Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), also known as winter depression or winter blues, is a mood disorder in which people who have normal mental health throughout most of the year experience depressive symptoms in the winter or, less frequently, in the summer,[1] spring or autumn, repeatedly, year after year. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), SAD is not a unique mood disorder, but is "a specifier of major depression".[2]
The US National Library of Medicine notes that "some people experience a serious mood change when the seasons change. They may sleep too much, have little energy, and crave sweets and starchy foods. They may also feel depressed. Though symptoms can be severe, they usually clear up."[3] The condition in the summer is often referred to as Reverse Seasonal Affective Disorder, and can also include heightened anxiety.[4] It has been estimated that 1.5-9% of adults in the US experience SAD.[5]
There are many different treatments for classic (winter-based) seasonal affective disorder, including light therapy with sunlight or bright lights, antidepressant medication, cognitive-behavioral therapy, ionized-air administration,[6] and carefully timed supplementation of the hormone melatonin.[7]
Contents[hide]
1 Symptoms
2 Diagnostic criteria
3 Physiology
4 Origin
5 Treatment
6 Incidence
6.1 Nordic countries
6.2 Other countries
7 SAD and bipolar
8 See also
9 References
10 External links
//
[edit] Symptoms
Symptoms of SAD may consist of: difficulty waking up in the morning, tendency to oversleep as well as to overeat, and especially a craving for carbohydrates, which leads to weight gain. Other symptoms include a lack of energy, difficulty concentrating on completing tasks, and withdrawal from friends, family, and social activities. All of this leads to the depression, pessimism, and lack of pleasure which characterize a person suffering from this disorder.
People that experience Reverse SAD (spring and summer depression) show symptoms of insomnia, anxiety, irritability, decreased appetite, weight loss, and an increased sex drive.[4] RSAD can also manifest depression, which makes it difficult to diagnose this rare affliction.
[edit] Diagnostic criteria
According to the American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV,[8] criteria, Seasonal Affective disorder is not regarded as a separate disorder, but is called a 'course specifier' and may be applied as an added description to the pattern of Major Depressive Episodes in patients with Major Depressive Disorder or patients with Bipolar Disorder. The Seasonal Pattern Specifier must meet four criteria: depressive episodes at a particular time of the year; remissions or mania/hypomania also at a characteristic time of year; these patterns must have lasted two years with no nonseasonal major depressive episodes during that same period; and these seasonal depressive episodes outnumber other depressive episodes throughout the patient's lifetime. The Mayo Clinic[4] describes three types of Seasonal Affective Disorder, each with its own set of symptoms.
[edit] Physiology
Seasonal mood variations are believed to be related to light. An argument for this view is the effectiveness of bright-light therapy.[9] SAD is measurably present at latitudes in the Arctic region, such as Finland (64ยบ 00´N) where the rate of SAD is 9.5%[10] Cloud cover may contribute to the negative effects of SAD.[5]
The symptoms of SAD mimic those of dysthymia or clinical depression. There is also potential risk of suicide in some patients experiencing SAD. One study reports 6-35% of sufferers required hospitalization during one period of illness.[5] At times, patients may not feel depressed, but rather lack energy to perform everyday activities.[9]
Various proximate causes have been proposed. One possibility is that SAD is related to a lack of serotonin, and serotonin polymorphisms could play a role in SAD,[11] although this has been disputed.[12] Mice incapable of turning serotonin into N-acetylserotonin (by Serotonin N-acetyltransferase) appear to express "depression-like" behavior, and antidepressants such as fluoxetine increase the amount of the enzyme Serotonin N-acetyltransferase, resulting in an antidepressant-like effect.[13] Another theory is that the cause may be related to melatonin which is produced in dim light and darkness by the pineal gland, since there are direct connections, via the retinohypothalamic tract and the suprachiasmatic nucleus, between the retina and the pineal gland.
Subsyndromal Seasonal Affective Disorder is a milder form of SAD experienced by an estimated 14.3% vs. 6.1% of the U.S. population.[14] The blue feeling experienced by both SAD and SSAD sufferers can usually be dampened or extinguished by exercise and increased outdoor activity, particularly on sunny days, resulting in increased solar exposure.[15] Connections between human mood, as well as energy levels, and the seasons are well documented, even in healthy individuals.
Mutation of a gene expressing melanopsin has been implicated in the risk of having Seasonal Affective Disorder.[16]
[edit] Origin
In many species, activity is diminished during the winter months in response to the reduction in available food and the difficulties of surviving in cold weather. Hibernation is an extreme example, but even species that do not hibernate often exhibit changes in behavior during the winter. It has been argued that SAD is an evolved adaptation in humans that is a variant or remnant of a hibernation response in some remote ancestor. [17] Presumably, food was scarce during most of human prehistory, and a tendency toward low mood during the winter months would have been adaptive by reducing the need for calorie intake. The preponderance of women with SAD suggests that the response may also somehow regulate reproduction.[17]
If these interpretations are correct, SAD would not be a dysfunction or disorder as most psychiatrists assume, but rather a normal and expected response to seasonal changes.
[edit] Treatment
One type of light therapy lamp
There are many different treatments for classic (winter-based) seasonal affective disorder, including bright light therapy, medication, ionized-air administration, cognitive-behavioral therapy and carefully timed supplementation[18] of the hormone melatonin.
Photoperiod-related alterations of the duration of melatonin secretion may affect the seasonal mood cycles of SAD. This suggests that light therapy may be an effective treatment for SAD.[19] Bright light therapy often includes the use of a lightbox which emits far more lumens than a customary incandescent lamp. White light, or "full spectrum" light is usually preferred, although blue light is also used.[20]
Lightbox therapy is effective at doses of 2500–10,000 lux,[14] with the patient sitting a prescribed distance, commonly 30–60 cm, in front of the box with her/his eyes open but not staring at the light source.[10] Most treatments use 30–60 minute treatments, however this may vary depending on the situation. Many patients use the light box in the morning, and there is evidence that morning light is superior to evening light, although people can respond to evening light as well.[21] Discovering the best schedule is essential. One study has shown that up to 69% of patients find the treatment inconvenient and as many as 19% stop use because of this.[10]
Dawn simulation has also proven to be effective; in some studies, there is an 83% better response when compared to other bright light therapy.[10] When compared in a study to negative air ionization, bright light was proven to be 57.1% effective vs. dawn simulation, 49.5%.[6] Patients using light therapy can experience improvement during the first week, but increased results are evident when continued throughout several weeks.[10] Most studies have found it effective without use year round, but rather as a seasonal treatment lasting for several weeks until frequent light exposure is naturally obtained.[9]
Light therapy can also consist of exposure to sunlight, either in the form of spending more time outside [22], or using a computer-controlled mirror device called a heliostat to reflect sunlight into the windows of a home or office.[23][24]
SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor) antidepressants have proven effective in treating SAD. Bupropion is also effective as a prophylactic.[5] Effective antidepressants are fluoxetine, sertraline, or paroxetine.[9][25] Both fluoxetine and light therapy are 67% effective in treating SAD according to direct head-to-head trials conducted during the 2006 CAN-SAD study.[26] Subjects using the light therapy protocol showed earlier clinical improvement, generally within one week of beginning the clinical treatment.[9]
Negative air ionization, which involves releasing charged particles into the sleep environment, has also been found effective with a 47.9% improvement if the negative ions are in sufficient density (quantity).[27][27][28][28][29][29] Depending upon the patient, one treatment (ie. lightbox) may be used in conjunction with another therapy (ie. medication).[9]
Modafinil may be also an effective and well-tolerated treatment in patients with seasonal affective disorder/winter depression.[30]
Alfred J. Lewy of Oregon Health and Science University in Portland, OHSU, and others see the cause of SAD as a misalignment of the sleep-wake phase contra the period of the body clock, circadian rhythms out of synch, and treat it with melatonin in the afternoon. Correctly timed melatonin administration shifts the rhythms of several hormones en bloc.[31]
Another explanation is that vitamin D levels are too low when people do not get enough Ultraviolet-B on their skin. An alternative to using bright lights is to take vitamin D supplements.[32] [33] [34] [35] However, one study did not show a link between vitamin D levels and depressive symptoms in elderly Chinese.[36]
[edit] Incidence
[edit] Nordic countries
Winter depression is a common slump in the mood of some inhabitants of most of the Nordic countries. It was first described by the 6th century Goth scholar Jordanes in his Getica wherein he described the inhabitants of Scandza (Scandinavia).[37] Iceland, however, seems to be an exception. A study of more than 2000 people there found the prevalence of seasonal affective disorder and seasonal changes in anxiety and depression to be unexpectedly low in both sexes.[38] The study's authors suggested that propensity for SAD may differ due to some genetic factor within the Icelandic population. A study of Canadians of wholly Icelandic descent also showed low levels of SAD.[39] It has more recently been suggested that this may be attributed to the large amount of fish traditionally eaten by Icelandic people, 225 lb per person per year as opposed to about 50 lb in the US and Canada, rather than to genetics.[40] Fish is high in vitamin D. Fish also contains docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), which has been shown to help with a variety of neurological dysfunction.[41]
[edit] Other countries
In the United States, a diagnosis of seasonal affective disorder was first proposed by Norman E. Rosenthal, MD in 1984. Rosenthal wondered why he became sluggish during the winter after moving from sunny South Africa to New York. He started experimenting increasing exposure to artificial light, and found this made a difference. In Alaska it has been established that there is a SAD rate of 8.9%, and an even greater rate of 24.9%[42] for subsyndromal SAD. American science fiction-fantasy author Barbara Hambly had undiagnosed SAD for many years and speaks freely about her condition.[43]
Around 20% of Irish people are affected by SAD, according to a survey conducted in 2007. The survey also shows women are more likely to be affected by SAD than men.[44] An estimated 10% of the population in the Netherlands suffers from SAD.[45]
[edit] SAD and bipolar
Most people with SAD experience major depressive disorder, but as many as 20% may have or may go on to develop a bipolar disorder, a manic-depressive disorder. It is important to discriminate the improved mood associated with recovery from the winter depression and a manic episode because there are important treatment differences.[46] In these cases, persons with SAD may experience depression during the winter and hypomania in the summer.
