds the harm to the Respondent if the stay is granted;


e) This stay Motion is urgent because if the stay is not granted, the Respondent’s taking of the oath will render the Minister’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada moot;


f) Rules 8, 35, and 55 of the Federal Courts Rules, and section 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26.

[12] Subsection 65.1(1) of the Supreme Court Act states that:



Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26

Loi sur la Cour Suprême, L.R.C. 1985, ch. S-26


65.1(1) The Court, the court appealed from or a judge of either of those courts may, on the request of the party who has served and filed a notice of application for leave to appeal, order that proceedings be stayed with respect to the judgment from which leave to appeal is being sought, on the terms deemed appropriate.

65.1(1) La Cour, la juridiction inférieure ou un de leurs juges peut, à la demande de la partie qui a signifié et déposé l’avis de la demande d’autorisation d’appel, ordonner, aux conditions jugées appropriées, le sursis d’exécution du jugement objet de la demande.


[13] Insofar as the Motion concentrates on the assertion of an issue of public importance and central Canadian values at play in this case, it seems awkward for this Court rather than the Supreme Court of Canada to decide whether a stay should be granted especially when the appellant has already filed his Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

[14] This said, it is trite law that the test for whether to grant a Motion to stay is set out inRJR — Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR‑Macdonald]: First, a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits of the case to ensure that a serious question has been raised. Secondly, it must be determined whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits (Ibid, at page 334).

[15] It is also trite law that failure of any of the three elements of the test is fatal.

[16] I chose not to pronounce myself on whether or not there is a serious issue to be determined. As indicated, I am of the respectful view that this is a question better left for the Supreme Court of Canada.

[17] I will say, however, that the issue the appellant raises in his motion is not one which this Court considered.

[18] Indeed, the appellant’s proposed issue has nothing to do with the matter as it was presented before us, where the appellant conceded that his appeal could not succeed in the event that the Policy was found to be mandatory and that valid regulations would have to be promulgated by the Governor in Council pursuant to subsection 27(h) of the Citizenship Act in order to achieve the goal which the Minister seeks to achieve through policy assertions.

[19] My ultimate conclusion flows from my finding that the appellant fails on the second prong of the RJR‑Macdonald test ‑ the irreparable harm.

[20] Presuming that the appellant is right that the Policy at issue is not mandatory and citizenship judges can apply it or not — to use the appellant’s language as expressed by counsel at the hearing of the appeal, that the Policy merely amounts to an encouragement in the strongest language possible — how can one raise a claim of irreparable harm?

[21] Moreover, a declaration that the Policy is unlawful leaves no void, simply reverting to the underlying laws and regulations and lawful policies previously in force. Before this Court, counsel for the appellant went so far as to characterize the Policy as already having no force or effect, prior to any judicial intervention. It is simply inconsistent to claim, on the one hand, that a policy has no binding effect on decision-makers, but that irreparable harm would result if that policy was to be declared unlawful on the other.

[22] As the respondent rightly states, Citizenship and Immigration Canada had valid guidelines and procedures to ensure that citizenship candidates take the oath prior to the adoption of the Policy (Respondent’s written representations, at para. 8). These guidelines and procedures are undisturbed by the finding that the Policy is unlawful. There is no legislative or regulatory void.

[23] I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that refusing his application for stay would result in irreparable harm to the public interest. This suffices to dispose of the appellant’s motion for stay.

[24] As a result, the motion for stay is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

"Johanne Trudel"


J.A.





FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD








DOCKET:

A-124-15


STYLE OF CAUSE:

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION v. ZUNERAISHAQ AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO







MOTION DEALT WITH IN WRITING WITHOUT APPEARANCE OF PARTIES


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

TRUDEL J.A.




DATED:

OCTOBER 5, 2015




WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:


Peter Southey

Negar Hashemi

Julie Waldman



FOR THE APPELLANT

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION




Lorne Waldman



FOR THE RESPONDENT

ZUNERA ISHAQ




Marlys A. Edwardh



FOR THE RESPONDENT

ZUNERA ISHAQ




Courtney Harris

Rochelle S. Fox



FOR THE INTERVENER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO




SOLICITORS OF RECORD:


William F. Pentney

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Ottawa, Ontario



FOR THE APPELLANT

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION




Waldman and Associates

Toronto, Ontario



FOR THE RESPONDENT

ZUNERA ISHAQ




Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP

Toronto, Ontario



FOR THE RESPONDENT

ZUNERA ISHAQ




The Attorney General of Ontario

Constitutional Law Branch

Toronto, Ontario



FOR THE INTERVENER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

Status of Ongoing Proceedings Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Patented Medicine Prices Review Board CANADA

Federal Court of Appeal Decision Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Date 2015-09-15 Neutral citation 2015 FCA 194 File numbers A-124-15 Date: 20150915 Ishaq copy

http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/119858/index.do?r=AAAAAQAMWlVORVJBIElTSEFRAQ

Federal Court of Appeal Decision Canada


Case name Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ishaq
Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions
Date 2015-09-15
Neutral citation 2015 FCA 194
File numbers A-124-15
Date: 20150915


Docket: A-124-15
Citation: 2015 FCA 194

CORAM:
TRUDEL J.A.
WEBB J.A.
GLEASON J.A.

