Tuesday, December 20, 2016

the UK Supreme Court case information regarding the Article 50 Brexit protocol. Basic question, do you need to get Parliament's OK before triggering Article 50 procedures?



the UK Supreme Court case information regarding the Article 50 Brexit protocol. Basic question, do you need to get Parliament's OK before triggering Article 50 procedures? Info link here


https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/article-50-brexit-appeal.html
The second link is the web cast of the proceedings. They had to break it up into multiple sections because of the sheer volume of the interested parties. I will leave the link to that here as well

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2016-0196.html
The set up of the Supreme Court of the UK looks extremely familiar. Little known fact, we helped the UK set it up. They used Canada, New Zealand and Australia as a template.

Monday, November 21, 2016

For those still interested in moving out of the United States, I wouldn't procrastinate.

For those still interested in moving out of the United States, I wouldn't procrastinate. I'd start packing now while you still have a rational president. After January 20th, 2017, I don't know what is going to happen. Hopefully, you have already filled out an application to begin the immigration process to whichever country you want to move to. This process takes time. The process may take less time if you are married to or have a significant other of the same nationality of the country you are moving to. And then there is Trump's pick of VP, Mike Pence who is about as anti-LGBTQ2+ as you could get. I post this note now because today we learned that the eldest members of the Trump family will have a better than top secret security clearance and a white nationalist has been given the job of White House Chief Strategist. Complacency is not your friend.

Sunday, October 16, 2016

Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery problems From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery problems
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


The grounded Japan Airlines 787 at Boston Logan Airport
In the Boeing 787 Dreamliner's first year of service, at least four aircraft suffered from electrical system problems stemming from its lithium-ion batteries. Although teething problems are common within the first year of a new aircraft design's life, after a number of incidents including an electrical fire aboard an All Nippon Airways 787, and a similar fire found by maintenance workers on a landed Japan Airlines 787 at Boston's Logan International Airport, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered a review into the design and manufacture of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, following five incidents in five days involving the aircraft, mostly involved with problems with the batteries and electrical systems. This was followed with a full grounding of the entire Boeing 787 fleet, the first such grounding since that of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 in 1979.[1] The plane has had two major battery thermal runaway events in 52,000 flight hours, which was substantially less than the 10 million flight hours predicted by Boeing, neither of which were contained in a safe manner.[2]

The National Transportation Safety Board released a report on December 1, 2014, and assigned blame to several groups:[3]

GS Yuasa of Japan, for battery manufacturing methods that could introduce defects not caught by inspection
Boeing’s engineers, who failed to consider and test for worst-case battery failures
The Federal Aviation Administration, that failed to recognize the potential hazard and did not require proper tests as part of its certification process
Contents  [hide]
1 Timeline
2 Groundings
3 Solution
4 See also
5 References
Timeline
In December 2012, Boeing CEO James McNerney told media outlets that the problems were no greater than those experienced by the company with the introduction of other new models, such as the Boeing 777.[4] However, on January 7, 2013, a battery overheated and started a fire in an empty 787 operated by Japan Airlines (JAL) at Boston's Logan International Airport.[5][6] On January 9, United Airlines reported a problem in one of its six 787s with the wiring located in the same area as where the battery fire occurred on JAL's airliner; subsequently, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board opened a safety probe.[7]

On January 11, 2013, the FAA announced a comprehensive review of the 787's critical systems, including the design, manufacture and assembly of the aircraft. U.S. Department of Transportation secretary Ray LaHood stated the administration was "looking for the root causes" behind the recent issues. The head of the FAA, Michael Huerta, said that so far nothing found "suggests [the 787] is not safe".[8] Japan's transport ministry also launched an investigation in response.[9]

On January 16, 2013, an All Nippon Airways (ANA) 787 made an emergency landing at Takamatsu Airport on Shikoku Island after the flight crew received a computer warning of smoke present inside one of the electrical compartments.[10][11] ANA said that there was an error message in the cockpit citing a battery malfunction. Passengers and crew were evacuated using the emergency slides.[12] According to The Register, there are no fire-suppression systems in the electrical compartments holding batteries, only smoke detectors.[13]

US-based aviation regulators' oversight into the 2007 safety approval and FAA certification of the 787 has now come under scrutiny, as a key US Senate committee prepares for a hearing into the procedures of aviation safety certification "in coming weeks". However, an FAA spokesperson defended their 2007 safety certification of the 787 by saying, "the whole aviation system is designed so that if the worst case happens, there are systems in place to prevent that from interfering with other systems on the plane".[14]

On February 12, 2013 the Wall Street Journal reported that "Aviation safety investigators are examining whether the formation of microscopic structures known as dendrites inside the Boeing Co. 787's lithium-ion batteries played a role in twin incidents that prompted the fleet to be grounded nearly a month ago."[15]

On January 14, 2014, Japan Airlines said a maintenance crew at Narita Airport discovered smoke coming from the main battery of one of its Boeing 787 jets, two hours before the plane was due to fly to Bangkok from Tokyo. Maintenance workers found smoke and unidentified liquid coming from the main battery, and alarms in the cockpit indicated faults with the power pack and its charger. The airline said no other equipment was affected by the incident. The cause was not immediately known, and the airline is investigating the incident.[16]

In January 2014, a battery in a Japanese Airlines 787 emitted smoke from the battery's protection exhaust and partially melted while the aircraft was undergoing pre-flight maintenance. The cause of this latest incident remains under investigation.[17][18][19] Soon after this incident, the Guardian noted that 'The agency [US Federal Aviation Administration] also launched a review of the design, manufacture and assembly of the 787 in January last year and said its report would be released last summer, but it has so far not released the report and has not responded to questions about when it will be finished.'[20]

Groundings
On January 16, 2013, both major Japanese airlines ANA and JAL announced that they were voluntarily grounding or suspending flights for their fleets of 787s after multiple incidents involving different 787s, including emergency landings. These two carriers operated 24 of the 50 Dreamliners delivered to that date.[21][22] It was estimated the grounding could cost ANA over $1.1 million a day.[23]

Wikinews has related news: FAA orders review of Boeing 787 Dreamliners following week of incidents
On January 16, 2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an emergency airworthiness directive ordering all U.S.-based airlines to ground their Boeing 787s until yet-to-be-determined modifications were made to the electrical system to reduce the risk of the battery overheating or catching fire.[24] This was the first time that the FAA had grounded an airliner type since 1979.[1] The FAA also announced plans to conduct an extensive review of the 787's critical systems. The focus of the review was on the safety of the lithium-ion batteries[1] that use lithium cobalt oxide(LiCoO2) as the positive electrode. These electrodes are known for their thermal runaway hazard and provide oxygen for a fire. The 787 battery contract was signed in 2005,[25] when LiCoO2 batteries were the only type of lithium aerospace battery available, but since then newer and safer[26] types (such as LiFePO4) and LiMn2O4 (Lithium Manganate), which provide less reaction energy during thermal runaway, have become available.[27][28] The FAA approved a 787 battery in 2007 with nine "special conditions".[29][30] A battery approved by the FAA (through Mobile Power Solutions) was made by Rose Electronics using Kokam cells,[31] but the batteries installed in the 787 were made by Yuasa.[32]


Three All Nippon Airways 787 aircraft grounded at Tokyo on January 27, 2013
On January 20, the NTSB declared that overvoltage was not the cause of the Boston incident, as voltage did not exceed the battery limit of 32 V,[33] and the charging unit passed tests. The battery had signs of short circuiting and thermal runaway.[34] Despite this, on January 24 the NTSB announced that it had not yet pinpointed the cause of the Boston fire; the FAA would not allow U.S.-based Dreamliners to fly again until the problem was found and corrected. In a press briefing that day, NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said that the NTSB had found evidence of failure of multiple safety systems designed to prevent these battery problems, and stated that fire must never happen on an aircraft.[35] The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) has said on January 23 that the battery in ANA jets in Japan reached a maximum voltage of 31 V (lower than the 32 V limit like the Boston JAL 787), but had a sudden unexplained voltage drop[36] to near zero.[37] All cells had signs of thermal damage before thermal runaway.[38] ANA and JAL had replaced several 787 batteries before the mishaps.[37] As of January 29, 2013, JTSB approved the Yuasa factory quality control[39][40][41] while the American NTSB continues to look for defects in the Boston battery.[42]

Industry experts disagreed on consequences of the grounding: Boeing's competitor Airbus was confident that Boeing would resolve the issue[43] and that no airlines would switch to a different type of aircraft,[44] while other experts saw the problem as "costly"[45] and "could take upwards of a year".[46]

Only two U.S.-based airlines operated the Dreamliner at the time – United Airlines and American Airlines.[47] Chile's Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC) grounded LAN Airlines' three 787s.[48] The Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) directed Air India to ground its six Dreamliners. The Japanese Transport Ministry made the ANA and JAL groundings official and indefinite following the FAA announcement.[49] The European Aviation Safety Agency also followed the FAA's advice and grounded the only two European 787s, operated by LOT Polish Airlines.[50] Qatar Airways announced it was grounding its five Dreamliners.[51] Ethiopian Air was the final operator to announce temporary groundings, of its four Dreamliners.[52]

As of January 17, 2013, all 50 of the aircraft were grounded.[52][53][54] On January 18, Boeing announced that it was halting 787 deliveries until the battery problem was resolved.[55] On February 4, 2013, the FAA permitted Boeing to conduct test flights of 787 aircraft to gather additional data.[56]

Solution
Ambox current red.svg
This section needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (August 2016)
The Federal Aviation Administration decided on April 19, 2013 to allow US Dreamliners to return to service after changes were made to their battery systems to better contain battery fires.[57] Japanese authorities announced they were doing the same for their airplanes. The causes of the battery failures are still unknown. There is still concern that because the root cause of the fires were not identified, the solutions put in place by Boeing will not be able to cover the full range of possible failure modes. These include problems that may arise from poor systems integration between the engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) and the battery management system [58]

In December 2014 the NTSB criticized the FAA, Boeing and the battery manufacturer for the faults,[59][60][61][62][63][64] as well as the performance of the flight data recorder.[65] The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau wants Boeing to redesign the battery.[66]

