Showing posts with label aviation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aviation. Show all posts
Friday, January 10, 2020
Saturday, March 16, 2019
Boeing 737 MAX Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was developed for the 737 MAX to prevent stalls in flaps-retracted, low-speed, nose-up flight.[60]. The MCAS uses airspeed and other sensor data to compute when a dangerous condition has developed and then trims the aircraft nose down.
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft have engines mounted higher and further forward than previous 737 models. According to The Air Current, "the relocated engines and the refined nacelle shape" cause an upward pitching moment.[61] In order to pass Part 25 certification requirements, Boeing employed the MCAS to automatically apply nose-down trim when the aircraft is in steep turns or in low-speed, flaps-retracted flight. When the angle of attackexceeds a limit that depends on airspeed and altitude, the system activates without notice to the pilot. The system is deactivated when a pilot trims the aircraft using a switch on the yoke.
The system is sensitive to failure of angle-of-attack (AOA) sensors mounted outside the aircraft.[61] The FAA and Boeing made the AOA Disagree alert an optional feature for the 737 MAX, deciding it was not critical for safe operation.[62] Following the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 soon after takeoff, Boeing announced a plan to introduce a software upgrade that notifies pilots of a sensor failure.[63][64] It will be deployed to aircraft operators "in the coming weeks," the company said on March 11, 2019.[63]
Monday, October 29, 2018
The Boeing 737 MAX is an American narrow-body aircraft series designed and produced by Boeing Commercial Airplanes as the fourth generation of the Boeing 737, succeeding the Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG). Boeing 737 MAX October 29, 2018.
msdogfood@hotmail.com
The Boeing 737 MAX is an American narrow-body aircraft series designed and produced by Boeing Commercial Airplanes as the fourth generation of the Boeing 737, succeeding the Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG).
Boeing 737 MAX
A WestJet Boeing 737 MAX 8 on final approach
Role Narrow-body twin-engine jet airliner
National origin United States
Manufacturer Boeing Commercial Airplanes
First flight January 29, 2016[1]
Introduction May 22, 2017 with Malindo Air[2]
Status In service
Primary users Southwest Airlines
Air Canada
American Airlines
Lion Air
Produced 2014–present[3]
Number built 219 as of September 2018[4]
Program cost Airframe only: $1–1.8 billion; including engine development: $2–3B[5]
Unit cost
MAX 7: US$96.0 million
MAX 8: $117.1M
MAX 200: $120.2M
MAX 9: $124.1M
MAX 10: $129.9M as of 2018[6]
Developed from Boeing 737 Next Generation
The program was launched on August 30, 2011.[7] The first flight was on January 29, 2016.[1] It gained FAA certification on March 8, 2017.[8] The first delivery was a MAX -8 on May 6, 2017 to Malindo Air,[9]which put it into service on May 22, 2017.[2] The 737 MAX is based on earlier 737 designs. The MAX is re-engined with more efficient CFM International LEAP-1B powerplants, aerodynamic improvements (most notably split-tip winglets), and airframe modifications.
The 737 MAX series is offered in four lengths, typically offering 138 to 230 seats and a 3,215 to 3,825 nmi (5,954 to 7,084 km) range. The 737 MAX 7, MAX 8, and MAX 9 replace, respectively, the 737-700, -800, and -900. Additional length is offered with the further stretched 737 MAX 10. As of September 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX has received 4,783 firm orders.[10]
Contents
DevelopmentEdit
BackgroundEdit
In 2006, Boeing started considering the replacement of the 737 with a "clean-sheet" design that could follow the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.[11] In June 2010, a decision on this replacement was postponed into 2011.[12]
On December 1, 2010, Boeing's competitor, Airbus, launched the Airbus A320neo family to improve fuel burn and operating efficiency with new engines: the CFM International LEAP and Pratt & Whitney PW1000G.[13] In February 2011, Boeing’s CEO Jim McNerney maintained "We're going to do a new airplane."[14] At the March 2011 ISTAT conference, BCA President James Albaugh was not sure about a 737 re-engine, like Boeing CFO James A. Bell stated at JP Morgan Aviation, Transportation and Defence conference the same month.[15] The A320neo gathered 667 commitments at the June 2011 Paris Air Show for a backlog of 1,029 units since its launch, setting an order record for a new commercial airliner.[16]
On July 20, 2011, American Airlines announced an order for 460 narrowbody jets including 130 A320ceos and 130 A320neos, and intended to order 100 re-engined 737s with CFM LEAPs, pending Boeing confirmation.[17] The order broke Boeing's monopoly with the airline and forced Boeing into a re-engined 737.[18] As this sale included a Most-Favoured-Customer Clause, the European airframer has to refund any difference to American if it sells to another airline at a lower price, so Airbus can not give a competitive price to competitor United Airlines, leaving it to a Boeing-skewed fleet.[19]
Program launchEdit
737 MAX 9 mockup at 2012 ILA Berlin
On August 30, 2011, Boeing's board of directors approved the launch of the re-engined 737, expecting a 16% lower fuel burn than the Airbus A320ceo and 4% lower than the A320neo.[7] Studies for additional drag reduction were performed during 2011, including revised tail cone, natural laminar flow nacelle, and hybrid laminar flow vertical stabilizer.[20] Boeing abandoned the development of a new design.[21] Boeing expects the 737 MAX to meet or exceed the range of the Airbus A320neo.[22] Firm configuration for the 737 MAX was scheduled for 2013.[23]
In March 2010, the estimated cost to re-engine the 737 by Mike Bair, Boeing Commercial Airplanes' vice president of business strategy & marketing, would be $2–3 billion including the CFM engine development and during Boeing Q2 2011 earnings call, former CFO James Bell said the development cost for the airframe only would be 10–15% of the cost of a new program estimated at $10–12 billion at the time ($1–1.8 billion)—while Bernstein Researchon 23 January 2012 concluded this will be twice that of the Airbus A320neo.[5]
Fuel consumption is reduced by 14% from the 737NG.[24] In November 2014, Boeing Chief Executive Officer Jim McNerney said the 737 will be replaced by a new airplane by 2030, slightly bigger and with new engines but keeping its general configuration, probably a composite airplane.[25]
ProductionEdit
Boeing 737 MAX roll-out in December 2015 with the first 737 MAX 8
On August 13, 2015, the first 737 MAX fuselage completed assembly at Spirit Aerosystems in Wichita, Kansas, for a test aircraft that would eventually be delivered to launch customer Southwest Airlines.[26] On December 8, 2015, the first 737 MAX–a MAX-8 named "Spirit of Renton"–was rolled out at the Boeing Renton Factory.[27][28]
Because GKN could not produce the titanium honeycombinner walls for the thrust reversers quickly enough, Boeing switched to a composite part produced by Spirit to deliver 47 MAXs per month in 2017. Spirit supplies 70 percent of the 737 airframe, including the fuselage, thrust reverser, engine pylons, nacelles, and wing leading edges.[29]
A new spar-assembly line with robotic drilling machines should increase throughput by 33 percent. The Electroimpact automated panel assembly line sped up the wing lower-skin assembly by 35 percent.[30] Boeing plans to increase its 737 MAX monthly production rate from 42 planes in 2017 to 57 planes by 2019.[31]
The rate increase strains the production and by August 2018, over 40 unfinished jets were parked in Renton, awaiting parts or engine installation, as CFM engines and Spirit fuselages were delivered late.[32] After parked airplanes peaked at 53 at the beginning of September, Boeing reduced this by nine the following month, as deliveries rose to 61 from 29 in July and 48 in August.[33]
Flight testingEdit
The first flight took place on January 29, 2016, nearly 49 years after the maiden flight of the 737, a 737-100, on April 9, 1967.[1] The first Max 8, 1A001, was used for aerodynamic trials: flutter testing, stability and control, and takeoff performance-data verification, before it was modified for an operator and delivered. 1A002 was used for performance and engine testing: climb and landing performance, crosswind, noise, cold weather, high altitude, fuel burn and water-ingestion. Aircraft systems including autoland were tested with 1A003. 1A004, with an airliner layout, flew function-and-reliability certification for 300h with a light flight-test instrumentation.[34]
The 737 MAX gained FAA certification on March 8, 2017.[8] It was approved by the EASA on March 27, 2017.[35] After completing 2,000 test flight hours and 180-minute ETOPS testing requiring 3,000 simulated flight cycles in April 2017, CFM International notified Boeing of a possible manufacturing quality issue with low pressure turbine (LPT) discs in LEAP-1B engines.[36] Boeing suspended the 737 MAX flights on May 4,[9] and resumed flights on May 12.[37]
IntroductionEdit
The first delivery was a MAX 8, handed over to Malindo Air (a subsidiary of Lion Air) on May 16, 2017; it entered service on May 22.[2] Norwegian Air subsidiary Norwegian Air International was the second airline to put a 737 MAX into service, when it performed its first transatlantic flight with a MAX 8 named Sir Freddie Laker on July 15, 2017 between Edinburgh Airport in Scotland and Hartford International Airport in the US state of Connecticut, followed by a second rotation from Edinburgh to Stewart Airport, New York.[38]
Boeing aims to match the 99.7% dispatch reliability of the NG.[39] Southwest Airlines, the launch customer, took delivery of its first 737 MAX on August 29, 2017.[40] Boeing plans to deliver at least 50 to 75 aircraft in 2017, 10-15% of the more than 500 737s to be delivered in the year.[9]
After one year of service, 130 have been delivered to 28 customers, logging over 41,000 flights in 118,000 hours and flying over 6.5 million passengers. flydubai observed 15% more efficiency than the NG, more than the 14% promised, and dependability reached 99.4%. Long routes include 24 over 2,500 nmi (4,630 km), including a daily Aerolineas Argentinasservice from Buenos Aires to Punta Cana over 3,252 nmi (6,023 km).[41]
DesignEdit
In summer of 2011, the objective was to match the A320neo 15% fuel burn advantage, but the initial reduction was 10–12%; it was later enhanced to 14.5%: the fan was widened from 61 inches to 69.4 inches by raising the nose gear and placing the engine higher and forward, the split winglet added 1–1.5%, a relofted tail cone 1% more and electronically controlling the bleed air system improves efficiency.[42]
EnginesEdit
LEAP mockup
Nacelle with chevrons for noise reduction
In 2011, the Leap-1B was initially 10-12% more efficient than the previous 156 cm (61 in) CFM56-7B of the 737NG.[43] The 18-blade, woven carbon-fiber fan enables a 9:1 bypass ratio (up from 5.1:1 with the previous 24-blade titanium fan) for a 40% smaller noise footprint.[24]The CFM56 bypass ranges from 5.1:1 to 5.5:1.[44] The two-shaft design has a low-pressure section comprising the fan and three booster stages driven by five axial turbine stages and a high-pressure section with a 10-stage axial compressor driven by a two-stage turbine.[24]The 41:1 overall pressure ratio, increased from 28:1, and advanced hot-section materials enabling higher operating temperatures permit a 15% reduction in thrust specific fuel consumption (TSFC) along with 20% lower carbon emissions, 50% lower nitrogen-oxide emissions, though each engine weighs 849 lb (385 kg) more at 6,129 lb (2,780 kg).[24]
In August 2011, Boeing had to choose between 66 in (168 cm) or 68 in (173 cm) fan diameters necessitating few landing gear changes to maintain a 17 in (43 cm) ground clearance beneath the new engines; Boeing Commercial Airplanes chief executive officer Jim Albaugh stated "with a bigger fan you get more efficiency because of the bypass ratio [but also] more weight and more drag", with more airframe changes.[45] The smaller Leap-1B engine will weigh less and have a lower frontal area but a lower bypass ratio leading to a higher thrust specific fuel consumption than the 78 in (200 cm) Leap-1A of the A320neo.[citation needed]
In November 2011, Boeing selected the larger fan diameter, necessitating a 6–8 in (15–20 cm) longer nose landing gear.[46][47] In May 2012, Boeing further enlarged the fan to 69.4 in (176 cm), paired with a smaller engine core within minor design changes before the mid-2013 final configuration.[48]
The nacelle features chevrons for noise reduction like the 787.[49] A new bleed air digital regulator will improve its reliability.[50] The larger engine is cantilevered ahead of and slightly above the wing, and the laminar flow engine nacelle lipskin is a GKN Aerospace one-piece, spun-formed aluminum sheet inspired by the 787.[30]
Aerodynamic improvementsEdit
Boeing's new "split tip" winglet on the 737 MAX
The split tip wingtip device is designed to maximize lift while staying in the same ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code letter C gates as current 737s. It traces its design to the McDonnell Douglas MD-12 1990s twin-deck concept, proposed for similar gate restrictions before the Boeing merger.[51] It should deliver at least 1.5% improvements in fuel economy or even more if the proposed laminar flow surface treatment meets expectations. A MAX 8 with 162 passengers on a 3,000 nmi (5,600 km) mission will have up to a 1.8% better fuel burn than a blended-winglet-equipped aircraft and even 1% over 500 nmi (930 km) at Mach 0.79.[51]
The new winglet is 9 ft 6 in (2.90 m) high.[30] Other improvements include a re-contoured tail cone, revised auxiliary power unit inlet and exhaust, aft-body vortex generators removal and other small aerodynamic improvements.[24] Aviation Partnersoffers a similar "Split-Tip Scimitar" winglet for previous 737NGs.[52] It resembles a three-way hybrid between a blended winglet, wingtip fence, and raked wingtip.
