Federal bill on the Senate ( Re ) 2013 QCCA 1807 QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL

Federal bill on the Senate ( Re ) 2013 QCCA 1807 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY MONTREAL N o : 500-09-022626-121 (Order # 346-2012) DATE: On October 24, 2013 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, JCQ PIERRE J. DALPHOND JA Yves-Marie Morissette JA ALLAN R. HILTON, JCA JULIE DUTIL JA REFERENCE TO A FEDERAL BILL ON THE SENATE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC APPLICANT and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and SERGE JOYAL SOCIETY OF ACADIA NEW BRUNSWICK FEDERATION OF SPEAKING COMMUNITIES AND ACADIAN CANADA SPEAKERS OPINION OF THE COURT [1] In accordance with the Act on referrals to the Court of Appeal , RSQ, c. R-23, the Court must advise the Government of Quebec on ​​three constitutional questions relating to possible changes to the way of selection of members of the Canadian Senate and the term of office: 1. Does the Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 relating to the limitation of the term of office of senators and its annex (Bill C-7, filed June 21, 2011) is a modification of the Constitution of Canada, on the issue of the office of Governor General referred to in paragraph 41 a of the Act constitutional 198 2, which can be made ​​with the consent of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislature of each province? 2. Does the Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 relating to the limitation of the term of office of senators and its annex (Bill C-7, filed June 21, 2011) is a modification of the Constitution of Canada in relation to the question of the mode of selecting senators, under subsection 42 (1) b of the Act Act, 1982 , amendment may only be made ​​pursuant to subsection 38 (1) of the Act of Constitution 1982 , with leave of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies of at least two thirds of the provinces, which in the aggregate at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces? 3. Does the Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 relating to the limitation of the term of office of senators and its annex (Bill C-7, filed June 21, 2011) is a modification of the Constitution of Canada on the basic characteristics and the role of the Senate that can only be made ​​pursuant to subsection 38 (1) of the ActAct, 1982 , with leave of the Senate, the House of Commons and assemblies laws of at least two thirds of the provinces, which in the aggregate at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces? [2] Since the decree authorizing the return, the federal government began its own reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, where, for six specific questions he asks the latter to determine the extent of its powers of amendments the Senate and, thereby, the role of the provinces in this regard. [3] In addition, subsequent to the hearing of the appeal, Bill C-7 ( Act Senate reform ) died on the Order Paper with the prorogation on 13 September, the first session of this Parliament Federal. When asked, the Attorney General of Quebec and the interveners argued that the reference continued to raise issues, requiring notification. The Court agrees, hence this notice. A CONTEXT [4] The Founding Fathers wanted a Canada modeled on the United Kingdom (preamble to the Parliament Act of 1867 Constitution ). So there are two legislative chambers, bass, also called the House of Commons, and the high, the Senate, since it does not really exist in the British colonies in North America aristocracy can be a House of Lords Dominion [1] . [5] Both institutions enjoy the privileges, immunities and powers so conferred upon the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and its members (Art. 18 Constitution Act, 1867). Their powers are equivalent in law, except in respect of bills on the appropriation of public revenues or creating taxes (Art. 53 Constitution Act, 1867 ) and certain constitutional amendments (Art. 47 Constitution Act 1982 ). [6] The transcript of the pre-Confederation conferences indicates that the Founding Fathers discussed at length the role and composition of the Senate. There is no doubt that this institution is a fundamental component of the federal compromise of 1867. Moreover, the Act Act, 1867 contains no less than 15 specific provisions in the Senate powers, prerogatives and privileges, composition, appointment of senators and their term (. essentially the art 21-36), not to mention others where the Senate is mentioned. [7] To Sir John A. Macdonald, there was no question that the members of the Senate are elected, it did not appreciate the fact that members of the Legislative Council of the Parliament of the Province of Canada were from 1856, and for terms renewable eight-year [2] . [8] At the legislative council, each component (Upper and Lower Canada) was represented, from the union in 1841, with 24 members, regardless of their population. This representation will be included in the Act constitutional, 1867 , when the colonies of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia also get all 24 senators [3] . The three parts of the new Dominion are also well represented in the Senate [4] . In addition, to protect the English and Protestant minority in the province, 24 senatorial divisions in Quebec are the 24 territorial divisions of Lower Canada to the Legislative Council of the Province of Canada. [9] Historians agree that the Senate should have the following functions for the Fathers of Confederation: - Regional Representation (three and four regions); - Representation of the anglophone minority in Quebec established; - Review weighted and serene bills and amendments as required; - Provide a right of the wealthiest, including the ability to control the excesses of the politicians. [10] Over time, the Senate has also become a place for the introduction of certain types of legislation by the government, including technical and non-controversial legislation (eg. omnibus legislation), other than financial. [11] Also, as members of Parliament, senators have the opportunity to influence ministerial decisions or firm, especially for those members of the government caucus. [12] In fact, it seems that the Senate and its members play a significant role in federal politics and the institution is not a simple mirror of the House of Commons [5] . [13] For various reasons, some publicly in favor of abolishing or at least the reformation of an institution whose usefulness in its current form, is now in question. However, such considerations are irrelevant for the purposes of this reference, which is not the legitimacy or appropriateness of changes to the method of selecting members of the Senate and their term of office. It is a purely political aspect of the debate. The Court is asked to decide only whether, under the Constitution, provincial participation is required for the validity of these changes. [14] Before concluding this brief in context, it should be noted that the vast majority of federations practice bicameralism, the second chamber often named senate [6] . THE RELEVANT CASE LAW [15] In December 1979, in Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House , [1980] 1 SCR 54, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[t] he Senate has a vital role as part of the institution federal system created by the Act [7] . "(P. 66). [16] She described its functions: A primary purpose of the institution of the Senate, as part of the federal legislative process, was therefore the protection of the various interests in Canada regarding the adoption of federal legislation. (P. 67) [...] The power to enact federal legislation was given to the Queen, with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons. Thus, it was intended that the agency created to protect the interests of the regions and provinces involved in the legislative process. (P. 68) [...] For the reasons already given, as to the first question, we believe that Parliament can, under s. 91 (1), weaken the role of the Senate in this system. (P. 75) [...] As we have seen, the system of regional representation in