BETWEEN:

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Appellant

and

ZUNERA ISHAQ
Respondent

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

Intervener
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on September 15, 2015.
Judgment delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on September 15, 2015.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:
GLEASON J.A.


Date: 20150915


Docket: A-124-15
Citation: 2015 FCA 194

CORAM:
TRUDEL J.A.
WEBB J.A.
GLEASON J.A.

BETWEEN:

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Appellant

and

ZUNERA ISHAQ

Respondent

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

Intervener

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on September 15, 2015.

[1]               In the judgment under appeal, the Federal Court declared that the change in policy applicable to women who wear the niqab, that requires them to unveil to take the oath of citizenship, was unlawful. This policy change first came into effect on December 12, 2011 and was initially enshrined in Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s [CIC’s] Operational Bulletin 359. The policy change was shortly thereafter incorporated into section 6.5 of CIC’s policy manual, CP 15:Guide to Citizenship Ceremonies.
[2]               One of the reasons given by the Federal Court for its judgment was the determination that this policy change was mandatory. The Federal Court also found that the policy change conflicted with the requirements of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 and with the regulations made under that Act.
[3]               The appellant has conceded that if we do not interfere with the Federal Court’s finding as to the mandatory nature of the policy change, this appeal must be dismissed in part because paragraph 27(1)(h) of the Citizenship Act delegates authority to make regulations regarding the taking of the oath of citizenship to the Governor in Council and this policy change was not adopted by the Governor in Council.
[4]               While we do not necessarily agree with all the reasons given by the Federal Court, we see no basis to interfere with the Federal Court’s finding as to the mandatory nature of the impugned change in policy as this finding is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. It follows that this appeal must be dismissed.
[5]               We decline to address the issues concerning the legality of the impugned policy change under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a determination on this point is unnecessary for the disposition of this case and the record before us is fairly scant as concerns the Charter challenge. Moreover, we believe that it is in the interests of justice that we not delay in issuing our decision through the examination of an unnecessary issue so as to hopefully leave open the possibility for the respondent to obtain citizenship in time to vote in the upcoming federal election.
[6]               As a result, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
“Mary J.L. Gleason”
J.A.

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD


DOCKET:
A-124-15

STYLE OF CAUSE:
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION v. ZUNERA ISHAQ


PLACE OF HEARING:

Ottawa, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:

SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:

TRUDEL J.A.
WEBB J.A.
GLEASON J.A.

DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY:

GLEASON J.A.

APPEARANCES:
Peter Southey
Negar Ashemi
Julie Waldman

FOR THE APPELLANT
Lorne Waldman
Naseem Mithoowani

CO-COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
Marlys Edwardh
Daniel Sheppard
CO-COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
Courtney Harris
Haley Pitcher
FOR THE INTERVENER
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

William F. Pentney
Deputy Attorney General of Canada

FOR THE APPELLANT
Waldman & Associates
Toronto, Ontario
CO-COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP
Toronto, Ontario
CO-COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

Ministry of the Attorney General
Toronto, Ontario
FOR THE INTERVENER

British Airways Flight 2276 registered as G-VIIO.

British Airways Flight 2276 was a scheduled passenger flight which caught fire during take-off from Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport on 8 September 2015, prompting an aborted take-off and the evacuation of all passengers and crew. The flight, bound for Gatwick Airport near London, had 157 passengers and 13 crew. The aircraft had suffered an uncontained engine failure in the left (#1) GE90 engine.[1]

The aircraft left Terminal 3, Gate E3, at 15:53 local time, and began its take-off from Runway 07L at 16:12 where the incident occurred.[2]

After noticing what the captain later described as a "catastrophic engine failure" and a "loud boom" in the left-hand engine, well before take-off speed, the flight crew aborted the take-off by using the aircraft's brakes and ordered an evacuation of the aircraft.[3] All passengers and crew escaped, with some suffering minor injuries.