See also
Aviation portal
Lithium Ion Batteries and Safety
Lithium Cobalt Oxide - LiCoO2
Plug-in electric vehicle fire incidents (related to lithium-ion batteries)
UPS Airlines Flight 6, a crash caused by the thermal runaway of its lithium-ion battery cargo.
References[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b c "Dreamliner: Boeing 787 planes grounded on safety fears". BBC News. January 17, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Accident: ANA B788 near Takamatsu on Jan 16th 2013, battery problem and burning smell on board". Aviation Herald. Retrieved February 8, 2013.
Jump up ^ Mouawad, Jad (December 1, 2014). "Report on Boeing 787 Dreamliner Batteries Assigns Some Blame for Flaws". The New York Times. Retrieved 1 Dec 2014.
Jump up ^ "Boeing: Problems with 787 Dreamliner "Normal"". Frequent Business Traveler. December 16, 2012. Retrieved December 16, 2012.
Jump up ^ "Fire aboard empty 787 Dreamliner prompts investigation". CNN. January 8, 2013. Retrieved January 8, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Second faulty Boeing Dreamliner in Boston". BBC. January 8, 2013. Retrieved January 8, 2013.
Jump up ^ "U.S. Opens Dreamliner Safety Probe". The Wall Street Journal. January 9, 2013. Retrieved January 9, 2013.
Jump up ^ Topham, Gwyn (January 11, 2013). "Boeing 787 Dreamliner to be investigated by US authorities". The Guardian. London. Retrieved January 11, 2013.
Jump up ^ Mukai, Anna (January 15, 2013). "Japan to Investigate Boeing 787 Fuel Leak as FAA Reviews". Bloomberg. Retrieved January 20, 2013.
Jump up ^ "全日空B787型機から煙 乗客避難・高松空港". NHK. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Top Japan airlines ground Boeing 787s after emergency". BBC. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "A Boeing 787 plane makes an emergency landing in Japan". BBC. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ Iain Thomson (25 January 2013). "Boeing 787 fleet grounded indefinitely as investigators stumped". The Register. Retrieved 8 February 2013.
Jump up ^ "Boeing 787's battery woes put US approval under scrutiny". Business Standard. 2013-01-23. Retrieved 2013-02-22.
Jump up ^ Ostrower, Jon (2013-02-11). "Microscopic 'Dendrites' a Focus in Boeing Dreamliner Probe - WSJ.com". Online.wsj.com. Retrieved 2013-02-22.
Jump up ^ "Japan Airlines: Smoke seen coming from Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery". CBS News. 2014-01-14. Retrieved 2014-01-14.
Jump up ^ "Boeing 787 aircraft grounded after battery problem in Japan". BBC News. January 14, 2014. Retrieved January 16, 2014.
Jump up ^ "No damage to JAL 787 in battery incident". Flight International. January 15, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2014.
Jump up ^ {url=http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/01/16/us_safety_authorities_on_boeings_case_787_batteries_fail/}
Jump up ^ "Japan Airlines Boeing 787 grounded after battery leaks and lets off smoke". The Guardian. Retrieved 15 January 2014.
Jump up ^ "Japanese airlines ground Boeing 787s after emergency landing". Reuters. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ McCurry, Justin (January 16, 2013). "787 emergency landing: Japan grounds entire Boeing Dreamliner fleet". The Guardian. London. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Boeing Dreamliners grounded worldwide on battery checks". Reuters. January 17, 2013. Retrieved January 21, 2013.
Jump up ^ "FAA Press Release". Federal Aviation Administration. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Thales selects GS Yuasa for Lithium ion battery system in Boeing's 787 Dreamliner" (PDF). GS Yuasa. Retrieved January 18, 2013.
Jump up ^ Dudley, Brier (January 17, 2013). "Lithium-ion batteries pack a lot of energy — and challenges". The Seattle Times. Retrieved January 24, 2013. iron phosphate “has been known to sort of be safer.”
Jump up ^ Dalløkken, Per Erlien (January 17, 2013). "Her er Dreamliner-problemet" (in Norwegian). Teknisk Ukeblad. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Energy storage technologies - Lithium". Securaplane. Retrieved January 24, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787– 8 Airplane; Lithium Ion Battery Installation" (PDF). Federal Aviation Administration / Federal Register. October 11, 2007. Retrieved January 30, 2013. NM375 Special Conditions No. 25–359–SC
Jump up ^ Alwyn Scott and Mari Saito. "FAA approval of Boeing 787 battery under scrutiny". NBC News / Reuters. Retrieved January 24, 2013.
Jump up ^ Supko / Iverson (2011). "Li battery UN test report applicability" (PDF). NextGov. Retrieved January 23, 2013.
Jump up ^ Brewin, Bob (January 22, 2013). "A 2006 BATTERY FIRE DESTROYED BOEING 787 SUPPLIER'S FACILITY". NextGov. Retrieved January 23, 2013.
Jump up ^ Nantel, Kelly (January 20, 2013). "NTSB Provides Third Investigative Update on Boeing 787 Battery Fire in Boston". NTSB. Retrieved January 21, 2013.
Jump up ^ "NTSB Press Release". NTSB. January 26, 2013. Retrieved January 24, 2013.
Jump up ^ Matthew Wald; Jad Mouwad (2013-01-25). "Protracted Fire Inquiry Keeping 787 on Ground". New York Times. Retrieved 2013-01-26.
Jump up ^ Mitra-Thakur, Sofia (January 23, 2013). "Japan says 787 battery was not overcharged". Engineering & Technology. Retrieved January 23, 2013.
^ Jump up to: a b CHRISTOPHER DREW, HIROKO TABUCHI and JAD MOUAWAD (January 29, 2013). "Boeing 787 Battery Was a Concern Before Failure". The New York Times. Retrieved January 30, 2013.
Jump up ^ Hradecky, Simon (Feb 5, 2013). "ANA B788 near Takamatsu on Jan 16th 2013, battery problem and burning smell on board". Aviation Herald. Retrieved Feb 6, 2013.
Jump up ^ "JTSB report JA804A" (Archive). Japan Transport Safety Board - See Japanese version (Archive) (The Japanese version is the version of record, and it prevails in case of any differences between it and the English version) and "航空重大インシデント調査報告書説明資料" (Archive).
Jump up ^ TABUCHI, HIROKO (January 28, 2013). "No Quality Problems Found at Battery Maker for 787". The New York Times. Retrieved January 30, 2013.
Jump up ^ Chris Cooper and Kiyotaka Matsuda (January 28, 2013). "GS Yuasa Shares Surge as Japan Ends Company Inspections". BusinessWeek. Retrieved January 29, 2013.
Jump up ^ Knudson, Peter (29 January 2013). "NTSB issues sixth update on JAL Boeing 787 battery fire investigation". NTSB. Retrieved 29 January 2013.
Jump up ^ "Airbus CEO `Confident' Boeing Will Find Fix for 787" Bloomberg, January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ Robert Wall & Andrea Rothman (January 17, 2013). "Airbus Says A350 Design Is 'Lower Risk' Than Troubled 787". Bloomberg. Retrieved January 17, 2013. “I don’t believe that anyone’s going to switch from one airplane type to another because there’s a maintenance issue,” Leahy said. “Boeing will get this sorted out.”
Jump up ^ "`Big Cost' Seen for Boeing Dreamliner Grounding" Bloomberg, January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ White, Martha C. "Is the Dreamliner Becoming a Financial Nightmare for Boeing?" TIME magazine, January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "FAA grounding all Boeing 787s". KIRO TV. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "LAN suspende de forma temporal la operación de flota Boeing 787 Dreamliner". La Tercera. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "DGCA directs Air India to ground all six Boeing Dreamliners on safety concerns". The Economic Times. January 17, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "European safety agency to ground 787 in line with FAA". Reuters. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Qatar Airways grounds Boeing Dreamliner fleet". Reuters. January 17, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
^ Jump up to: a b "U.S., others ground Boeing Dreamliner indefinitely". Reuters. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Boeing's 787 Dreamliner". Reuters. January 16, 2013. Retrieved January 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ Boeing 787 Dreamliner: The impact of safety concerns. BBC News. January 17, 2013. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
Jump up ^ "BBC News - Dreamliner crisis: Boeing halts 787 jet deliveries". Bbc.co.uk. January 1, 1970. Retrieved January 20, 2013.
Jump up ^ "FAA approves test flights for Boeing 787". Seatle PI. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
Jump up ^ Drew, Christopher; Mouawad, Jad (April 19, 2013). "Boeing Fix for Battery Is Approved by F.A.A.". The New York Times. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
Jump up ^ Williard, He, Hendricks, Pecht, "Lessons Learned from the 787 Dreamliner Issue on Lithium-Ion Battery Reliability" Energies 2013, 6, 4682-4695; doi:10.3390/en6094682
Jump up ^ Knudson, Peter. "NTSB Recommends Process Improvements for Certifying Lithium-ion Batteries as it Concludes its Investigation of the 787 Boston Battery Fire Incident" NTSB, 1 December 2014.
Jump up ^ Hemmerdinger, Jon (1 December 2014), "NTSB faults Boeing, FAA and contractors for 787 battery fire", Flightglobal, Reed Business Information, archived from the original on 2 December 2014, retrieved 2 December 2014
Jump up ^ Hemmerdinger, Jon (1 December 2014), "Temperature in 787 battery cells spikes in cold conditions: NTSB", Flightglobal, Reed Business Information, archived from the original on 2 December 2014, retrieved 2 December 2014
Jump up ^ Hemmerdinger, Jon (1 December 2014), "NTSB 787 battery report details quality concerns at GS Yuasa", Flightglobal, Reed Business Information, archived from the original on 2 December 2014, retrieved 2 December 2014
Jump up ^ Gallagher, Sean. "NTSB blames bad battery design—and bad management—in Boeing 787 fires" Ars Technica, 2 December 2014.
Jump up ^ Croft, John. "NTSB 787 Battery Recommendations Focus On Processes, Quality, Oversight" Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 December 2014. Accessed: 3 December 2014. Archived on 3 December 2014
Jump up ^ Hemmerdinger, Jon (2 December 2014), "NTSB details issues with 787 flight and data recorder", Flightglobal, Reed Business Information, archived from the original on 2 December 2014, retrieved 2 December 2014
Jump up ^ Trimble, Stephen (29 December 2014), "Japan presses Boeing to redesign 787 battery", Flightglobal, Reed Business Information, archived from the original on 30 December 2014, retrieved 30 December 2014

Monday, September 19, 2016

Patrick Brown (politician) Political views


Political views

Brown characterizes himself as a 'pragmatic conservative' and has noted his limited support from labour unions.[citation needed]


During his Ontario PC Party leadership campaign, Brown was noted for his social conservatism,[2][3] and his criticism of Ontario's sex education in schools.[4] However, since his victory he has been successful in pushing the Ontario PC Party towards the "political centre." [5] Patrick Brown would go on to become the first Ontario PC Leader to march in the Toronto Pride Parade.[6] At his first Ontario PC Convention as Leader, Brown boldly affirmed his belief in anthropogenic climate change and announced his support for a revenue-neutral price on carbon.[7]


His new progressivism, stands in contrast to his voting record from a decade ago. In December 2006, as an MP, Brown voted to repeal same-sex marriage in Canada.[2][8] Brown also voted against several bills between 2011 and 2013, which were aimed at amending the Canadian Human Rights Act to include gender expression and identity, and the Criminal Code, to prevent discrimination.[9] On September 26, 2012, Brown voted in favour of Stephen Woodworth's private member's bill to create a special committee to examine the legal definition of when a fetus becomes a human being,[10] which many argued would reopen the abortion debate in Canada. Brown did so, even though then Prime Minister Stephen Harper voted against the bill and said that Canadians did not want to reopen the abortion debate.[11][12] Since becoming Ontario's Progressive Conservative party leader, Brown has stated that it's not a provincial issue, and doesn't intend to revisit it in the Ontario Legislature.[13]


Patrick Brown's first Private Member's Bill in the Ontario Legislature, Bill 151 the Estate Administration Tax Abolition Act, was an attempt to eliminate the death tax.[14] His bill was voted down at Second Reading by the Liberal Government's majority.