the Senate was one of the essential characteristics of this organization at its inception. Without him, the fundamental character of the Senate as part of the Canadian federal system disappears. (P. 76) [...] Subsection ( e ) in paragraph (iv) is possible some or all of the members of the Senate by direct election by the people selected. The substitution of an election system to a system of appointment implies a radical change in the nature of one of the parliamentary bodies. As noted, the preamble of the Act referred to "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom," where the upper house is not elected. In creating the Senate in the manner provided in the Act, it is clear that we wanted to make a completely independent organization that could dispassionately the measures adopted by the House of Commons. This was accomplished by providing that members of the Senate are appointed for life. If we make the Senate a wholly or partially elected body would affect a fundamental trait. We would answer in the negative on this point. (P. 77). [17] In sum, since the Senate is a fundamental component of the federal compromise of 1867, the Supreme Court stated in Reference to the Upper House as its essential characteristics, the method of selection of its members, can not be changed without provincial participation, rejecting the claims of the federal government that Parliament can act only by virtue of its power to amend the constitution under section 91 (1) of the Act Act, 1867 (available repealed with the entry into force of the Act Act, 1982 and replaced by section 44 of the latter). [18] In Reference re Secession of Quebec , [1998] 2 SCR 217, the Supreme Court said that our Constitution is based on several principles, including federalism as a mode of governance of the country and change its institutions. THE PARTIES 'CLAIMS [19] By Bill C-7, the federal government was considering two reforms: limiting the length of the Senate according to a non-renewable term of nine years and hold elections before the appointment of senators. [20] The bill expressly recognized amend section 29 of the Act Act, 1867 relating to the length of the Senate term, but any other provision of the Constitution. [21] The Attorney General of Quebec, the project also changed de facto Article 24 of Law Act, 1867relating to the method of selecting senators, allowing them to be actually elective rather than registered. [22] To the Attorney General of Quebec, such reforms are referred to in paragraph 42 (1) b ) of theAct Act, 1982 and can only be made ​​in accordance with subsection 38 (1), or with the consent of two thirds of the provinces with a population of at least 50% of the population of the ten provinces [8](general amending formula 7/50). Alternatively, he argues that the amendment regarding the method of selection would have undermined the office of the Governor General, which requires the consent of Parliament and all the provinces (section 41 of the Act of 1982 Constitution ). Finally, the Attorney General of Quebec argued that the proposal to reduce the length of Senate terms to nine years would have changed an essential feature of the Senate (appointed for life) which also requires the consent of the provinces as the general amending formula 7/50 . [23] Instead, the Attorney General of Canada argues that Parliament could act alone in these matters under Article 91 (Peace, Order and Good Government) of the Act Act, 1867 and section 44 of the Law Act, 1982 . [24] The three players, they essentially share the position of the Attorney General of Quebec on ​​the need for the participation of the provinces to changes in dispute. Senator Joyal emphasizes the royal office and the need for unanimity for processing or abolition. In the case of francophones outside Quebec and Acadians, they argue that an essential feature of the present Senate is the representation of linguistic minorities in the country, which can not be, according to them, changed that in applying Article 38 of the Act Act, 1982 (general amending formula 7/50). PROCEDURE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT [25] Since the patriation of the Constitution, Part V of the Act Act, 1982 is a complete code that describes the different applicable to any constitutional amendment procedures ( Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution , [1982] 2 SCR 793, 806). [26] This part V enacts five different procedures depending on the nature of the change described.In a judgment of this Court, Potter c. Quebec (Attorney General) , [2001] RJQ 2823, para. 12-16 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31 October 2002, [2002] 3 SCR x, Baudouin judge summarized as follows: [12] The first is the standard procedure (Art. 38, 39 and 40 of the Act Act, 1982 ) which requires the assistance of the federal government and at least seven provinces representing at least 50% of the population. [13] The second is the procedure called unanimous (art. 41), which affects only certain areas deemed to be of particular importance (eg, the use of French or English, or charge of the queen, Governor General or the Lieutenant-Governor) [9] . [14] The third is the light standard procedure (Art. 42) for six subjects listed in the text. [15] The fourth is the unilateral procedure (Art. 44 and 45), allowing Parliament to amend constitutional provisions relating to the executive government, the Senate and the House of Commons and provincial legislatures to amend their Constitution . [16] The fifth finally [...] is the bilateral procedure (Art. 43). [27] With respect to the Senate, pursuant to Article 42 of Law Act, 1982 , the consent of the provinces, according to the general amending formula 7/50, is required for any changes on the fourissues ( English, matters ) [10] the following: - The powers of the Senate; - The method of selecting Senators; - The number of senators allocated to each province, and - The conditions of residence qualifications. [28] Under Article 44, the Parliament can act unilaterally, subject to sections 41 and 42, with respect to provisions of the Constitution relating to the Senate: 44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to modify the provisions of the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government, the Senate or the House of Commons. 44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, May Exclusively Parliament make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons. [29] With regard to Articles 38 and 41 of the Act of 1982 Constitution , they are not designed to apply to amendments to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the Senate as an institution that continues, the latter being covered either by Article 44 or Article 42. However, the unanimous procedure (Article 41) would be initiated for its abolition, because the Senate, subject to Article 47, is an institution must consent to any amendment to the Constitution, except those covered by Article 45.It follows that its abolition would lead to a change in the procedure for amending the Constitution, which requires unanimity of the political authorities of the country (Article 41). [30] The determination that a constitutional amendment on the Senate is covered by section 42 or 44 must be reading these provisions in their linguistic, philosophical and historical context in order to fully understand their real significance ( R . c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.. , [1985] 1 SCR 295, 344). [31] In interpreting these items, the underlying principles of the Constitution "guide the interpretation of the text" ( Reference re Secession of Quebec , supra, para. 52), even if they must be used with some "caution" to the decision maker is not required to minimize the written text of the Constitution (BC c. