UPDATED: A Tale of Two Document Dumps
December 7, 2009 10:45 AM Comments26Recommend27
By Kady O'Malley
Last Wednesday, those of us who are following the simmering controversy over Canada's past policies and practices in the handling of Afghan detainees were confronted by competing sets of previously unreleased documents from the government, and the Amnesty International/British Columbia Civil Liberties Association legal teams, respectively.
At first glance, it seemed that the two files were virtually identical, but a more thorough investigation revealed that the PDF posted by the BCCLA contained considerably more material than the one provided to the committee. Not all of it is directly relevant to the detainee controversy; there are memos from Richard Colvin on the challenges facing the Afghan National Police, as well as heavily-censored reports on the progress being made in Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan. Some of it, however, is: the flurry of email sparked by the Globe series, discussion on the need to improve the existing detainee transfer agreement, as well as other options, including taking fewer prisoners, or establishing a NATO-run holding facility, and even an exchange between Colvin and various military and foreign affairs officials on the protocol for handling minors.
So, why didn't any of that material make it into the binders that the government finally grudgingly handed over to the committee?
Because they didn't ask for it, that's why.
According to the minutes from the November 25 meeting, the committee requested that the government produce the following material:
All documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All documents within the Department of Foreign Affairs written in response to the documents referred to in the Affidavit of Richard Colvin, dated October 5, 2009;
All memoranda for information or memoranda for decision sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning detainees from December 18, 2005 to the present;
All documents produced pursuant to the orders of the Federal Court in Amnesty International and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and Attorney General of Canada;
All documents produced to the Military Police Complaints Commission in the Afghanistan Public Interest Hearings;
All annual human rights reports by the Department of Foreign Affairs on Afghanistan.
A subsequent motion added a deadline -- December 2, the date of the next scheduled meeting -- for the first item on the list, and when it rolled around, that's exactly what the government delivered: a binder containing every document referred to in the Colvin affidavit, and not one heavily redacted page more. Although the material released last week by Amnesty would, in theory, be covered by the request for documents produced in federal court, the committee neglected to set a date for that particular item, which is almost certainly why it hasn't yet been produced, and likely won't be until they tack on a deadline, and with just one meeting left before the House rises for the holidays, it seems unlikely that the committee will get their collective hands on the additional documents until February at the earliest.
What are they missing? Here's the full list of material found in the Amnesty file, but not the committee binder -- complete with page numbers, to make it easier to find.
UPDATE: You can now access the pages in smaller, more bite-sized PDF format.
Pages 5-9: September 9th 2006 email/report re KGBR0101/GSRP which references visit by then-defence minister O'Connor; also includes almost entirely blacked out summary of roundtable, as well as meeting between minister and Afghan officials, including Karzai - who "showed himself in strong form" and Afghan defence minister. Only bits left unblacked out involve praise for the work of Canadian soldiers.
Pages 14-20: October 15th email/report drafted by COLVIN re KGBRs 0125,0126 and 0104 on discussions with Afghan officials on the state of the Afghan National Police, which "remain largely unreconstructed." Details of the challenges facing the ANP, who "often end up as de facto first responders" including the statement that "in the south, the unhappy combination of high risk and low salary offer little incentive for a policeman" -- short blacked out bit here -- "As a result, in insurgent-heavy provinces such as Kandahar, many districts are believed to have very few police [CENSORED]." Also some heavily censored references to having had to isuse a "clarification" to the Police Act, which had been used by "some governors [LONGISH CENSORED BIT HERE]to assert control over the police within their province."
Pages 21-26: November 18th email drafted by COLVIN and SPROULE on FTAG0058 "on performance of 1 Nov 2006 international organizations in Afghanistan" and KANDH0070 of 13th November on [CENSORED]".Includes assessment of UNAMA staff in Kabul and field offices (noteably former Canadian ambassador turned Conservative candidate in waiting Chris Alexander, who is described as "a dynamic, high-profile and impressive personality, and one of the best connected internationalists in Afghanistan." Entire section on "Human Rights, Governance/Rule of Law/Corruption" blacked out. Also redacted in its entirety is the section on UNAMA's Kandahar office. One almost entirely censored section: "[CENSORED], who brings considerable institutional memory -- said that [FOUR LINES CENSORED]." The next point begins, "On the positive side [...]"
Pages 30-33: January 23, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0183 - Afghanistan: PAG - [CENSORED]. Discusses how the "Policy Action Group heard an exceptionally upbeat presentation [CENSORED]" on 20 January; Afghan participants included Afghan defence minister Abdurl Wardak, NDS security head Amrullah Saleh and "the deputy ministers of the interior, education and information" - also present were ambassadors and "equivalents" from the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, and, among others, Chris Alexander. At one point, someone "congratulated Saleh and Warda on GoA's accomplishments," followed by approximately twenty lines of blacked out text.
Pages 34-37: February 4, 2007 email/report drafted by COLVIN - KBGR0187 on "the Taliban spring offensive, ISAF, intelligence and Pakistan," which is, not surprisingly, almost entirely blacked out.
Pages 38-39: almost entirely redacted February 26 email from Colvin to Scott Proudfoot, among others, with the subject blacked out and this note: "KANDH: For Buchan and Fudge only"
Pages 40-44: KBGR0232, largely blacked-out report drafted by COLVIN on "Glyn Berry investigation, Meetings with [CENSORED]" Among the non-censored portions is an explanation of the difference between an NDS and a police investigation -- in this case, into the bombing that killed Berry -- and the NDS and criminal court system, which is almost entirely redacted.