Structural changes and other improvementsEdit
The 8 in (20 cm) taller nose-gear strut keeps the same 17 in (43 cm) ground clearance of the engine nacelles.[24] New struts and nacelles for the heavier engines add bulk, the main landing gear and supporting structure are beefier, and fuselage skins are thicker in some places for a 6,500 lb (2,900 kg) increase to the MAX 8's empty aircraft weight.[24] To preserve fuel and payload capacity, its maximum takeoff weight is 7,000 lb (3,200 kg) heavier.[24]
Rockwell Collins will supply four 15.1-inch (380 mm) landscape liquid crystal displays (LCD), as used on the 787 Dreamliner, to improve pilots' situational awareness and efficiency.[53]Boeing plans no major modifications for the 737 MAX flight deck, as it wants to maintain commonality with the 737 Next Generation family. Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Jim Albaugh said in 2011 that adding more fly-by-wire control systems would be "very minimal".[54] Most of the systems are carried from the 737NG for a short differences-training course to upgrade flight crews.[24]
The 737 MAX extended spoilers are fly-by-wire controlled.[30] As production standard, the 737 MAX will feature the Boeing Sky Interior with overhead bins and LED lighting based on the Boeing 787's interior.[55]
VariantsEdit
The 737-700, -800 and -900ER, the most widespread versions of the previous 737NG,[10]are replaced by the 737 MAX 7, MAX 8 and MAX 9, respectively[56] (FAA type certificate: 737-7, -8, and -9[8]). The 737 MAX 8 entered service in May 2017,[2] and the MAX 9 entered service in March 2018.[57] The MAX 7 is expected to enter service in January 2019, followed by the MAX 200 later in 2019, and the MAX 10 in 2020.[58]
Boeing forecasts that 60–65% of demand for the airliner will be for the 737 MAX 8 variant, 20–25% for the MAX 9 and MAX 10, and 10% for the MAX 7.[59]
737 MAX 7Edit
737 MAX 7 at Farnborough Airshow.
Originally based on the 737-700, Boeing announced the redesign of the MAX 7 derived from the MAX 8 at the July 2016 Farnborough Air Show, accommodating two more seat rows than the 737-700 for 138 seats, up 12 seats.[60][61] The redesign uses the 737-8 wing and landing gear; a pair of overwing exits rather than the single-door configuration; a 46-inch longer aft fuselage and a 30-inch longer forward fuselage; structural re-gauging and strengthening; and systems and interior modifications to accommodate the longer length.[62] It is to fly 1,000 nmi (1,900 km) farther than the -700 with 18% lower fuel costs per seat. Boeing predicts the MAX 7 to carry 12 more passengers 400 nmi (740 km) farther than A319neo with 7% lower operating costs per seat.[63] Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,850 nmi (4,430 mi; 7,130 km) to 3,915 nmi (4,505 mi; 7,251 km) after 2021.[64]
Production on the first 65 ft (19.8 m) long wing spar for the 737-7 began in October 2017.[58]Assembly of the first flight-test aircraft began on November 22, 2017[65] and was rolled out of the factory on February 5, 2018.[66] The MAX 7 took off for its first flight on March 16, 2018 from the factory in Renton, Washington and flew for three hours over Washington state.[67] It reached 250 kn (460 km/h) and 25,000 ft (7,600 m), performed a low approach, systems checks and an inflight engine restart, and landed in Moses Lake, Washington, Boeing’s flight test center.[68]
Entry into service with launch operator Southwest Airlines is expected in January 2019.[58]Entry into service with WestJet will follow shortly, with 5 deliveries expected in 2019.[69]Customers for the aircraft include Southwest Airlines (30), WestJet (23), Canada Jetlines (5) and ILFC Aviation (5).[10] The -7 seems to have fewer than 100 orders among over 4,300 MAX sales.[63]
737 MAX 8Edit
A top view of the MAX 8 showing double overwing exits
The first variant developed in the 737 MAX series, the MAX 8 will replace the 737-800 with a longer fuselage than the MAX 7. Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,515 nmi (4,045 mi; 6,510 km) to 3,610 nmi (4,150 mi; 6,690 km) after 2021.[64] On July 23, 2013, Boeing completed the firm configuration for the 737 MAX 8.[70]The MAX 8 has a lighter empty weight and higher maximum takeoff weight than the A320neo and in cruise at 140,500 lb (63,700 kg), it burns 4,460 lb (2,020 kg) per hour at Mach 0.78 (450 kn; 833 km/h) and FL350, at a suboptimal flight level and forward center of mass.[24]
Its first commercial flight was operated by Malindo Air on May 22, 2017 between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore as Flight OD803.[2] In early 2017, a new -8 was valued at $52.85 million, rising to below $54.5 million by mid 2018.[71]
737 MAX 200Edit
In September 2014, Boeing launched a high density version of the 737 MAX 8, the 737 MAX 200, named for seating for up to 200 passengers in a single-class high-density configuration with slimline seats; an extra exit door is required because of the higher passenger capacity. Boeing states that this version will be 20% more cost efficient per seat than current 737 models, and will be the most efficient narrow-body on the market when delivered, including 5% lower operating costs than the 737 MAX 8.[72][73] Three of eight galley trolleys are removed to accommodate more passenger space.[74] A 100 aircraft order with Ryanair was completed on December 1, 2014.[75] It is to enter service in the second quarter of 2019.[76]
Proposed 737-8 ERXEdit
Airlines have been shown a 737-8ERX concept based on the 737 MAX 8 with a higher 194,700 lb (88.3 t) maximum take-off weight using wings, landing gear and central section from the MAX 9 to provide a longer range of 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 mi; 7,400 km) with seating for 150, closer to the Airbus A321LR.[77]
737 MAX 9Edit
737 MAX 9 first flight
The 737 MAX 9 will replace the 737-900 with a longer fuselage than the MAX 8. Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,510 nmi (4,040 mi; 6,500 km) to 3,605 nmi (4,149 mi; 6,676 km) after 2021.[64] Lion Air is the launch customer with an order for 201 in February 2012.[30] It made its roll-out on March 7 and first flight on April 13, 2017;[78] it took off from Renton Municipal Airport and landed at Boeing Field after a 2 hr 42 min flight.[79] It was presented at the 2017 Paris Air Show.[80]
Boeing 737-9 flight tests were scheduled to run through 2017, with 30% of the -8 tests repeated; aircraft 1D001 was used for autoland, avionics, flutter, and mostly stability-and-control trials, while 1D002 was used for environment control system testing.[34] It was certified by February 2018.[81] Asian low-cost carrier Lion Air Group took delivery of the first on March 21, 2018 before entering service with Thai Lion Air.[57]
737 MAX 10Edit
737 MAX 10 rendering
To compete with the Airbus A321neo, loyal customers such as Korean Air and United Airlines pressed Boeing to develop a larger variant than the MAX 9 which Boeing revealed studies of in early 2016.[82] As the A321neo had outsold the MAX 9 five-to-one, the proposed MAX 10 included a larger engine, stronger wing, and telescoping landing gear in mid-2016.[83] In September 2016, it was reported that the variant would be simpler and lower-risk with a modest stretch of 6–7 ft (1.83–2.13 m) for a length of 143–144 ft (43.6–43.9 m), seating 12-18 more passengers for 192-198 in dual class or 226-232 in single class, needing an uprated 31,000 lbf (140 kN) CFM LEAP-1B that could be available by 2019 or 2020 and would likely require a simple landing gear modification to move the rotation point slightly aft.[84]
In October 2016, Boeing's board granted authority to offer the stretched variant with two extra fuselage sections forward and aft with a 3,100 nautical miles (3,600 mi; 5,700 km) range reduced from 3,300 nautical miles (3,800 mi; 6,100 km) of the -9.[82] In early 2017, Boeing showed a 66 in (1.7 m) stretch to 143 feet (44 m), enabling seating for 230 in a single class or 189 in two-class capacity, compared to 193 in two-class seating for the A321neo. The modest stretch of the MAX 10 enables the aircraft to retain the existing wing and CFM Leap 1B engine from the MAX 9 with a trailing-link main landing gear as the only major change.[85] Boeing 737 MAX Vice President and General Manager Keith Leverkuhn says the design has to be frozen in 2018 for a 2020 introduction.[82]
Boeing prospects 737-900 operators and 737 MAX 9 customers like United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Alaska Airlines, Air Canada, Lion Air, and Chinese airlines will be interested in the new variant.[86] Boeing predicts a 5% lower trip cost and seat cost compared to the A321neo.[87] Air Lease Corporation wants it a year sooner; its CEO John Pleuger stated "It would have been better to get the first airplane in March 2019, but I don't think that's possible".[88] AerCap CEO Aengus Kelly is cautious and said the -9 and -10 "will cannibalize each other".[82]
As it progressed towards a telescopic semi-levered main landing gear design like the 777 and 787-10, Boeing anticipated a launch at the June 2017 Paris Airshow for a total market of 1,000 airplanes.[89] Lion Air is a possible launch customer at this Air Show with United Airlines, Norwegian or Spicejet are cited as interested, but commitments could be conversions of existing orders rather than new sales.[90] Ryanair is expected to hold out for the best possible price before placing an order.[91]
The MAX 10 was launched on June 19, 2017 with 240 orders and commitments from more than 10 customers.[92][93] United Airlines will be the largest 737 MAX 10 customer, converting 100 of their 161 orders for the MAX 9 into orders for the MAX 10.[94] Boeing ended the 2017 Paris Air Show with 361 orders and commitments, including 214 conversions, from 16 customers,[95] including 50 orders from Lion air.[96]
Its configuration was firmed up by February 2018.[97] Its modified landing gear will require additional flight-testing.[34] To fit the 9 in (23 cm) taller main landing gear in the same wheel well, at the lower end the semi-levered gear includes an additional shock absorber strut to keep the wheels on the ground as the aircraft rotates and move the pivot point aft, and at the upper end a shrinking, translating mechanical linkage enables it to be drawn in and shortened while being retracted, inspired from carrier aircraft designs. It weighs 5,500 lb (2,500 kg) less than the A321neo, which needs 7,000 lb (3,200 kg) more takeoff weight and 5,000 lb (2,300 kg) more thrust to fly the same mission.[98]
By Summer 2018, the variant critical design review was done as it passed 70% of the detailed design. Assembly was underway for a first flight targeted for late 2019 and entry into service for 2020. The landing gear design was disclosed: a telescoping oleo-pneumatic strut with a down-swinging lever permit a 9.5 in. (24 cm) taller gear. Driven by the existing retraction system, a shrink link mechanism at the top of the leg allow to keep the existing wheel well to preserve development costs.[99]
Boeing Business JetEdit
The BBJ MAX 8 and BBJ MAX 9 are proposed business jets variants of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 9 with new CFM LEAP-1B engines and advanced winglets providing 13% better fuel burn than the Boeing Business Jet; the BBJ MAX 8 will have a 6,325 nmi (11,710 km) range and the BBJ MAX 9 a 6,255 nmi (11,580 km) range.[100] The BBJ MAX 7 was unveiled in October 2016 with a 7,000 nautical miles (12,960 km) range and 10% lower operating costs than the original BBJ while being larger.[101] The MAX BBJ 8 first flew on April 16, 2018, before delivery later the same year, and will reach 6,640 nmi (12,300 km) with an auxiliary fuel tank.[102]
Orders and deliveriesEdit