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. , 2005 SCC 49, para. 65, [2005] 2 SCR 473). [32] It must therefore be given to the four issues mentioned in Article 42 an interpretation that reflects the importance of the Senate in the pre-Confederation compromise. This interpretation must also reflect the historical reality surrounding the adoption of Article 42 in 1982, many attempts, unsuccessful so far, to terminate, amend or replace the upper chamber, and the contents ofReference to the Upper House . [33] The interpretation must be purposive. Thus, it would be wrong to say that Article 44 is the general rule and that Article 42 lays down exceptions to the power of Parliament to act unilaterally.This article should not be interpreted in a restrictive manner. [34] In reality, each of these provisions is part of the same constitutional logic changes to the Constitution relating to the Senate, by their very nature, deal either with the internal governance of the institution, or the characteristics of the Senate to ensure its role in the federal legislative process, including regional and provincial representation and a serene and balanced review of bills. [35] In the first case, the Parliament alone has an interest and can act unilaterally, protection against slippage then lies in the power to veto the Senate itself (Art. 47 of Law Act, 1982 that s' not apply to art. 44). In the second case, the provinces also have an interest and consent is required under the general amending formula 7/50, as the Senate itself, it can not veto (Art. 47). [36] Section 44 is thus the counterpart to the Parliament, Article 45 legislatures. These provisions have the same purpose: to enable each level of government to change its internal constitution, particularly with regard to its legislative institutions, and government reports. The ability to act unilaterally in this area is understandable, since it is to preserve, in internal constitution, independence or sovereignty of each level of government. [37] However, unlike the provincial legislative institutions, certain characteristics of the Senate arising from pre-Confederation compromise. With respect to the latter, it must be recognized that the provinces have an interest. So, unlike the internal constitution of the provinces, the power of Parliament in respect of amendments to the federal internal constitution is limited by the fact that it does not allow him to act unilaterally to modify aspects of the structure affecting provincial interests. [38] This is the essence of interrelations between, on the one hand, Articles 42 and 44 and, on the other hand, Articles 44 and 45. [39] The four characteristics of the Senate to which the provinces have an interest are identified in section 42 of the Act of 1982 constitutional . The provision codifies and the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference to the Upper House , or the provincial interest in the powers of the Senate, the method of appointment of its members, their qualification and residence number of seats allocated to each region and province. For these questions, the unilateral power to amend the Constitution under Article 44 shall apply, as was also the case also under the old section 91 (1) of theAct Act, 1867 ( Reference to the Upper House , above). [40] The interpretation of Article 42 must also take into account, that at the failure of the federal and provincial governments to agree, in 1982, a comprehensive reform of the Constitution, including some of the institutions the Senate, the framers agreed to postpone the discussion on the issues set out in this Article, specifying the procedure for amendment will be applicable to the incorporation of a possible consensus in the Constitution. [41] While Article 44 is related to changes in the then existing provisions of the Constitution, Article 42 deals with any amendment to the Constitution on one of the issues listed there, which is wider than the simple modification of the existing provisions. Article 42 "is more consistent with the adoption of entirely new provisions on the matters referred" to quote professors Woehrling and Morin [11] . [42] In addition, one can not argue that without sufficient consensus that the 7/50, Parliament may by ordinary law, legislate with respect to matters for which Article 42 recognizes a provincial interest, provided he did not formally amend the text of the written constitution, and for several reasons. [43] First, it follows from the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution that politicians must adhere to the text and spirit. They can not, under the pretext that the amendment procedure is complex or cumbersome, try to circumvent it. This would deny the protections required by the Constitution. In reality, the Constitution prohibits circumventing the amendment procedure ( Reference re Secession of Quebec , supra, para. 73-74, John White, "Senate Reform: What Does the Constitution Say?" in Jennifer Smith (ed.) , The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate , supra, p 97). [12]. [44] To do otherwise would be to ignore the principles of federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of law, with the first title, the Constitution. As recalled by the Supreme Court in Reference re Secession of Quebec , supra, at paragraph 77: In this way, it is possible to combine our faith in democracy and our belief in constitutionalism. The constitutional amendment often requires some form of substantial consensus precisely because the content of the fundamental principles of the Constitution requires. The need for broad support as to introduce a constitutional amendment ensures that minority interests will be taken into consideration before implementing changes that will affect them "enhanced majority" . [45] Secondly, it is undeniable that the matters referred to in Article 42, the grantor has a recognized interest in the provinces and postponed until the formation of consensus required, any changes related to these issues. Meanwhile, until the appearance of this consensus, the powers of the Senate, the mode of selection of its members (nominative process by the Governor General on behalf of Her Majesty, and until the age of retirement 75 years [13] ), the number of senators and the residence can not be changed by Parliament acting unilaterally, with or without a constitutional amendment. [46] Third, we can interpret the power of Parliament to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the country (Article 91 of Law Act, 1867 ) as authorizing the disregard of the principles federalism and constitutionalism. If we were to allow Parliament by ordinary law, to change the status quo in respect of the matters listed in Article 42, it would not need to develop a consensus with the provinces. Instead, it would take away any interest for the federal government to seek consensus in Form 7/50. [47] Finally, Article 42 can not be read as reflecting a consensus among the provinces and the federal government in 1982 to preserve the formalism and not reality to the matters referred to therein, including the mode of appointment current senators. Limit the constitutional protection of Article 42 of the formal authority of the Governor General to appoint senators appears indefensible. Indeed, what was the point of the provinces in the adoption of the Law Act, 1982 to protect a legal reality that, even then, had no place in the political reality? [48] ​​In short, the status quo on issues mentioned in Article 42, including the method of selecting senators (appointed, and until the age of 75) must continue because the questions are listed as logically escape the application of Article 44 of the Act of 1982 Constitution to that of Article 91 ofLaw Act, 1867 . In this sense, Article 42 requires not only a procedure for amending the Constitution on matters mentioned therein, but also recognizes that these issues are beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, as was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada the Reference to the Upper House , supra. [49] then is to identify the scope of paragraph 42 (1) b ) of the Act Act, 1982 , the only relevant here: . 42 (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made ​​pursuant to subsection 38 (1): a ) [...] b ) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators; [...] 