The airport's emergency services extinguished the fire within five minutes of the mayday call. Fire officials said that twenty-seven people were taken to Sunrise Hospital & Medical Center to be treated for minor injuries, including cuts and bruises, mostly a result of sliding down the inflatable chutes to escape.[4][5] The fire caused an opening of a large hole in the cargo hold and damage to the engine.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated the fire was caused by failure of the left General Electric GE90 engine, one of two fitted on the plane.[6] The aircraft came to a halt upwind, causing the fire to be blown towards the fuselage; the aircraft sustained localized, but major, structural damage as a result.[7][8] The aircraft was equipped with suppression systems, though the systems did not extinguish the fire.[9]

The runway, one of four, was closed for four hours, and a number of inbound flights were cancelled.[10]

Aircraft
The aircraft involved in the incident was a Boeing 777-236ER, registered as G-VIIO. The aircraft itself is about 17 years old and was delivered new to British Airways on 26 January 1999.[11]

If the aircraft is declared a hull loss, the insurers would have to absorb around £21.4m ($32.8m) to cover the aircraft and liabilities.[12]

Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the American air accident investigative body, dispatched four investigators to the site the day after.[13] As well as FAA, Boeing and General Electric involvement, the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch has a representative and that representative has appointed "British Airways and the UK Civil Aviation Authority as technical advisors". Initial NTSB findings were that an uncontained engine failure had occurred and that the "left engine and pylon, left fuselage structure and inboard left wing airplane were substantially damaged by the fire".[14]

See also
British Airtours Flight 28M, a similar, although fatal accident, which took place in 1985.
China Airlines Flight 120
References[edit]
Jump up ^ "NTSB Issues Update on the British Airways Engine Fire at Las Vegas". NTSB. Retrieved 10 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "Flight Info". FlightStats. Retrieved 9 September 2015. (Login required)
Jump up ^ "13 hospitalized after British Airways fire in Las Vegas". Fox 5 Vegas. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ Phipps, Claire. "British Airways plane catches fire at Las Vegas airport". The Guardian. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "British Airways fire: Jet's suppression system didn't work, source says". CNN. 9 September 2015. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ Alcock, Charles (8 September 2015). "Engine Failure Causes Fire on British Airways Boeing 777". AIN Online. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ Waldron, Greg. "Unclear whether BA 777 engine failure was contained". flightglobal.com. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ Kaminski-Morrow, David (9 September 2015). "Weather data suggests crosswind at time of BA 777 fire". Flightglobal. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "British Airways fire: Jet's suppression system didn't work, source says". CNN. 9 September 2015. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "Accident: British Airways B772 at Las Vegas on Sep 8th 2015, rejected takeoff due to engine fire". The Aviation Herald. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ Boeing 777 (G-VIIO)— British Airways — Plane Finder Data
Jump up ^ McNestrie, Adam (9 September 2015). "Aviation market to absorb $33mn BA Vegas loss". Insurance Insider. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "NTSB Investigators to Probe Engine Fire on British Airways 777 in Las Vegas". NTSB. Retrieved 9 September 2015.
Jump up ^ "NTSB Issues Update on the British Airways Engine Fire at Las Vegas". NTSB. Retrieved 10 September 2015.

2015, British Airways Flight 2276, a Boeing 777-236ER G-VIIO,

On 8 September 2015, British Airways Flight 2276, a Boeing 777-236ER G-VIIO, aborted its takeoff at Las Vegas McCarren International Airport due to a catastrophic engine failure of its left (#1) General Electric GE90engine, which led to a large fire. The aircraft was evacuated on the main runway. All 189 passengers and crew escaped the aircraft with only 14 people sustaining minor injuries. An NTSB and AAIB investigation is underway with the aircraft already declared a hull loss.[161]

The Canadian Transportation Agency INFORMATION FOR SKYGREECE TICKET-HOLDERS copy

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INFORMATION FOR SKYGREECE TICKET-HOLDERS



The Canadian Transportation Agency is providing the following advice to passengers who hold tickets for travel on SkyGreece.


If you have purchased a ticket but have not yet travelled, or you are still in transit and your air carrier ceases operations, you should contact your travel agent or other transportation providers as soon as possible to make alternate arrangements.


If you have purchased travel insurance, you should contact the insurance company to see if you are covered.


If you have an unused ticket, you may be eligible for a refund from your credit card company or certain provincial government authorities responsible for travel. Passengers whose travel agents are registered in Ontario, Quebec or British Columbia may contact the following provincial authorities for advice on claims for reimbursement:

Ontario
Travel Industry Council of Ontario (TICO)
Tel.: 1 888-451-8426
Email: tico@tico.ca
www.tico.ca

Quebec
Office de la protection du consommateur
Tel.: 1-888-672-2556
www.opc.gouv.qc.ca

British Columbia
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Authority
Tel.: 1-888-564-9963
Email: info@consumerprotectionbc.ca
http://www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/


Residents of other provinces or territories or persons outside Canada should contact their travel agents.


The Agency can handle certain air travel complaints about flights originating in Canada or where the ultimate ticketed destination is Canada by domestic and foreign carriers. Visit our Air Complaints page for information on how the Agency handles complaints related to flight disruptions.