Initially, the customers for the 737 MAX were not disclosed, except for American Airlines. On November 17, 2011, Boeing released the names of two other customers – Lion Air and SMBC Aviation Capital. At that time, Boeing reported 700 commitments from 9 customers for the 737 MAX.[103][104] On December 13, 2011, Southwest Airlines ordered 150 737 MAX aircraft with 150 options.[105]
By December 2011, Boeing had 948 commitments and firm orders from 13 customers for the 737 MAX.[106] On September 8, 2014, Ryanair signed an agreement with Boeing to purchase up to 200 new Boeing 737 MAX 200 "gamechanger" aircraft - comprising 100 firm orders and 100 options.[107] In January 2017, aircraft leasing company GECAS ordered 75 more 737 MAX 8 airliners.[108]
As of September 2018, Boeing had 4,783 firm orders from 98 identified customers for the 737 MAX.[4] The top three identified airline customers for the 737 MAX are Southwest Airlines with 280 orders, flydubai with 251 orders, and Lion Air with 251 orders.[10] The first new series aircraft, a MAX 8, was delivered to Malindo Air on May 16, 2017.[9]
Boeing 737 MAX orders and deliveries
The Boeing 737 MAX is an American narrow-body aircraft series designed and produced by Boeing Commercial Airplanes as the fourth generation of the Boeing 737, succeeding the Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG).
Boeing 737 MAX
A WestJet Boeing 737 MAX 8 on final approach
Role Narrow-body twin-engine jet airliner
National origin United States
Manufacturer Boeing Commercial Airplanes
First flight January 29, 2016[1]
Introduction May 22, 2017 with Malindo Air[2]
Status In service
Primary users Southwest Airlines
Air Canada
American Airlines
Lion Air
Produced 2014–present[3]
Number built 219 as of September 2018[4]
Program cost Airframe only: $1–1.8 billion; including engine development: $2–3B[5]
Unit cost
MAX 7: US$96.0 million
MAX 8: $117.1M
MAX 200: $120.2M
MAX 9: $124.1M
MAX 10: $129.9M as of 2018[6]
Developed from Boeing 737 Next Generation
The program was launched on August 30, 2011.[7] The first flight was on January 29, 2016.[1] It gained FAA certification on March 8, 2017.[8] The first delivery was a MAX -8 on May 6, 2017 to Malindo Air,[9]which put it into service on May 22, 2017.[2] The 737 MAX is based on earlier 737 designs. The MAX is re-engined with more efficient CFM International LEAP-1B powerplants, aerodynamic improvements (most notably split-tip winglets), and airframe modifications.
The 737 MAX series is offered in four lengths, typically offering 138 to 230 seats and a 3,215 to 3,825 nmi (5,954 to 7,084 km) range. The 737 MAX 7, MAX 8, and MAX 9 replace, respectively, the 737-700, -800, and -900. Additional length is offered with the further stretched 737 MAX 10. As of September 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX has received 4,783 firm orders.[10]
Contents
DevelopmentEdit
BackgroundEdit
In 2006, Boeing started considering the replacement of the 737 with a "clean-sheet" design that could follow the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.[11] In June 2010, a decision on this replacement was postponed into 2011.[12]
On December 1, 2010, Boeing's competitor, Airbus, launched the Airbus A320neo family to improve fuel burn and operating efficiency with new engines: the CFM International LEAP and Pratt & Whitney PW1000G.[13] In February 2011, Boeing’s CEO Jim McNerney maintained "We're going to do a new airplane."[14] At the March 2011 ISTAT conference, BCA President James Albaugh was not sure about a 737 re-engine, like Boeing CFO James A. Bell stated at JP Morgan Aviation, Transportation and Defence conference the same month.[15] The A320neo gathered 667 commitments at the June 2011 Paris Air Show for a backlog of 1,029 units since its launch, setting an order record for a new commercial airliner.[16]
On July 20, 2011, American Airlines announced an order for 460 narrowbody jets including 130 A320ceos and 130 A320neos, and intended to order 100 re-engined 737s with CFM LEAPs, pending Boeing confirmation.[17] The order broke Boeing's monopoly with the airline and forced Boeing into a re-engined 737.[18] As this sale included a Most-Favoured-Customer Clause, the European airframer has to refund any difference to American if it sells to another airline at a lower price, so Airbus can not give a competitive price to competitor United Airlines, leaving it to a Boeing-skewed fleet.[19]
Program launchEdit
737 MAX 9 mockup at 2012 ILA Berlin
On August 30, 2011, Boeing's board of directors approved the launch of the re-engined 737, expecting a 16% lower fuel burn than the Airbus A320ceo and 4% lower than the A320neo.[7] Studies for additional drag reduction were performed during 2011, including revised tail cone, natural laminar flow nacelle, and hybrid laminar flow vertical stabilizer.[20] Boeing abandoned the development of a new design.[21] Boeing expects the 737 MAX to meet or exceed the range of the Airbus A320neo.[22] Firm configuration for the 737 MAX was scheduled for 2013.[23]
In March 2010, the estimated cost to re-engine the 737 by Mike Bair, Boeing Commercial Airplanes' vice president of business strategy & marketing, would be $2–3 billion including the CFM engine development and during Boeing Q2 2011 earnings call, former CFO James Bell said the development cost for the airframe only would be 10–15% of the cost of a new program estimated at $10–12 billion at the time ($1–1.8 billion)—while Bernstein Researchon 23 January 2012 concluded this will be twice that of the Airbus A320neo.[5]
Fuel consumption is reduced by 14% from the 737NG.[24] In November 2014, Boeing Chief Executive Officer Jim McNerney said the 737 will be replaced by a new airplane by 2030, slightly bigger and with new engines but keeping its general configuration, probably a composite airplane.[25]
ProductionEdit
.jpg)
Boeing 737 MAX roll-out in December 2015 with the first 737 MAX 8
On August 13, 2015, the first 737 MAX fuselage completed assembly at Spirit Aerosystems in Wichita, Kansas, for a test aircraft that would eventually be delivered to launch customer Southwest Airlines.[26] On December 8, 2015, the first 737 MAX–a MAX-8 named "Spirit of Renton"–was rolled out at the Boeing Renton Factory.[27][28]
Because GKN could not produce the titanium honeycombinner walls for the thrust reversers quickly enough, Boeing switched to a composite part produced by Spirit to deliver 47 MAXs per month in 2017. Spirit supplies 70 percent of the 737 airframe, including the fuselage, thrust reverser, engine pylons, nacelles, and wing leading edges.[29]
A new spar-assembly line with robotic drilling machines should increase throughput by 33 percent. The Electroimpact automated panel assembly line sped up the wing lower-skin assembly by 35 percent.[30] Boeing plans to increase its 737 MAX monthly production rate from 42 planes in 2017 to 57 planes by 2019.[31]
The rate increase strains the production and by August 2018, over 40 unfinished jets were parked in Renton, awaiting parts or engine installation, as CFM engines and Spirit fuselages were delivered late.[32] After parked airplanes peaked at 53 at the beginning of September, Boeing reduced this by nine the following month, as deliveries rose to 61 from 29 in July and 48 in August.[33]
Flight testingEdit
The first flight took place on January 29, 2016, nearly 49 years after the maiden flight of the 737, a 737-100, on April 9, 1967.[1] The first Max 8, 1A001, was used for aerodynamic trials: flutter testing, stability and control, and takeoff performance-data verification, before it was modified for an operator and delivered. 1A002 was used for performance and engine testing: climb and landing performance, crosswind, noise, cold weather, high altitude, fuel burn and water-ingestion. Aircraft systems including autoland were tested with 1A003. 1A004, with an airliner layout, flew function-and-reliability certification for 300h with a light flight-test instrumentation.[34]
The 737 MAX gained FAA certification on March 8, 2017.[8] It was approved by the EASA on March 27, 2017.[35] After completing 2,000 test flight hours and 180-minute ETOPS testing requiring 3,000 simulated flight cycles in April 2017, CFM International notified Boeing of a possible manufacturing quality issue with low pressure turbine (LPT) discs in LEAP-1B engines.[36] Boeing suspended the 737 MAX flights on May 4,[9] and resumed flights on May 12.[37]
IntroductionEdit
The first delivery was a MAX 8, handed over to Malindo Air (a subsidiary of Lion Air) on May 16, 2017; it entered service on May 22.[2] Norwegian Air subsidiary Norwegian Air International was the second airline to put a 737 MAX into service, when it performed its first transatlantic flight with a MAX 8 named Sir Freddie Laker on July 15, 2017 between Edinburgh Airport in Scotland and Hartford International Airport in the US state of Connecticut, followed by a second rotation from Edinburgh to Stewart Airport, New York.[38]
Boeing aims to match the 99.7% dispatch reliability of the NG.[39] Southwest Airlines, the launch customer, took delivery of its first 737 MAX on August 29, 2017.[40] Boeing plans to deliver at least 50 to 75 aircraft in 2017, 10-15% of the more than 500 737s to be delivered in the year.[9]
After one year of service, 130 have been delivered to 28 customers, logging over 41,000 flights in 118,000 hours and flying over 6.5 million passengers. flydubai observed 15% more efficiency than the NG, more than the 14% promised, and dependability reached 99.4%. Long routes include 24 over 2,500 nmi (4,630 km), including a daily Aerolineas Argentinasservice from Buenos Aires to Punta Cana over 3,252 nmi (6,023 km).[41]
DesignEdit
In summer of 2011, the objective was to match the A320neo 15% fuel burn advantage, but the initial reduction was 10–12%; it was later enhanced to 14.5%: the fan was widened from 61 inches to 69.4 inches by raising the nose gear and placing the engine higher and forward, the split winglet added 1–1.5%, a relofted tail cone 1% more and electronically controlling the bleed air system improves efficiency.[42]
EnginesEdit
.jpg)
LEAP mockup
Nacelle with chevrons for noise reduction
In 2011, the Leap-1B was initially 10-12% more efficient than the previous 156 cm (61 in) CFM56-7B of the 737NG.[43] The 18-blade, woven carbon-fiber fan enables a 9:1 bypass ratio (up from 5.1:1 with the previous 24-blade titanium fan) for a 40% smaller noise footprint.[24]The CFM56 bypass ranges from 5.1:1 to 5.5:1.[44] The two-shaft design has a low-pressure section comprising the fan and three booster stages driven by five axial turbine stages and a high-pressure section with a 10-stage axial compressor driven by a two-stage turbine.[24]The 41:1 overall pressure ratio, increased from 28:1, and advanced hot-section materials enabling higher operating temperatures permit a 15% reduction in thrust specific fuel consumption (TSFC) along with 20% lower carbon emissions, 50% lower nitrogen-oxide emissions, though each engine weighs 849 lb (385 kg) more at 6,129 lb (2,780 kg).[24]
In August 2011, Boeing had to choose between 66 in (168 cm) or 68 in (173 cm) fan diameters necessitating few landing gear changes to maintain a 17 in (43 cm) ground clearance beneath the new engines; Boeing Commercial Airplanes chief executive officer Jim Albaugh stated "with a bigger fan you get more efficiency because of the bypass ratio [but also] more weight and more drag", with more airframe changes.[45] The smaller Leap-1B engine will weigh less and have a lower frontal area but a lower bypass ratio leading to a higher thrust specific fuel consumption than the 78 in (200 cm) Leap-1A of the A320neo.[citation needed]