[edit] See also
Circadian rhythm sleep disorder
Depression (mood)
Social anxiety disorder
Vitamin D
[edit] References
^ Seasonal Depression can Accompany Summer Sun. Ivry, Sara. The New York Times. Retrieved September 6, 2008
^ Lurie, Stephen J.; et al. (November 2006). "Seasonal Affective Disorder". American Family Physician (American Academy of Family Physicians) 74 (9): 1521–4. PMID 17111890. http://www.aafp.org/afp/20061101/1521.html. Retrieved 2009-07-26.
^ U.S. National Library of Medicine
^ a b c Seasonal Affective Disorder by Mayo Clinic
^ a b c d Modell, Jack; Rosenthal NE, Harriett AE, Krishen A, Asgharian A, Foster VJ, Metz A, Rockett CB, Wightman DS (2005). "Seasonal affective disorder and its prevention by anticipatory treatment with bupropion XL Biological Psychiatry". Biological psychiatry 58 (8): 658–667. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2005.07.021. PMID 16271314.
^ a b Terman, M.; Terman, J.S. (2006). "Controlled Trial of Naturalistic Dawn Simulation and Negative Air Ionization for Seasonal Affective Disorder". American Journal of Psychiatry 163 (12): 2126–2133. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.163.12.2126. 17151164. PMID 17151164.
^ "Properly Timed Light, Melatonin Lift Winter Depression by Syncing Rhythms" (Science Update). National Institute of Mental Health. 2006-05-01. http://www.nimh.nih.gov/science-news/2006/properly-timed-light-melatonin-lift-winter-depression-by-syncing-rhythms.shtml. Retrieved 2009-08-30.
^ Gabbard, Glen O. Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders (Third edition, Volume 2 ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. pp. 1296.
^ a b c d e f Lam, RW; Levitt AJ, Levitan RD, Enns MW, Morehouse R, Michalak EE, Tam EM (2006). "The Can-SAD Study: a randomized controlled trial of the effectiveness of light therapy and fluoxetine in patients with winter seasonal affective disorder". American Journal of Psychiatry 163 (5): 805–812. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.163.5.805. PMID 16648320.
^ a b c d e Avery, D H; Eder DN, Bolte MA, Hellekson CJ, Dunner DL, Vitiello MV, Prinz PN (2001). "Dawn simulation and bright light in the treatment of SAD: a controlled study". Biological Psychiatry 50 (3): 205–216. doi:10.1016/S0006-3223(01)01200-8. PMID 11513820.
^ Johansson, C; Smedh C, Partonen T, Pekkarinen P, Paunio T, Ekholm J, Peltonen L,Lichtermann D, Palmgren J, Adolfsson R, Schalling M (2001). "Seasonal affective disorder and serotonin-related polymorphisms". Neurobiology of Disease 8 (2): 351–357. doi:10.1006/nbdi.2000.0373. PMID 11300730.
^ Johansson, C; Willeit M, Levitan R, Partonen T, Smedh C, Del Favero J, Bel Kacem S, Praschak-Rieder N,Neumeister A, Masellis M, Basile V, Zill P, Bondy B, Paunio T, Kasper S, Van Broeckhoven C, Nilsson LG,Lam R, Schalling M, Adolfsson R. (2003). "The serotonin transporter promoter repeat length polymorphism, seasonal affective disorder and seasonality". Psychological Medicine 33 (5): 785–792. doi:10.1017/S0033291703007372. PMID 12877393.
^ Uz, T; Manev, H (2001). "Prolonged swim-test immobility of serotonin N-acetyltransferase (AANAT)-mutant mice". Journal of Pineal Research 30 (3): 166–170. doi:10.1034/j.1600-079X.2001.300305.x. PMID 11316327.
^ a b Avery, D. H.; Kizer D, Bolte MA, Hellekson C (2001). "Bright light therapy of subsyndromal seasonal affective disorder in the workplace: morning vs. afternoon exposure". Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 103 (4): 267–274. doi:10.1034/j.1600-0447.2001.00078.x. PMID 11328240.
^ Leppรคmรคki, Sami; Haukka J, Lonnqvist J, Partonen T (2004). "Drop-out and mood improvement: a randomised controlled trial with light exposure and physical exercise". BMC Psychiatry 4 (22): 22. doi:10.1186/1471-244X-4-22. PMID 15306031.
^ "Breakthroughs tips and trends: November 7th - Times Online". www.timesonline.co.uk. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article5106718.ece. Retrieved 2008-11-10.
^ a b Nesse, Randolphe M; Williams, George C. Why We Get Sick (First ed.). New York: Vintage Books. pp. 290.
^ Bhattacharjee, Y (2007). "Psychiatric research. Is internal timing key to mental health?". Science (New York, N.Y.) 317 (5844): 1488–90. doi:10.1126/science.317.5844.1488. PMID 17872420. http://www.ohsu.edu/ohsuedu/academic/som/images/Al-Lewy-Science.pdf.
^ Howland, RH (2009). "Somatic therapies for seasonal affective disorder.". J Psychosoc Nurs Ment Health Serv 47 (1): 17-20. PMID 19227105.
^ Strong, RE; Marchant, BK; Reimherr, FW; Williams, E; Soni, P; Mestas, R (2009). "Narrow-band blue-light treatment of seasonal affective disorder in adults and the influence of additional nonseasonal symptoms.". Depress Anxiety. 26 (3): 273-8. PMID 19016463. "BROKEN/DEAD LINK".
^ Tuunainen, Arja; Kripke, Daniel F; Endo, Takuro; Tuunainen, Arja (2004). Light therapy for non-seasonal depression. doi:10.1002/14651858.CD004050.pub2.
^ Beck, Melinda. (December 1, 2009) "Bright Ideas for Treating the Winter Blues". (Section title: "Exercise outdoors") The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300504574567881192085174.html?mod=rss_Today%27s_Most_Popular
^ "Applications: Health". Practical Solar. http://www.practicalsolar.com/applications.html. Retrieved 2009-06-09.
^ "Grab the Sun With Heliostats". New York House. 2009-06-01. http://www.newyorkhousemagazine.com/pages/full_story?page_label=home_main_top&id=2631630&widget=push&instance=home_green_future&article-Grab%20the%20Sun%20With%20Heliostats%20=&open=&. Retrieved 2009-12-08.
^ Moscovitch, A; Blashko CA, Eagles JM, Darcourt G, Thompson C, Kasper S, Lane RM (2004). "A placebo-controlled study of sertraline in the treatment of outpatients with seasonal affective disorder". Psychopharmacology 171 (4): 390–397. doi:10.1007/s00213-003-1594-8. PMID 14504682.