His critics have called him 'policy-lite' since he made no policy statements during the Progressive Conservative leadership campaign.[15] Since winning the leadership race, he has focused his plan on four main issues which he suggests will lead to a more "prosperous province"; less red tape, improved transportation corridors, affordable energy, and addressing Ontario's growing skills gap.[16]


Municipal politics
Brown was elected to the Barrie City Council in 2000 at age 22 while still a student, becoming the youngest councillor ever elected to the Barrie City Council. He defeated the incumbent councillor. He was re-elected in 2003 with 72 percent of the vote.


Brown was seen as a very active member of council, serving on various Committees, including the Budget Committee. Brown's primary focus while on council was health care, despite it being a provincial responsibility. In response to a shortage of doctors, Brown founded the Physician Recruitment Task Force with the Royal Victoria Hospital to help attract more doctors to Barrie.[17]


Federal politics
In the 2004 federal election, Brown ran as the Conservative Party candidate in the riding of Barrie. He lost to incumbent Aileen Carroll by 1,295 votes.[18] Brown ran again in 2006 this time defeating Carroll by 1,523 votes.[19] He was re-elected in the 2008 election by 15,295 votes over Liberal candidate Rick Jones.[20]


In November 2010, the Canadian Taxpayers Federation expressed concern about how Patrick Brown used his Canadian House of Commons account. He sent flyers to his riding which included a letter of support and a flyer from Barrie City Councillor Michael Prowse. Brown used his House of Commons account to pay for the mailing because Michael Prowse could not afford to send the flyer out himself.[21]


In the 2011 election, Brown was elected to his third term in office.[22]


On September 28, 2014, he announced his intention to run in the 2015 Ontario party leadership election. He registered as a leadership candidate on November 20, 2014. He said that, unlike the other candidates, he was not involved in the four consecutive losses that have kept the Ontario PCs out of power since 2003.[23] Fellow Ontario MP Rick Dykstra endorsed him.[24]


Provincial politics
See also: Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario leadership election, 2015
In September 2014, Brown announced his intention to run in the contest to replace PC Party Leader, Tim Hudak. From the outset of his campaign, Brown positioned himself as an outsider, challenging the leadership of the PC Party, which had been defeated in the last four provincial elections. In the most recent election campaign, in 2014, the party election platform included a commitment to "cut 100,000 government jobs". As the only one of the original five leadership candidates who was not a member of the Ontario legislature, Brown claimed not to have been involved in the promise, which he considered "ill-advised",[23][25] despite attending the announcement in his home riding.[26] Brown's rivals attempted to use this same lack of previous involvement in provincial politics as an argument against his leadership bid.[27][28]


In March, Brown emerged as the front-runner in the leadership election, having sold over 40,000 of the 70,000 memberships in the party.[29][30][31][32] During the campaign, Brown was successful in bringing many new members to the party. The past four leadership contests had been won by those who sold the most memberships.[33]


Brown was endorsed by the Campaign Life Coalition and the Ontario Landowners Association.[34][35] During Brown's leadership bid both special interest groups actively supported him by selling Ontario PC Party memberships amongst their members.[36][37]


Brown was criticized by his rivals and in the media for not resigning his federal seat during the leadership campaign.[38] Brown was frequently absent from the House of Commons for votes during the leadership campaign and had one of the worst voting attendance records in the Conservative Party caucus and of any MP between September to December 2014.[39] A spokesperson for Prime Minister Stephen Harper confirmed that members aren't expected to step down but are expected to "continue to fulfill their parliamentary responsibilities, including membership on committees and attendance at votes."[40]


The campaign started with five candidates including Vic Fedeli, Lisa MacLeod, and Monte McNaughton. All three withdrew in early 2015 citing membership recruitment or financial reasons. On May 9, 2015, Brown was elected leader, defeating his only remaining opponent, Christine Elliott, winning with 61.8% of the membership vote.[41][42]


Brown, who resigned his seat in the House of Commons on May 13, 2015, days after winning the provincial leadership, led the Progressive Conservative party from outside the legislature during most of the summer.[43] On July 22, 2015, Garfield Dunlop agreed to step down as MPP for Simcoe North on August 1 in order to open up a seat for Brown. A provincial by-election, called for September 3, 2015, was won by Brown.[44][45][46]


Electoral record


ntario provincial by-election, September 3, 2015: Simcoe North
Resignation of Garfield Dunlop
Party Candidate Votes % ∆%
Progressive Conservative Patrick Brown 21,095 53.68 +9.74
Liberal Fred Larsen 9,281 23.62 –8.90
New Democratic Elizabeth Van Houtte 6,637 16.89 +1.34
Green Valerie Powell 1,791 4.56 –3.43
New Reform James Gault 200 0.51
People's Political Party Kevin Clarke 146 0.37
Libertarian Darren Roskam 104 0.26
Pauper John Turmel 47 0.12
Total valid votes 39,301 100.0
Total rejected, unmarked and declined ballots 170 0.43
Turnout 39,471 40.71
Eligible voters 96,950
Progressive Conservative hold Swing +9.32
Source(s) [show]
[hide]Canadian federal election, 2011
Party Candidate Votes % ∆% Expenditures
Conservative Patrick Brown 32,121 56.69 +4.32
New Democratic Myrna Clark 11,846 20.91 +8.90
Liberal Colin Wilson 9,111 16.08 -7.80
Green Erich Jacoby-Hawkins 3,271 5.77 -5.33
Libertarian Darren Roskam 150 0.26 -0.23
Marxist–Leninist Christine Nugent 82 0.14 -0.02
Canadian Action Jeff Sakula 77 0.14
Total valid votes/Expense limit 56,651 100.00
Total rejected ballots 174 0.31
Turnout 56,825 60.70
Conservative hold Swing -2.29
[hide]Canadian federal election, 2008
Party Candidate Votes % ∆% Expenditures
Conservative Patrick Brown 27,927 52.37 +10.5 $91,512
Liberal Rick Jones 12,732 23.88 -15.3 $80,023
New Democratic Myrna Clark 6,403 12.01 -0.2 $16,038
Green Erich Jacoby-Hawkins 5,921 11.10 +4.3 $58,204
Libertarian Paolo Fabrizio 260 0.49 N/A $171
Marxist–Leninist Christine Anne Nugent 84 0.16 N/A $0
Total valid votes/Expense limit 53,327 100 $92,671
[hide]Canadian federal election, 2006
Party Candidate Votes % ∆% Expenditures
Conservative Patrick Brown 23,999 41.88 +1.8 $81,530
Liberal Aileen Carroll 22,476 39.18 -3.5 $69,313
New Democratic Peter Bursztyn 6,984 12.18 +1.5 $14,496
Green Erich Jacoby-Hawkins 3,874 6.76 +0.2 $19,036
[hide]Canadian federal election, 2004
Party Candidate Votes %
Liberal Aileen Carroll 21,233 42.7
Conservative Patrick Brown 19,938 40.1
New Democratic Peter Bursztyn 5,312 10.7
Green Erich Jacoby-Hawkins 3,288 6.6
References[edit]
Jump up ^ [1]
^ Jump up to: a b Hébert, Chantal (May 11, 2015). "Is Patrick Brown as socially conservative as he appears". Toronto Star.
Jump up ^ "Ontario PCs failing in sex-ed debate", Toronto Star, Feb 25 2015.
Jump up ^ Fisher, Robert (2015-05-09). "Patrick Brown must reach out beyond PC Party faithful to challenge Liberals". CBC News. Retrieved 2015-05-11.
Jump up ^ Benzie, Robert. "Patrick Brown pulls Ontario Tories towards political centre". The Star. Toronto Star. Retrieved 4 June 2016.
Jump up ^ Taber, Jane. "Why Ontario PC Leader Patrick Brown embraced Pride". The Globe and Mail. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 4 June 2016.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown says he supports putting a price on carbon". CBC.ca. The Canadian Press.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown says Ontario PC 'establishment' to blame for recent losses". May 5, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown's Federal Voting Record".
Jump up ^ "Vote #466 on September 26th, 2012". Retrieved 3 October 2012.
Jump up ^ Payton, Laura (September 21, 2012). "'Human being' motion excuse to open abortion debate, MPs say". CBC News.
Jump up ^ Payton, Laura (September 26, 2012). "Motion to study when life begins defeated in Parliament". CBC News.
Jump up ^ Matys, Frank (April 21, 2015). "Patrick Brown: From long shot to front runner". Barrie Advance.
Jump up ^ Artuso, Antonella. "PC leader moves to kill death tax in Ontario". Toronto Sun. Toronto Sun. Retrieved 4 June 2016.
Jump up ^ Taber, Jane (May 10, 2015). "New Ontario PC leader Patrick Brown focused on uniting party". The Globe and Mail.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown - Canadian Club of Toronto". Canadian Club of Toronto. Retrieved 4 June 2016.
Jump up ^ Watt, Laurie (Feb 12, 2006). "MP Brown off to Ottawa 'to make Barrie better'". Huntsville Forester.
Jump up ^ "Election results...riding by riding". The Globe and Mail. June 29, 2004. p. A14.
Jump up ^ "Election results...riding by riding". The Globe and Mail. January 24, 2006. p. A16.
Jump up ^ "Ontario Results". The Toronto Star. October 15, 2008. p. U2.
Jump up ^ Raj, Althia (2010-11-14). "Call for review of MPs' mailing privileges". Toronto Sun. Retrieved 2010-12-03.
Jump up ^ Bowe, Raymond (May 3, 2011). "Brown wins third term". Barrie Examiner. Retrieved 2015-03-25.
^ Jump up to: a b "Tory MP Patrick Brown joins Ontario PC leadership race". 2014-09-28. Retrieved 2015-03-25.
Jump up ^ "Rick Dykstra will not seek Ontario PC leadership bid". News Talk 610 CKTB Radio. September 12, 2014. Retrieved 2015-03-25.
Jump up ^ Morrow, Adrian (September 28, 2014). "Brown launches bid for Ontario PC leadership, promises 'fresh start'". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ Benzie, Robert; Ferguson, Rob; Brennan, Richard J. (May 9, 2015). "Patrick Brown wins Ontario PC leadership". Toronto Star. Retrieved May 10, 2015.
Jump up ^ Benzie, Robert (February 11, 2015). "Sparks fly at PC Debate over Patrick Brown's lack of a seat". Toronto Star. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ McInroy, Ian (September 28, 2014). "Brown seeking Ontario PC leadership". Barrie Examiner. Retrieved March 3, 2015.
Jump up ^ Benzie, Robert; Ferguson, Rob (March 1, 2015). "Patrick Brown sells more than 40,000 Ontario PC memberships". Toronto Star. Retrieved April 4, 2015.
Jump up ^ Chase, Sean (2015-03-29). "Patrick Brown promises to reset PC party". Daily Observer. Retrieved 2015-04-27.
Jump up ^ Maloney, Ryan (April 14, 2015). "Patrick Brown Leads Christine Elliott In Ontario PC leadership race, poll suggests". The Huffington Post Canada. Retrieved April 27, 2015.
Jump up ^ Matys, Frank (April 21, 2015). "Patrick Brown: From long shot to front runner". Barrie Advance. Retrieved April 27, 2015.
Jump up ^ Benzie, Robert; Ferguson, Rob (March 1, 2015). "Patrick Brown sells more than 40,000 Ontario PC memberships". Toronto Star. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown wins Ontario PC leadership". Toronto Star. May 9, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Ontario PCs pick a pro-lifer to lead their rebirth". Toronto Star. May 9, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Ontario Progressive Conservatives to crown new leader". Innisfil Examiner. May 9, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Ontario PC Leadership Endorsement by CLC". Campaign Life Coalition. January 29, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Christine Elliott says she didn't know specifics of job cut plan". February 12, 2015. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ Fekete, Jason (January 16, 2015). "Ontario PC leadership contender Patrick Brown has spotty voting attendance in Commons". Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ O'Malley, Kady (January 22, 2015). "Patrick Brown does double duty as MP and Ontario PC leadership contender". CBC News. Retrieved March 26, 2015.
Jump up ^ Elliot, Josh (May 9, 2015). "Patrick Brown elected leader of Ontario PC party". CTVNews.ca. Retrieved May 9, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Patrick Brown wins Ontario PC leadership race". CBC News. 2015-05-10. Retrieved 2015-05-10.
Jump up ^ "Barrie MP Patrick Brown resigns seat as he shifts to lead provincial PCs". Ottawa Citizen. May 13, 2015. Retrieved May 14, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Ontario PC leader Patrick Brown seeking seat in Simcoe North riding". Globe and Mail. July 22, 2015. Retrieved July 22, 2015.
Jump up ^ "PC Leader Patrick Brown projected to win in Simcoe North byelection". CBC News. September 3, 2015. Retrieved September 3, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Wynne changes course, gives PC leader chance to run in early byelection". Toronto Star. Retrieved August 2, 2015.
External links[edit]
Ontario Legislative Assembly Parliamentarian History
Patrick Brown – Parliament of Canada biography
Speeches, votes and activity at OpenParliament.ca