In November 2011, Boeing selected the larger fan diameter, necessitating a 6–8 in (15–20 cm) longer nose landing gear.[46][47] In May 2012, Boeing further enlarged the fan to 69.4 in (176 cm), paired with a smaller engine core within minor design changes before the mid-2013 final configuration.[48]
The nacelle features chevrons for noise reduction like the 787.[49] A new bleed air digital regulator will improve its reliability.[50] The larger engine is cantilevered ahead of and slightly above the wing, and the laminar flow engine nacelle lipskin is a GKN Aerospace one-piece, spun-formed aluminum sheet inspired by the 787.[30]
Aerodynamic improvementsEdit
Boeing's new "split tip" winglet on the 737 MAX
The split tip wingtip device is designed to maximize lift while staying in the same ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code letter C gates as current 737s. It traces its design to the McDonnell Douglas MD-12 1990s twin-deck concept, proposed for similar gate restrictions before the Boeing merger.[51] It should deliver at least 1.5% improvements in fuel economy or even more if the proposed laminar flow surface treatment meets expectations. A MAX 8 with 162 passengers on a 3,000 nmi (5,600 km) mission will have up to a 1.8% better fuel burn than a blended-winglet-equipped aircraft and even 1% over 500 nmi (930 km) at Mach 0.79.[51]
The new winglet is 9 ft 6 in (2.90 m) high.[30] Other improvements include a re-contoured tail cone, revised auxiliary power unit inlet and exhaust, aft-body vortex generators removal and other small aerodynamic improvements.[24] Aviation Partnersoffers a similar "Split-Tip Scimitar" winglet for previous 737NGs.[52] It resembles a three-way hybrid between a blended winglet, wingtip fence, and raked wingtip.
Structural changes and other improvementsEdit
The 8 in (20 cm) taller nose-gear strut keeps the same 17 in (43 cm) ground clearance of the engine nacelles.[24] New struts and nacelles for the heavier engines add bulk, the main landing gear and supporting structure are beefier, and fuselage skins are thicker in some places for a 6,500 lb (2,900 kg) increase to the MAX 8's empty aircraft weight.[24] To preserve fuel and payload capacity, its maximum takeoff weight is 7,000 lb (3,200 kg) heavier.[24]
Rockwell Collins will supply four 15.1-inch (380 mm) landscape liquid crystal displays (LCD), as used on the 787 Dreamliner, to improve pilots' situational awareness and efficiency.[53]Boeing plans no major modifications for the 737 MAX flight deck, as it wants to maintain commonality with the 737 Next Generation family. Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Jim Albaugh said in 2011 that adding more fly-by-wire control systems would be "very minimal".[54] Most of the systems are carried from the 737NG for a short differences-training course to upgrade flight crews.[24]
The 737 MAX extended spoilers are fly-by-wire controlled.[30] As production standard, the 737 MAX will feature the Boeing Sky Interior with overhead bins and LED lighting based on the Boeing 787's interior.[55]
VariantsEdit
The 737-700, -800 and -900ER, the most widespread versions of the previous 737NG,[10]are replaced by the 737 MAX 7, MAX 8 and MAX 9, respectively[56] (FAA type certificate: 737-7, -8, and -9[8]). The 737 MAX 8 entered service in May 2017,[2] and the MAX 9 entered service in March 2018.[57] The MAX 7 is expected to enter service in January 2019, followed by the MAX 200 later in 2019, and the MAX 10 in 2020.[58]
Boeing forecasts that 60–65% of demand for the airliner will be for the 737 MAX 8 variant, 20–25% for the MAX 9 and MAX 10, and 10% for the MAX 7.[59]
737 MAX 7Edit
.jpg)
737 MAX 7 at Farnborough Airshow.
Originally based on the 737-700, Boeing announced the redesign of the MAX 7 derived from the MAX 8 at the July 2016 Farnborough Air Show, accommodating two more seat rows than the 737-700 for 138 seats, up 12 seats.[60][61] The redesign uses the 737-8 wing and landing gear; a pair of overwing exits rather than the single-door configuration; a 46-inch longer aft fuselage and a 30-inch longer forward fuselage; structural re-gauging and strengthening; and systems and interior modifications to accommodate the longer length.[62] It is to fly 1,000 nmi (1,900 km) farther than the -700 with 18% lower fuel costs per seat. Boeing predicts the MAX 7 to carry 12 more passengers 400 nmi (740 km) farther than A319neo with 7% lower operating costs per seat.[63] Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,850 nmi (4,430 mi; 7,130 km) to 3,915 nmi (4,505 mi; 7,251 km) after 2021.[64]
Production on the first 65 ft (19.8 m) long wing spar for the 737-7 began in October 2017.[58]Assembly of the first flight-test aircraft began on November 22, 2017[65] and was rolled out of the factory on February 5, 2018.[66] The MAX 7 took off for its first flight on March 16, 2018 from the factory in Renton, Washington and flew for three hours over Washington state.[67] It reached 250 kn (460 km/h) and 25,000 ft (7,600 m), performed a low approach, systems checks and an inflight engine restart, and landed in Moses Lake, Washington, Boeing’s flight test center.[68]
Entry into service with launch operator Southwest Airlines is expected in January 2019.[58]Entry into service with WestJet will follow shortly, with 5 deliveries expected in 2019.[69]Customers for the aircraft include Southwest Airlines (30), WestJet (23), Canada Jetlines (5) and ILFC Aviation (5).[10] The -7 seems to have fewer than 100 orders among over 4,300 MAX sales.[63]
737 MAX 8Edit
.jpg)
A top view of the MAX 8 showing double overwing exits
The first variant developed in the 737 MAX series, the MAX 8 will replace the 737-800 with a longer fuselage than the MAX 7. Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,515 nmi (4,045 mi; 6,510 km) to 3,610 nmi (4,150 mi; 6,690 km) after 2021.[64] On July 23, 2013, Boeing completed the firm configuration for the 737 MAX 8.[70]The MAX 8 has a lighter empty weight and higher maximum takeoff weight than the A320neo and in cruise at 140,500 lb (63,700 kg), it burns 4,460 lb (2,020 kg) per hour at Mach 0.78 (450 kn; 833 km/h) and FL350, at a suboptimal flight level and forward center of mass.[24]
Its first commercial flight was operated by Malindo Air on May 22, 2017 between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore as Flight OD803.[2] In early 2017, a new -8 was valued at $52.85 million, rising to below $54.5 million by mid 2018.[71]
737 MAX 200Edit
In September 2014, Boeing launched a high density version of the 737 MAX 8, the 737 MAX 200, named for seating for up to 200 passengers in a single-class high-density configuration with slimline seats; an extra exit door is required because of the higher passenger capacity. Boeing states that this version will be 20% more cost efficient per seat than current 737 models, and will be the most efficient narrow-body on the market when delivered, including 5% lower operating costs than the 737 MAX 8.[72][73] Three of eight galley trolleys are removed to accommodate more passenger space.[74] A 100 aircraft order with Ryanair was completed on December 1, 2014.[75] It is to enter service in the second quarter of 2019.[76]
Proposed 737-8 ERXEdit
Airlines have been shown a 737-8ERX concept based on the 737 MAX 8 with a higher 194,700 lb (88.3 t) maximum take-off weight using wings, landing gear and central section from the MAX 9 to provide a longer range of 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 mi; 7,400 km) with seating for 150, closer to the Airbus A321LR.[77]
737 MAX 9Edit
.jpg)
737 MAX 9 first flight
The 737 MAX 9 will replace the 737-900 with a longer fuselage than the MAX 8. Boeing plans to improve its range from 3,510 nmi (4,040 mi; 6,500 km) to 3,605 nmi (4,149 mi; 6,676 km) after 2021.[64] Lion Air is the launch customer with an order for 201 in February 2012.[30] It made its roll-out on March 7 and first flight on April 13, 2017;[78] it took off from Renton Municipal Airport and landed at Boeing Field after a 2 hr 42 min flight.[79] It was presented at the 2017 Paris Air Show.[80]
Boeing 737-9 flight tests were scheduled to run through 2017, with 30% of the -8 tests repeated; aircraft 1D001 was used for autoland, avionics, flutter, and mostly stability-and-control trials, while 1D002 was used for environment control system testing.[34] It was certified by February 2018.[81] Asian low-cost carrier Lion Air Group took delivery of the first on March 21, 2018 before entering service with Thai Lion Air.[57]
737 MAX 10Edit
737 MAX 10 rendering
To compete with the Airbus A321neo, loyal customers such as Korean Air and United Airlines pressed Boeing to develop a larger variant than the MAX 9 which Boeing revealed studies of in early 2016.[82] As the A321neo had outsold the MAX 9 five-to-one, the proposed MAX 10 included a larger engine, stronger wing, and telescoping landing gear in mid-2016.[83] In September 2016, it was reported that the variant would be simpler and lower-risk with a modest stretch of 6–7 ft (1.83–2.13 m) for a length of 143–144 ft (43.6–43.9 m), seating 12-18 more passengers for 192-198 in dual class or 226-232 in single class, needing an uprated 31,000 lbf (140 kN) CFM LEAP-1B that could be available by 2019 or 2020 and would likely require a simple landing gear modification to move the rotation point slightly aft.[84]
In October 2016, Boeing's board granted authority to offer the stretched variant with two extra fuselage sections forward and aft with a 3,100 nautical miles (3,600 mi; 5,700 km) range reduced from 3,300 nautical miles (3,800 mi; 6,100 km) of the -9.[82] In early 2017, Boeing showed a 66 in (1.7 m) stretch to 143 feet (44 m), enabling seating for 230 in a single class or 189 in two-class capacity, compared to 193 in two-class seating for the A321neo. The modest stretch of the MAX 10 enables the aircraft to retain the existing wing and CFM Leap 1B engine from the MAX 9 with a trailing-link main landing gear as the only major change.[85] Boeing 737 MAX Vice President and General Manager Keith Leverkuhn says the design has to be frozen in 2018 for a 2020 introduction.[82]
Boeing prospects 737-900 operators and 737 MAX 9 customers like United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Alaska Airlines, Air Canada, Lion Air, and Chinese airlines will be interested in the new variant.[86] Boeing predicts a 5% lower trip cost and seat cost compared to the A321neo.[87] Air Lease Corporation wants it a year sooner; its CEO John Pleuger stated "It would have been better to get the first airplane in March 2019, but I don't think that's possible".[88] AerCap CEO Aengus Kelly is cautious and said the -9 and -10 "will cannibalize each other".[82]
As it progressed towards a telescopic semi-levered main landing gear design like the 777 and 787-10, Boeing anticipated a launch at the June 2017 Paris Airshow for a total market of 1,000 airplanes.[89] Lion Air is a possible launch customer at this Air Show with United Airlines, Norwegian or Spicejet are cited as interested, but commitments could be conversions of existing orders rather than new sales.[90] Ryanair is expected to hold out for the best possible price before placing an order.[91]
The MAX 10 was launched on June 19, 2017 with 240 orders and commitments from more than 10 customers.[92][93] United Airlines will be the largest 737 MAX 10 customer, converting 100 of their 161 orders for the MAX 9 into orders for the MAX 10.[94] Boeing ended the 2017 Paris Air Show with 361 orders and commitments, including 214 conversions, from 16 customers,[95] including 50 orders from Lion air.[96]