^ Lam, Raymond W.; Anthony J. Levitt, Robert D. Levitan, et al. (May 2006). "The Can-SAD Study: A Randomized Controlled Trial of the Effectiveness of Light Therapy and Fluoxetine in Patients With Winter Seasonal Affective Disorder" (PDF, full text). Am J Psychiatry 163 (163): 805–812. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.163.5.805. http://day-lights.com/light-therapy-news/downloads/can-sad-study-wp.pdf. Retrieved 2008-09-30.
^ a b Terman, M.; Terman, J. S. (2006). "Controlled Trial of Naturalistic Dawn Simulation and Negative Air Ionization for Seasonal Affective Disorder". American Journal of Psychiatry 163: 2126. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.163.12.2126.
^ a b Terman, M. (1998). "A Controlled Trial of Timed Bright Light and Negative Air Ionization for Treatment of Winter Depression". Archives of General Psychiatry 55: 875. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.55.10.875 (inactive 2009-10-07).
^ a b Terman, M; Terman, JS (1995). "Treatment of seasonal affective disorder with a high-output negative ionizer.". Journal of alternative and complementary medicine 1 (1): 87–92. doi:10.1089/acm.1995.1.87. PMID 9395604.
^ Lundt, L (2004). "Modafinil treatment in patients with seasonal affective disorder/winter depression: an open-label pilot study". Journal of Affective Disorders 81: 173. doi:10.1016/S0165-0327(03)00162-9.
^ Bhattacharjee, Y (2007). "Psychiatric research. Is internal timing key to mental health?". Science (New York, N.Y.) 317 (5844): 1488–90. doi:10.1126/science.317.5844.1488. PMID 17872420. http://www.ohsu.edu/ohsuedu/academic/som/images/Al-Lewy-Science.pdf.
^ http://newfoundlandnews.blogspot.com/2008/01/sadness-seasonal-affective-disorder.html
^ http://www.nowfoods.com/M092051.htm "Vitamin D Deficiency Linked to Low Mood State and Lowered Intellectual Ability in Elderly" 2006
^ Lansdowne, AT; Provost, SC (1998). "Vitamin D3 enhances mood in healthy subjects during winter.". Psychopharmacology 135 (4): 319–23. doi:10.1007/s002130050517. PMID 9539254.
^ Gloth Fm, 3rd; Alam, W; Hollis, B (1999). "Vitamin D vs broad spectrum phototherapy in the treatment of seasonal affective disorder.". The journal of nutrition, health & aging 3 (1): 5–7. PMID 10888476.
^ http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090317142847.htm "Vitamin D May Not Be The Answer To Feeling SAD" Mar 2009
^ Jordanes, Getica, ed. Mommsen, Mon. Germanae historica, V, Berlin, 1882.
^ Magnusson, Andres; Axelsson, Johann; Karlsson, Mikael M.; Oskarsson, Hรถgni (February 2000). "Lack of Seasonal Mood Change in the Icelandic Population: Results of a Cross-Sectional Study". Am J Psychiatry (American Psychiatric Association) 157 (2): 234–238. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.157.2.234. PMID 10671392. http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/157/2/234. Retrieved 2007-11-27.
^ sson A, Magnรบ Axelsson J (1993). "The prevalence of seasonal affective disorder is low among descendants of Icelandic emigrants in Canada". Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 50 (12): 947–51. PMID 8250680.
^ Cott, Jerry; Joseph R. Hibbeln (February 2001). "Lack of Seasonal Mood Change in Icelanders" (Letter to the Editor). Am J Psychiatry (American Psychiatric Association) 158 (158): 328. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.158.2.328. http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/158/2/328. Retrieved 2008-09-02. "Thus, high levels of fish consumption should be considered a potential etiology for the finding of a lack of seasonal affective disorder among the Icelandic population.".
^ Horrocks, LA; Yeo, YK (1999). "Health benefits of docosahexaenoic acid (DHA)". Pharmacological research : the official journal of the Italian Pharmacological Society 40 (3): 211–25. doi:10.1006/phrs.1999.0495. PMID 10479465.
^ Seasonal Affective Disorder and Latitude
^ [ http://www.andromedaspaceways.com/inter_0002.htm Andromeda Spaceways interview with Barbara Hambly, discusses SAD]
^ BreakingNews.ie - One in five suffers from SAD
^ Elsevier – Dark Days: Winter Depression (in Dutch, easy to translate to English with google translate (or anything like that)
^ "Depression" (PDF). Mood Disorders Society of Canada. http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Consumer%20and%20Family%20Support/Depression.pdf. Retrieved 2009-08-08.
[edit] External links
Seasonal Affective Disorder at the Open Directory Project
Seasonal Affective Disorder – The Basics on ScienceBlogsHia
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seasonal_affective_disorder"
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Thank you Kady O'Malley!
UPDATED: A Tale of Two Document Dumps
December 7, 2009 10:45 AM Comments26Recommend27
By Kady O'Malley
Last Wednesday, those of us who are following the simmering controversy over Canada's past policies and practices in the handling of Afghan detainees were confronted by competing sets of previously unreleased documents from the government, and the Amnesty International/British Columbia Civil Liberties Association legal teams, respectively.
At first glance, it seemed that the two files were virtually identical, but a more thorough investigation revealed that the PDF posted by the BCCLA contained considerably more material than the one provided to the committee. Not all of it is directly relevant to the detainee controversy; there are memos from Richard Colvin on the challenges facing the Afghan National Police, as well as heavily-censored reports on the progress being made in Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan. Some of it, however, is: the flurry of email sparked by the Globe series, discussion on the need to improve the existing detainee transfer agreement, as well as other options, including taking fewer prisoners, or establishing a NATO-run holding facility, and even an exchange between Colvin and various military and foreign affairs officials on the protocol for handling minors.
So, why didn't any of that material make it into the binders that the government finally grudgingly handed over to the committee?
Because they didn't ask for it, that's why.
According to the minutes from the November 25 meeting, the committee requested that the government produce the following material:
All documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All documents within the Department of Foreign Affairs written in response to the documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All memoranda for information or memoranda for decision sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning detainees from December 18, 2005 to the present;
All documents produced pursuant to the orders of the Federal Court in Amnesty International and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and Attorney General of Canada;
All documents produced to the Military Police Complaints Commission in the Afghanistan Public Interest Hearings;
All annual human rights reports by the Department of Foreign Affairs on Afghanistan.
A subsequent motion added a deadline -- December 2, the date of the next scheduled meeting -- for the first item on the list, and when it rolled around, that's exactly what the government delivered: a binder containing every document referred to in the Colvin affidavit, and not one heavily redacted page more. Although the material released last week by Amnesty would, in theory, be covered by the request for documents produced in federal court, the committee neglected to set a date for that particular item, which is almost certainly why it hasn't yet been produced, and likely won't be until they tack on a deadline, and with just one meeting left before the House rises for the holidays, it seems unlikely that the committee will get their collective hands on the additional documents until February at the earliest.
What are they missing? Here's the full list of material found in the Amnesty file, but not the committee binder -- complete with page numbers, to make it easier to find.
UPDATE: You can now access the pages in smaller, more bite-sized PDF format.
Pages 5-9: September 9th 2006 email/report re KGBR0101/GSRP which references visit by then-defence minister O'Connor; also includes almost entirely blacked out summary of roundtable, as well as meeting between minister and Afghan officials, including Karzai - who "showed himself in strong form" and Afghan defence minister. Only bits left unblacked out involve praise for the work of Canadian soldiers.
Pages 14-20: October 15th email/report drafted by COLVIN re KGBRs 0125,0126 and 0104 on discussions with Afghan officials on the state of the Afghan National Police, which "remain largely unreconstructed." Details of the challenges facing the ANP, who "often end up as de facto first responders" including the statement that "in the south, the unhappy combination of high risk and low salary offer little incentive for a policeman" -- short blacked out bit here -- "As a result, in insurgent-heavy provinces such as Kandahar, many districts are believed to have very few police [CENSORED]." Also some heavily censored references to having had to isuse a "clarification" to the Police Act, which had been used by "some governors [LONGISH CENSORED BIT HERE]to assert control over the police within their province."
Pages 21-26: November 18th email drafted by COLVIN and SPROULE on FTAG0058 "on performance of 1 Nov 2006 international organizations in Afghanistan" and KANDH0070 of 13th November on [CENSORED]".Includes assessment of UNAMA staff in Kabul and field offices (noteably former Canadian ambassador turned Conservative candidate in waiting Chris Alexander, who is described as "a dynamic, high-profile and impressive personality, and one of the best connected internationalists in Afghanistan." Entire section on "Human Rights, Governance/Rule of Law/Corruption" blacked out. Also redacted in its entirety is the section on UNAMA's Kandahar office. One almost entirely censored section: "[CENSORED], who brings considerable institutional memory -- said that [FOUR LINES CENSORED]." The next point begins, "On the positive side [...]"