Monday, August 8, 2016

Emirates Flight 521 3 August 2016

Emirates Flight 521
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Emirates Flight 521
Boeing 777-31H, Emirates AN1633283.jpg
A6-EMW, the aircraft involved in the accident, pictured in 2009 at Dubai International Airport
Accident summary
Date 3 August 2016
Summary Crashed during go-around attempt, fire, under investigation
Site Dubai International Airport
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Runway 12L
Passengers 282
Crew 18
Injuries (non-fatal) 14[1][2]
Fatalities 1 (firefighter)[1][3]
Survivors 300 (all)
Aircraft type Boeing 777-300
Operator Emirates
Registration A6-EMW
Flight origin Trivandrum International Airport
Thiruvananthapuram, India
Destination Dubai International Airport
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Emirates Flight 521 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Thiruvananthapuram, India, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates,[4] operated by Emirates using a Boeing 777-300.[5] On 3 August 2016, the aircraft carrying 282 passengers[6] and 18 crew[7] crashed upon landing at Dubai International Airport, at approximately 12:45 local time.[8][9]

All 300 people on board survived the accident and were evacuated from the aircraft. Thirteen injuries were reported; ten of those injured were taken to a local hospital, while the remaining three received treatment at the airport.[10] An airport firefighter died during the rescue operation.[3] This accident was the first hull loss of an aircraft operated by Emirates airlines.[11]

Contents  [hide]
1 Aircraft
2 Flight
3 Passengers and crew
4 Investigation
5 Aftermath
6 References
7 External links
Aircraft
The aircraft involved was a 13-year-old Boeing 777-31H with the registration A6-EMW, serial number 434. It made its first flight on 7 March 2003. It was delivered new to Emirates on 28 March 2003 and was equipped with two Rolls-Royce Trent 892 engines.[12]

Flight
On 3 August 2016, Flight EK521 took off from Trivandrum International Airport (TRV) at 10:34 IST (05:04 UTC), 29 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It was scheduled to land at Dubai International Airport (DXB) at 12:24 GST (08:24 UTC).[13]

The approach and landing were normal from the air traffic control (ATC) point of view, with no emergency declared according to ATC recordings at the time.[10][14] The crew reported that they were going around, after which the tower instructed them to climb to 4,000 feet, which was acknowledged by the crew. Shortly after, the tower instructed the next flight to go around and alerted emergency services.[10] Wind shear and an ambient temperature of 48 °C (118 °F) were reported.[15] Eyewitness accounts suggested that the landing gear retracted during a failed go-around attempt.[10]

The incident occurred at 12:44 Gulf Standard Time (08:44 UTC). Footage was taken showing the aircraft skidding along runway 12L after striking the tarmac with its right wing.[16][15] All 300 passengers and crew were safely evacuated.[17] Reports were of a major fire and large amounts of black smoke on the runway. The airport was closed during and following the incident, which resulted in major diversions.[18]

Photographs of the aircraft on its belly[19] suggest the landing gear may have collapsed on landing or been up for the whole approach. It is unclear whether the landing gear was retracted during a go-around attempt. Passengers were told by the pilot moments before landing that there was a problem with the landing gear.[19] Before the aircraft finished skidding down the runway, the number 2 (starboard) engine detached.[20] Large explosions were observed flipping objects around during the post-evacuation fire. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the ensuing fire.[21] An explosion resulted in the death of a firefighter, a Ras al-Khaimah resident named Jasim Issa Mohammed Hasan.[19]

Passengers and crew
The aircraft had 282 passengers and 18 crew members.[22] The captain was a Dubai native and the first officer was Australian.[23] Passengers were criticized for giving priority to luggage instead of deplaning urgently.[24]

Investigation
The General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) is responsible for investigating civil aviation accidents in the United Arab Emirates. It has opened an investigation into the accident.[25] According to the GCAA, the investigation will take three to five months to complete and will be assisted by Emirates, Boeing and Rolls-Royce.[26] In addition, the NTSB have sent a five-person team to join the other investigators.[27] On 4 August 2016, the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered.[28][29]

Aftermath

A memorial poster in a fire station in Kerala of Jasim Issa Mohammed Hasan, the Emirati fire fighter who lost his life in the rescue efforts.
Following the accident, the airport was closed for 5½ hours; several flights were diverted to nearby airports such as Sharjah International Airport and Al Maktoum International Airport.[30] The closure led Emirates and Flydubai to cancel several of their flights,[31][32] and also affected 23,000 passengers at the airport.[33] Dubai International Airport resumed operations at 18:30 local time,[34][35] at restricted capacity, utilizing only one runway and maximizing the use of the runways at Al Maktoum International Airport.[33] Arrival flights were prioritized over departure flights.[36]

On 4 August 2016, Emirates and Dubai Airport announced that there would be flight disruptions for 48 hours, the airport being in recovery mode as an effort to handle backlogged flights affected by the accident.[36][37] Around 19,000 passengers were affected by the disruption when several inbound and departing flights were cancelled.[38] The second runway was repaired and reopened at 17:45 local time.[39] On 6 August 2016, the airport resumed normal operations, 72 hours after the accident.[40][41]

References
^ Jump up to: a b Dean, Jon (3 August 2016). "Emirates plane crash fire: Live updates after jet crash-lands at Dubai International Airport with 24 Brits on board". Mirror. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Burke, Louise (3 August 2016). "Dubai plane crash: Emirates expects network-wide delay after flight EK521 bursts into flames on crash-landing". Telegraph (UK). Retrieved 3 August 2016.
^ Jump up to: a b "Firefighter dies responding to Emirates plane fire at Dubai airport". The National (UAE). 3 August 2016. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Emirates (3 August 2016). "Emirates airline on Twitter" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ "Playback of Emirates flight EK521". Flightradar24. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Mitchell, Georgina (3 August 2016). "Smoke pours from plane after 'crash-landing' incident at Dubai Airport". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Emirates flight EK521 from Thiruvananthapuram crash lands at Dubai airport – Firstpost". 3 August 2016. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Emirates (3 August 2016). "Emirates airline on Twitter" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ "Emirates plane crash-lands at Dubai airport". BBC News. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
^ Jump up to: a b c d "Accident: Emirates B773 at Dubai on Aug 3rd 2016, touched down during go-around without gear, aircraft on fire". Aviation Herald. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Fire guts Emirates jet after hard landing; one firefighter dies". Reuters. 3 August 2016. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "mages Of The Emirates Plane That Burst Into Flames In Dubai". NDTV. NDTV Convergence Ltd. Retrieved 6 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Emirates 521 – 03-Aug-2016/ TRV – DXB". FlightAware. Retrieved 8 July 2013.
Jump up ^ "OMDB Towers, 3 Aug 2016 0830-0900Z". LiveATC.net. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
^ Jump up to: a b "A6-EMW Accident description". Aviation Safety Network. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Dubai airport fire: Emirates plane in flames on runway after 'crash landing'". Independent.
Jump up ^ DXBMediaOffice (3 August 2016). "All reported safe" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ FlightRadar24 (3 August 2016). "Dubai International Airport remains closed for takeoffs & landings after earlier #EK521 accident." (Tweet).
^ Jump up to: a b c "Alive! 300 passengers – including 24 Brits – escape when their Emirates jet crash-lands at Dubai airport after catching fire in the air and EXPLODING on landing". Daily Mail. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Flight_Report (3 August 2016). "Seconds after the crash, aircraft sliding on his belly with engine No. 2 detached" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ UAVPilot07 (3 August 2016). "Flight 521 explosion on DXB tarmac" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ "Emirates airliner with 300 on board crash-lands in Dubai ." Associated Press at the Los Angeles Times. 3 August 2016. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Australian co-pilot Jeremy Webb escaped Emirates plane crash in Dubai". News.com.au. 5 August 2016. Retrieved 6 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Bhattacharya, Sindhu (5 August 2016). "Emirates flight EK521 crash: Why passengers think about bags, not lives in emergency". Firstpost. Retrieved 6 August 2016.
Jump up ^ General Civil Aviation Authority [gcaa_uae] (3 August 2016). "(untitled)" (Tweet).
Jump up ^ Alexander Cornwell (4 August 2016). "Exclusive: Emirates EK521 investigation to take 3 to 5 months". Gulf News. Al Nasir Publishing. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Emirates jet tried to abort landing shortly before Dubai crash (VIDEO)". Malay Mail Online. Dubai. 6 August 2016. Retrieved 7 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Kelly Clarke (4 August 2016). "DXB facilities now 'fully operational', black box recovered". Khaleej Times. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Alexander Cornwell (4 August 2016). "Investigators recover EK521 recorders". Gulf News. Al Nasir Publishing. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Flight EK521: Landing gear issues not confirmed". Gulf News. Al Nasir Publishing. 4 August 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Sneha May Francis (3 August 2016). "Flydubai cancels all flights". Emirates 247. Dubai Media Incorporated. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ "Flight operations resume at Dubai airport". Khaleej Times. 3 August 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
^ Jump up to: a b "Dubai airport day 2: Flight cancellation and warning of delays". Gulf News. Al Nasir Publishing. 4 August 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Kelly Clarke and Nivriti Butalia (4 August 2016). "Emirates incident: Guess what costs $1 million a minute?". Khaleej Times. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Sneha May Francis; Bindu Rai (3 August 2016). "DXB departures, arrivals resume". Emirates 247. Dubai Media Incorporated. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
^ Jump up to: a b Nadeem Hanif (4 August 2016). "Flight disruptions expected at Dubai airport for 48 hours following crash landing". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Aarti Nagraj (4 August 2016). "Dubai airport on 'recovery mode' for next 48 hours". Gulf Business. Motivate Publishing. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Cleofe Maceda (4 August 2016). "19,000 passengers affected by EK521 accident". Gulf News. Al Nasir Publishing. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Shoshana Kedem (4 August 2016). "Dubai International Airport reopens runway after fire on Emirates flight". 7Days. Catchpole Communications FZ-LLC. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Alexander Cornwell. "Dubai International returns to full capacity after Emirates fire". Gulf News. AL Nasir Publishing. Retrieved 6 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Ismail Sebugwaawo (6 August 2016). "Dubai airport flights 'back to normal' after Emirates accident". 7Days. Catchpole Communications FZ-LLC. Retrieved 6 August 2016.