42. (1) in 38 (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada relation to the matters Following May Be made ​​only in Accordance with subsection: ( a ) ... ( b ) the powers of the Senate and the method of Selecting Senators; [50] This is referred to in paragraph 42 (1) b ) of the Act of 1982 Constitution , it is not as formal power of appointment by the Governor General that the current method of selecting senators. The words chosen by the settlor indicates an intention not to restrict the scope of this paragraph in the final act of appointment by the Governor General. In fact, this paragraph does not deal with the mode of appointment, but the method of selecting senators suggesting that covers at least the process leading to the appointment. The comments of Professor Charles-Emmanuel Côté, "The unconstitutionality of the proposed federal Senate elections" (2010) 3 Québec Journal of Constitutional Law 81, at p. 83, should be mentioned here: According to the Oxford Dictionary of the French language , the selection is " the [a] ction to choose [...] individuals who are best ", while the appointment is" the [a] ction to appoint someone a job, a function "and that name means" [d] esigner, choose (a person) on its own authority, to fulfill a function, a load . " The word "selection" thus refers to the general idea to choose, select, while the word " appointment "refers to the more specific idea to designate a person to perform a function. The use of Article 42 (1) b) the word " selection "seems already tell itself what is covered, what is the process leading to the appointment of a person to the Senate, but its combination with the word "fashion" confirms this broad interpretation.Also according to the Oxford Dictionary of the French language , " fashion "means" particular form in which [...] is performing an action , "which refers to the way the process by which an action is performed. The English version of the Act of 1982 Constitution confirms this broad interpretation of the term " method of selecting Senators "[" method of Selecting Senators . "] According to theConcise Canadian Oxford Dictionary , " selection "means" the act or instance the Selecting of "whereas" select "means" you choose the best or more suitable . " But the English version clears particularly the broad and encompassing the term " method of selecting senators "in the light of the definition the word " method ". According to the same dictionary, " method "means" a method of procedure "," gold has defined systemic way of doing a thing , "" orderliness "," regular clothes , "which clearly refers to the process of selection leading to the appointment of a person in the Senate. BILL AND THE ROYAL CHARGE [51] The burden of the monarch and his representatives, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governors, may be amended or abolished without the consent of all the provinces and the Parliament (Article 41 of Law Act, 1982 ). [52] Under Article 24 of Law Act, 1867 , it is the Governor General, on behalf of Her Majesty, the "summon" people in the Senate. [53] In fact, this power can only be exercised by the Governor General, by constitutional conventions currently in force, on the advice of the Prime Minister, accepted practice in the minutes of the Privy Council for Canada July 13, 1896 and October 25, 1935. [54] In addition, as of 1890, the federal government is a partner in the process leading to the recommendation to Her Majesty an incumbent governor general by the British Prime Minister. This practice continues to evolve to the point where, after the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, His Majesty takes notice only Canadian Prime Minister. Supplementary letters patent of 1931 and 1947 confirm that the Governor General has become a Canadian institution that can act only on the advice of the Prime Minister. [55] In fact, the appointment of senators became the exclusive business of the incumbent Prime Minister during a vacancy. With this context, the premiers suggested since 1867 in almost 95% of vacancies in the Senate, people who are then identified under the banner of the ruling party (Christopher P. Manfredi, Expert opinion on the possible effects Bill C-7 , May 2013, para. 21), many of whom were former elected or defeated candidates. [56] In this case, any aspect of the bill did not infringe the royal office or the authority of the Governor General to appoint people to the Senate. In fact, the Governor General would formally continued to appoint, and, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. [57] As for the practices followed by the Prime Minister before making a recommendation for appointment, except the limitations arising from the Constitution, Article 42 of Law Act, 1982 , they fall conventions, precedents and political realities. Their changes will require the use of any process of constitutional amendments under Part V of the Act Act, 1982 (Benoît Pelletier, the constitutional amendment in Canada , Toronto (Ont.), Carswell, 1996, p. 104). Indeed, the vast majority of authors oppose constitutional law that the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Governor General are part of the formal constitution (B. Pelletier, supra, at pp. 100-102;. Peter W. Hogg , Constitutional Law of Canada , Volume 1, 5. th ed, looseleaf edition, Toronto, Carswell, 2012, n. o 9.3, pp. 9-5;. Patrick J. Monahan and Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law , 4 th ed. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003, p. 190-191, 208). [58] In addition, a change assimilate the powers of the prime minister to those of the Governor General for the purposes of paragraph 41 a ) Constitution Act 1982 restricts the powers of the Parliament due to a constitutional convention. Such a limitation does not exist or, at least, not for the courts. [59] In contrast, constitutional conventions, which are non-justiciable, unlike the text of the Constitution, are, by their nature, subject to changes as stated P. Hogg, supra n o 1.10 (e), p. 1-29: [T] he conventions allow the law has to adapt to changing political realities without the necessity for formal amendment. [60] If Parliament was unable to change a constitutional convention by law, this would imply a fortiorithat the agreements could also not be modified by the behavior of political actors. Such reasoning shows that the submission of a constitutional convention to the amendment procedure is untenable. [61] Finally, since section 42 (1) b ) of the Act Act, 1982 deals specifically with the method of selecting senators and how to amend the Constitution in this regard, one can not argue that such a change requires more unanimity under section 41 has ) the Royal load. The scope of these items must be determined so as to give the whole consistency, which means that a change covered by section 42 (1) b ) can not fall more under the formula by a unanimous interpretation reasonable words the "burden [...] Governor General" (s. 41 a )). BILL AND SECTION 42 (1) b ) [62] As noted above, the parties do not agree on the true nature of the provisions of the bill relating to stages prior to the appointment of a person in the Senate. To the Attorney General of Quebec, was a change in the method of selecting senators covered by paragraph 42 (1) b ) of the Act of 1982 constitutional . To the Attorney General of Canada, it was only the introduction in Parliament of a consultation procedure in favor of Prime Minister before he makes a recommendation to the Governor General. Parliament would have exercised its power to enact laws for the order, peace and good government (art. 91 of the Act constitutional, 1867 ). [63] The character of legislation can be analyzed according to the object of it and its effect. [64] At the object level, we can distinguish, "[t] he internal evidence, such as the provisions which set out the objectives and the general structure of the law" and "[t] he extrinsic evidence, such as Hansard or other accounts of the legislative process "( Reference Re Securities Act , 2011 SCC 66, para. 61, [2011] 3 SCR 837). [65] In this case, the title and the first four paragraphs of the preamble to the Act on Senate reformwere indicative of the objective pursued by the government: An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 relating to the limitation of the term of office of senators An act respecting