Pages 30-33: January 23, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0183 - Afghanistan: PAG - [CENSORED]. Discusses how the "Policy Action Group heard an exceptionally upbeat presentation [CENSORED]" on 20 January; Afghan participants included Afghan defence minister Abdurl Wardak, NDS security head Amrullah Saleh and "the deputy ministers of the interior, education and information" - also present were ambassadors and "equivalents" from the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, and, among others, Chris Alexander. At one point, someone "congratulated Saleh and Warda on GoA's accomplishments," followed by approximately twenty lines of blacked out text.
Pages 34-37: February 4, 2007 email/report drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0187 on "the Taliban spring offensive, ISAF, intelligence and Pakistan," which is, not surprisingly, almost entirely blacked out.
Pages 38-39: almost entirely redacted February 26 email from Colvin to Scott Proudfoot, among others, with the subject blacked out and this note: "KANDH: For Buchan and Fudge only"
Pages 40-44: KBGR0232, largely blacked-out report drafted by COLVIN on "Glyn Berry investigation, Meetings with [CENSORED]" Among the non-censored portions is an explanation of the difference between an NDS and a police investigation -- in this case, into the bombing that killed Berry -- and the NDS and criminal court system, which is almost entirely redacted.
Pages 45: April 14, 2007 email from "Marvin" (no last name given)RE: Upcoming Globe & Mail story on alleged NDS torture of detainees in Kandahar" that appears to be entirely unredacted, and in which Martin tells "Richard" that he spoke to "the media folks about this a few days ago," who told him that "the comms group under DMA had been informed and "are very much on the ball." It includes a forwarded email from Colvin alerting Elissa Goldberg, David Mulroney and others that Graeme Smith had told "us" that he had been conducting "extensive examinations in Kandahar" over the preceding two weeks into "the alleged torture of detainees by the National Directorate of Security ... including detainees transferred to NDS by Cdn forces." It quotes Smith as saying that some of the stories "are really terrible" and that "some of the Canadian involvement is too close for comfort."
Page 46: April 18, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN on "UNAMA in southern Afghanistan; Prospects for Afghanistan" that is almost completely blacked out
Page 52: April 23 email from COLVIN to RON HOFFMAN, cc'd to PROUDFOOT, on "Suggestions to address the detainee problem" with the designation "LDN: For Lalani" provides three recommendations, including "Canadian Forces, [CENSORED] approach, to take fewer detainees" and "Amend MOU (if political circumstances allow) to allow for Cdn followup monitoring," with some explanation of how that could be done. It concludes: "In our assessment, direct engagement by Cda is needed on this issue a) to respond, and be seen to respond, to concerns by the Cdn public and media, and [CENSORED}."
Page 53: April 23 email from COLVIN to Proudfood, Mulroney, COLLEEN SWORDS and others, under the subject "Re: Detainees: Urgent Demarche", reporting on his discussion with Ahmad Zia Langari, one of nine commissioners at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, to whom he delivered "the five bullets below." Langari told him that the commission "has faced problems of access to NDS facilities," and, as such, "is unable to monitor the condition of detainees, as per their agreements with the Canadians, Dutch and others" and has raised the issue "about 9 days ago with President Karzai," but the "access problem has not gone away." He notes that he has had a request in to meet with Saleh -- the head of NDS -- since April 17th on detainee handling issues and Glyn Berry," and is "awaiting confirmation of the appointment."
Pages 55-61: April 24, 2007 email from SWORDS of a fwded report from COLVIN, on which she is "copying BNATO on this msg as coordination with NATO is important aspect of how we deal with detainees as we move forward," and asking that "we automatically put them on distr detainee msgs so we can best integrate that angle." In the fwded email, Colvin discusses his request for an "urgent meeting with NDS," and suggests that they might also be able to meet with Karzai's chief of staff, "and possibly also Karzai himself." It also includes the full text of the April 24, 2007 Globe and Mail articles.
Page 64: KBGR0266, April 25, 2007 email from COLVIN to Mulroney, Swords, Buck and many others, in which he recommends that Canada, "for reasons of our own national interest, establish -- and announce that we are establishing -- a Canadian capacity to monitor, in both Kandahar and Kabul, the treatment of Afghan detainees following their transfer to Government of Afghanistan (GoA) control," as well as an attempt to limit the number of Afghans detained by Cdn forces and "handed to GoA," noting that "detainee methodologies in the field are too expansive, resulting in the detention of a significant number of Afghans who are not/not insurgents or combatants [CENSORED]"
Page 65: Aprul 25, 2007 email from COLVIN re: "Allied detention faciltiies," in which he notes that "[CENSORED] confirms they have never had bilateral discussions with [CENSORED] on a detention facility, which also includes a fwd of his own heavily redacted email to LAPORTE on the same topic. It notes that the UK, Canada and Belgium "have paid for the renovation of a wing of Pol-Charki for high-value CN prisoners," but that although it is complete,"because no high-value CN targets have been taken, it has not been operationalized."
Pages 106-107: KBGR0295 June 26, 2007 email from COLVIN on Senlis Council CEO Norine MacDnald "regarding the closure by the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) of Senlis's offices in Afghanistan," in which the lengthy background section is almost completely blacked out.
Page 108: June 30, 2007 email from "GAVIN" to COLVIN on "A question on the transfer of Minors," in which KEVIN REX notes that "the Commander has asked for "a ruling from DFAIT" on this one;" the writer acknowledges that "this is obviously not my forte," but says that he believes "we simply transder everyone to the NDS. I am not aware of any specific arrangements made for minors," nor can be find reference in the SOPS and MOU. Gavin tells Kevin to ask ELISSA GOLBERG, "with a c.c. to GHH (and FTAG, of course)" but nots tes that his "own two cents is that if we are clearly dealing with a minor, we should respect whatever Afhan law dictates in terms of institutions of detention," and if "that means transferring direct to Sarpoza and not to NDS, that's do-able -- logistically challenging, of course, but not impossible."
Page 111: July 4, 2007 email from COLVIN on "NDS facility in Kabul, Proposal for a Canadian renovation project" -- which, from the contents, seems to have been a request from NDS director Saleh whether Canada "would be interested in modernizing, rebuilding and expanding" the Sederat NDS facility in Kabul. It notes that, during interviews with prisoners, "none complained of abuse" but did speak of "poor living conditions," and notes that, although "an unorthodox project, we do not see any significant communications risks."
Pages 115-117: July 27, 2009 KBGR0306 - "Police update: EU police mission and MoI reform," almost entirely redacted, but does include recent developments in police recruitment, and "the future of the International Police Coordination Board."
Pages 121-125: October 24, 2007 - Colvin's unsent end-of-posting observations
December 7, 2009 10:45 AM Comments26Recommend27
By Kady O'Malley
Last Wednesday, those of us who are following the simmering controversy over Canada's past policies and practices in the handling of Afghan detainees were confronted by competing sets of previously unreleased documents from the government, and the Amnesty International/British Columbia Civil Liberties Association legal teams, respectively.
At first glance, it seemed that the two files were virtually identical, but a more thorough investigation revealed that the PDF posted by the BCCLA contained considerably more material than the one provided to the committee. Not all of it is directly relevant to the detainee controversy; there are memos from Richard Colvin on the challenges facing the Afghan National Police, as well as heavily-censored reports on the progress being made in Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan. Some of it, however, is: the flurry of email sparked by the Globe series, discussion on the need to improve the existing detainee transfer agreement, as well as other options, including taking fewer prisoners, or establishing a NATO-run holding facility, and even an exchange between Colvin and various military and foreign affairs officials on the protocol for handling minors.
So, why didn't any of that material make it into the binders that the government finally grudgingly handed over to the committee?
Because they didn't ask for it, that's why.
According to the minutes from the November 25 meeting, the committee requested that the government produce the following material:
All documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All documents within the Department of Foreign Affairs written in response to the documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All memoranda for information or memoranda for decision sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning detainees from December 18, 2005 to the present;
All documents produced pursuant to the orders of the Federal Court in Amnesty International and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and Attorney General of Canada;
All documents produced to the Military Police Complaints Commission in the Afghanistan Public Interest Hearings;
All annual human rights reports by the Department of Foreign Affairs on Afghanistan.