Saturday, July 23, 2016

Lukács v. Canadian Transportation Agency Federal Court of Appeal Decision copy

http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/145216/index.do?r=AAAAAQA4THVrw6FjcyB2LiBDYW5hZGlhbiBUcmFuc3BvcnRhdGlvbiBBZ2VuY3ksIDIwMTYgRkNBIDE3NCAB


Date: 20160609


Docket: 16-A-17
Citation: 2016 FCA 174

CORAM:
GAUTHIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.
GLEASON J.A.

BETWEEN:

GÁBOR LUKÁCS
Appellant

and

CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AND NEWLEAF TRAVEL COMPANY INC.
Respondents

Dealt with in writing without appearance of parties.

Order delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on June 9, 2016.

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:

GLEASON J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:
GAUTHIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.


Date: 20160609


Docket: 16-A-17
Citation: 2016 FCA 174

CORAM:
GAUTHIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.
GLEASON J.A.

BETWEEN:

GÁBOR LUKÁCS
Appellant

and

CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AND NEWLEAF TRAVEL COMPANY INC.
Respondents

REASONS FOR ORDER

GLEASON J.A.

[1]               The appellant, Dr. Gábor Lukács, is seeking leave to appeal Decision 100-A-2016 of the Canadian Transportation Agency, issued on March 29, 2016 [the Decision]. In the Decision, the Agency made two determinations. First, it decided that resellers of domestic air service are no longer required to hold licences under the Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 [the CTA], so long as they do not hold themselves out as an air carrier operating an air service. Second, in application of the foregoing, the Agency held that the respondent, Newleaf Travel Company Inc., was such a reseller and therefore not required to hold a licence. In so deciding, the Agency modified its previous interpretation of subsection 55(1) and paragraph 57(a) of the CTA that it had applied to several other domestic resellers of air services.
[2]               Dr. Lukács submits the Agency made an error of law as its changed interpretation of subsection 55(1) and paragraph 57(a) of the CTA is unreasonable. He also alleges that the Agency lacked jurisdiction to undertake the inquiry which led to the new interpretation of the licencing requirements applicable to resellers of domestic air services. The issues in the proposed appeal therefore raise questions that fall within the scope of section 41 of the CTA.
[3]               Newleaf does not contest this but rather says that Dr. Lukács lacks standing to commence this appeal as he was not a party to the proceeding before the Agency. It also asserts that Dr. Lukács has failed to raise an arguable case in respect of the issues that he has raised.
[4]               Contrary to what Newleaf asserts, the materials filed do raise an arguable case and Dr. Lukács does have standing to commence this appeal, either as a private or public interest applicant.
[5]               Dr. Lukács participated in the consultation before the Agency undertaken with respect to the change in the interpretation of the licencing requirements applicable to domestic resellers of air service, which is sufficient to afford him standing to launch this appeal.
[6]               Even if this were not the case, he would possess standing as a public interest litigant. The test for public interest standing involves consideration of three inter-related factors: first, whether there is a justiciable issue, second, whether the individual seeking standing has a genuine interest in the issue, and, third, whether the proposed proceeding is a reasonable and effective way to bring the matter before the courts: Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524 at paras. 36-37. As leave is being granted, this appeal raises a justiciable issue. It is undisputed that Dr. Lukács is an air passenger rights advocate, who has frequently brought applications to this Court in respect of Agency decisions, and therefore does have a genuine interest in the issues raised in this appeal. Finally, an appeal by someone like Dr. Lukács is an effective way for the issues raised in this appeal to be brought before the Court as Newleaf would not challenge the Decision rendered in its favour.
[7]               Thus, leave should be granted to Dr. Lukács to commence this appeal.
[8]               Dr. Lukács requests that this appeal be expedited and joined for hearing with an earlier judicial review application he commenced, challenging the jurisdiction of the Agency to embark upon the inquiry that led to the Decision (Federal Court of Appeal File A-39-16). The judicial review application in File A-39-16 is being conducted on an expedited basis. If the judicial review application is not rendered moot by this appeal, it makes sense that this appeal and the judicial review application be heard one immediately after the other by the same panel of this Court as there is considerable overlap between the files. It also is appropriate to expedite this appeal due both to the fact that the judicial review application is being expedited and to the nature of the issues raised in the appeal.
[9]               I would therefore order that the appeal be conducted on an expedited basis if Dr. Lukács files his Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the date of this Order. I would also order that if this matter is expedited, this appeal be heard immediately following the judicial review application in File A-39-16 if that application proceeds to hearing. The other issues raised by the parties regarding production of materials should be dealt with in a separate procedural Order issued concurrently with this Order.
[10]           While Dr. Lukács seeks his costs in respect of this motion for leave, it is more appropriate that they be in the cause.
"Mary J.L. Gleason"
J.A.
“I agree
Johanne Gauthier J.A."

“I agree
Wyman W. Webb J.A."

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD


DOCKET:
16-A-17

STYLE OF CAUSE:
GÁBOR LUKÁCS v. CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AND NEWLEAF TRAVEL COMPANY INC.

MOTION DEALT WITH IN WRITING WITHOUT APPEARANCE OF PARTIES

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:
GLEASON J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY:
GAUTHIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:

Dr. Gábor Lukács

FOR THE APPELLANT
(ON HIS OWN BEHALF)

Allan Matte

FOR THE RESPONDENT
CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

Brian J. Meronek
Ian S. McIvor
FOR THE RESPONDENT
NEWLEAF TRAVEL COMPANY INC.
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Legal Services Branch
Canadian Transportation Agency
Gatineau, Quebec

FOR THE RESPONDENT
CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

D’Arcy & Deacon LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Winnipeg, Manitoba

FOR THE RESPONDENT
NEWLEAF TRAVEL COMPANY INC.

Monday, June 27, 2016

NewLeaf Legality

source and  Lukács v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2016 FCA 174 (CanLII)Date: 2016-06-09Docket: 16-A-17Citation: Lukács v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2016 FCA 174 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/gs5q4>, retrieved on 2016-06-27

Legality of NewLeaf’s business is up in the air
In order to lawfully run an air service in Canada, one must get a licence from the Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA). NewLeaf does not hold any licence, but the CTA decided that NewLeaf can operate without one anyway.
On June 9, 2016, three judges of the Federal Court of Appeal ruled unanimously against NewLeaf and agreed to review whether NewLeaf needs a licence:

Friday, June 3, 2016

Sunday, May 1, 2016

Big CUPW Win in Court — 2011 Back-to-work Legislation Struck Down copy



Big CUPW Win in Court — 2011 Back-to-work Legislation Struck Down






Thursday April 28 2016


2015-2019/097


When back-to-work legislation cut off our collective bargaining in 2011, after the NDP filibuster in the House of Commons, after a frustrating round of bargaining with Canada Post Corporation, we knew our rights were being violated. We knew we were signing a collective agreement under duress, accepting conditions that we would have rejected if not threatened with such legislation.


As members, we all faced a difficult choice: ratify an agreement with diminished wages and working conditions, or submit to the Final Offer Selection arbitration process. This position was entirely created by the Harper government’s back-to-work legislation – free collective bargaining could not have brought us to such a moment.


So in October 2011 we filed a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenge with The Ontario Superior Court, claiming that the Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act violated our right to free expression. The decision was issued today: the court found that it did violate our rights, and was unconstitutional.


Sisters and brothers, we won – we are vindicated!


You can read the decision, attached. (Available in English only.)

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA Case name: R. v. Safarzadeh‑Markhali copy

Case name: R. v. Safarzadeh‑Markhali
Collection: Supreme Court Judgments
Date: 2016-04-15
Neutral citation: 2016 SCC 14
Case number: 36162
Judges: McLachlin, Beverley; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard; Gascon, Clément; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell
On appeal from: Ontario
Subjects: Constitutional law
Notes: SCC Case Information: 36162

 

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Citation: R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14
Appeal heard: November 4, 2015
Judgment rendered: April 15, 2016
Docket: 36162

Between:
Her Majesty the Queen
Appellant
and
Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Canada,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario),
John Howard Society of Canada,
West Coast Prison Justice Society and
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.
Interveners


Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and Brown JJ.

Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 74)
McLachlin C.J. (Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and Brown JJ. concurring)

Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.





r. v. safarzadeh‑markhali

Her Majesty The Queen                                                                                 Appellant

v.

Hamidreza Safarzadeh‑Markhali                                                              Respondent

and

Attorney General of Canada,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario),
John Howard Society of Canada,
West Coast Prison Justice Society and
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.                                                 Interveners

Indexed as: R. v. Safarzadeh‑Markhali

2016 SCC 14

File No.: 36162.

2015: November 4; 2016: April 15.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and Brown JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario

                    Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Fundamental justice — Overbreadth — Sentencing — Credit for pre‑sentence custody — Criminal Code denying enhanced credit in certain circumstances — Whether denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody to offenders who are denied bail primarily because of prior conviction is overbroad in violation of s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether infringement justifiable under s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 515(9.1), 719(3.1).