the selection of Senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits Whereas: it is important that the representative institutions of Canada, including the Senate , continue to evolve in concert with the principles of modern democracy and expectations of Canadians; Whereas it is significant That Canada'srepresentative institutions , Including the Senate continues to evolve in Accordance with the principles ofmodern democracy and the expectations of Canadians; The Government of Canada is committed to exploring ways to allow the Senate to better reflect the democratic values ​​of Canadian and better meet the needs of Canada's regions; Whereas the Government of Canada HAS Undertaken to explore means clustering to enable the Senate to better Reflect the democratic values ​​of Canadians and sponds to the needs of Canada's regions; In 1987 the prime ministers of Canada agreed, as an interim measure until the Senate reform is carried out, the Senate vacancies are filled through a list of Senate nominees submitted by the Government the province or territory concerned; Whereas in 1987 the First Ministers of Canada Agreed, as an interim measure up to Senate reform is Achieved, that 'any person Summoned to fill a vacancy in the Senate is to be Chosen from Among persons Whose names Have Been Submitted by the government of the province or All which territory to the vacancy concerne; indicated that individuals whose nomination is made ​​by the Queen's Privy Council for Canada for appointment to the Senate are chosenthrough a democratic election by the people of the province or territory they represent; [...] Whereas it is Appropriate That ThoseWhose names are Submitted to the Queen's Privy Council for Canada for the Senate summons to be determined by democratic election by the people of the province or territory That A senator is to Represent; ... [Bold emphasis added] [66] Proponents of the bill therefore wanted to focus on "democratic values" and that the Senate would better reflect. More importantly, the bill expressed the clear objective that the persons whose names were submitted to the Privy Council "for their appointment to the Senate are chosen through a democratic election. " The purpose of the bill was not only to create a consultative process, but to give a truly democratic institution in the Senate. [67] The steps prior to the election of candidates also showed the seriousness and importance given to the elective process. Candidates could be associated with the provincial political parties (Bill, annex, art. 3) and identified as such on the ballot (Annex, Art. 19). The bill included several provisions designed to ensure the fairness of the process: provincial laws, usually including criminal offenses, were likely to apply (. Annex, Article 27, 31, 39), candidates must have an election agent and terms for the ballot were provided (Annex, Art. 35). Finally, several provisions governing the result: the recount was expected (Annex, Article 24.), The bill prescribed a draw in case of a tie (annex, 21 (4).) And legal action to contest an election applied (Annex, Art. 26). [68] In short, the legislative framework is intended to be more than just a consultative process before a recommendation to the Governor General. He had all of the electoral law. [69] The effect of the bill showed a similar result. [70] The bill does not require state to hold Senate elections. If it chooses to do so, the process was set up however substantially comply with the requirements set out in Annex bill. If a province chooses to do nothing, the current process remained unchanged. [71] By cons, in the provinces would have liked a real electoral battle took place, supervised all aspects as if it were a provincial election. Subsequently, the name of the person who obtained the highest vote was sent to the Prime Minister. [72] It is true that the text of the bill does not seem to require the Prime Minister to advise the Governor General only a person who had previously obtained the largest number of votes in an election held in the province to represent the Senate, but only obliged to consider. However, it is clear from the text and the extrinsic evidence, including comments by the Prime Minister and other government officials on the subject, a very considerable weight, even decisive, was given to this result. [73] In practice, if the Prime Minister had not responded to the elections, it is clear that the year would have been in vain and that the provinces have lost interest in maintaining and provincial political parties to participate, not to mention the candidates and voters. [74] It is also clear that once appointed by the Governor General, the elected person could legitimately claim to have won the support of the population of the province or Senate district. As mentionait Bill, that person could claim to have been chosen "through a democratic election by the people." [75] In sum, when the actual scope or pith of the bill are analyzed, it shows undoubtedly an attempt to significantly change the current method of selecting senators, a registered system until the age of retirement set at 75 years. Such a change can not be done under the Act Act, 1982 as a result of a federal-provincial agreement (s. 42 (1) b )) . [76] The agreement of a majority of provinces under the general amending formula 7/50 was therefore required. [77] It was also contrary to the principle of federalism, a bill that requires the holding of elections conducted under provincial laws with candidates endorsed by provincial or independent parties can be imposed on the provinces without a discussion with they and their agreement in Form 7/50. [78] Finally, the bill was unconstitutional in that it allowed the change in the method of selecting senators la carte choice of the province concerned, that component of 1982 would prohibit stating in paragraph 42 (2) of the Act Act, 1982 , an amendment adopted on a matter referred to in subsection 42 (1) applies throughout Canada, with no possibility of exclusion. The constituent wanted changes made ​​with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 42 (1) is general and uniform application. ***** [79] The bill also proposed to limit Senate terms to nine years, not renewable. This amendment to section 29 of the Act of 1867 constitutional seemed motivated by the fact that the preferred model for the selection of senators was elected and that "the tenure of senators should be consistent with the principles of modern democracy" (Sixth expected the preamble of the bill). It seems that he was an accessory to the rest of the bill. In this sense, then it must follow the fate of the principal. [80] Furthermore, it is clear from paragraph 42 (1) b ) of the Act Act, 1982 that the chargor has recognized not only a provincial interest in issues as the powers of the Senate and the method of selection of its members, but also the relationship between these two issues by putting them in the same paragraph. [81] The component thus takes an observation made ​​by the Supreme Court in 1979 in theReference re Upper House (p. 76-77): Currently, when appointed, Senators hold office until the age of sixty-five years. At some point, the reduction of the term of office might impair the functioning of the Senate which provides, in the words of Sir John A. Macdonald, [TRANSLATION] "a second careful look at the law." The Act provides for a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, where members of the House of Lords serve for life. The imposition of mandatory retirement at age sixty-five did not change the essential character of the Senate. However, to answer this question, we need to know what changes it proposes to make to the tenure. [Emphasis added] [82] The Supreme Court thus recognized that the term is closely linked to the powers of the Senate and its operation, as is the method of selection of its members. In fact, a change in the term may undermine both the authority of the Senate and the method of selection of its members. [83] It follows that there is a provincial interest in replacing life tenure (until age 75) a warrant for a predetermined period of time and that the proposed