A subsequent motion added a deadline -- December 2, the date of the next scheduled meeting -- for the first item on the list, and when it rolled around, that's exactly what the government delivered: a binder containing every document referred to in the Colvin affidavit, and not one heavily redacted page more. Although the material released last week by Amnesty would, in theory, be covered by the request for documents produced in federal court, the committee neglected to set a date for that particular item, which is almost certainly why it hasn't yet been produced, and likely won't be until they tack on a deadline, and with just one meeting left before the House rises for the holidays, it seems unlikely that the committee will get their collective hands on the additional documents until February at the earliest.
What are they missing? Here's the full list of material found in the Amnesty file, but not the committee binder -- complete with page numbers, to make it easier to find.
UPDATE: You can now access the pages in smaller, more bite-sized PDF format.
Pages 5-9: September 9th 2006 email/report re KGBR0101/GSRP which references visit by then-defence minister O'Connor; also includes almost entirely blacked out summary of roundtable, as well as meeting between minister and Afghan officials, including Karzai - who "showed himself in strong form" and Afghan defence minister. Only bits left unblacked out involve praise for the work of Canadian soldiers.
Pages 14-20: October 15th email/report drafted by COLVIN re KGBRs 0125,0126 and 0104 on discussions with Afghan officials on the state of the Afghan National Police, which "remain largely unreconstructed." Details of the challenges facing the ANP, who "often end up as de facto first responders" including the statement that "in the south, the unhappy combination of high risk and low salary offer little incentive for a policeman" -- short blacked out bit here -- "As a result, in insurgent-heavy provinces such as Kandahar, many districts are believed to have very few police [CENSORED]." Also some heavily censored references to having had to isuse a "clarification" to the Police Act, which had been used by "some governors [LONGISH CENSORED BIT HERE]to assert control over the police within their province."
Pages 21-26: November 18th email drafted by COLVIN and SPROULE on FTAG0058 "on performance of 1 Nov 2006 international organizations in Afghanistan" and KANDH0070 of 13th November on [CENSORED]".Includes assessment of UNAMA staff in Kabul and field offices (noteably former Canadian ambassador turned Conservative candidate in waiting Chris Alexander, who is described as "a dynamic, high-profile and impressive personality, and one of the best connected internationalists in Afghanistan." Entire section on "Human Rights, Governance/Rule of Law/Corruption" blacked out. Also redacted in its entirety is the section on UNAMA's Kandahar office. One almost entirely censored section: "[CENSORED], who brings considerable institutional memory -- said that [FOUR LINES CENSORED]." The next point begins, "On the positive side [...]"
Pages 30-33: January 23, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0183 - Afghanistan: PAG - [CENSORED]. Discusses how the "Policy Action Group heard an exceptionally upbeat presentation [CENSORED]" on 20 January; Afghan participants included Afghan defence minister Abdurl Wardak, NDS security head Amrullah Saleh and "the deputy ministers of the interior, education and information" - also present were ambassadors and "equivalents" from the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, and, among others, Chris Alexander. At one point, someone "congratulated Saleh and Warda on GoA's accomplishments," followed by approximately twenty lines of blacked out text.
Pages 34-37: February 4, 2007 email/report drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0187 on "the Taliban spring offensive, ISAF, intelligence and Pakistan," which is, not surprisingly, almost entirely blacked out.
Pages 38-39: almost entirely redacted February 26 email from Colvin to Scott Proudfoot, among others, with the subject blacked out and this note: "KANDH: For Buchan and Fudge only"
Pages 40-44: KBGR0232, largely blacked-out report drafted by COLVIN on "Glyn Berry investigation, Meetings with [CENSORED]" Among the non-censored portions is an explanation of the difference between an NDS and a police investigation -- in this case, into the bombing that killed Berry -- and the NDS and criminal court system, which is almost entirely redacted.
Pages 45: April 14, 2007 email from "Marvin" (no last name given)RE: Upcoming Globe & Mail story on alleged NDS torture of detainees in Kandahar" that appears to be entirely unredacted, and in which Martin tells "Richard" that he spoke to "the media folks about this a few days ago," who told him that "the comms group under DMA had been informed and "are very much on the ball." It includes a forwarded email from Colvin alerting Elissa Goldberg, David Mulroney and others that Graeme Smith had told "us" that he had been conducting "extensive examinations in Kandahar" over the preceding two weeks into "the alleged torture of detainees by the National Directorate of Security ... including detainees transferred to NDS by Cdn forces." It quotes Smith as saying that some of the stories "are really terrible" and that "some of the Canadian involvement is too close for comfort."
Page 46: April 18, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN on "UNAMA in southern Afghanistan; Prospects for Afghanistan" that is almost completely blacked out
Page 52: April 23 email from COLVIN to RON HOFFMAN, cc'd to PROUDFOOT, on "Suggestions to address the detainee problem" with the designation "LDN: For Lalani" provides three recommendations, including "Canadian Forces, [CENSORED] approach, to take fewer detainees" and "Amend MOU (if political circumstances allow) to allow for Cdn followup monitoring," with some explanation of how that could be done. It concludes: "In our assessment, direct engagement by Cda is needed on this issue a) to respond, and be seen to respond, to concerns by the Cdn public and media, and [CENSORED}."
Page 53: April 23 email from COLVIN to Proudfood, Mulroney, COLLEEN SWORDS and others, under the subject "Re: Detainees: Urgent Demarche", reporting on his discussion with Ahmad Zia Langari, one of nine commissioners at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, to whom he delivered "the five bullets below." Langari told him that the commission "has faced problems of access to NDS facilities," and, as such, "is unable to monitor the condition of detainees, as per their agreements with the Canadians, Dutch and others" and has raised the issue "about 9 days ago with President Karzai," but the "access problem has not gone away." He notes that he has had a request in to meet with Saleh -- the head of NDS -- since April 17th on detainee handling issues and Glyn Berry," and is "awaiting confirmation of the appointment."
Pages 55-61: April 24, 2007 email from SWORDS of a fwded report from COLVIN, on which she is "copying BNATO on this msg as coordination with NATO is important aspect of how we deal with detainees as we move forward," and asking that "we automatically put them on distr detainee msgs so we can best integrate that angle." In the fwded email, Colvin discusses his request for an "urgent meeting with NDS," and suggests that they might also be able to meet with Karzai's chief of staff, "and possibly also Karzai himself." It also includes the full text of the April 24, 2007 Globe and Mail articles.
Page 64: KBGR0266, April 25, 2007 email from COLVIN to Mulroney, Swords, Buck and many others, in which he recommends that Canada, "for reasons of our own national interest, establish -- and announce that we are establishing -- a Canadian capacity to monitor, in both Kandahar and Kabul, the treatment of Afghan detainees following their transfer to Government of Afghanistan (GoA) control," as well as an attempt to limit the number of Afghans detained by Cdn forces and "handed to GoA," noting that "detainee methodologies in the field are too expansive, resulting in the detention of a significant number of Afghans who are not/not insurgents or combatants [CENSORED]"
Page 65: Aprul 25, 2007 email from COLVIN re: "Allied detention faciltiies," in which he notes that "[CENSORED] confirms they have never had bilateral discussions with [CENSORED] on a detention facility, which also includes a fwd of his own heavily redacted email to LAPORTE on the same topic. It notes that the UK, Canada and Belgium "have paid for the renovation of a wing of Pol-Charki for high-value CN prisoners," but that although it is complete,"because no high-value CN targets have been taken, it has not been operationalized."
Pages 106-107: KBGR0295 June 26, 2007 email from COLVIN on Senlis Council CEO Norine MacDnald "regarding the closure by the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) of Senlis's offices in Afghanistan," in which the lengthy background section is almost completely blacked out.
Page 108: June 30, 2007 email from "GAVIN" to COLVIN on "A question on the transfer of Minors," in which KEVIN REX notes that "the Commander has asked for "a ruling from DFAIT" on this one;" the writer acknowledges that "this is obviously not my forte," but says that he believes "we simply transder everyone to the NDS. I am not aware of any specific arrangements made for minors," nor can be find reference in the SOPS and MOU. Gavin tells Kevin to ask ELISSA GOLBERG, "with a c.c. to GHH (and FTAG, of course)" but nots tes that his "own two cents is that if we are clearly dealing with a minor, we should respect whatever Afhan law dictates in terms of institutions of detention," and if "that means transferring direct to Sarpoza and not to NDS, that's do-able -- logistically challenging, of course, but not impossible."