                    Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Fundamental justice — Sentencing — Whether proportionality in sentencing process a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

                    Sentencing courts have historically given enhanced credit for time spent in pre‑sentence custody, typically at a rate of two days for every day of detention. The Truth in Sentencing Act amended the Criminal Code to provide a general expectation of one day of credit for every day spent in pre‑sentence custody and, if the circumstances justify it, enhanced credit to a maximum of one and a half days. Pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Code, enhanced credit is not available if the person was denied bail primarily because of a prior conviction. M was arrested, charged with several offences and consented to his detention. At his bail hearing, the bail judge concluded that s. 515(9.1) required her to make an endorsement that M’s detention was warranted primarily because of M’s criminal record. The endorsement made M ineligible to receive enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody. The sentencing judge found the restrictions on enhanced credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Code unconstitutional. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed and concluded that the challenged portion of s. 719(3.1) is of no force and effect.

                    Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

                    The denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody to offenders who are denied bail primarily because of a prior conviction is overbroad because it catches people in ways that have nothing to do with the legislative purpose of s. 719(3.1) of the Code, which is to enhance public safety and security. Section 719(3.1) thus violates s. 7 of the Charter.

                    It is clear that s. 719(3.1) limits liberty. Its effect is to require offenders who come within its ambit to serve more time in prison than they would have otherwise. Laws that curtail liberty in a way that is overbroad do not conform to the principles of fundamental justice.

                    The first step in the overbreadth analysis is to ascertain the purpose of the challenged law. To determine a law’s purpose, courts look to statements of purpose in the legislation, if any; the text, context, and scheme of the legislation; and, extrinsic evidence such as legislative history and evolution. In presenting the Truth in Sentencing Act to Parliament, the Minister of Justice explained that denial of enhanced credit was aimed at promoting public safety and public confidence in the justice system, by imposing longer sentences on violent and repeat offenders and increasing their exposure to rehabilitative programming. Based on the text, context and scheme of the legislation, coupled with the Minister’s statements of purpose, the animating social value behind the denial of enhanced credit is enhancing public confidence in the justice system. The legislative purpose of the total denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody to offenders who are denied bail because of a prior conviction is to enhance public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic offenders’ access to rehabilitation programs. The means for achieving the legislative purpose is the challenged provision itself and the effect of the provision is to impose longer periods of custody on all persons who receive an endorsement under s. 515(9.1) of the Code.

                    It is a principle of fundamental justice that a law that deprives a person of life, liberty, or security of the person must not do so in a way that is overbroad. The law must not go further than reasonably necessary to achieve its legislative goals. The provision in issue captures people it was not intended to capture: offenders who do not pose a threat to public safety or security. Section 515(9.1) does not specify or even broadly identify the offences that warrant an endorsement and limited availability of judicial review means that persons wrongly tagged with an endorsement will be without recourse to have the error remedied.

                    The infringement of s. 7 of the Charter is not justified under s. 1. While the challenged provision is rationally connected to its purpose of enhancing public safety and security, it is neither minimally impairing nor proportionate. Alternative and more reasonable means of achieving its purposes were open to Parliament. The benefit to public safety by increasing access to rehabilitation programs is not trivial but the law’s overbreadth means that offenders who have neither committed violent offences nor present a risk to public safety will be unnecessarily deprived of liberty.

                    The Court of Appeal erred in holding that proportionality in the sentencing process is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. The principles and purposes for determining a fit sentence, enumerated in s. 718 of the Code and provisions that follow — including the fundamental principle of proportionality in s. 718.1 — do not have constitutional status. The constitutional dimension of proportionality in sentencing is the prohibition of grossly disproportionate sentences in s. 12 of the Charter. The standard imposed by s. 7 with respect to sentencing is the same as it is under s. 12.

Cases Cited

                    Applied: R. v. Moriarity, 2015 SCC 55, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 485; referred to: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433; R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167; R. v. Malmo‑Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 12.

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52.

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 515(9.1), 520(1), 521(1), 524(4), (8), 718, 718.1, 718.2(b), 719(3), (3.1).

Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29.

Authors Cited

Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol. 144, No. 41, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., April 20, 2009, pp. 2417‑18 and 2432.

Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Evidence, No. 20, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., May 6, 2009, pp. 11 and 15.

                    APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Rosenberg, Watt and Strathy JJ.A.), 2014 ONCA 627, 122 O.R. (3d) 97, 316 C.C.C. (3d) 87, 325 O.A.C. 17, 13 C.R. (7th) 30, 319 C.R.R. (2d) 36, [2014] O.J. No. 4194 (QL), 2014 CarswellOnt 12258 (WL Can.), affirming a sentencing decision of Block J., 2012 ONCJ 494, 265 C.R.R. (2d) 32, [2012] O.J. No. 3563 (QL), 2012 CarswellOnt 9292 (WL Can.). Appeal dismissed.

                    Roger A. Pinnock, for the appellant.

                    Jill R. Presser, Andrew Menchynski and Timothy J. Lutes, for the respondent.

                    Sharlene Telles‑Langdon and Kathryn Hucal, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

                    Nader R. Hasan and Justin Safayeni, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

                    Ingrid Grant, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario).

                    Andrew S. Faith and Jeffrey Haylock, for the intervener the John Howard Society of Canada.

                    Greg J. Allen and Kenneth K. Leung, for the intervener the West Coast Prison Justice Society.

                    Jonathan Rudin and Emily Hill, for the intervener the Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.



The judgment of the Court was delivered by

                    The Chief Justice —

I.              Introduction

[1]                              A person charged with a crime is held in custody pending trial unless released on bail. If found guilty at trial, an issue arises: In calculating the sentence, how much credit should the person receive for the time already spent in custody? A credit of one day for every day of pre-sentence custody will almost never put the person on equal footing with offenders released on bail, because the time spent in pre-sentence custody does not count for purposes of parole eligibility, earned remission and statutory release: R. v. Summers, 2014  SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at para. 26. A one-for-one credit, in other words, results in longer incarceration for offenders detained in pre-sentence custody than for offenders released on bail. On account of this discrepancy and the reality that pre-sentence custody is generally more onerous than post-sentence custody, sentencing courts have historically given “enhanced” credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody.

[2]                              Parliament revised this regime in 2009. It did not do away with enhanced credit, but it capped that credit at one and a half days for each day of pre-sentence custody. Parliament also — which brings us to the issue in this case — removed a sentencing court’s discretion to give any enhanced credit to offenders for pre-sentence custody, if they were denied bail primarily on the basis of their criminal record. The question is whether this law violates the right to liberty guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[3]                              For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the provision infringes s. 7 of the Charter, and is not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

II.           Background

[4]                              The respondent, Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali, was arrested and charged with several offences in November 2010. Because of the nature of some of the charges against him, Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali bore the burden of justifying his release on bail. At his bail hearing, he initially sought to show cause for his release, but later made clear that he consented to his detention. Notwithstanding this consent, the bail judge concluded that s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, required her to make an endorsement that Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali’s detention was warranted primarily because of his criminal record. Under s. 719(3.1) of the Code, this endorsement made Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali ineligible to receive enhanced credit for the pre-sentence custody that followed.

[5]                              The sentencing judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the removal of discretion to award enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) is unconstitutional. The Crown appeals.

[6]                              Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali has been deported to Iran. While the appeal is moot as to him, counsel agree that the issue of whether the relevant portion of s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code is constitutional is of importance throughout Canada, and that we should decide it.

III.        The Challenged Legislation

[7]                              The challenged legislation relates to the practice of granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

[8]                              Enhanced credit serves two purposes. First, it ensures that an offender detained in pre-sentence custody — which is not subject to parole and early release provisos — does not spend more time behind bars than an identically situated offender released on bail. Second, it compensates for factors such as overcrowding, inmate turnover, and labour disputes that make pre-sentence custody more onerous than post-sentence custody: Summers, at para. 28. For these reasons, sentencing courts have long followed a practice of granting offenders enhanced credit — typically at a rate of two-for-one, but occasionally higher or lower depending on an offender’s particular circumstances — for time in pre-sentence custody.

[9]                              Parliament sought to change this practice by enacting the Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29, which amended the Criminal Code to provide:  (1) a general expectation of one day of credit for every day spent in pre-sentence custody; (2) the possibility of enhanced credit, capped at one and a half days of credit for every day of pre-sentence custody, “if the circumstances justify it”; (3) a cap of one day (i.e., no enhanced credit) if the offender was denied bail primarily on the basis of a prior conviction as certified under s. 515(9.1), or if the offender’s bail was revoked under ss. 524(4) or (8) of the Code.

[10]                          These provisions are found in ss. 719(3) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code:

(3) In determining the sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence, a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence but the court shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum of one day for each day spent in custody.

(3.1) Despite subsection (3), if the circumstances justify it, the maximum is one and one-half days for each day spent in custody unless the reason for detaining the person in custody was stated in the record under subsection 515(9.1) or the person was detained in custody under subsection 524(4) or (8).

This appeal is concerned only with the underlined portion of s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

[11]                          The denial of enhanced credit in s. 719(3.1) relevant here is triggered by an endorsement made by a bail judge under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code:

(9.1) Despite subsection (9), if the justice orders that the accused be detained in custody primarily because of a previous conviction of the accused, the justice shall state that reason, in writing, in the record.

[12]                          No one disputes that a s. 515(9.1) endorsement is, in some circumstances, unreviewable. The review provisions of the Criminal Code, ss. 520(1) and 521(1), do not refer to endorsements under s. 515(9.1). In oral argument, the Crown took the position that if a reviewing judge vacates an accused’s detention order, the endorsement is also necessarily vacated. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not obvious that this is so. In any event, the Crown concedes that a s. 515(9.1) endorsement is unreviewable where the reviewing judge determines that an accused’s detention is justified, even if the reviewing judge believes that the bail judge erred in making the endorsement. Nor, it appears, would the sentencing judge have discretion to vacate an endorsement based, for example, on a clerical error, or on a conviction that was later reversed.

IV.        Judicial History

[13]                          At his bail hearing, Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali consented to detention pending trial and argued that the bail judge should therefore not make a s. 515(9.1) endorsement. The judge rejected this argument and concluded that an endorsement was required. This made Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali ineligible for enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

[14]                          Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali was tried on June 14 and 17, 2011, and convicted on July 28, 2011. His sentencing was initially scheduled for December 9, 2011, but on December 1, newly retained counsel learned of the endorsement, and brought an application asserting that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter.

[15]                          The sentencing judge, Block J., found the restrictions on enhanced credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional, and credited Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali with 31 months of pre-sentence custody based on a rate of one and a half for one, to be deducted from his sentence of six years (2012 ONCJ 494, 265 C.R.R. (2d) 32). He held that the purposes of the statute that added s. 719(3.1) to the Code, the Truth in Sentencing Act, are to repress manipulation of pre-sentence custody to achieve a lower sentence than would otherwise be served, and to provide transparency in this aspect of the sentencing process. He went on to hold that s. 719(3.1):  (1) problematically binds the discretion of the sentencing judge; (2) has a disproportionate effect on equally placed offenders; (3) creates arbitrariness because the deprivation of liberty effected has no rational connection to either of the statute’s stated aims; (4) leads to double-counting and double penalization; (5) improperly lowers the burden of proof for sentencing; and (6) has the oblique purpose of increasing sentences outside the sentencing process.