amendment could not be covered by Article 44 of the Act of 1982 constitutional . [84] The citation of the Supreme Court above also highlights the difficulty in determining the appropriate relationship between, on the one hand, the powers and, on the other hand, the term of office. It would be difficult for the courts to draw clear boundaries beyond which one could say, without hesitation, that the operation of the Senate is not affected by a change in the tenure of senators. In addition, the passage of a life term in a term of fixed term not exceeding nine years constitute a significant qualitative change. In these circumstances, it is more logical to assume that the framers intended to leave the determination of the length of the Senate term political actors, rather than the courts, and that section 42 (1) b ), includes, in matters powers and mode of selection, term of office. ***** [85] In conclusion, the proposed federal legislation, if passed, would be unconstitutional without the concurrence of a majority of provinces given under subsection 38 (1) of the Act Act, 1982 , as was, by its very nature, a change in the method of selecting senators and powers of the Senate, and without complying with the process expected, but rather trying to circumvent. THE ABSENCE OF OTHER FEATURES PROTECTED [86] The third question raises the possibility that there are characteristics of the Senate other than those provided for in Article 42 of Law Act, 1982 , which could be described as fundamental or essential and could not be changed in accordance with the general amending formula, section 38 (7/50). [87] With respect to the proponents of this view, the Court is of the opinion that the framers enacted in 1982 that the only characteristics of the Senate as an institution continues, requiring the consent of the provinces before be changed are those mentioned in paragraph 42 (1) of the Act Act, 1982 : its powers and the method of selection of its members (s. 42 (1) b )), the number of senators per province and residency requirements (s. 42 (1) c )). [88] He would go against the consistent interpretation of Part V of the Act of 1982 Constitution to consider that there are other characteristics of the Senate as an institution that continues implicitly protected by Article 38. RESPONSE TO MATTERS [89] For these reasons, the Court replied: On the question o 1: no; On the question o 2: yes; On the question o 3: no. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, JCQ PIERRE J. DALPHOND JA Yves-Marie Morissette JA ALLAN R. HILTON, JCA JULIE DUTIL JA M e Jean-Yves Bernard M e Jean-François Beaupré BERNARD, ROY (JUSTICE-QUEBEC) For the Attorney General of Quebec M e David Lucas M e Alexander Pless M e Warren J. Newman M e Marc Ribeiro DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA To the Attorney General of Canada Senator Serge Joyal Personally M e Christian E. Michaud M e Serge Rousselle COX & PALMER For the Company in Acadian New Brunswick M e Sébastien Grammond Dentons CANADA LLP M e Perri Ravon M e Mark C. Power M e Jennifer Klinck HEENAN BLAIKIE For the Federation of Francophone and Acadian communities in Canada Date of hearing: 10 and 11 September 2013 APPENDIX - APPENDIX CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 - CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 [...] Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into a single Power (Dominion) under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom [...] ... Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick Have Expressed Their Desire to be Federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to That of the United Kingdom ... . 24 The Governor General shall from time to time in the Senate, on behalf of the Queen, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, people with relevant qualifications and subject to the provisions of this Act, the persons so summoned and will become members of the Senate and senators. . 24 The Governor General Shall from Time to Time, in the Queen's Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate, and, subject to the provisions of this Act, every Person so Summoned Shall Become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator. 29. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a senator hold his place in the Senate for life, subject to the provisions of this Act. 29. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a Senator Shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, hold His place in the Senate for life. (2) A Senator who was appointed to the Senate after the entry into force of this subsection has its place in the Senate, subject to this Act, until he reaches the age of sixty-five years. (2) Have you Senator is Summoned to the Senate Effective the coming into power of this subsection Shall, subject to this Act, hold His place in the Senate he Attains up to the age of seventy-five years. 91. will be lawful for the Queen, with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not falling not in the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces, but, for greater certainty, but without limiting the generality of the above terms used in this article, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything otherwise provided in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; 91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming Within the Classes of Subjects by this Act Assigned Exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces, and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is HEREBY Declared That (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming Within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; That is to say, 1. The amendment from time to time, of the Constitution of Canada, except with regard to matters coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces, or in respect of the rights or privileges granted or secured by this Act or by any other constitutional law, legislature or government of a province, or any class of persons with respect to schools, or what the French look or use of English or requirements on the Parliament of Canada to hold at least one session each year and the duration of each House of Commons will be limited to five years from the date of the report of the Writs for choosing this room, but the Parliament of Canada may extend the duration of the House of Commons in time of war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended, if this extension is not subject to opposition expressed by the votes of more third of the members of the chamber. [...] 1. The amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada, except as regards matters coming Within the classes of subjects by this Act Assigned Exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act Granted or secured to the Legislature or the Government of a province, or to any class of persons with respect to schools or as regards the use of the English or the French language or as regards the requirements That There Shall Be a session of the Parliament of Canada at least oz EACH year, and That no House of Commons Shall continue for more than five years from the day of the return of the Writs for choosing the House: Provided, HOWEVER, that 'a House of Commons May in time of real or Apprehended war, invasion or insurrection be continued by the Parliament of Canada yew Such continuation is not Opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members of Such House. ... [Subsection repealed in 1982] [Subsection repealed in 1982] . 92 In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; . 92 In EACH Province the Legislature May Exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming Within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; That is to say, 1. The amendment from time to time, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the constitution of the province, except for the provisions relating to the office of Lieutenant Governor ; [...] 1. The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the Constitution of the Province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant Governor . ... [Subsection repealed in 1982] [Subsection repealed in 1982] CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 - CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 . 