Page 111: July 4, 2007 email from COLVIN on "NDS facility in Kabul, Proposal for a Canadian renovation project" -- which, from the contents, seems to have been a request from NDS director Saleh whether Canada "would be interested in modernizing, rebuilding and expanding" the Sederat NDS facility in Kabul. It notes that, during interviews with prisoners, "none complained of abuse" but did speak of "poor living conditions," and notes that, although "an unorthodox project, we do not see any significant communications risks."
Pages 115-117: July 27, 2009 KBGR0306 - "Police update: EU police mission and MoI reform," almost entirely redacted, but does include recent developments in police recruitment, and "the future of the International Police Coordination Board."
Pages 121-125: October 24, 2007 - Colvin's unsent end-of-posting observations
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Report into the RCMP in-custody death of Mr. Robert Dziekanski, October 14, 2007
Report into the RCMP in-custody death of Mr. Robert Dziekanski, October 14, 2007
Quick Links
Public Report************
Executive Summary
A Timeline
Complaint Process Flowchart
December 8, 2009
Ottawa, Ontario – The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP's (CPC) two-year long investigation into the RCMP in-custody death of Robert Dziekanski on October 14, 2007 has concluded. The CPC report highlights 23 findings and 16 recommendations made to the RCMP. The report was provided to the RCMP and the Minister of Public Safety on October 15, 2009.
The CPC endeavours to include the RCMP Commissioner's response to reports it writes prior to public release. However, with more than 100 complaints received on this case, the CPC has deemed it in the public interest to release the report without any further delay.
The details of the Robert Dziekanski case are now well-known to the public. Simply stated, the conduct of the four members of the RCMP who responded to the 911 calls of a disturbance being caused by Mr. Dziekanski fell short of that expected of members of the RCMP. Additionally, while the subsequent investigation was found to be unbiased, it could have been done better. The CPC report also raises concerns about the manner in which the RCMP communicated with the public following Mr. Dziekanski's death.
It is the CPC's intent that its findings and recommendations contribute to the improvement of policing practices and assist in preventing such a tragedy from recurring.
Key Findings
While they were in the lawful execution of their duties as police officers, the four officers failed to adopt a measured, coordinated and appropriate response to Mr. Dziekanski's reported behaviour.
The senior on-scene RCMP member failed to take charge of the RCMP's response.
No meaningful attempt was made to de-escalate the situation.
No warning—visual or otherwise—was given to Mr. Dziekanski prior to him being tasered by the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW).
Use of the CEW against Mr. Dziekanski was premature and inappropriate.
The CEW was used multiple times on Mr. Dziekanski without any significant effort made to determine the need for further use.
The RCMP members present should have more actively provided first aid and monitored Mr. Dziekanki's condition.
The four RCMP members inappropriately met alone after the death of Mr. Dziekanski—prior to giving their statements.
The versions of events given to investigators by the four RCMP officers involved in the Vancouver International Airport in-custody death of Robert Dziekanski are not deemed credible by the CPC.
The senior on-scene RCMP member should not have been present at the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT) briefing held at the Richmond Detachment on October 14, 2007.
No bias or partiality toward the involved RCMP members was present in the IHIT investigation of the death of Mr. Dziekanski, but the Pritchard video should have been shown to the members before taking statements from them.
The RCMP should have released certain information to the media which would have served to clarify information pertaining to the death of Mr. Dziekanski and corrected erroneous information previously provided without compromising the IHIT investigation.
The CPC first became engaged in the Vancouver International Airport incident on October 15, 2007 when it deployed an independent observer to the RCMP's criminal investigation into events surrounding the death of Mr. Dziekanski. The CPC Chair-initiated complaint and subsequent investigation was launched by CPC Chair Paul E. Kennedy on November 8, 2007.
The CPC is distinct and independent of the RCMP and has jurisdiction over public complaints regarding all members of the RCMP.
– 30 –
For more information, please contact:Nelson KalilManager, Communications613-952-2452nelson.kalil@cpc-cpp.gc.ca
Quick Links
Public Report************
Executive Summary
A Timeline
Complaint Process Flowchart
December 8, 2009
Ottawa, Ontario – The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP's (CPC) two-year long investigation into the RCMP in-custody death of Robert Dziekanski on October 14, 2007 has concluded. The CPC report highlights 23 findings and 16 recommendations made to the RCMP. The report was provided to the RCMP and the Minister of Public Safety on October 15, 2009.
The CPC endeavours to include the RCMP Commissioner's response to reports it writes prior to public release. However, with more than 100 complaints received on this case, the CPC has deemed it in the public interest to release the report without any further delay.
The details of the Robert Dziekanski case are now well-known to the public. Simply stated, the conduct of the four members of the RCMP who responded to the 911 calls of a disturbance being caused by Mr. Dziekanski fell short of that expected of members of the RCMP. Additionally, while the subsequent investigation was found to be unbiased, it could have been done better. The CPC report also raises concerns about the manner in which the RCMP communicated with the public following Mr. Dziekanski's death.
It is the CPC's intent that its findings and recommendations contribute to the improvement of policing practices and assist in preventing such a tragedy from recurring.
Key Findings
While they were in the lawful execution of their duties as police officers, the four officers failed to adopt a measured, coordinated and appropriate response to Mr. Dziekanski's reported behaviour.
The senior on-scene RCMP member failed to take charge of the RCMP's response.
No meaningful attempt was made to de-escalate the situation.
No warning—visual or otherwise—was given to Mr. Dziekanski prior to him being tasered by the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW).
Use of the CEW against Mr. Dziekanski was premature and inappropriate.
The CEW was used multiple times on Mr. Dziekanski without any significant effort made to determine the need for further use.
The RCMP members present should have more actively provided first aid and monitored Mr. Dziekanki's condition.
The four RCMP members inappropriately met alone after the death of Mr. Dziekanski—prior to giving their statements.
The versions of events given to investigators by the four RCMP officers involved in the Vancouver International Airport in-custody death of Robert Dziekanski are not deemed credible by the CPC.
The senior on-scene RCMP member should not have been present at the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT) briefing held at the Richmond Detachment on October 14, 2007.
No bias or partiality toward the involved RCMP members was present in the IHIT investigation of the death of Mr. Dziekanski, but the Pritchard video should have been shown to the members before taking statements from them.
The RCMP should have released certain information to the media which would have served to clarify information pertaining to the death of Mr. Dziekanski and corrected erroneous information previously provided without compromising the IHIT investigation.
The CPC first became engaged in the Vancouver International Airport incident on October 15, 2007 when it deployed an independent observer to the RCMP's criminal investigation into events surrounding the death of Mr. Dziekanski. The CPC Chair-initiated complaint and subsequent investigation was launched by CPC Chair Paul E. Kennedy on November 8, 2007.
The CPC is distinct and independent of the RCMP and has jurisdiction over public complaints regarding all members of the RCMP.
– 30 –
For more information, please contact:Nelson KalilManager, Communications613-952-2452nelson.kalil@cpc-cpp.gc.ca
Detainee incident renews debate in House
Detainee abuse incident renews debate in House
Last Updated: Monday, December 7, 2009 11:01 PM ET Comments0Recommend1
CBC News
A previously known incident of abuse of a detainee by Afghan policemen was raised in the House of Commons on Monday as evidence of serious problems in Canada's handling of prisoners.
"What kind of government, what kind of Canadian government, refuses to act on credible accusations of torture — evidence of torture, in this case, evidence provided by Canadian Forces?" Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff said during question period.
In June 2006, a joint Canadian-Afghan operation in Zangabad village, about 40 kilometres southwest of Kandahar city, netted several prisoners. The Afghan National Police eventually took custody of the prisoners, all of whom were freed except one. That man was beaten by a group of five or six local ANP members.
The details were recorded in notes taken by Canadian soldiers in the field and were among documents submitted as part of a Federal Court action in which Amnesty International and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association sought to stop further prisoner transfers.
The notes reveal Canadian soldiers took custody of the prisoner, provided medical treatment and eventually handed him to provincial ANP. The incident was first outlined in a May 2007 affidavit by Col. Steven Noonan, the first Canadian Task Force-Afghanistan commander.
On Monday, the federal government said those reports reveal nothing nefarious was going on — at least not involving a detainee held by Canadians.
'Not a Canadian detainee'
"The Afghan in question was not a Canadian detainee, and our men and women in uniform did the right thing," Transport Minister John Baird said.
Baird's distinction is based on a legal question about whether a detainee caught by Canadian soldiers during a joint Canadian-Afghan operation is a Canadian detainee, as opposed to a prisoner caught by Canadian soldiers and transferred to Afghan authorities later.