[16]                          The Court of Appeal (Rosenberg, Watt and Strathy JJ.A. (now Strathy C.J.O.)) agreed that the challenged portion of s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code is inconsistent with s. 7 of the Charter (2014 ONCA 627, 122 O.R. (3d) 97). While it is open to Parliament to set markers to guide judges in sentencing, Strathy J.A. concluded that restricting credit for time served to a one-for-one ratio in this manner infringes s. 7, because it deprives affected persons of liberty in a manner inconsistent with the principle of proportionality in sentencing. This principle, which Strathy J.A. identified as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, prevents Parliament from making sentencing contingent on factors unrelated to the determination of a fit sentence. The challenged provision offends that principle because it subjects identically placed offenders to periods of incarceration of varying lengths for irrelevant reasons. Increasing the custodial terms of repeat offenders may be an appropriate objective. Strathy J.A. found, however, that Parliament’s attempt to give effect to that objective through ss. 515(9.1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code misses the mark, and results in unfairness, discrimination, and unjust sentences.

[17]                          The Court of Appeal held that the breach of s. 7 is not justified as a reasonable measure under s. 1 of the Charter. It held that the objectives of the denial of enhanced credit — which, at this stage, Strathy J.A. articulated as preventing manipulation of credit for pre-sentence custody and enhancing public safety by increasing the likelihood that repeat offenders and those who breach their bail conditions will serve part of their sentence in post-sentence custody with access to rehabilitative programs unavailable in remand centres — are pressing and substantial. However, the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code is not rationally connected to these purposes, because it draws distinctions between offenders with criminal records on arbitrary grounds — whether they seek bail and whether, if denied bail, they receive an endorsement under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code. Nor does the provision minimally impair the right to liberty, since Parliament could have achieved its objectives through less intrusive measures. Finally, the benefit secured by the provision — keeping some offenders in jail longer and thus increasing their access to rehabilitative programs — is outweighed by the detriment flowing from an artificial distinction that undermines public confidence in the justice system. The court therefore dismissed the Crown’s appeal and concluded that the challenged portion of s. 719(3.1) is unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

V.           Analysis

[18]                          The central issue on this appeal is whether s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Charter. If it does, we must ask whether the limitation is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

[19]                          Section 7 of the Charter provides the following:

7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[20]                          It is clear that s. 719(3.1) limits liberty. Its effect is to require offenders who come within its ambit to serve more time in prison than they would have otherwise. The only issue under s. 7 is whether this deprivation of liberty comports with the principles of fundamental justice.

[21]                          The Court of Appeal based its analysis on the principle of proportionality in the sentencing process, which it found to be a principle of fundamental justice. The Crown argues that, while proportionality is an important principle of sentencing, it should not be treated as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7. I agree with the Crown. Proportionality in the sentencing process, as distinct from the well-accepted principle of gross disproportionality under s. 7, is not a principle of fundamental justice.

[22]                          However, I conclude that the portion of the Truth in Sentencing Act challenged in this appeal — the denial of any enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to persons to whom bail is denied primarily because of a prior conviction — violates s. 7 of the Charter for another reason: it is overbroad. Laws that curtail liberty in a way that is arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate do not conform to the principles of fundamental justice: Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 105. Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali contends that the challenged provision violates all three of these principles. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the challenged law is unconstitutionally overbroad, because its effect is to deprive some persons of liberty for reasons unrelated to its purpose. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to address whether the law is arbitrary or grossly disproportionate.

[23]                          The first step in the overbreadth analysis is to ascertain the purpose of the law. I turn to that now.

A.           The Purpose of Section 719(3.1)

[24]                          Whether a law is overbroad within the meaning of s. 7 turns on the relationship between the law’s purpose and its effect: R. v. Moriarity, 2015 SCC 55, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 485, at para. 24. It is critically important, therefore, to identify the purpose of the challenged law at the outset of the s. 7 inquiry.

[25]                          Moriarity summarizes the considerations that guide the task of properly characterizing Parliament’s purpose in a s. 7 analysis into overbreadth.

[26]                          First, the law’s purpose is distinct from the means used to achieve that purpose: Moriarity, at para. 27. A law’s means may be helpful in determining its objective, but the two must be treated separately.

[27]                          Second, the law’s purpose should be characterized at the appropriate level of generality, which “resides between the statement of an ‘animating social value’ — which is too general — and a narrow articulation” that amounts to a virtual repetition of the challenged provision, divorced from its context: Moriarity, at para. 28.

[28]                          Third, the statement of purpose should be both precise and succinct: Moriarity, at para. 29. Precision requires that courts focus on the purpose of the particular statutory provision subject to constitutional challenge: ibid.; see also RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 144.

[29]                          Fourth, the analysis is not concerned with the appropriateness of the legislative purpose. The court must take the legislative objective “at face value” and assume that it is appropriate and lawful: Moriarity, at para. 30. The appropriateness of a legislative objective may be relevant to its constitutionality under other Charter provisions. But it has no place in the s. 7 analysis of overbreadth.

[30]                          With these propositions in mind, I turn to the task at hand: to formulate a statement of purpose for s. 719(3.1)’s denial of enhanced credit to persons denied bail primarily because of a prior conviction.

[31]                          To determine a law’s purpose for a s. 7 overbreadth analysis, courts look to:  (1) statements of purpose in the legislation, if any; (2) the text, context, and scheme of the legislation; and (3) extrinsic evidence such as legislative history and evolution: Moriarity, at para. 31.

[32]                          The first source of purpose is statements of purpose in the legislation. The Truth in Sentencing Act does not contain explicit statements of legislative purpose. The title of the statute suggests that the evil to which it is directed is opaqueness in the sentencing process. Beyond this, however, the statute is silent as to its purposes. More to the point, it contains no explicit statement of the specific purpose of denying enhanced credit to offenders denied bail primarily on the basis of a prior conviction.

[33]                          I turn next to the text, context and scheme of the legislation. These provide the contextual matrix in which the challenged portion of s. 719(3.1)’s denial of enhanced credit is embedded.

[34]                          Part of the contextual matrix is this Court’s decision in Summers, which considered, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the one-and-a-half-for-one cap on enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody. The Court there said that the broad purposes of the legislative scheme were to enhance public confidence in the justice system and make the process of granting enhanced credit more transparent: Summers, at paras. 52-53. Summers suggests a broad over-arching purpose for the 1.5:1 limit on enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody — enhancing confidence in the justice system. This purpose is pitched at a high level of generality and underlies the other objectives of the scheme and the challenged provision. In the words of Moriarity, enhancing confidence in the justice system is more of an “animating social value” than a statement of purpose.

[35]                          Turning to the text of the provision, s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code requires a bail justice to make a written endorsement if the accused is detained “primarily because of a previous conviction”. The language in this section is very broad. A lengthy record is not necessary, nor is a particular type of conviction required. Any previous conviction could theoretically lead to an endorsement. Section 515(9.1) tells justices only that they must make the endorsement if detention is ordered “primarily” for this reason. In short, the breadth of the section does not provide much guidance in determining Parliament’s purpose, beyond indicating that Parliament intended to target accused persons with criminal records.

[36]                          This brings us to the third source of legislative purpose — extrinsic evidence of legislative history and evolution. We have little evidence of the legislative evolution of the challenged provision. However, we do have the statements of the Minister who introduced it. Statements of purpose in the legislative record may be rhetorical and imprecise. Yet providing information and explanations of proposed legislation is an important ministerial responsibility, and courts rightly look to it in determining the purpose of a challenged provision.

[37]                          In presenting the Truth in Sentencing Act to Parliament and the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the Minister of Justice explained that denial of enhanced credit was aimed at promoting public safety and public confidence in the justice system, by imposing longer sentences on violent and repeat offenders and increasing their exposure to rehabilitative programming. He said:

The practice of awarding generous credit erodes public confidence in the integrity of the justice system. It also undermines the commitment of the government to enhance the safety and security of Canadians by keeping violent or repeat offenders in custody for longer periods. [Emphasis added.]

(House of Commons Debates, vol. 144, No. 41, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., April 20, 2009 (“Debates”), at p. 2418)

The Minister’s reference to “violent or repeat offenders” suggests that the challenged provision is targeted at two groups: (1) dangerous persons, who have committed crimes of violence or threatened violence; and (2) chronic offenders, whether convicted of violent crimes or not.

[38]                          The Minister also linked longer periods in custody to rehabilitation:

As a result of [the challenged provision], a greater number of offenders would now serve a federal sentence of two or more years , and there will be an increased number of federal offenders spending in federal custody.

     This time [in] the federal system will present the opportunity for longer-term programming that may have a positive effect on the offender.  [Emphasis added.]

(Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, No. 20, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., May 6, 2009 (“Evidence”), at pp. 11-12)

[39]                          The Minister referred to other goals. One was the goal of adequate or fit punishment, in a retributive sense. On this, he said:

Not only does [enhanced credit] deprive offenders of the prison programs   that might help to keep them out of jail in the future, it also fails to punish them adequately for the deeds that led to their convictions in the first place. [Emphasis added.]

(Debates, at p. 2418)


[40]                          The Minister coupled the desire for adequate punishment with the idea that enhanced credit gives repeat offenders a “benefit” they do not deserve: “You shouldn’t get any benefit for being detained if there are legitimate reasons for you not to make bail” (Evidence, at p. 15). Although the Minister erred in characterizing enhanced credit as a “benefit” (see Summers, at paras. 23-27), it is clear that he wanted to ensure “adequate” periods of incarceration for repeat offenders — a “final sentence [that] reflects the seriousness of the crime”: Evidence, at p. 11.

[41]                          Do the Minister’s comments on achieving adequate sentences for repeat offenders reflect the central purpose of denying any enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to offenders denied bail because of a prior conviction? I think not. Those comments must be considered in context. The weight of the legislative record suggests that the challenged provision was geared towards promoting public safety and security, not retribution. Achieving adequate punishment is not, in the s. 7 analysis, a purpose of the challenged provision.

[42]                          Finally, the Minister referred to the goals of making the system more transparent and preventing offenders from manipulating the system: see e.g. Debates, at p. 2417. Once again, it is difficult to see these goals as the purpose of a total denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to persons denied bail primarily because of a prior conviction.

[43]                          The challenged provision — the denial of enhanced credit to repeat offenders who receive a s. 515(9.1) endorsement — is difficult to relate to a desire to make the system clearer or easier to understand. While requiring a bail judge to make a written notation that the primary basis for denying bail is a prior conviction may enhance transparency in the bail system, it cannot be said that the actual deprivation of liberty imposed by s. 719(3.1) seeks to further transparency.

[44]                          Similarly, the challenged provision, by its words and how it operates, is not directed at preventing offenders’ manipulation of the system. The Minister expressed concern that under the old system, offenders were prolonging pre-sentence custody to take advantage of enhanced credit that would shorten their total time in custody. While this goal is reflected in the one-and-a-half-for-one cap on enhanced credit, which removes the incentive to extend the period of pre-sentence custody, it is not related to the challenged provision.