38 (1) The Constitution of Canada may be made ​​by proclamation of the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada, approved both: a ) resolutions of the Senate and the House of Commons; b ) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two thirds of the provinces which, in the aggregate, according to the most recent at the time general census, at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces. 38. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada May Be Issued by proclamation made ​​by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada Where so authorized by ( a ) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons, and ( b ) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-Thirds of the provinces That have, in the aggregate, According to the then latest general census, at least fifty per hundred of the population of all the provinces. (2) An amendment made under subsection (1) that derogates from the legislative powers, property rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province shall require a resolution adopted by a majority of senators, MPs and members of each of the legislatures of the required number of provinces. [...] (2) An amendment made under subsection (1) That derogates from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province Shall require a resolution supported by a majorité of Each of the members of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies required under subsection (1). ... . 41 Any amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made ​​by proclamation of the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate, the House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of each province: a ) the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor; b ) the right of a province to the House of Commons a number of members at least equal to that of Senators by which it is entitled to be represented at the commencement of this Part; c ) subject to section 43, the use of French or English; d ) the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada; e ) amendment of this Part. 41. An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the matters Following May Be Issued by proclamation made ​​by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only Where authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of Each Province: ( a ) the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of a province; ( b ) the right of a province to a number of members in the House of Commons not less than the number of Senators by All which the province is entitled to be Represented at the time this Part comes into force, ( c ) subject to section 43, the use of the English or the French language; ( d ) the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada and ( e ) an amendment to this Part. . 42 (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made ​​pursuant to subsection 38 (1): a ) the principle of proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of Commons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada; b ) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators; c ) the number of members by which a province is entitled to be represented and residency requirements they must fulfill; d ) subject to paragraph 41 d ), the Supreme Court of Canada; e ) the extension of existing provinces into the territories; f ) Notwithstanding any other law or practice, the establishment of provinces. 42. (1) in 38 (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada relation to the matters Following May Be made ​​only in Accordance with subsection: ( a ) the principle of Proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of Commons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada; ( b ) the powers of the Senate and the method of Selecting Senators; ( c ) the number of members by All which a province is entitled to be Represented in the Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators; ( d ) subject to paragraph 41 ( d ), the Supreme Court of Canada; ( e ) the extension of Existing provinces into the territories, and ( f ) notwithstanding any other law or practice, the establishment of new provinces. (2) Subsections 38 (2) to (4) do not apply to matters mentioned in subsection (1). (2) Subsections 38 (2) to (4) do not apply in respect of amendments in relation to Matters Referred to in subsection (1). 43. The provisions of the Constitution of Canada applicable only some provinces can not be changed by proclamation of the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate, the House of Commons and the Legislative Assembly each province. This section applies in particular: a ) to change the layout of the provincial borders; b ) changes to the provisions relating to the use of French or English in a province. 43 . An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision That Applies to one or more, but not all, provinces, Including ( a ) any alteration to boundaries betweens provinces and ( b ) any amendment to any provision concerne That to the use of the English or the French language Within a province, May be made by proclamation Issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only Where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of Each province Applies to All which the amendment. 44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to modify the provisions of the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government, the Senate or the House of Commons. 44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, May Exclusively Parliament make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons. 45. Subject to section 41, the legislature has the authority to amend the constitution of the province. 45. Subject to section 41, the legislature of Each Province May Exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the province. 47. (1) In the cases referred to in Article 38, 41, 42 or 43, it can be made ​​without a permit from the Senate if it did not adopt a resolution within one hundred eighty eighty days after the adoption of the House of Commons and if the latter, after the deadline, adopts a new resolution in the same direction. [...] 47. (1), 42 or 43 May be made ​​without a resolution of the Senate Authorizing the issue of the proclamation if, Within one hundred and eighty days after the An amendment to the Constitution of Canada made ​​by proclamation under section 38 41 adoption by the House of Commons of a resolution Authorizing icts outcome, not the Senate HAS ADOPTED Such a resolution and if, at any time after the expiration of That period, the House of Commons again Adopts the resolution. ... . 52 (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, it is inconsistent with the provisions of any other law. 52. (1), and That Is any law inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada or strength effect. (2) The Constitution of Canada includes: a ) the Act of 1982 on Canada , including this Act; b ) the Acts and orders referred to in the Annex; c ) changes in laws and decrees referred to in paragraphs a ) or b ). (2) The Constitution of Canada includes ( a ) the Canada Act 1982 , Including this Act; ( b ) the Acts and orders Referred to in the schedule, and ( c ) any amendment to any Act or order Referred to in paragraph ( a ) or ( b ). (3) The Constitution of Canada may only be amended in accordance with the powers conferred by it. (3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada Shall Be made only in Accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada. BILL C-7 - BILL C-7 Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 relating to the limitation of the term of office of senators An act respecting the selection of Senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits Whereas: it is important that representative institutions in Canada, including the Senate, continue to evolve in concert with the principles of modern democracy and the expectations of Canadians; Whereas it is significant That Canada's representative