When the incident first broke in May 2007, the government stressed that the prisoner was never a Canadian detainee. But the field notes obtained by CBC News indicate the soldiers on the ground didn't make that distinction, nor did Noonan who testified before the Federal Court.
"I think it's frankly outrageous," said NDP defence critic Jack Harris, "that ministers would get up in the House and essentially say that sworn evidence of soldiers, generals and contemporaneous notes of soldiers, are in fact lies."
Last Updated: Monday, December 7, 2009 11:01 PM ET Comments0Recommend1
CBC News
A previously known incident of abuse of a detainee by Afghan policemen was raised in the House of Commons on Monday as evidence of serious problems in Canada's handling of prisoners.
"What kind of government, what kind of Canadian government, refuses to act on credible accusations of torture — evidence of torture, in this case, evidence provided by Canadian Forces?" Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff said during question period.
In June 2006, a joint Canadian-Afghan operation in Zangabad village, about 40 kilometres southwest of Kandahar city, netted several prisoners. The Afghan National Police eventually took custody of the prisoners, all of whom were freed except one. That man was beaten by a group of five or six local ANP members.
The details were recorded in notes taken by Canadian soldiers in the field and were among documents submitted as part of a Federal Court action in which Amnesty International and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association sought to stop further prisoner transfers.
The notes reveal Canadian soldiers took custody of the prisoner, provided medical treatment and eventually handed him to provincial ANP. The incident was first outlined in a May 2007 affidavit by Col. Steven Noonan, the first Canadian Task Force-Afghanistan commander.
On Monday, the federal government said those reports reveal nothing nefarious was going on — at least not involving a detainee held by Canadians.
'Not a Canadian detainee'
"The Afghan in question was not a Canadian detainee, and our men and women in uniform did the right thing," Transport Minister John Baird said.
Baird's distinction is based on a legal question about whether a detainee caught by Canadian soldiers during a joint Canadian-Afghan operation is a Canadian detainee, as opposed to a prisoner caught by Canadian soldiers and transferred to Afghan authorities later.
When the incident first broke in May 2007, the government stressed that the prisoner was never a Canadian detainee. But the field notes obtained by CBC News indicate the soldiers on the ground didn't make that distinction, nor did Noonan who testified before the Federal Court.
"I think it's frankly outrageous," said NDP defence critic Jack Harris, "that ministers would get up in the House and essentially say that sworn evidence of soldiers, generals and contemporaneous notes of soldiers, are in fact lies."
Monday, December 7, 2009
Swedes Backing -Left Parties
Swedes Backing -Left Parties
November 24, 2009
(Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Many people in Sweden are throwing their support behind a coalition of centre-left parties, according to a poll by Sifo published in Svenska Dagbladet. 48.9 per cent of respondents would vote for the alliance encompassing the Workers’ Party - Social-Democrats (S), the Environmental Party - The Greens (MP), and the Left Party (Vp) in the next legislative election, essentially unchanged since October.
The governing alliance—featuring the Moderate Rally Party (M), the People’s Party Liberals (FpL), the Centre Party (C) and the Christian-Democrats (KD)—is a close second with 44 per cent. The far-right Sweden Democrats (SD) garner the support of 5.8 per cent of decided voters—above the threshold to earn seats in the legislature.
Swedish voters renewed the Diet in September 2006. The centre-right alliance secured 178 seats, ending the ten-year tenure of Social-Democrat prime minister Goran Persson. Moderate leader Fredrik Reinfeldt became prime minister in October 2006. In January 2007, former sustainable development minister Mona Sahlin took over as the new leader of the Social-Democrats.
Each European Union (EU) member state presides over the Council of the EU for a period of six months, in accordance with a pre-established rotation. In July, Sweden took over these responsibilities from the Czech Republic.
On Nov. 20, Reinfeldt praised the appointment of Belgian prime minister Herman van Rompuy as the new president of the EU and Catherine Ashton as the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, declaring, "We were looking for individuals who could create continuity, who could bring us together, be Europe’s voice, face and presence in the world. I think we have achieved this."
The next general election in Sweden is scheduled for Sept. 19, 2010.
Polling Data
What party would you support if a general election were held today?
Nov. 2009
Oct. 2009
Aug. 2009
Opposition Parties (Centre-Left)
48.9%
49.2%
48.1%
Workers’ Party - Social-Democrats (S)
33.3%
35.7%
32.8%
Environmental Party - The Greens (MP)
9.7%
7.6%
9.2%
Left Party (Vp)
5.9%
5.9%
6.1%
Governing Alliance (Centre-Right)
44.0%
44.4%
45.2%
Moderate Rally Party (M)
28.5%
29.2%
27.6%
People’s Party Liberals (FpL)
7.0%
6.3%
6.8%
Centre Party (C)
4.5%
4.6%
6.1%
Christian-Democrats (KD)
4.0%
4.3%
4.7%
Sweden Democrats (SD)
5.8%
4.7%
4.2%
Source: Sifo / Svenska Dagbladet Methodology: Telephone interviews to 1,894 Swede adults, conducted from Nov. 1 to Nov. 11, 2009. No margin of error was provided.
November 24, 2009
(Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Many people in Sweden are throwing their support behind a coalition of centre-left parties, according to a poll by Sifo published in Svenska Dagbladet. 48.9 per cent of respondents would vote for the alliance encompassing the Workers’ Party - Social-Democrats (S), the Environmental Party - The Greens (MP), and the Left Party (Vp) in the next legislative election, essentially unchanged since October.
The governing alliance—featuring the Moderate Rally Party (M), the People’s Party Liberals (FpL), the Centre Party (C) and the Christian-Democrats (KD)—is a close second with 44 per cent. The far-right Sweden Democrats (SD) garner the support of 5.8 per cent of decided voters—above the threshold to earn seats in the legislature.
Swedish voters renewed the Diet in September 2006. The centre-right alliance secured 178 seats, ending the ten-year tenure of Social-Democrat prime minister Goran Persson. Moderate leader Fredrik Reinfeldt became prime minister in October 2006. In January 2007, former sustainable development minister Mona Sahlin took over as the new leader of the Social-Democrats.
Each European Union (EU) member state presides over the Council of the EU for a period of six months, in accordance with a pre-established rotation. In July, Sweden took over these responsibilities from the Czech Republic.
On Nov. 20, Reinfeldt praised the appointment of Belgian prime minister Herman van Rompuy as the new president of the EU and Catherine Ashton as the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, declaring, "We were looking for individuals who could create continuity, who could bring us together, be Europe’s voice, face and presence in the world. I think we have achieved this."
The next general election in Sweden is scheduled for Sept. 19, 2010.
Polling Data
What party would you support if a general election were held today?
Nov. 2009
Oct. 2009
Aug. 2009
Opposition Parties (Centre-Left)
48.9%
49.2%
48.1%
Workers’ Party - Social-Democrats (S)
33.3%
35.7%
32.8%
Environmental Party - The Greens (MP)
9.7%
7.6%
9.2%
Left Party (Vp)
5.9%
5.9%
6.1%
Governing Alliance (Centre-Right)
44.0%
44.4%
45.2%
Moderate Rally Party (M)
28.5%
29.2%
27.6%
People’s Party Liberals (FpL)
7.0%
6.3%
6.8%
Centre Party (C)
4.5%
4.6%
6.1%
Christian-Democrats (KD)
4.0%
4.3%
4.7%
Sweden Democrats (SD)
5.8%
4.7%
4.2%
Source: Sifo / Svenska Dagbladet Methodology: Telephone interviews to 1,894 Swede adults, conducted from Nov. 1 to Nov. 11, 2009. No margin of error was provided.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
New Democrat transport critic calls for review of Canada’s aviation safety regime!,
New Democrat transport critic calls for review of Canada’s aviation safety regime
Wed 02 Dec 2009
OTTAWA – Transport Canada needs to review its entire Aviation Safety program following revelations by safety inspectors and mechanics testifying before the House of Commons Transport Committee, said New Democrat Transport Critic Dennis Bevington (Western Arctic).
“We heard how inspectors are spending all of their time doing paperwork rather than actually making sure aircraft are safe and we heard that the pilots who the aircrafts are not always qualified,” said Bevington. “The change to safety management systems has resulted in Transport Canada not being aware of serious safety violations.”
A Safety Management System (SMS) approach has the airlines developing their own programs to deal with safety problems. Transport Canada began the move to SMS in 1999. The system is recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization but only with continuation of regular safety inspections and enforcement.
Currently SMS is in place for large airlines. In an email sent on November 13, 2009, Martin Eley, Transport Canada’s Director General of Civil Aviation, wrote that there are “common concerns” with SMS. Eley goes on to say that implementation of SMS for air taxi and commuter operations will be delayed until January 2011.