Pages 45: April 14, 2007 email from "Marvin" (no last name given)RE: Upcoming Globe & Mail story on alleged NDS torture of detainees in Kandahar" that appears to be entirely unredacted, and in which Martin tells "Richard" that he spoke to "the media folks about this a few days ago," who told him that "the comms group under DMA had been informed and "are very much on the ball." It includes a forwarded email from Colvin alerting Elissa Goldberg, David Mulroney and others that Graeme Smith had told "us" that he had been conducting "extensive examinations in Kandahar" over the preceding two weeks into "the alleged torture of detainees by the National Directorate of Security ... including detainees transferred to NDS by Cdn forces." It quotes Smith as saying that some of the stories "are really terrible" and that "some of the Canadian involvement is too close for comfort."
Page 46: April 18, 2007 email drafted by COLVIN on "UNAMA in southern Afghanistan; Prospects for Afghanistan" that is almost completely blacked out
Page 52: April 23 email from COLVIN to RON HOFFMAN, cc'd to PROUDFOOT, on "Suggestions to address the detainee problem" with the designation "LDN: For Lalani" provides three recommendations, including "Canadian Forces, [CENSORED] approach, to take fewer detainees" and "Amend MOU (if political circumstances allow) to allow for Cdn followup monitoring," with some explanation of how that could be done. It concludes: "In our assessment, direct engagement by Cda is needed on this issue a) to respond, and be seen to respond, to concerns by the Cdn public and media, and [CENSORED}."
Page 53: April 23 email from COLVIN to Proudfood, Mulroney, COLLEEN SWORDS and others, under the subject "Re: Detainees: Urgent Demarche", reporting on his discussion with Ahmad Zia Langari, one of nine commissioners at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, to whom he delivered "the five bullets below." Langari told him that the commission "has faced problems of access to NDS facilities," and, as such, "is unable to monitor the condition of detainees, as per their agreements with the Canadians, Dutch and others" and has raised the issue "about 9 days ago with President Karzai," but the "access problem has not gone away." He notes that he has had a request in to meet with Saleh -- the head of NDS -- since April 17th on detainee handling issues and Glyn Berry," and is "awaiting confirmation of the appointment."
Pages 55-61: April 24, 2007 email from SWORDS of a fwded report from COLVIN, on which she is "copying BNATO on this msg as coordination with NATO is important aspect of how we deal with detainees as we move forward," and asking that "we automatically put them on distr detainee msgs so we can best integrate that angle." In the fwded email, Colvin discusses his request for an "urgent meeting with NDS," and suggests that they might also be able to meet with Karzai's chief of staff, "and possibly also Karzai himself." It also includes the full text of the April 24, 2007 Globe and Mail articles.
Page 64: KBGR0266, April 25, 2007 email from COLVIN to Mulroney, Swords, Buck and many others, in which he recommends that Canada, "for reasons of our own national interest, establish -- and announce that we are establishing -- a Canadian capacity to monitor, in both Kandahar and Kabul, the treatment of Afghan detainees following their transfer to Government of Afghanistan (GoA) control," as well as an attempt to limit the number of Afghans detained by Cdn forces and "handed to GoA," noting that "detainee methodologies in the field are too expansive, resulting in the detention of a significant number of Afghans who are not/not insurgents or combatants [CENSORED]"
Page 65: Aprul 25, 2007 email from COLVIN re: "Allied detention faciltiies," in which he notes that "[CENSORED] confirms they have never had bilateral discussions with [CENSORED] on a detention facility, which also includes a fwd of his own heavily redacted email to LAPORTE on the same topic. It notes that the UK, Canada and Belgium "have paid for the renovation of a wing of Pol-Charki for high-value CN prisoners," but that although it is complete,"because no high-value CN targets have been taken, it has not been operationalized."
Pages 106-107: KBGR0295 June 26, 2007 email from COLVIN on Senlis Council CEO Norine MacDnald "regarding the closure by the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) of Senlis's offices in Afghanistan," in which the lengthy background section is almost completely blacked out.
Page 108: June 30, 2007 email from "GAVIN" to COLVIN on "A question on the transfer of Minors," in which KEVIN REX notes that "the Commander has asked for "a ruling from DFAIT" on this one;" the writer acknowledges that "this is obviously not my forte," but says that he believes "we simply transder everyone to the NDS. I am not aware of any specific arrangements made for minors," nor can be find reference in the SOPS and MOU. Gavin tells Kevin to ask ELISSA GOLBERG, "with a c.c. to GHH (and FTAG, of course)" but nots tes that his "own two cents is that if we are clearly dealing with a minor, we should respect whatever Afhan law dictates in terms of institutions of detention," and if "that means transferring direct to Sarpoza and not to NDS, that's do-able -- logistically challenging, of course, but not impossible."
Page 111: July 4, 2007 email from COLVIN on "NDS facility in Kabul, Proposal for a Canadian renovation project" -- which, from the contents, seems to have been a request from NDS director Saleh whether Canada "would be interested in modernizing, rebuilding and expanding" the Sederat NDS facility in Kabul. It notes that, during interviews with prisoners, "none complained of abuse" but did speak of "poor living conditions," and notes that, although "an unorthodox project, we do not see any significant communications risks."
Pages 115-117: July 27, 2009 KBGR0306 - "Police update: EU police mission and MoI reform," almost entirely redacted, but does include recent developments in police recruitment, and "the future of the International Police Coordination Board."
Pages 121-125: October 24, 2007 - Colvin's unsent end-of-posting observations