institutions, Including the Senate continues to evolve in Accordance with the principles of modern democracy and the expectations of Canadians; The Government of Canada is committed to exploring ways to allow the Senate to better reflect Canada's democratic values ​​and to better meet the needs of the regions of Canada; Whereas the Government of Canada HAS Undertaken to explore means clustering to better enable the Senate to Reflect the democratic values ​​of Canadians and sponds to the needs of Canada's regions; In 1987 the prime ministers of Canada agreed, as an interim measure until the Senate reform is carried out, the Senate vacancies are filled through a list of Senate nominees submitted by the Government the province or territory concerned; Whereas in 1987 the First Ministers of Canada Agreed, as an interim measure up to Senate reform is Achieved, that 'any person Summoned to fill a vacancy in the Senate is to be Chosen from Among persons Whose names Have Been Submitted by the government of the province or All which territory to the vacancy concerne; indicated that people who are nominated to the Queen's Privy Council for Canada for appointment to the Senate to be selected through a democratic election by the people of the province or territory they represent; Whereas it is Appropriate That Those Whose names are Submitted to the Queen's Privy Council for Canada for the Senate summons to be determined by democratic election by the people of the province or territory That A senator is to Represent; it is appropriate to establish a framework to guide the provinces and territories with respect to the law governing the conduct of the elections; Whereas it is Appropriate That a framework be Established To Provide guidance to provinces and territories for the text of laws governing Such elections; the tenure of senators should be consistent with the principles of modern democracy; Whereas the tenure of Senators shoulds be consist with modern democratic principles; that Parliament enacted the Act of 1965 constitutional to reduce the term of senators, hitherto appointed for life by setting seventy-five years of age limit their retention; Whereas the Constitution Act, 1965 , Enacted by Parliament, Reduced the tenure of Senators from life to the attainment of seventy-five years of age; that under Article 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament has the power to amend the provisions of the Constitution of Canada in relation to the Senate; Whereas Parliament, by virtue of section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, May make laws to amend, the Constitution of Canada in relation to the Senate; that Parliament intends to preserve the essential characteristics of the Senate of independent, sober second thought in Canadian parliamentary democracy, And Whereas Parliament wishes to maintain maintenance the essential characteristics of the Senate Within Canada's parliamentary democracy as a chamber of independent, sober second thought; 3. If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially consistent with the framework set out in the Annex, the Prime Minister shall take into account when recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, the persons whose names appears on the most recent list of senatorial candidates chosen for this province or territory. 3. If a province or territory HAS Enacted Legislation That Is Substantially in Accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in Recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, Must Consider MOST names from the current list of Senate nominees selected for That province or territory. . 5 Article 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is replaced by the following: 5. Section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is mittal by the Following: 29. (1) Subject to sections 29A to 31, the Senate after the entry into force of the Constitution Act, 2011 (limiting the tenure of senators) is for a single term of nine years. 29. (1) Subject to sections 29A to 31, a person is Have you Summoned to the Senate Effective the coming into power of the Constitution Act, 2011 (Senate term limits) Shall hold a place I'm his House for one term of nine years. (2) Subject to sections 29A to 31, in case of interruption of its mandate, the senator referred to in subsection (1) may be re-appointed for the unexpired term. (2) Subject to sections 29A to 31, a person Referred to in subsection (1) Whose term is interrupted May Be Summoned again to fill the remainder of the term. 29A. Senator, regardless of the date on which he was appointed, ceases to be a senator when he reaches the age of sixty-five years. 29A. A person All who is a senator on Attaining the age of seventy-five years to be a senator CEASES at That Time, Regardless of When Summoned to the Senate. Schedule - Schedule UNDER THE SELECTION PROCESS SENATORS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SELECTION OF SENATORS 1. Senators to be appointed for a province or territory should be chosen from the list of senatorial candidates presented by the government of the province or territory. 1. Senators to be appointed for a province or territory shoulds be Chosen from a list of Senate nominees Submitted by the government of the province or territory. [1] In 1867, not only Parliament is bicameral, but the legislatures of Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. This is also the case in the colony of Prince Edward Island, Prince Edward Island and is in the creation of the province of Manitoba. Provincial upper house will all eventually abolished because of their redundancy and costs they engendered (David Smith, "The Senate of Canada and the Conundrum of Reform," in Jennifer Smith (ed.), The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate , Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, p. 11, at p. 13). [2] An Act respecting the Legislative Council , Revised Statutes of Canada, 1859 (22 Vict.), c. 1, art. 1. [3] With the accession in 1873 of Prince Edward Island Prince Edward Island, four of these are reallocated to the new province. [4] With the accession of the colony of British Columbia in 1871, and the constitution of Manitoba, in 1870, Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, a fourth region is created and granted She also 24 senators. Then add six senators in the attachment of the colony of Newfoundland in Canada and one each from federal territories. In total, the regular number of senators is 105. [5] See Andrew Heard, "Assessing Senate Reform Through Bill C-19: The Effects of Limited Terms for Senators" in Jennifer Smith (ed.), The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate , Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press , 2009, p. 117. [6] See Ronald L. Watts, "Compared Federal Second Chambers" in Jennifer Smith (ed.), The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate , Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, p. 35. [7] The Act of 1867 constitutional . [8] So excluding the population of the territories. [9] Following the 1995 provincial referendum, Parliament banned the government to propose a constitutional amendment in the 7/50 without the consent of the National Assembly Act respecting constitutional amendments , SC 1996, c. 1. [10] Art. 42, as art. 41 deals with amendments to the Constitution regarding matters ( matters ), while art. 43 and 44 refer to changes in provisions ( provisions ) of the Constitution. [11] Jacques-Yvan Morin and Jose Woehrling The constitutions of Canada and Quebec: the French regime to the present day , t. 1 "Studies", Montreal, Themis Publishing, 1994, p. 516. [12] Similarly, in Attorney General of Nova Scotia v.. Attorney General of Canada, [1951] SCR 31, 36, the interdelegation is discarded because it could allow Parliament and the legislatures to indirectly change the distribution of power without a constitutional amendment. In Ladore v. Bennett , [1939] AC 468, 474 (PC), the Privy Council said that about "government cannot do what it cannot do Indirectly Directly . " [13] See Articles 24, 26 and 32 of the Act constitutional, 1867 , Reference to the Upper House, supra, 77 .