Its configuration was firmed up by February 2018.[97] Its modified landing gear will require additional flight-testing.[34] To fit the 9 in (23 cm) taller main landing gear in the same wheel well, at the lower end the semi-levered gear includes an additional shock absorber strut to keep the wheels on the ground as the aircraft rotates and move the pivot point aft, and at the upper end a shrinking, translating mechanical linkage enables it to be drawn in and shortened while being retracted, inspired from carrier aircraft designs. It weighs 5,500 lb (2,500 kg) less than the A321neo, which needs 7,000 lb (3,200 kg) more takeoff weight and 5,000 lb (2,300 kg) more thrust to fly the same mission.[98]
By Summer 2018, the variant critical design review was done as it passed 70% of the detailed design. Assembly was underway for a first flight targeted for late 2019 and entry into service for 2020. The landing gear design was disclosed: a telescoping oleo-pneumatic strut with a down-swinging lever permit a 9.5 in. (24 cm) taller gear. Driven by the existing retraction system, a shrink link mechanism at the top of the leg allow to keep the existing wheel well to preserve development costs.[99]
Boeing Business JetEdit
The BBJ MAX 8 and BBJ MAX 9 are proposed business jets variants of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 9 with new CFM LEAP-1B engines and advanced winglets providing 13% better fuel burn than the Boeing Business Jet; the BBJ MAX 8 will have a 6,325 nmi (11,710 km) range and the BBJ MAX 9 a 6,255 nmi (11,580 km) range.[100] The BBJ MAX 7 was unveiled in October 2016 with a 7,000 nautical miles (12,960 km) range and 10% lower operating costs than the original BBJ while being larger.[101] The MAX BBJ 8 first flew on April 16, 2018, before delivery later the same year, and will reach 6,640 nmi (12,300 km) with an auxiliary fuel tank.[102]
Orders and deliveriesEdit
Initially, the customers for the 737 MAX were not disclosed, except for American Airlines. On November 17, 2011, Boeing released the names of two other customers – Lion Air and SMBC Aviation Capital. At that time, Boeing reported 700 commitments from 9 customers for the 737 MAX.[103][104] On December 13, 2011, Southwest Airlines ordered 150 737 MAX aircraft with 150 options.[105]
By December 2011, Boeing had 948 commitments and firm orders from 13 customers for the 737 MAX.[106] On September 8, 2014, Ryanair signed an agreement with Boeing to purchase up to 200 new Boeing 737 MAX 200 "gamechanger" aircraft - comprising 100 firm orders and 100 options.[107] In January 2017, aircraft leasing company GECAS ordered 75 more 737 MAX 8 airliners.[108]
As of September 2018, Boeing had 4,783 firm orders from 98 identified customers for the 737 MAX.[4] The top three identified airline customers for the 737 MAX are Southwest Airlines with 280 orders, flydubai with 251 orders, and Lion Air with 251 orders.[10] The first new series aircraft, a MAX 8, was delivered to Malindo Air on May 16, 2017.[9]
Boeing 737 MAX orders and deliveries
Monday, March 12, 2018
Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Supreme Court Judgments
Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács
Collection Supreme Court Judgments
Date 2018-01-19
Neutral citation 2018 SCC 2
Case number 37276
Judges McLachlin, Beverley; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard; Gascon, Clément; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell; Rowe, Malcolm
On appeal from Federal Court of Appeal
Notes SCC Case Information: 37276
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács, 2018 SCC 2
Appeal Heard: October 4, 2017
Judgment Rendered: January 19, 2018
Docket: 37276
Between:
Delta Air Lines Inc.
Appellant
and
Gábor Lukács
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Ontario, Canadian Transportation Agency, International Air Transport Association and Council of Canadians with Disabilities
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 32)
McLachlin C.J. (Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. concurring)
Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 33 to 67)
Abella J. (Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
delta air lines inc. v. lukács
Delta Air Lines Inc. Appellant
v.
Gábor Lukács Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario,
Canadian Transportation Agency,
International Air Transport Association and
Council of Canadians with Disabilities Interveners
Indexed as: Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács
2018 SCC 2
File No.: 37276.
2017: October 4; 2018: January 19.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Administrative law — Boards and tribunals — Canadian Transportation Agency — Inquiry into complaint — Standing — Public interest standing — Complainant alleging air carrier’s practices regarding transportation of obese persons are discriminatory — Agency dismissed complaint on basis that complainant lacked standing — Whether Agency reasonably exercised its discretion to dismiss complaint — Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, s. 37 .
L filed a complaint with the Canadian Transportation Agency alleging that Delta Air Lines’ practices in relation to the transportation of obese passengers are discriminatory and contrary to s. 111(2) of the federal Air Transportation Regulations. The Agency dismissed the complaint on the basis that L failed to meet the tests for private interest standing and public interest standing as developed by and for courts of civil jurisdiction. It found L lacked private interest standing because he was not himself obese, and so could not claim to be aggrieved or affected or to have some other sufficient interest. It also determined that L lacked public interest standing because his complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of legislation or the illegal exercise of an administrative authority. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed L’s appeal and held that a strict application of the law of standing as applied in courts was inconsistent with the Agency’s enabling legislation. The court directed that the matter be returned to the Agency to determine, otherwise than on the basis of standing, whether it will inquire into, hear and decide L’s complaint.
Held (Abella, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed in part. The matter is remitted to the Agency to reconsider the matter in whole, whether on the basis of standing or otherwise.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.: The Canada Transportation Act bestows broad discretion on the Agency to hear and determine complaints. In this case, the Agency did not reasonably exercise its discretion to dismiss L’s complaint. A decision is reasonable if it is justifiable, transparent and intelligible, and falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes. The Agency’s decision that L lacked standing does not satisfy these requirements for two reasons. First, the Agency presumed public interest standing is available and then applied a test that can never be met. Any valid complaint against an air carrier would impugn the terms and conditions established by a private company. Such a complaint can never, by its very nature, be a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation or the illegality of administrative action. The imposition of a test that can never be met could not be what Parliament intended when it conferred a broad discretion on this administrative body to decide whether to hear complaints. The Agency’s application of the test is also inconsistent with the rationale underlying public interest standing, which is for the court to use its discretion, where appropriate, to allow more plaintiffs through the door. The Agency did not maintain a flexible approach to this question and in so doing unreasonably fettered its discretion.
Second, the total denial of public interest standing is inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Agency’s legislative scheme. Applying the tests for private and public interest standing in the way the Agency did would preclude any public interest group or representative group from ever having standing before the Agency, regardless of the content of its complaint. In effect, only a person who is herself targeted by the impugned policy could bring a complaint. This is contrary to the scheme of the Act. Parliament has seen fit to grant the Agency broad remedial authority and to allow the Agency to act to correct discriminatory terms and conditions before passengers actually experience harm. To refuse a complaint based solely on the identity of the group bringing it prevents the Agency from hearing potentially highly relevant complaints, and hinders its ability to fulfill the statutory scheme’s objective.
While a reviewing court may supplement the reasons given in support of an administrative decision, it cannot ignore or replace the reasons actually provided. This is not a case where merely supplementing the reasons can render the decision reasonable. The Agency clearly stated a test for public interest standing and applied that test. The Agency could have adapted the test so that the complainants under its legislative scheme could actually meet it. It could also have exercised its discretion without any reference to standing at all. But it did neither of these things and the reviewing court must not do them in the Agency’s place.
The Court of Appeal should not have held that standing rules could not be considered by the Agency in its reconsideration of the matter. The better approach is to send the matter back to the Agency for reconsideration in its entirety. Deference requires that the Agency determines for itself how to use its discretion, provided it does so reasonably.
Per Abella, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. (dissenting): There is nothing in the Agency’s mandate that circumscribes its ability to determine how it will decide what cases to hear. Parliament has given the Agency wide discretion to choose, according to its own institutional constraints and demands, how it will promote its overall mandate to regulate and adjudicate national transportation issues. The Agency’s power to process and resolve complaints is framed in discretionary language, giving the Agency the authority to make its own rules about how it carries on its work, as well as the manner of, and procedures for, dealing with matters before the Agency. In this case, the Agency developed its standing rules in full accordance with its legislative mandate. There is no basis for interfering with them.
Standing rules exist to enable a court or tribunal to economize and prioritize its resources, and ensure that it benefits from contending points of view that are advanced by those best placed to advance them. The Agency is entitled to apply a gatekeeping or screening mechanism which enables it to balance, in a transparent and effective manner, the Agency’s various competing interests and demands, such as access and resources.
Tribunals are not required to follow the same procedures courts use, but when a tribunal like the Agency chooses to apply and exercise its broad legislative mandate by borrowing an approach to standing long sanctioned by the courts as an effective and principled way to determine which cases it will hear, reviewing courts should not interfere merely because the court might have applied the mandate differently. Where, as here, the adopted standing procedures flow from the same concerns and rationales as those relied on by courts, there is no reason for a tribunal to be immunized from access to a procedure courts have endorsed. Access to justice demands that both courts and tribunals be encouraged to develop screening methods to ensure that access to justice will be available to those who need it most in a timely way. The fact that a tribunal’s governing legislation has a public interest dimension does not preclude it from adopting similar rules of standing to those used by the courts.