“This delay shows Transport Canada is aware of problems with the system, what I don’t understand is why they think it can continue to work for large airlines,” said Bevington. “If it isn’t protecting Canadians on small airlines how can it protect Canadians when they fly on the large airlines which carry the vast majority of passengers?”
In responding to a Bevington’s question in the House of Commons on December 1, Transport Minister John Baird said he sees aviation safety as the government’s concern.
“I’m glad the Minister agrees that the role of Transport Canada is to ensure public safety,” said Bevington. “That is why he should order a review of the safety regime and fix the system immediately.”
Related Content
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Transport minister’s campaign of sabotage revealed
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Maloway in Washington: Defending airline passenger rights
Type: Story
New Democrat transport critic demands federal aviation safety practices must be investigated
Wed 02 Dec 2009
OTTAWA – Transport Canada needs to review its entire Aviation Safety program following revelations by safety inspectors and mechanics testifying before the House of Commons Transport Committee, said New Democrat Transport Critic Dennis Bevington (Western Arctic).
“We heard how inspectors are spending all of their time doing paperwork rather than actually making sure aircraft are safe and we heard that the pilots who the aircrafts are not always qualified,” said Bevington. “The change to safety management systems has resulted in Transport Canada not being aware of serious safety violations.”
A Safety Management System (SMS) approach has the airlines developing their own programs to deal with safety problems. Transport Canada began the move to SMS in 1999. The system is recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization but only with continuation of regular safety inspections and enforcement.
Currently SMS is in place for large airlines. In an email sent on November 13, 2009, Martin Eley, Transport Canada’s Director General of Civil Aviation, wrote that there are “common concerns” with SMS. Eley goes on to say that implementation of SMS for air taxi and commuter operations will be delayed until January 2011.
“This delay shows Transport Canada is aware of problems with the system, what I don’t understand is why they think it can continue to work for large airlines,” said Bevington. “If it isn’t protecting Canadians on small airlines how can it protect Canadians when they fly on the large airlines which carry the vast majority of passengers?”
In responding to a Bevington’s question in the House of Commons on December 1, Transport Minister John Baird said he sees aviation safety as the government’s concern.
“I’m glad the Minister agrees that the role of Transport Canada is to ensure public safety,” said Bevington. “That is why he should order a review of the safety regime and fix the system immediately.”
Related Content
Type: Story
Transport minister’s campaign of sabotage revealed
Type: Story
Maloway in Washington: Defending airline passenger rights
Type: Story
New Democrat transport critic demands federal aviation safety practices must be investigated
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Government wanted quick Afghan detainee transfers
Government wanted quick Afghan detainee transfers
Source: CBC News
Posted: 12/03/09 6:50PM
Filed Under: Top News
Canada's top two commanders in Afghanistan in spring 2006 told investigators the government pressured them to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities faster than they felt was appropriate, CBC News has learned.
Investigators for the military police complaints commission interviewed Brig.-Gen. David Fraser and Lt.- Col. Tom Putt, who both described the government as being obsessed with speed when it came to the transfer of Afghan detainees, according to transcripts of those interviews obtained by CBC News.
Commanders in Canada wanted detainees handed over within 12 hours faster, in most cases, than soldiers in the field could process them.
The first three Afghan detainees captured by Canadian troops in Kandahar province were taken April 6, 2006. After being on the receiving end of a Canadian attack, they needed medical care and, according to military orders, to be questioned and eventually transferred to Afghan authorities.
All of this usually happened within 96 hours too slow for the government, according to Fraser and Putt's accounts to investigators examining allegations of abuse of Afghan detainees.
The moment a detainee was captured, Fraser said, he had to notify his boss in Ottawa, Lt.- Gen. Michel Gauthier.
"As soon as I got a detainee, I would phone him," Fraser said, adding the question he got back was: "How fast could we get them to hand over to the Afghan authorities?"
Fraser, who was in charge of Canadian troops in Afghanistan in 2006, said the question puzzled him because he didn't understand the need for speed.
Neither did Putt, who was Fraser's deputy and the commander responsible for the handling of detainees. He said the government's unofficial goal for transfer was 12 hours.
But it was difficult to get the prisoners back to base in Kandahar and they often required medical treatment, all of which took time.
Putt said he resisted Ottawa's calls for speed, sometimes because it was difficult to find an Afghan authority for the transfer.
"We took a bit of heat on that from Ottawa," Putt told investigators. "' Move, move, move,' [but] we can't. There's no one to hand them off to in the police station, you know?"
Both Putt and Fraser said the military's interest in detainees ended as soon as the prisoners were transferred. The military didn't monitor their condition that was not its jurisdiction, Fraser said.
And the government's position was that monitoring detainees was an Afghan problem.
"It's their country, it's their elected government, it's their security forces, and if we can't you know, hand [detainees] off to them, then you know, why are we here?" Putt said.
It wasn't until a full year after Canada started transferring detainees that the government started monitoring their treatment. In the meantime, it has been alleged that many had been abused possibly even tortured.
Richard Colvin, a former senior diplomat with Canada's mission in Afghanistan, told a parliamentary committee last month that all detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan prisons were likely tortured by Afghan officials.
He also said his concerns were ignored by top government officials and that the government may have tried to cover up the issue.
The government denies the allegations, saying the majority of them are baseless and made by the Taliban.
Putt's testimony also suggests Canadian troops frequently weren't capturing high value Taliban targets an assertion Colvin first raised two weeks ago.
"I mean, we were basically capturing a local yokel, " Putt said. "Detaining the local yokels and handing them off."
Source: CBC News
Posted: 12/03/09 6:50PM
Filed Under: Top News
Canada's top two commanders in Afghanistan in spring 2006 told investigators the government pressured them to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities faster than they felt was appropriate, CBC News has learned.
Investigators for the military police complaints commission interviewed Brig.-Gen. David Fraser and Lt.- Col. Tom Putt, who both described the government as being obsessed with speed when it came to the transfer of Afghan detainees, according to transcripts of those interviews obtained by CBC News.
Commanders in Canada wanted detainees handed over within 12 hours faster, in most cases, than soldiers in the field could process them.
The first three Afghan detainees captured by Canadian troops in Kandahar province were taken April 6, 2006. After being on the receiving end of a Canadian attack, they needed medical care and, according to military orders, to be questioned and eventually transferred to Afghan authorities.
All of this usually happened within 96 hours too slow for the government, according to Fraser and Putt's accounts to investigators examining allegations of abuse of Afghan detainees.
The moment a detainee was captured, Fraser said, he had to notify his boss in Ottawa, Lt.- Gen. Michel Gauthier.
"As soon as I got a detainee, I would phone him," Fraser said, adding the question he got back was: "How fast could we get them to hand over to the Afghan authorities?"
Fraser, who was in charge of Canadian troops in Afghanistan in 2006, said the question puzzled him because he didn't understand the need for speed.
Neither did Putt, who was Fraser's deputy and the commander responsible for the handling of detainees. He said the government's unofficial goal for transfer was 12 hours.
But it was difficult to get the prisoners back to base in Kandahar and they often required medical treatment, all of which took time.
Putt said he resisted Ottawa's calls for speed, sometimes because it was difficult to find an Afghan authority for the transfer.
"We took a bit of heat on that from Ottawa," Putt told investigators. "' Move, move, move,' [but] we can't. There's no one to hand them off to in the police station, you know?"
Both Putt and Fraser said the military's interest in detainees ended as soon as the prisoners were transferred. The military didn't monitor their condition that was not its jurisdiction, Fraser said.
And the government's position was that monitoring detainees was an Afghan problem.
"It's their country, it's their elected government, it's their security forces, and if we can't you know, hand [detainees] off to them, then you know, why are we here?" Putt said.
It wasn't until a full year after Canada started transferring detainees that the government started monitoring their treatment. In the meantime, it has been alleged that many had been abused possibly even tortured.
Richard Colvin, a former senior diplomat with Canada's mission in Afghanistan, told a parliamentary committee last month that all detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan prisons were likely tortured by Afghan officials.
He also said his concerns were ignored by top government officials and that the government may have tried to cover up the issue.
The government denies the allegations, saying the majority of them are baseless and made by the Taliban.
Putt's testimony also suggests Canadian troops frequently weren't capturing high value Taliban targets an assertion Colvin first raised two weeks ago.
"I mean, we were basically capturing a local yokel, " Putt said. "Detaining the local yokels and handing them off."
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