[45]                          In summary, examined in the light of Moriarity, the text, context and scheme of the legislation, coupled with the Minister’s statements of purpose, lead me to the following conclusions.

[46]                          First, the animating social value behind the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) is enhancing public confidence in the justice system.

[47]                          Second, the legislative purpose of the total denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to offenders who are denied bail because of a prior conviction is to enhance public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic offenders’ access to rehabilitation programs. To be sure, the Minister referred to other legislative purposes — providing adequate punishment, increasing transparency in the pre-sentence credit system, and reducing manipulation. But these are peripheral, for the reasons discussed above.

[48]                          Third, the means for achieving the purpose of enhancing public safety and security is the challenged provision itself — the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to persons refused bail primarily on the basis of their existing criminal record.

[49]                          Finally, the effect of the provision is to impose longer periods of custody on all persons who receive an endorsement indicating they were denied bail primarily on the basis of a previous conviction.

B.            Is the Law Overbroad?

[50]                          It is a principle of fundamental justice that a law that deprives a person of life, liberty, or security of the person must not do so in a way that is overbroad. In other words, the law must not go further than reasonably necessary to achieve its legislative goals: Bedford, at para. 101.

[51]                          The Court explained the substance of the principle against overbreadth in Bedford, at paras. 112-13:

Overbreadth deals with a law that is so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose. In this sense, the law is arbitrary in part. At its core, overbreadth addresses the situation where there is no rational connection between the purposes of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts. . . .

Overbreadth allows courts to recognize that the law is rational in some cases, but that it overreaches in its effect in others. Despite this recognition of the scope of the law as a whole, the focus remains on the individual and whether the effect on the individual is rationally connected to the law’s purpose. For example, where a law is drawn broadly and targets some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose in order to make enforcement more practical, there is still no connection between the purpose of the law and its effect on the specific individual. Enforcement practicality may be a justification for an overbroad law, to be analyzed under s. 1 of the Charter. [Underlining added.]

[52]                          The denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to offenders who are denied bail primarily because of a prior conviction is overbroad because it catches people in ways that have nothing to do with enhancing public safety and security.

[53]                          First, the provision’s ambit captures people it was not intended to capture: offenders who do not pose a threat to public safety or security. Section 515(9.1) is broadly worded. It catches any person denied bail primarily for a criminal record, without specifying or even broadly identifying the nature or number of offences that would warrant a s. 515(9.1) endorsement. The section may therefore ensnare persons whose imprisonment does not advance the purpose of the law. For example, a person with two or three convictions for failing to appear in court might be subject to a s. 515(9.1) endorsement, even though he or she did not pose any real threat to public safety or security. And even if such a person receives greater access to rehabilitative programming and benefits from it, the consequence is not necessarily to improve public safety and security. In short, a s. 515(9.1) endorsement is an inexact proxy for the danger that an offender poses to public safety and security. The Crown says the law casts the net broadly because targeting all offenders with a criminal record is a more practical option than attempting to identify only offenders who pose a risk to public safety and security. But practicality is no answer to a charge of overbreadth under s. 7: Bedford, at para. 113.

[54]                          Second, regardless of the types of offenders the challenged provision was meant to capture, the provision suffers from overbreadth because, as the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) notes, the limited availability of judicial review means that persons wrongly tagged with an endorsement will be without recourse to have the error remedied. There is dispute about precisely when if ever review for an endorsement is available. But the Crown concedes that if the reviewing judge finds that the detention order was properly made, he or she is powerless to vacate an endorsement and that the sentencing judge has no choice under the challenged provision but to give effect to an endorsement in computing an offender’s sentence. This absence of review and discretion renders the challenged provision overbroad for at least two categories of individuals: (1) persons who erroneously received the endorsement because their detention is not warranted primarily because of their criminal record, and (2) persons who, during the period between the bail hearing and sentencing, successfully appeal the conviction that drew the endorsement. In both cases, the effect of the provision is to strip persons of liberty even though their detention does not obviously advance public safety and security.

[55]                          I conclude that the challenged provision seeks to advance the objective of enhancing public safety and security in a manner that is overbroad.

C.            Is the Infringement Justified Under Section 1 of the Charter?

[56]                          The Crown contends that if the challenged provision violates s. 7 of the Charter, the infringement is justified under s. 1. I cannot accept this submission.

[57]                          It is difficult, but not impossible, to justify a s. 7 violation under s. 1. Laws that deprive individuals of liberty contrary to a principle of fundamental justice are not easily upheld. However, a law may be saved under s. 1 if the state can point to public goods or competing social interests that are themselves protected by the Charter: Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 95. Courts may accord deference to legislatures under s. 1 for breaches of s. 7 where, for example, the law represents a “complex regulatory response” to a social problem: Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 37.

[58]                          An infringement of the Charter is justified under s. 1 where the law has a “pressing and substantial object and . . . the means chosen are proportional to that object”: Carter, at para. 94. A law is proportionate where the means adopted are rationally connected to the law’s objective, minimally impairing of the right in question, and the law’s salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects : R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

[59]                          The main objective of the challenged provision in this case is, as noted, enhancing public safety and security with longer and more rehabilitative sentences for violent and chronic offenders. This objective is pressing and substantial.

[60]                          The real issue is whether the means chosen here are proportionate to this objective. For reasons much the same as those discussed in the overbreadth analysis, I conclude that this has not been established.

[61]                          The challenged provision is rationally connected to its purpose of enhancing public safety and security. The denial of enhanced credit gives rise to longer periods of custody. It is therefore likely to increase the opportunities of some offenders to access rehabilitative programs.

[62]                          However, the law is neither minimally impairing nor proportionate in the balance it achieves between salutary and deleterious effects.

[63]                          To establish minimal impairment, the Crown must show the absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective in a “real and substantial manner”: Carter, at para. 102. The Crown has not discharged that burden. Alternative and more reasonable means of achieving its purposes were open to Parliament. Strathy J.A. provided one example — a law requiring the sentencing judge to consider whether to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody based on (i) the offender’s criminal record, (ii) the availability of rehabilitative programs and the desirability of giving the offender access to those programs, and (iii) whether the offender was responsible for prolonging his or her time in pre-sentence custody. Such a regime would achieve the goal of promoting public safety and security through rehabilitation, without catching chronic or other offenders who pose no risk to public safety.

[64]                          The Crown argues that the provision is reasonably tailored to its objective because it “applies to a relatively narrow class of offenders, focusing on the most serious recidivists”: A.F., at para. 62. But the law plainly does the opposite: it makes any person with a criminal record, even for missed court dates, a potential target for restriction of enhanced credit. In my view, the challenged provision is not minimally impairing of the right to liberty.

[65]                          Finally, I agree with Court of Appeal that the Crown has failed to establish benefits that outweigh the detrimental effect of the challenged provision on the right to liberty. The benefit to public safety by increasing access to rehabilitation programs is not trivial. But the law’s overbreadth means that offenders who have neither committed violent offences nor present a risk to public safety will be unnecessarily deprived of liberty. The Crown has failed to meet that high bar required to justify such a deprivation.

[66]                          I conclude that the challenged provision is not saved under s. 1.

D.           The Court of Appeal’s Reliance on Proportionality of Process

[67]                          The Court of Appeal held that proportionality in the sentencing process is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, and that the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) offends that principle. The court erred in doing so. Proportionality in the sentencing process is not a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

[68]                          The content of the principle the Court of Appeal recognized is not entirely clear. Strathy J.A. stated that the principle of proportionality already finds expression in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” He also noted that the principle of proportionality “is informed by other sentencing principles in the Code” (para. 77), including the parity principle, found at s. 718.2(b): “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”. These statements suggest that the Court of Appeal viewed proportionality in sentencing as a comparative concept, concerned with the relationship between the seriousness of the offence committed and the sentence imposed.

[69]                          At the same time, Strathy J.A. emphasized that proportionality is about the sentencing process, not its result. As he put it, proportionality in sentencing entitles an offender “to a process directed at crafting a just sentence” and “prevents Parliament from making sentencing contingent on factors unrelated to the determination of a fit sentence”: paras. 82 (emphasis in original) and 85. Proportionality in this sense is more concerned with what considerations properly belong in the sentencing process, and less with the magnitude of the sentence ultimately imposed.

[70]                          Proportionality in the sense articulated at s. 718.1 of the Code — that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of an offence and an offender’s degree of responsibility — is a fundamental principle of sentencing. As LeBel J. stated for a majority of the Court in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37, proportionality is “the sine qua non of a just sanction”. It is grounded in elemental notions of justice and fairness, and is indispensable to the public’s confidence in the justice system.  LeBel J. went so far as to opine that “proportionality in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter”:  para. 36 (emphasis added); see also R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at para. 21. LeBel J. also, however, recognized that the “constitutional dimension” of proportionality in sentencing is the prohibition of grossly disproportionate sentences in s. 12 of the Charter: para. 36.

[71]                          To say that proportionality is a fundamental principle of sentencing is not to say that proportionality in the sentencing process is a principle of fundamental justice for the purpose of determining whether a deprivation of liberty violates s. 7 of the Charter, notwithstanding the obiter comment of LeBel J. in Ipeelee. The principles and purposes for determining a fit sentence, enumerated in s. 718 of the Criminal Code and provisions that follow  — including the fundamental principle of proportionality in s. 718.1 — do not have constitutional status. Parliament is entitled to modify and abrogate them as it sees fit, subject only to s. 12 of the Charter. Parliament can limit a sentencing judge’s ability to impose a fit sentence, but it cannot require a sentencing judge to impose grossly disproportionate punishment. It follows, then, that the Court of Appeal erred in declaring proportionality in the sentencing process to be a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

[72]                           This conclusion accords with precedent. In R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 160, a majority of this Court squarely rejected the proposition that there is “a principle of fundamental justice embedded in s. 7 that would give rise to a constitutional remedy against a punishment that does not infringe s. 12”.  The standard imposed by s. 7 with respect to sentencing is the same as it is under s. 12: gross disproportionality.

[73]                          I see no reason to depart from that holding here. Proportionality, as expressed in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, is a foundational principle of sentencing. But the constitutional standard against which punishment is measured is and remains gross disproportionality. Proportionality in the sentencing process is not a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

VI.        Conclusion

[74]                          I would dismiss the Crown’s appeal. The challenged portion of s. 719(3.1) violates s. 7 of the Charter, and the Crown has not justified that infringement under s. 1. It is therefore declared to be of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.



                    Appeal dismissed.

                    Solicitor for the appellant: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.

                    Solicitors for the respondent: Presser Barristers, Toronto; Timothy J. Lutes, Toronto.

                    Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada: Attorney General of Canada, Winnipeg.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Stockwoods, Toronto.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario): Russel Silverstein & Associate, Toronto.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the John Howard Society of Canada: Polley Faith, Toronto.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the West Coast Prison Justice Society: Hunter Litigation Chambers, Vancouver.

                    Solicitor for the intervener the Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.: Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, Toronto.