The Agency’s decision to deny L’s complaint on the basis that he lacked standing was reasonable in the circumstances. L brought a complaint with no underlying facts, no representative claimants and no argument. His complaint is purely theoretical, his interest in the issues is academic, and the proposed suit does not constitute an effective and reasonable means of bringing the issue before the Agency. It is therefore unnecessary to remit the matter back to the Agency.
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J.
Referred to: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654; Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42; Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Lukács v. Porter Airlines Inc., Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 121‑C‑A‑2016, April 22, 2016; Pathmanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 353, 17 Imm. L.R. (4th) 154; Petro‑Canada v. Workers’ Compensation Board (B.C.), 2009 BCCA 396, 276 B.C.A.C. 135; Komolafe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431, 16 Imm. L.R. (4th) 267.
By Abella J. (dissenting)
Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 51 Imm. L.R. (3d) 101; Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575; Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607; Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236; Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650; Lukács v. Porter Airlines Inc., Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 121‑C‑A‑2016, April 22, 2016; Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 279 (Re), Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 431‑AT‑MV‑2008, August 20, 2008; Lukács v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2014 FCA 76, 456 N.R. 186; Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Government of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2; Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87; Norman Estate v. Air Canada, Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 6‑AT‑A‑2008, January 10, 2008.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Air Transportation Regulations, SOR/88‑58, ss. 111, 113, 113.1.
Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, ss. 5 , 17 , 25 , 37 , Part V.
Canadian Transportation Rules (Dispute Proceedings and Certain Rules Applicable to All Proceedings), SOR/2014‑104, s. 5(1).
Authors Cited
Dyzenhaus, David. “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law. Oxford: Hart, 1997, 279.
Jones, David Phillip, and Anne S. de Villars. Principles of Administrative Law, 5th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2009.
Sossin, Lorne. “Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries”, in Flood, Colleen M., and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed. Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013, 211.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Webb, Scott and de Montigny JJ.A.), 2016 FCA 220, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 760, [2016] F.C.J. No. 971 (QL), 2016 CarswellNat 4268 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of the Canadian Transportation Agency, No. 425‑C‑A‑2014, November 25, 2014, dismissing a complaint for discriminatory practices. Appeal allowed in part, Abella, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting.
Carlos P. Martins and Andrew W. MacDonald, for the appellant.
Gábor Lukács, on his own behalf.
Heather Mackay and Edmund Huang, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Allan Matte and Mante Molepo, for the intervener the Canadian Transportation Agency.
David Neave and Derek Bell, for the intervener the International Air Transport Association.
Byron Williams, Joëlle Pastora Sala and Alyssa Mariani, for the intervener the Council of Canadians with Disabilities.
Benjamin Zarnett, as amicus curiae, and Jane Scholes.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice —
[1] The respondent, Dr. Gábor Lukács, filed a complaint with the Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”), alleging that the appellant, Delta Air Lines Inc. (“Delta”), applied discriminatory practices governing the carriage of obese persons. The Agency dismissed this complaint on the basis that Dr. Lukács failed to meet the tests for private interest standing and public interest standing as developed by and for courts of civil jurisdiction.
[2] The question is whether the Agency’s decision was reasonable. I conclude that it was not. I would remit the matter to the Agency to reconsider whether to hear the complaint.
I. Facts and Decisions Below
[3] On August 24, 2014, Dr. Lukács submitted a complaint to the Agency alleging that Delta’s practices in relation to the transportation of obese passengers are discriminatory and contrary to s. 111(2) of the Air Transportation Regulations, SOR/88-58 (“Regulations”). In support of his complaint, he attached an email from Delta in response to a passenger’s negative experience of sitting next to another passenger “who required additional space”. In the email, Delta apologized and explained:
Sometimes, we ask the passenger to move to a location in the plane where there’s more space. If the flight is full, we may ask the passenger to take a later flight. We recommend that large passengers purchase additional seats, so they can avoid being asked to rebook and so we can guarantee comfort for all. [A.R., at p. 38]
[4] On September 5, 2014, the Agency issued a letter decision in response to this complaint. It stated: “It is not clear to the Agency that, on the basis of his submission, Mr. Lukács has an interest in Delta’s practices governing the carriage of obese persons. As such, his standing (or locus standi) in this matter is in question”: (Decision No. LET-C-A-63-2014, September 5, 2014, reproduced in A.R., at p. 1). The Agency called for submissions on the standing question.
[5] In its ultimate decision, which is at issue in this case, the Agency denied Dr. Lukács standing and dismissed his complaint: Decision No. 425-C-A-2014, November 25, 2014. To do so, it applied the tests for private interest standing and public interest standing as they have been developed by and for civil courts. It found Dr. Lukács lacked private interest standing because he was not himself obese, and so could not claim to be “aggrieved” or “affected” or to have some other “sufficient interest” (para. 64). It then determined that he lacked public interest standing because his complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of legislation or the illegal exercise of an administrative authority (para. 74).
[6] The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Dr. Lukács’ appeal: 2016 FCA 220, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 760. The Court of Appeal held that a strict application of the law of standing as applied in courts was inconsistent with the Agency’s enabling legislation. Moreover, it was contrary to the Agency’s objective to refuse to examine a complaint based solely on whether a complainant had been directly affected or had public interest standing (para. 27). The Court of Appeal held that in refusing to examine Dr.Lukács’ complaint, the Agency “unreasonably fettered its discretion” (para. 30). Ultimately, the Court of Appeal directed that the matter be “returned to the Agency to determine, otherwise than on the basis of standing, whether it will inquire into, hear and decide [Dr. Lukács’] complaint” (para. 32).
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
[7] The standard of review to be applied in this case is reasonableness. This was the finding of the Court of Appeal (paras. 14-15) and is not disputed by the parties.
[8] Where an administrative body interprets its own statute and is required to exercise discretion under it, it is presumptively entitled to deference: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paras. 53-54;Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, at para. 39; Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 22; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42, at paras. 33-35. There is no contention that the presumption of reasonableness is rebutted in this case. As the Court of Appeal found, the issue “falls squarely within the Agency’s expertise” (para. 15).
B. The Legislative Scheme and the Agency’s Discretion
[9] The Agency is charged with implementing the Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“Act ”) and the Regulations. This legislative scheme requires the Agency to balance a range of interests in order to ensure a competitive, safe, and accessible transportation network for all Canadians: s. 5 .
[10] To meet these objectives, s. 37 of the Act bestows broad discretion on the Agency to hear and determine complaints:
37 The Agency may inquire into, hear and determine a complaint concerning any act, matter or thing prohibited, sanctioned or required to be done under any Act of Parliament that is administered in whole or in part by the Agency.
[11] With respect to international carriers, including Delta, the Regulations prohibit any terms or conditions of carriage which are unjustly discriminatory (s. 111(2)) and empower the Agency to take action against any such term or condition (s. 113.1). The parties agree that s. 37 of the Act grants the Agency broad discretion to hear complaints regarding international carriers, including Dr. Lukács’ complaint against Delta in this case.
C. The Agency’s Decision
[12] A decision is reasonable if it is justifiable, transparent, and intelligible, and falls within “a range of possible, acceptable outcomes”: Dunsmuir, at para. 47. Courts are required to pay “respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision”: ibid., at para. 48, quoting D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart ed., The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286. A reviewing court must refer “both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes”: ibid., at para. 47.
[13] The question in this case is whether the Agency reasonably exercised its discretion to dismiss Dr. Lukács’complaint. On a respectful reading of the Agency’s reasons, I conclude that it did not. The decision does not satisfy the requirements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility for two reasons. First, the Agency presumed public interest standing is available and then applied a test that can never be met. This approach to standing unreasonably fettered the Agency’s discretion. Second, the total denial of public interest standing is inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Agency’s legislative scheme. I will address each of these points in turn.
[14] In this case, the Agency had discretion under s. 37 of the Act to determine whether to hear Dr. Lukács’ complaint. The Agency did not advert to this discretion, however, and appeared to approach the standing question as if bound by the tests for standing as applied in civil courts. As such, it found that it would hear the complaint only if Dr. Lukács could satisfy the test for either private interest standing or public interest standing.
[15] The Agency held that to establish private interest standing, complainants must show that they are “aggrieved”, “affected”, or have some other “sufficient interest” (para. 64). While the Agency appears to have accepted that a complainant does not need to have suffered discrimination, it held that the complainant does need to be a person to whom the impugned policy applies. Dr. Lukács, who was not a “‘large person’ for the purpose of Delta’s policy”, did not therefore have private interest standing (ibid.).
[16] Nor, the Agency held, could Dr. Lukács claim public interest standing. The Agency stated the relevant test as follows, at para. 68:
1. Is there a serious issue as to the validity of the legislation?
2. Is the party seeking public interest affected by the legislation or does the party have a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation?
3. Is there another reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be brought to the court?
The Agency recognized this Court’s direction in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, at para. 36, that these factors are not technical requirements and must be weighed cumulatively. Nonetheless, the Agency proceeded to deny standing based on a rigid application of the second factor of the test. It concluded that standing must be denied because the complaint was “not related to the constitutionality of legislation or to the non-constitutionality of administrative action” (para. 74).
[17] This brings us to the first problem: the Agency applied a test for public interest standing that could arguably never be satisfied. One of the Agency’s functions is the regulation of air carriers, which are private, non-governmental actors. Any valid complaint against an air carrier would impugn the terms and conditions established by a private company. A complaint regarding these terms and conditions can never, by its very nature, be a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation or the illegality of administrative action. In sum, theAgency suggests the availability of public interest standing to bring a complaint of this type and then, in the same breath, precludes any possibility of granting it. The imposition of a test that can never be met could not be what Parliament intended when it conferred a broad discretion on this administrative body to decide whether to hear complaints.
[18] The Agency’s application of the test is also inconsistent with the rationale underlying public interest standing. In determining whether to grant public interest standing, courts must take a “flexible, discretionary approach”:Downtown Eastside, at para. 1. This requires balancing the preservation of judicial resources with access to justice: ibid. at para. 23. The whole point is for the court to use its discretion, where appropriate, to allow more plaintiffs through the door.As the Agency rightly put it, the objective is to hear from those plaintiffs or complainants “with the most at stake” (para. 52).The Agency’s decision in this case, however, exhibits no balancing; it does not allow those with most at stake to be heard. Rather, it uses public interest standing simply to bar access. Downtown Eastside makes clear that at least someplaintiffs will be granted public interest standing. The Agency’s decision, in contrast, allows no complainants to have public interest standing. The Agency did not maintain a flexible approach to this question and in so doing unreasonably fettered its discretion. While the public interest standing test was designed to protect courts’ discretion, the Agency eliminated any of its own discretion under this test.
[19] The second problem with the decision is that the impact of the tests for private and public interest standing, applied as they were in this decision, cannot be supported by a reasonable interpretation of how the legislative scheme is intended to operate. Applying these tests in the way the Agency did would preclude any public interest group or representative group from ever having standing before the Agency, regardless of the content of its complaint. A complaint by the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, like the one brought in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, would not be heard. In effect, only a person who is herself targeted by the impugned policy could bring a complaint.
[20] This is contrary to the scheme of the Act . Parliament has seen fit to grant the Agency broad remedial authority. Section 5 (d) of the Act requires the Agency to promote accessible transportation. And ss. 111 and 113 of the Regulations allow the Agency to act to correct discriminatory terms and conditions before passengers actually experience harm. Indeed, these provisions empower the Agency to investigate based on a complaint or of its own motion. To refuse a complaint based solely on the identity of the group bringing it prevents the Agency from hearing potentially highly relevant complaints, and hinders its ability to fulfill the statutory scheme’s objective. This does not mean that every complaint from a public interest group must be heard. It is unreasonable, however, for the Agency to apply a test that would prevent it from hearing the complaint of any such group.
[21] For these reasons, I conclude that the Agency’s decision fails to meet the indicia of reasonableness enumerated in Dunsmuir.
[22] Delta acknowledges that the Agency’s reasons are deficient. It argues, however, that the reviewing court is required to examine not only the reasons given, but the reasons that could be given to support the Agency’s decision: see Alberta Teachers, at para. 53; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, at para. 12. Specifically, it urges this Court to look to the justifications for denying standing enumerated in Lukács v. Porter Airlines Inc., Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 121-C-A-2016, April 22, 2016.
[23] Supplementing reasons may be appropriate in cases where the reasons are either non-existent or insufficient. In Alberta Teachers, no reasons were provided because the issue had not been raised before the decision maker (para. 51). In Newfoundland Nurses, the reasons were alleged to be insufficient (para. 8). These authorities are distinguishable from this case, where the Agency provided detailed reasons that enumerated and then strictly applied a test unsupported by the statutory scheme.
[24] The requirement that respectful attention be paid to the reasons offered, or the reasons that could be offered, does not empower a reviewing court to ignore the reasons altogether and substitute its own: Newfoundland Nurses, at para. 12; Pathmanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 353, 17 Imm. L.R. (4th) 154, at para. 28. I agree with Justice Rothstein in Alberta Teachers when he cautioned:
The direction that courts are to give respectful attention to the reasons “which could be offered in support of a decision” is not a “carte blanche to reformulate a tribunal’s decision in a way that casts aside an unreasonable chain of analysis in favour of the court’s own rationale for the result” [para. 54, quoting Petro-Canada v. Workers’ Compensation Board (B.C.), 2009 BCCA 396, 276 B.C.A.C. 135, at paras. 53 and 56].
In other words, while a reviewing court may supplement the reasons given in support of an administrative decision, it cannot ignore or replace the reasons actually provided. Additional reasons must supplement and not supplant the analysis of the administrative body.
[25] In my view, this is not a case where merely supplementing the reasons can render the decision reasonable. The Agency clearly stated a test for public interest standing and applied that test. The Agency could have adapted the test so that the complainants under its legislative scheme could actually meet it. Of course, it could also have exercised its discretion without any reference to standing at all. But it did neither of these things. The reviewing court must not do them in the Agency’s place for three principal reasons.
[26] First, to do so would require erasing the public interest standing test and its application, as set out by the Agency, and replacing them with reasons and justifications formulated by this Court. Delta has not pointed to any administrative law authority that would justify this approach.
[27] Second, it would undermine, if not negate, the vital role of reasons in administrative law. Dunsmuir still stands for the proposition that reviewing courts must look at both the reasons and the outcome. While this does not require “two discrete analyses” (Newfoundland Nurses, at para. 14), it means that reasons still matter. If we allow reviewing courts to replace the reasons of administrative bodies with their own, the outcome of administrative decisions becomes the sole consideration. With that approach, as long as the reviewing court could come up with some possible justification — even if it contradicted the reasons given by the administrative body — the decision would be reasonable. This goes too far. It is important to maintain the requirement that where administrative bodies provide reasons for their decisions, they do so in an intelligible, justified, and transparent way.
[28] Finally, this would amount to the reviewing court assuming the role of the Agency by developing and applying a complaints procedure under the Act . It would be ironic to allow the appeal in the name of deference and then stipulate how the Agency should determine when to hear a complaint: see Komolafe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431, 16 Imm. L.R. (4th) 267, at para. 11.
[29] With respect, I am of the view that this is the approach taken by Abella J. in this case. Abella J. explains that the outcome is reasonable because Dr. Lukács’ complaint is not “an effective and reasonable means of bringing the issue before the Agency” (para. 64) and because he provides no explanation for why an affected passenger could not have submitted his or her own complaint (para. 65). These are not justifications that were provided by the Agency, which set out that the public interest test requires a complaint that raises the constitutionality of legislation or the illegal exercise of administrative authority. The Agency then dismissed Dr. Lukács’ complaint on the sole basis that his complaint did neither of these things. I do not see how my colleague’s justifications can be used to supplement the Agency’s reasons, unless the Agency’s own formulation and justification of the legal test is struck from the reasons and these justifications are put in their place. This goes beyond paying respectful attention to the reasons or appropriately supplementing them. It amounts instead to replacing the Agency’s reasons with those of this Court and effectively leaving the Agency with a standing test not of its own making.
[30] I would agree with Abella J., however, that the Court of Appeal should not have held that standing rules could not be considered by the Agency in its reconsideration of the matter. The better approach is to send this matter back to the Agency for reconsideration in its entirety. In its order, the Court of Appeal stipulated that the Agency must reconsider the matter “otherwise than on the basis of standing” (para. 32). I would not structure the order so strictly so as to foreclose the possibility that the Agency could reasonably adapt the standing tests of civil courts in light of its statutory scheme. As my colleague observes, s. 25 of the Act confers on the Agency “all the powers, rights and privileges that are vested in a superior court” (para. 56) with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction. This language indicates the legislator’s intention to give deference to the Agency’s determination of its complaints process.
[31] Of course, there are numerous other ways that the Agency could exercise its discretion under s. 37 of the Act , including examining whether the complaint is in good faith, timely, vexatious, duplicative, or in line with the Agency’s workload and prioritization of cases. The Agency may also wish to consider whether the claim raises a serious issue to be tried or, as Abella J. has done, whether the complaint is based on sufficient evidence. It is not for this Court to tell the Agency which of these methods is preferable. Deference requires that we let the Agency determine for itself how to use its discretion, provided it does so reasonably.
III. Conclusion
[32] I would allow the appeal in part to vary the order of the Court of Appeal, with costs to the respondent. The matter should be remitted to the Agency to reconsider the matter in whole, whether on the basis of standing or otherwise.
The reasons of Abella, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. were delivered by
Abella J. —
Introduction
[33] Gábor Lukács, a mathematician who describes himself as an “air passenger rights advocate”, complained to the Canadian Transportation Agency asserting that Delta Air Lines Inc.’s practices regarding “large” persons were contrary to a tariff provision of the Air Transportation Regulations, SOR/88-58.
[34] Mr. Lukács’ complaint was based on an email concerning a passenger who had told Delta that another passenger’s size made him feel discomfort. Delta had apologized to that customer for the discomfort and explained that under its guidelines, “large” passengers are either moved to a part of the plane with more space or, if the plane is full, asked if they wish to take a later flight. The discomforted passenger did not file a complaint with the Agency. Mr. Lukács did.
[35] Mr. Lukács did not make a complaint about disability.[1] He chose instead to bring a tariff complaint under s. 111(2) of the Regulations, which states:
(2) No air carrier shall, in respect of tolls or the terms and conditions of carriage,
(a) make any unjust discrimination against any person or other air carrier;
(b) give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favour of any person or other air carrier in any respect whatever; or
(c) subject any person or other air carrier or any description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatever.
His complaint was not supported by any facts. Nor was there any suggestion that Mr. Lukács spoke for, or represented, any “large” persons.
[36] Mr. Lukács acknowledged that he was not raising any disability-related issues and was not seeking better or special treatment for “large” passengers, since he acknowledged that imposing such policies on Delta “would be beyond the scope of the present complaint”. Instead, Mr. Lukács was seeking to have Delta’s practices regarding “large” passengers stopped.
[37] The Agency invited Mr. Lukács and Delta to file submissions on whether Mr. Lukács had standing. The Agency concluded that Mr. Lukács lacked both private interest and public interest standing. It held that private interest standing prioritizes those who have a direct personal interest in the issue being litigated, those whose interests are affected more than those of the general public, and those who are seeking to gain something more than simply righting a wrong. It is, as a result, only made out if a complainant is “aggrieved” or “affected” or has some other “sufficient interest” (citing D. P. Jones and A. S. de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th ed. 2009), at pp. 646-47). Since Mr. Lukács brought forward no evidence that he fell within Delta’s guidelines, Mr. Lukács was found not to be an “aggrieved” or “affected” or a “sufficient[ly] interest[ed]” person able to get private interest standing.
[38] Mr. Lukács argued that the applicable test for public interest standing should be the one he said was applied by the Ontario Superior Court in Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 51 Imm. L.R. (3d) 101. He referred to the following three factors:
1. Is there a serious issue to be tried?
2. Does the party seeking public interest standing have a genuine interest in the matter?
3. Is the proceeding a reasonable and effective means to bring the issue before the court (or tribunal)?
(Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 425-C-A-2014, November 25, 2014, at para. 66)
[39] The Agency, noting that the Ontario Superior Court in Fraser actually framed the second factor differently — “Does the UFCW have a genuine interest in the validity of the legislation?” (emphasis added) — ultimately chose not to apply Mr. Lukács’ proposed test and adopted instead the three-part framework developed by this Court in Thorson, McNeil, Borowski, Finlay, Canadian Council of Churches, and Downtown Eastside[2], which was in fact the test applied in Fraser. The framework can be summarized as follows:
1. Is there a serious justiciable issue as to the validity of the legislation (or the legality of the administrative acts)?
2. Is the party seeking public interest standing affected by the legislation directly or does the party have a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation?
3. Is the proposed suit, in all the circumstances, a reasonable and effective means of bringing the matter before the court?
Applying this jurisprudence, and based on the nature of his complaint, the Agency concluded that Mr. Lukács also lacked public interest standing.
[40] At the Federal Court of Appeal, Mr. Lukács acknowledged that he lacked a personal and direct interest in this case and therefore no longer claimed private interest standing.
[41] The Federal Court of Appeal found that the Agency’s decision to dismiss the complaint based on the public interest standing test developed by the courts was unreasonable. It concluded that since tribunals are entitled to use less formal procedures, they should use standing rules that are less formal than the ones used by courts. The issue was returned to the Agency to determine whether it would inquire into Mr. Lukács’ complaint on a basis other than the rules of standing developed by the courts.
[42] In my respectful view, based on the purposes and provisions in its governing statute, while the Agency is not required to apply the same standing rules used by courts, nothing in its governing statute prevents it from doing so. Nor is its conclusion that Mr. Lukács lacked standing unreasonable. I would therefore allow the appeal.
Analysis
[43] The issue is whether the Agency can develop and apply its own standing rules and, if so, whether they can be similar to those applied by courts. All of the parties agree that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review.
[44] The intention of Parliament was for the Agency to have the authority to interpret and apply its wide-ranging governing statute dealing with national transportation issues, address policy, and balance the multiple and competing interests before it (Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, at para. 107). There is nothing in the Agency’s mandate that circumscribes its ability to determine how it will decide what cases to hear.
[45] Like the courts, the Agency is entitled to apply a gatekeeping or screening mechanism that is principled and for the same principled reason, namely, to avoid an arbitrary and undisciplined ad hoc approach to standing. And, like the courts, a principled gatekeeping function enables the Agency to balance, in a transparent and effective manner, the various competing interests and demands before it, such as access and resources.
[46] The Agency’s approach to public interest standing is based on this Court’s jurisprudence and reflects traditional gatekeeping rationales:
. . . applying standing to public law accomplishes three key objectives. First, it ensures that scarce judicial resources are economized. Second, it ensures that the most urgent cases (those that actually affect people, as opposed to theoretical cases) are heard as quickly and efficiently as possible. Finally, it ensures that the best evidence is before the decision maker: the evidence of someone actually affected.
(Lukacs v. Porter Airlines Inc., Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 121-C-A-2016, April 22, 2016, at para. 19; see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 279 (Re), Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 431-AT-MV-2008, August 20, 2008.)
[47] Mr. Lukács argued, however, that the courts’ law of standing is inappropriate in a tribunal context because, in his view, the assumptions that justify the use of standing in the civil courts context are absent. His argument, at its core, is for universal standing, namely that everyone who brings a claim before the Agency is entitled to have it heard.
[48] This claim for universal standing ignores why standing rules exist. As Cromwell J. explained in Downtown Eastside, “it would be intolerable if everyone had standing to sue for everything, no matter how limited a personal stake they had in the matter” (para. 1). Standing rules allow tribunals to preserve and properly allocate scarce judicial resources, screen out “the mere busybody”, and ensure that contending points of view are fully canvassed (Downtown Eastside, at para. 25).
[49] Standing rules also ensure that tribunals have the “benefit of contending points of view of the persons most directly affected by the issue” (Downtown Eastside, at para. 29).
[50] And, as in courts, standing enables a tribunal to economize and prioritize its resources, and ensure that it benefits from contending points of view that are advanced by those best placed to advance them. And all this to ensure that the most timely and effective use can be made of a tribunal’s ability to implement its mandate.
[51] Requiring a tribunal to adjudicate even marginal or inadequately substantiated complaints, on the other hand, grinds the operation of a tribunal to a halt and can be “devastating” to private litigants. As Cory J. warned in Canadian Council of Churches:
It would be disastrous if the courts were allowed to become hopelessly overburdened as a result of the unnecessary proliferation of marginal or redundant suits brought by well-meaning organizations pursuing their own particular cases certain in the knowledge that their cause is all important. It would be detrimental, if not devastating, to our system of justice and unfair to private litigants. [p. 252]
[52] The fact that a tribunal’s governing legislation has a public interest dimension does not preclude it from adopting similar rules of standing to those used by the courts. Alltribunals have a public interest mandate because all legislation does. This does not mean that all litigants who want to bring a claim can automatically do so. The question is what the tribunal’s enabling legislation mandates or precludes (L. Sossin, “Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries”, in C. M. Flood and L. Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context (2nd ed. 2013), 211, at p. 214).
[53] Parliament has given the Agency wide discretion to choose, according to its own institutional constraints and demands, how it will promote its overall mandate to regulate and adjudicate national transportation issues. That discretion is found in ss. 17 , 25 and 37 of the Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 . Under s. 37 of the Act , the Agency has the authority to determine which complaints it will inquire into:
37 The Agency may inquire into, hear and determine a complaint concerning any act, matter or thing prohibited, sanctioned or required to be done under any Act of Parliament that is administered in whole or in part by the Agency.
The Agency’s power to process and resolve complaints is framed in discretionary language. The Agency may inquire into, hear and determine a complaint. I agree with Mr. Lukács that anyone can bring a complaint, but his view that there is no discretion to decide which complaints to hear reads out the word “may” from s. 37.
[54] Under s. 17 of the Act , the Agency may make its own rules about how it carries on its work, as well as the manner of and procedures for dealing with matters before the Agency. It states:
17 The Agency may make rules respecting
(a) the sittings of the Agency and the carrying on of its work;
(b) the manner of and procedures for dealing with matters and business before the Agency, including the circumstances in which hearings may be held in private; and
(c) the number of members that are required to hear any matter or perform any of the functions of the Agency under this Act or any other Act of Parliament.
These rules are codified in the Canadian Transportation Agency Rules (Dispute Proceedings and Certain Rules Applicable to All Proceedings), SOR/2014-104 (“Rules”).
[55] Under s. 5(1) of the Rules,[3] the Rules are to be interpreted so as to facilitate the optimal use of Agency and party resources, and the promotion of justice. Examining the Agency’s mandate through the lens of efficiency, Dawson J.A. noted that “[e]fficient processes are the result of a number of factors, not the least of which are rules of procedure that establish efficient procedures and that are flexible and able to react to changing circumstances” (Lukács v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2014 FCA 76, 456 N.R. 186, at para. 54). Formulating and applying screening or gatekeeping rules represents one way in which the Agency can legitimately realize these goals.
[56] And, under s. 25 of the Act , the Agency has “all the powers, rights and privileges that are vested in a superior court” to deal with “all matters necessary or proper for the exercise of its jurisdiction”, including compelling the attendance and examination of witnesses, ordering the production and inspection of documents, entering and inspecting property and enforcing its orders. Like s. 17 of the Act, s. 25 reflects a choice on the part of Parliament to grant the Agency expansive, discretionary authority to manage its own processes and procedures, including judicial powers.
[57] The Federal Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that the Agency has the discretion not to hear every case:
As recently stated by this Court in Lukacs v. Canada (Transport Agency), 2016 FCA 202 (F.C.A.) at paragraphs 31-32, the Act does not create a general obligation for the Agency to deal with each and every complaint regarding compliance with the Act and its various regulations. Section 37 of the Act , in particular, makes it clear that the Agency “may” inquire into, hear and determine a complaint. There is no question . . . that the Agency retains a gatekeeping function and has been granted the discretion to screen the complaints that it receives to ensure, among other things, the best use of its limited resources.
(2016 FCA 220, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 760, at para. 16)
Yet after accepting that the Agency has discretionary gatekeeping authority, the Federal Court of Appeal went on to constrain that discretion by saying that the gatekeeping exercise could not be based on the approach used by courts.
[58] The legislature has given the Agency wide discretionary authority over how to exercise its mandate. It is not a fettering of discretion for a tribunal to exercise this discretionary authority differently from how a reviewing court would exercise it. This, with respect, results in the court unduly fettering the Agency’s discretion, not the Agency fettering its own.
[59] There is no doubt that one can envision other tests for standing, but once we accept that gatekeeping is a legitimate exercise of the Agency’s discretion in accordance with its mandate, what is the court’s authority for replacing the Agency’s test with one it prefers? As McIntyre J. cautioned in Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Government of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, when he wrote: “. . . courts should not interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a statutory authority merely because the court might have exercised the discretion in a different manner had it been charged with that responsibility” (para. 7).
[60] A tribunal’s standing rules will not necessarily survive scrutiny simply because the tribunal is authorized by statute to develop its own procedures. But when a tribunal like the Agency chooses to apply and exercise its broad legislative mandate by borrowing an approach long sanctioned by the courts as an effective and principled way to determine which cases it will hear, reviewing courts should not be overly eager to substitute their own vision of how that tribunal’s procedural mandate should be applied. To do so, in effect, undermines not only the legitimacy of the standing rules developed and applied by the courts, it undermines public confidence in the tribunal by suggesting it lacks the indicia of an adjudicative body with sufficient institutional maturity to apply the same rules as a court. Put colloquially, if it’s good enough for the courts, it’s good enough for tribunals. I recognize that the application of court-like procedures to the tribunal context may not, in certain circumstances, be appropriate, but where, as here, the adopted procedures flow from the same concerns and rationales, I see no reason for a tribunal to feel immunized from access to a procedure courts have found helpful.
[61] This does not mean that tribunals are required to follow the same procedures courts use, but when they do, this should not be a stand-alone basis for quashing them. Unless we are prepared to say that the courts’ standing rules are inappropriate, I see no reason to conclude that their propriety is diminished when applied by a tribunal. In this case, the Agency developed its standing rules in full accordance with its legislative mandate. There is no basis for interfering with them.
[62] There is no doubt that the test for public interest standing is a high threshold and results in some individuals or groups being unable to raise issues they consider significant. Yet courts routinely apply this threshold as a transparent way to determine the most effective use of their time, resources and expertise. No less are tribunals entitled to apply high thresholds in order to preserve their ability to manage resources and expertise in accordance with their mandate. Access to justice demands that courts and tribunals be encouraged to, not restrained from, developing screening methods to ensure that access to justice will be available to those who need it most in a timely way (Hryniak v. Mauldin, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87). That is why courts developed standing rules in the first place.
[63] The test applied by the Agency effectively foreclosed Mr. Lukács’ ability to make out a case for public interest standing in this case. But, in my respectful view, that does not end the matter. The question to be determined is whether the outcome reached by the Agency was reasonable. Mr. Lukács has brought a complaint with no underlying facts, no representative claimants and no argument. He wants to engage the Agency in a fishing expedition that will have the effect of distracting it from its ability to exercise its mandate on behalf of those with a prima facie legitimate claim.
[64] Even if the Agency had applied the lower public interest standing test proposed by Mr. Lukács, I do not see how he would have been successful in having his complaint inquired into. It is therefore unnecessary to remit the matter back to the Agency. His complaint regarding Delta’s practices is purely theoretical, his interest in the issues is academic and the proposed suit does not constitute an effective and reasonable means of bringing the issue before the Agency. He submitted no evidence that any of Delta’s passengers, including the passenger whose email he relied on, had actually been affected by the issue he raised before the Agency. In fact, he submitted no evidence at all even though the Agency has an open complaint procedure whereby complainants are invited to make and substantiate their complaints through an accessible online application.
[65] Nor has he provided any explanation for why a passenger affected by Delta’s practices could not have submitted his or her own application to the Agency, “thereby provid[ing] the Agency with direct and concrete evidence upon which to adjudicate” (Porter, at para. 65). Such direct and concrete evidence seems all the more necessary given the Agency’s decision dealing with, and Mr. Lukács’ acknowledged familiarity with the Agency’s best known disability case, setting out the “one-person - one-fare” policy, which states that “the determination of whether a person is disabled by reason of obesity is dependent on the facts and circumstances in each individual case and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis” (Norman Estate v. Air Canada, Decision No. 6-AT-A-2008, January 10, 2008, at para. 128).
[66] The Agency’s decision to deny Mr. Lukács’ complaint on the basis that he lacked standing was therefore reasonable in all the circumstances.
[67] I would allow the appeal and restore the Agency’s decision. Delta is not seeking costs.
Appeal allowed in part with costs to the respondent, Abella, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors for the appellant: Bersenas Jacobsen Chouest Thomson Blackburn, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Canadian Transportation Agency: Canadian Transportation Agency, Gatineau.
Solicitors for the intervener the International Air Transport Association: DLA Piper (Canada), Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener the Council of Canadians with Disabilities: Public Interest Law Centre, Winnipeg.
[1] Disability complaints are brought under Part V of the Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 , which deals with the “Transportation of Persons with Disabilities”.
[2] Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265, Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575, Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607, Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236, and Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524.
[3] 5 (1) These Rules are to be interpreted in a manner that facilitates the most expeditious determination of every dispute proceeding, the optimal use of Agency and party resources and the promotion of justice.
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